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vForeword
The papers in the present Review are based on lectures given during the seventh 
University of Eastern Finland1 – UNEP Course on International Environmental 
Law-making and Diplomacy, which was held from 15 to 27 August 2010 at the 
Joensuu campus of the University of Eastern Finland. Previous courses have been 
held in Joensuu (2004, 2005, 2007), in South Africa (2006, 2008), and at the UNEP 
headquarters in Kenya (2009). The proceedings of those courses have been published 
in the previous Course Reviews.2
The aim of the Course is to convey key tools and experiences in the area of interna-
tional environmental law-making to present and future negotiators of multilateral 
environmental agreements and their further development and implementation. In 
addition, the Course serves as a forum for fostering cooperation between developed 
and developing country negotiators; and for taking stock of recent developments in 
the negotiation and implementation of multilateral environmental agreements and 
diplomatic practices in the field. The ultimate aim of the Course is to improve envi-
ronmental negotiation capacity and governance worldwide.
The Course is an annual event designed to enhance the negotiation skills of government 
officials who are, or will be, engaged in international environmental negotiations. In 
addition, other stakeholders such as representatives of non-governmental organizations 
and the private sector may apply and be selected to attend the Course. Researchers and 
academics in the field are also eligible. Altogether 32 participants from 23 countries, 
with a geographical and gender balance, participated in the seventh Course. 
We would like to express our gratitude to all of those who contributed to the suc-
cessful outcome of the seventh Course. It gives us great pleasure to recognize that the 
lectures and presentations given during the Course are now recorded in this Review. 
We are grateful that the authors were willing to take on an extra burden by transfer-
ring their presentations into article form; thereby making the Review such a useful 
resource. In addition, we would like to thank Ed Couzens and Tuula Honkonen for 
skilful and dedicated editing of the Review, and the members of the Editorial Board 
for providing guidance in the editing process.
Professor Perttu Vartiainen  Achim Steiner
Rector  Executive Director 
University of Eastern Finland United Nations Environment Programme
1 Please note that the University of Joensuu is now the University of Eastern Finland.
2 For electronic versions of the 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 Reviews see the University of 
Eastern Finland – UNEP Course on International Law-making and Diplomacy website at <http://www.
uef.fi/unep>.
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editorial preFace
The lectures given on the seventh annual University of Eastern Finland3 – United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) Course on Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, from which most of the papers in the present Review	originate, were 
delivered by experienced diplomats, government officials and members of academia.4 
One of the main purposes of the Course is to take advantage of the practical experi-
ences of experts working in the field of international environmental law-making and 
diplomacy – both to train the participants of each Course as well as to contribute to 
knowledge and research through publication in the present Review. As such, the 
papers in this Review	and the different approaches taken by the authors reflect the 
diverse professional backgrounds of the lecturers, resource persons and participants 
who submitted papers for the Review (some of whom are experienced diplomats in 
their own right). Overall, the Review	 represents various aspects of the broad and 
complex field of international environmental law-making and diplomacy.
The current Review	seeks to provide practical guidance, professional perspective and 
historical background to decision-makers, diplomats, negotiators, practitioners, re-
searchers and stakeholders working in the area of international environmental law-
making and diplomacy specifically related to environmental governance in respect 
of climate change. The Review	aims to elucidate different approaches, doctrines and 
techniques in the field, including international environmental compliance and en-
forcement, international environmental governance, international environmental 
law-making, environmental empowerment, and the enhancement of sustainable de-
velopment generally.
The first, second, fourth and seventh Courses were hosted by the University of East-
ern Finland, in Joensuu, Finland – an area in which forests and water provide abiding 
and dominant images, and in which dramatic seasonal changes provide an ever-
present reminder of how dominant an aspect of life climate can be. The special 
themes of the first two Courses were ‘Water’ and ‘Forests’. The third Course was 
hosted by the University of KwaZulu-Natal, on its Pietermaritzburg campus in Kwa-
Zulu-Natal, South Africa. KwaZulu-Natal is an extremely biodiversity-rich area, 
both in natural and cultural terms, and the chosen special theme was therefore ‘Bio-
diversity’. The fourth Course, which returned to Finland, had ‘Chemicals’ as its 
special theme. The chosen focus was appropriate considering the important role 
Finland has played in international chemicals management. The fifth course focused 
3 It is to be noted that the University of Joensuu merged with the University of Kuopio on 1 January 2010 
to constitute the University of Eastern Finland. Consequently, the University of Joensuu – UNEP Course 
on International Environmental Law-making and Diplomacy has been renamed the University of Eastern 
Finland – UNEP Course on Multilateral Environmental Agreements. The Course activities are concen-
trated on the Joensuu campus of the new university.
4 General information on the University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course on Multilateral Environmen-
tal Agreements is available at <http://www.uef.fi/unep>.
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on ‘Oceans’ as its special theme, and was again held in the coastal province of Kwa-
Zulu-Natal in South Africa, on the Pietermaritzburg campus of the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. The sixth Course was held in Nairobi and at Lake Naivasha in 
Kenya – with UNEP as the host, it was fitting to have ‘Environmental Governance’ 
as the special theme. The seventh Course, and thus this seventh volume of the Review,	
has ‘Climate Change’ as its special focus, or theme. Given the growing understanding 
of the importance of climate change as an issue-area in international environmental 
law and diplomacy, and given its cross-cutting nature, many of the issues raised in 
the first six Courses are, of course, relevant to the seventh.
The organizers of the Course, and the editorial board and editors of this Review, 
believe that the ultimate value of the Review	 lies in its making a contribution to 
knowledge and learning in the field of international environmental negotiation and 
diplomacy. The papers contained in the Review	are in most cases based on lectures 
given during the Course, but take their subject matters further as the authors explore 
their ideas. In particular, the Review	has been proud to receive ongoing contributions 
through the various editions – meaning that the same writer has contributed several 
papers – which has given these writers the opportunity to make wider contributions 
than would be possible with single contributions only. Many of the writers are per-
sons who have been involved in some of the most important environmental nego-
tiations in the past several decades. Publication of these contributions means that the 
experiences, insights and reflections of these environmental leaders are now recorded 
and disseminated, where they might not otherwise have been committed to print. 
The value of these contributions cannot be overstated. In addition, an ongoing fea-
ture of the Review has been the publication of papers by Course participants – these 
papers undergo the same editorial process as the other papers in the Review, which 
includes careful scrutiny by the editors, numerous iterations of drafts and approval 
for publication only after consideration by the Board.
The special theme of the 2010 Course was climate change, and consequently that 
is the special theme of this Review. The first convention to deal with climate 
change as a whole, rather than with particular polluting substances or forms of 
harm, was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC),5 1992 – allied with its Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFC-
CC of 1997.6 The UNFCCC has near universal membership with 195 parties; the 
Kyoto Protocol has 193 parties.7 The UNFCCC divides its Parties into three es-
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
7 See ‘Status of Ratification of the Convention’, available at <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/con-
vention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php> and ‘Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol’, avail-
able at <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php> (both visited 14 Octo-
ber 2011).
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sential groupings: ‘Annex I’ parties;8 ‘Annex II’ parties;9 and ‘Non-Annex I’ par-
ties.10 
While binding, as a convention in force, the UNFCCC provides a framework for 
governance and does not provide for specific emissions targets; and it was always 
intended that binding commitments to lessening those emissions considered poten-
tially damaging would be provided for in a Protocol. The UNFCCC is, of course, 
binding on all Parties which have ratified or adhered to it. In addition, even states 
which have signed but not ratified are probably bound not to commit any acts which 
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty (see Art. 1811 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,12 which strongly arguably now reflects inter-
national customary law also). However, and herein lies the rub, the commitments to 
which states have bound themselves are weak. This is a common problem with mul-
tilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), in that Parties bind themselves firmly, 
but what they bind themselves to tends to be more in the nature of ‘guidelines’ or 
‘statements of intent’. How, for instance, can anybody point a finger at, and accuse 
of non-compliance, a state which has firmly bound itself only to ‘endeavour to’?
There is a strong argument to be made that this is the best way in which to proceed 
toward the eventual establishment of binding international rules – by starting on the 
broad and non-binding scale and gradually working, through experience and trial 
and error, toward the specific and binding. Even the operation of the Kyoto Protocol 
itself, while providing legally binding emissions13 reduction targets for Annex I coun-
tries (in fact, for 37 industrialized countries and the European Community) to meet, 
has been further refined. Detailed rules for the operation of the Kyoto Protocol were 
8 These are the industrialized countries which were, in 1992, members of the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development), together with countries with ‘economies in transition’ (or 
‘EIT Parties’) including the Baltic States, several Central and Eastern European States, and the Russian 
Federation. See UNFCCC, ‘Parties and Observers’ at <http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/
items/2704.php> (visited 4 October 2011).
9 These are the parties who are the OECD members of Annex I, excluding the EIT Parties. See ibid.
10 These are parties, mostly developing countries, which are for various reasons recognized as being espe-
cially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change (be these impacts physical or economic), such 
as countries with low-lying coastal areas or which are prone to desertification and drought; or countries 
which rely heavily fossil fuel production. Of these parties, 49 are classified by the United Nations as being 
‘least developed countries’ (LDCs) and together form an important sub-group. See ibid.
11 Art. 18 provides that states have an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its 
entry into force. The wording is that:
[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: 
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratifica-
tion, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party 
to the treaty; or 
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the 
treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 22 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155 
United	Nations	Treaty	Series 331.
13 Of so-called ‘greenhouse gases’.
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adopted at the seventh Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2001, and are known as 
the ‘Marrakesh Accords’.14
As well as providing emissions reduction targets, the Kyoto Protocol establishes a 
number of ‘mechanisms’ which can be used by its parties in meeting the targets. 
These mechanisms can be described as clean development mechanisms (CDM); an 
emissions trading system; and joint implementation of emissions-reduction pro-
grammes. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005, and provides 
essentially for reductions of an average of five per cent against 1990 levels, over the 
five year period 2008 to 2012. This period, the first commitment period, is due to 
expire at the end of 2012.
The Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol meet an-
nually on parallel tracks – obviously, most of the delegates to one will also be dele-
gates to the other. At time of writing of this Editorial Preface, for instance, the next 
COP will be that in Durban, South Africa at the end of 2011 – this will see, com-
bined, the 17th COP to the UNFCCC and the 7th Conference of the Parties serving 
as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).15 
Realizing, by 2007, that there was a danger that the first commitment period under 
the Kyoto Protocol might expire without agreement having been reached on either 
a second commitment period or a replacement agreement, the parties decided – at 
the 13th CoP of the UNFCCC (3rd CMP of the Kyoto Protocol), held in Bali – on 
a two-year process to conclude negotiations by the 15th CoP, at the end of 2009. 
This two-year process was named the ‘Bali Action Plan’.16 The intention of the Bali 
Action Plan was that agreement would be reached in respect of four main commit-
ment areas – these being adaptation (including agreement on appropriate measures 
to be supported), financing (including funding provision for developing countries), 
mitigation (including commitments to reduction targets) and technology (including 
technology transfer).
At the intended conclusion of the two-year period, at the 15th COP (5th CMP of 
the Kyoto Protocol) which was held in Copenhagen, the parties proved, however, 
unable to agree on the way forward. This meeting was considered by many observers 
to represent a failure on the part of the negotiators to meet their ‘obligations’ toward 
14 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventh session, held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 
November 2001. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume I, UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2001).
15 As various other bodies have been formed, this meeting will also see the 35th session of the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation (SBI); the 35th session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA); the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP); and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under 
the Convention (AWG-LCA). See UNFCCC, ‘Meetings: Durban Climate Change Conference – Novem-
ber 2011’, available at <http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_17/items/6070.php> (visited 14 October 2011). 
16 Decision 1/CP.13 ‘Bali Action Plan’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 13th sess., UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (2008), Appendum.
x‘humanity’ and ‘the planet’. The 15th COP was, however, not a complete failure and 
some progress was made, especially in that a document known as the ‘Copenhagen 
Accord’17 was adopted. The word ‘adopted’ requires clarification, in that the Accord 
was not adopted formally but was, instead, ‘noted’ by both the COP and the CMP. 
The Accord therefore provided a statement of will, rather than a formal commitment, 
but did include a number of significant references to future commitments, including 
on the major goal of long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, as well as on 
elements such as reduced emissions, reduced deforestation, and climate-related fi-
nancing to assist developing countries. At the time of writing, 141 states had indi-
cated their intention to be listed as parties which have agreed to the Accord.18 
Much had been expected of the 15th COP, and by comparison very little was ex-
pected of the 16th COP (6th CMP of the Kyoto Protocol). However, strongly argu-
ably, more was achieved than had been anticipated. The 15th COP was held in 
Cancún at the end of 2010, and a set of documents known as the ‘Cancún Agree-
ments’19 was formally adopted. The Agreements include the establishment of innova-
tions such as an ‘Adaptation Framework’, an ‘Adaptation Committee’, ‘nationally 
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions’ by both developed and developing 
countries, and a ‘Green Climate Fund’. The Cancun Agreements also deal with as-
pects such as capacity-building; technology development and transfer; the econom-
ic and social consequences of actions taken; market approaches; and deforestation. 
Importantly, there is a general affirmation of the goal of limiting global warming to 
a high of 2 degrees Celsius above agreed pre-industrial levels; and agreement even to 
consider a 1.5 degree limit.20 
This will hopefully provide a solid platform for the next, crucial, meeting – the 17th 
COP (7th CMP of the Kyoto Protocol) to be held in Durban at the end of 2011. 
This meeting will provide the last opportunity, before its expiry, to negotiate a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, or a successor agreement. As in the 
run up to the 16th COP, not a great deal is expected of the 17th COP. Nevertheless, 
after the final set of formal preparatory negotiations for the 17th COP concluded in 
Panama City in October 2011, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Christiana 
Figueres, declared that ‘good progress’ had been made. Figueres declared that ‘Dur-
ban will have to resolve the open question over the future of the Kyoto Protocol and 
17 Decision 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th sess., UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), Addendum.
18 See UNFCCC, ‘Copenhagen Accord’, available at <http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_ac-
cord/items/5262.php> (visited 14 October 2011). 
19 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Coopera-
tive Action under the Convention’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, 
held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011).
20 See UNFCCC, ‘The Cancun Agreements: An assessment by the Executive Secretary of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change’ available at <http://cancun.unfccc.int/> or ClimateFocus.
com, ‘CP16/CMP6:Cancun Agreements: Summary and Analysis’, available at <http://www.climatefocus.
com/documents/cp16cmp6_cancun_agreements> (both visited 12 October 2011). 
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what that means for a future global climate agreement’; but that while ‘[g]overn-
ments retain different positions, … many technical issues related to this have already 
been brought to conclusion and there is a strong desire from all sides to see a final 
political decision made’.21 
This sense of optimism bodes well for the future, but it remains to be seen whether 
any significant steps will be taken at the 17th COP. Arguably, it is not a bad thing 
that greater care and more time are taken about setting up new institutional struc-
tures, despite the urgency of responding to the problems posed by climate change 
– given the importance of the issue-area, it is essential that the architecture be as 
inclusive of different viewpoints, and as broadly representative, as possible. The cross-
cutting nature of the climate change issue-area, the wide range of different eco-
nomic, environmental and social aspects affected by climate change, and the impor-
tance of creating effective structures, make it imperative that responses be chosen as 
wisely as possible. 
In the meantime, while global responses are being negotiated, it is important that 
mitigation and adaptation measures continue to be taken, and that research contin-
ues to increase our understanding of all aspects of climate change – diplomatic, 
economic, legal, scientific, social and related. One aspect which must not be over-
looked, but which too frequently is, is that there are many reasons to take measures 
in respect both of mitigation of climate change and adaptation thereto. These reasons 
include that mitigation and adaptation measures have, almost necessarily, positive 
effects in respect of improving awareness and understanding, increasing the protec-
tion of biological diversity, and reducing pollution. It is the hope of the editors, the 
editorial board, and all involved with this Review that its publication will contribute 
to the body of research in the area of climate change and, indeed, to the development 
of international environmental law and diplomacy generally.
The present Review	is divided into five Parts. Part I contains papers which address 
general issues relating to international environmental law-making and climate 
change. The first paper in the 2010 Review, by Mikko Alestalo, lays the foundation 
for the papers on law-making and diplomacy by presenting the scientific evidence 
for human-induced climate change. 
The second paper, by Daniel Bodansky, explains generally how international envi-
ronmental law came into existence, has evolved through several definable stages, and 
has reached its present stage of development. Professor Bodansky delivered the key-
note lecture on the 2010 Course.
21 See UNFCCC, ‘Press Release: Panama climate talks mean governments can push ahead strongly in Dur-
ban with concrete help for developing world to deal with climate change’, 7 October 2011, available at 
<http://unfccc.int/files/press/press_releases_advisories/application/pdf/pr20111007awg_panama_clos-
ing_eng.pdf> (visited 12 October 2011).
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Part II contains papers which deal with various aspects of the international climate 
change regime and papers on particular issues of relevance to law-making in the 
climate change field. The first of these papers, by Kati Kulovesi, considers the impor-
tance of the access which international negotiators have to relevant information – 
particularly when they are actually involved in negotiations and may face difficulties 
related to delegation size and available resources. As what amounts to a case study, 
the paper describes an information resource which appears to have a very useful role 
to play in informing negotiators.
The second paper in Part II of the 2010 Review, by Tuomas Kuokkanen, provides an 
overview of the international legal regime in respect of climate change. The paper 
explores the ways in which different perspectives, within the climate change-related 
legal regime, operate in both contrasting and mutually supportive ways. 
The third paper, by Harri Laurikka and Anna-Pia Schreyögg (who was involved in 
2010 both as a course participant and as a lecturer), describes the carbon trading 
market created under the international climate change regime. The paper considers 
successes and failures of the carbon market to date, and draws conclusions as to how 
the market might be strengthened in the future.
One of the most important aspects of an international legal regime, in fact often the 
issue which ‘makes or breaks’ the regime, is that of compliance. As the success or 
failure of the climate change regime will depend, in large part, on contracting parties 
meeting at home the commitments they have made on the international stage, com-
pliance is of particular importance. In the fourth paper in Part II, Sebastian Oberthür 
and René Lefeber explain, and examine the strengths and weaknesses of, the compli-
ance system developed within the climate change regime. 
The fifth paper in Part II, by Maria Pohjanpalo, considers the role of the United Na-
tions headquarters within the climate change-related law-making process. The paper 
shows that there are different levels within the United Nations structures which deal 
with climate change-related issues, and that an understanding of these provides use-
ful understanding of the coordinating and convening roles which the UN plays.
The sixth and final paper in Part II, by Mark Radka, deals with technology transfer. 
After reviewing the development of the concept; the paper explains how the concept 
can be used to enhance measures to combat climate change. 
Part III contains papers which address regional and national legal regimes, related of 
course to climate change. How countries incorporate their international obligations 
into their national law is, obviously, of crucial importance to the success or failure of 
the international initiatives. In the first paper in this Part, course participant Lisa 
Benjamin considers a regional block of states – the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) – and examines how these states have sought to position themselves within 
xiii
the international network of states contributing to the climate change-related legal 
framework. 
The role of countries which are both developing countries but significant carbon 
emitters is particularly interesting in understanding climate change-related negotia-
tions, providing as they do an important link between rich and poor interests. The 
second and third papers in Part III provide case studies of South Africa and Brazil. 
The paper by Michael Kidd gives an overview of South Africa’s position relating to 
climate change emissions, and canvasses the history of the country’s legislative efforts 
in the area. With South Africa due to host the 2011 Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and with the host 
country often being well-placed to influence international negotiations, this paper 
provides an analysis of South Africa’s position which ought to assist with understand-
ing the role which the country might play. 
The third and final paper in Part III, by course participant Natascha Trennepohl, 
canvasses Brazil’s national policy on climate change; and then Brazil’s involvement 
in the international carbon market. While South Africa has not been a major player 
in the carbon market, Brazil has – comparing the two papers in this Part should il-
luminate two different approaches which can be taken to national policy in the area 
of climate change.
Part IV concerns particular issue-areas relevant to climate change. In the first paper, 
Ed Couzens canvasses various problems faced by marine environments generally, 
many of which problems are either caused by or exacerbated by climate change. In 
the absence of a dedicated global convention dealing with marine protection, the 
paper considers how it might be possible to work toward protection of the oceans 
and coastal areas from the effects of climate change using existing provisions in 
various conventions.
In the second paper, Niklas Hagelberg considers the important contribution which 
forests make, and that which they may potentially make, to realizing the goals of 
sustainable development. The paper explains the REDD+ programme (which stands 
for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhance-
ment of Forest Carbon Stocks), describes how this programme developed, and con-
siders the role which the programme might play in the future as a catalyst for change. 
Suggestions are made as to how this role might be enhanced. 
The third paper in Part IV, by Aline Kühl and Elizabeth Maruma Mrema examines 
how migratory species are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and how mul-
tilateral environmental instruments on climate change, on one hand, and on migra-
tory species, on the other hand, could help the situation. The authors conclude that 
while more scientific research is needed on the complex issue, the parties to multi-
lateral environmental agreements should make every effort to ensure that the right 
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governance structures are in place to allow migratory species to adapt to and survive 
in changing climatic conditions. Greater synergies among MEAs and between the 
biodiversity-related MEAs and UNFCCC are essential.
The fourth paper in Part IV, by Leila Suvantola, considers some of the different ways 
in which value can be placed on aspects of the natural environment – particularly 
through an understanding of the concept of ‘ecosystem services’. The paper then 
explores ways in which the concept can be used to improve efforts to deal with the 
effects of climate change.
Part V of the Review	reflects the interactive nature of the Course. During the Course 
negotiation simulation exercises were organized to introduce the participants to the 
real-life challenges facing negotiators of international environmental agreements. In 
the main simulation exercise, participants were given individual instructions and a 
hypothetical, sometimes country-specific, negotiating mandate and were guided by 
international environmental negotiators. Excerpts from, and explanations of, the 
exercise are included in Part V.
The 2009 simulation exercise was devised and run by Marko Berglund and Kati 
Kulovesi. The exercise was focused on some key procedural and substantive issues 
related to ongoing negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change on enhancing international climate change cooperation. The 
scenario ‘placed’ participants at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Cancún, Mexico and the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN-
FCCC (COP 16). In advance of the real COP 16, the simulation exercise gave 
Course participants a realistic flavour of how negotiations at COP 16 might have 
advanced.
While the majority of the papers in the present Review	deal with specific environ-
mental issues, or aspects of specific multilateral environmental agreements, the 
negotiation exercises provide, in a sense, the core of each Course. This is because 
each Course contains at least one, sometimes two, major practical negotiation 
exercise which the participants undertake; and it is both intended and suggested 
that the papers explaining the exercises provide insights into the international law-
making process. The inclusion of the simulation exercises has been a feature of 
every Review	published to date, and the editorial board, editors and course organ-
izers believe that the collection of these exercises (which now spans seven years, 
and is moving into its eighth) has significant potential value as a teaching tool for 
the reader or student seeking to understand international environmental negotia-
tions. It does need to be understood, of course, that not all of the material used in 
each negotiation exercise is distributed in the Review. This is indeed a downside, 
but the material is often so large in volume that it cannot be reproduced in the 
Review.
xv
Generally, it is the hope of the editors that the papers in the present Review	will not 
be considered in isolation. Rather, it is suggested that the reader should make use of 
all of the Reviews	(spanning the years 2004 to 2009, with more to come), all of which 
are easily accessible on the internet through a website provided by the University of 
Eastern Finland,22 to gain a broad understanding of international environmental 
law-making and diplomacy.
To give examples of this, in the 2009 Review, under the theme of ‘Governance’ there 
is a paper by Daniel Schramm and Carl Bruch which considers the specific environ-
mental issue of climate change. Recognizing climate change as a ‘crosscutting, mul-
ti-sector stressor that implicates a wide range of legal frameworks’, the paper shows 
how difficult it is to create an effective governance regime to deal with so wide an 
issue; but goes on to explain, however, that such development is essential as it is 
becoming apparent that existing ‘old order’ governance structures are not equipped 
to deal with the wide nature of the climate change issue area. The 2007 Review was 
devoted to the theme of ‘Chemicals’ and many of the papers in that volume are 
relevant to climate change-related law-making, such as the paper by Tammy de 
Wright on the Montreal Protocol compliance mechanisms, using Russia’s non-com-
pliance as a case study.
These are merely two papers of many. Inclusive of the present volume, in the first 
seven volumes of the Review (spanning the years 2004 to 2010 of the Course from 
which the papers in each Review emanate) 99 authors have contributed to 117 pa-
pers. Work is already underway on the 2011 Review, to be published in 2012, which 
it is anticipated will add approximately 15 papers to this total – under the theme of 
‘synergies amongst the biodiversity-related conventions’. 
Ed Couzens23 Tuula Honkonen24
22 See <http://www.uef.fi/unep/publications-and-materials>.
23 BA Hons LLB (Wits) LLM Environmental Law (Natal & Nottingham) Ph.D. (KwaZulu-Natal); Attor-
ney, RSA; Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. Email: 
couzense@ukzn.ac.za or couzens.ed@gmail.com.
24 LLM (London School of Economics and Political Science) DSc.Environmental Law (University of Joen-
suu). Email: tuula.h.honkonen@gmail.com.
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3man-made climate change: the 
ScientiFic BaSiS and the main 
implicationS1
Mikko	Alestalo2
1 The scientific basis of human-induced climate change
The natural existence of the so-called ‘greenhouse gases’3 in the atmosphere keeps the 
surface of the earth warmer by roughly 30°C than it would otherwise be. The bio-
sphere on earth necessary for life has, over the course of geological time scales, ad-
justed to the prevailing specific conditions. Adding greenhouse gases into the atmos-
phere causes extra warming, which – if rapid and large – may be hazardous to the 
life and economy of nature and humankind. 
Available scientific evidence shows that humankind has, by burning fossil fuels4 and 
by changing land use,5 caused a marked increase of greenhouse gas concentrations, 
the impact of which is very likely already seen in the atmosphere, the oceans and the 
cryosphere.6 The level of carbon dioxide7 – the most effective of the green house 
1 The main references used for this paper are the following: S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, 
M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds), Climate	Change	2007:	The	Physical	Science	
Basis.	Contribution	of	Working	Group	I	to	the	Fourth	Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	
Climate	Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007), available at <http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-
wg1.htm>; and The Royal Society, Climate change: A Summary of the Science (The Royal Society, 2010), 
available at <http://royalsociety.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=4294972963> (both visited 24 
November 2010).
2 Director, Ph.D in Meteorology, Finnish Meteorological Institute; e-mail: mikko.alestalo@fmi.fi.
3 Gases which absorb part of the terrestrial radiation so as to prevent it from escaping to the space, and 
return it back to the surface, thus having a warming effect on the surface – akin to the effect on growing 
plants kept in a glass greenhouse.
4 For instance, coal, natural gas and oil for energy production.
5 For instance, deforestation.
6 The areas of earth (such as Antarctica and the northern polar regions) where, due to the cold temperatures, 
water is generally found as ice – ‘cryo’ meaning ‘icy cold’ (Collins English Dictionary (3rd ed., 1991) at 
383).
7 A colourless, odourless, incombustible gas formed during respiration (formula: CO2) (Ibid. at 242).
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gases – concentration currently already exceeds the pre-industrial level by about 40 
per cent. The present-day levels are actually higher than at least for several hundreds 
of thousands of years. 
Similar development is true for other greenhouse gases such as methane8 or nitrous 
oxide9 which mainly originate from agriculture and industry. There also are other 
greenhouse gases: so called halocarbons (chlorofluorocarbons; hydrochlorofluorocar-
bons; hydrofluorocarbons;) and ozone – and even compounds, like perfluorocarbons 
and sulphur hexafluoride. The net warming effect of these other greenhouse gases is 
presently less, but comparable to that of the carbon dioxide alone. However, towards 
the end of the 21st century, the role of carbon dioxide will clearly dominate as its 
atmospheric concentrations obviously increase more rapidly than those of the other 
gases. Thus, it is important to concentrate most of the interest on this gas. 
If the present rate of increase in greenhouse gas concentrations continues, the result 
(according to the several plausible scenarios10) will be an about 3°C global warming 
by 2100. Even a higher degree of warming cannot be ruled out, noting the ‘business-
as-usual’ approach to global development of energy production based on fossil fuels 
and of land degradation, especially through deforestation in tropical forests. The 
elevated concentrations of carbon dioxide will remain in the atmosphere for thou-
sands of years even if we were to stop the releases immediately. This is because the 
natural sinks of atmospheric carbon dioxide (the biosphere and ultimately the oceans) 
would remove the extra carbon dioxide only very slowly.
The net warming is a result of not only the elevated greenhouse gas concentrations but 
also of certain feedback11 phenomena. Positive feedbacks dominate, meaning that they 
enhance the warming effect. A warmer atmosphere can contain more water vapour,12 
which also has a greenhouse gas-like effect (but which is not affected directly by hu-
mankind). In a warmer world, especially in the northern high latitudes, less terrain will 
be covered by ice and snow. Surfaces free of ice and snow increase the absorption of 
radiation from the sun due to the diminishing reflection of radiative energy back to 
space, and eventually cause further warming of the atmosphere and ocean.
In the land-ocean-atmosphere system, the oceans take most (over 80 per cent) of the 
extra heat, some goes to melting the glaciers and only a very small portion remains 
to warm the atmosphere. The oceans thus act as a buffer against the warming. How-
8 A colourless, odourless, flammable gas, the simplest alkane and the main constituent of natural gas (for-
mula: CH4) (Ibid. at 383).
9 A colourless, nonflammable, slightly soluble gas with a sweet smell (formula: N2O) (Ibid. at 1058).
10 See IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (IPCC, 2000), available at <http://www.gcrio.org/OnL-
nDoc/pdf/sres_spm.pdf> (visited 22 February 2011).
11 Phenomena or forces that increase the rate, or the extremes, of climate change are considered ‘positive 
feedback phenomena’, while those that slow the rate of climate change are known as ‘negative feedback 
phenomena’. 
12 Water vapour is water in the atmosphere in gaseous invisible form as a result of evapotranspiration from 
water surfaces or from vegetation. 
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ever, due to the enormous heat capacity of the oceans compared to that of air, the 
increase in temperature units in the oceans is much less than in the atmosphere, i.e. 
tenths of a Celsius degree versus full degrees.
Besides altering the greenhouse gas concentrations, humankind has changed the 
atmosphere in a further way relevant for the climate change. While burning fossil 
and bio-fuels for energy production, artificial aerosol,13 i.e. fine particles, are gener-
ated that spread into the atmosphere. A major constituent of this aerosol is sulphur 
dioxide (SO2). The effect of the atmospheric aerosol is to reflect sun radiation back 
to space, thus leading to a cooling effect. The extra aerosol has a secondary cooling 
effect via increased cloudiness. This is due to the increased number of cloud droplets 
as the fine particles act as condensation nuclei for water vapor. As the net effect of 
cloudiness is a cooling one, due to the reflection of the sun radiation, this enhances 
the cooling effect of man-made aerosol.
Taken together, the overall effect of human-generated warming by greenhouse gases 
and man-made cooling by aerosol remains a warming one. Presently, the latter effect 
cancels out only roughly 40 per cent of the warming effect of the former. The resi-
dence time of the aerosol in the atmosphere is short, of the order of days to weeks, 
so that in the long-term its relative impact on the global mean temperature is to 
diminish, if the greenhouse gas concentrations continue their growth.14 The uncer-
tainties connected with the aerosol and cloud effects are, however, perhaps the larg-
est in estimating the future climate, and require more research.
2 The potential impacts of climate change
Observed global warming from the pre-industrial era to the present day is about 
0.8°C, which is evident via direct temperature measurements that are gradually avail-
able since roughly 1850. Part of this can be explained by natural processes (for in-
stance, increased solar radiation), but closer to the present time human-generated 
warming clearly dominates. Simultaneously, the world’s oceans have become warm-
er and at the same time more acid; mountain glaciers have retreated; and overall sea 
levels have risen. The minimum coverage of the Arctic sea ice in summertime has 
diminished faster than most climate models have been able to indicate, as evident by 
the satellite data since the 1970s.15 
Sea levels are rising due, firstly, to the heat expansion of the ocean water as warmer 
ocean water takes up a larger volume. Secondly, sea levels are rising due to melt wa-
13 Colloidal dispersion of solid or liquid particles within fog, gas or smoke (Collins,	supra note 6, at 24).
14 See IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios, supra note 10.
15 I. Allison et al., The Copenhagen Diagnosis. Updating the World on the Latest Climate Science (UNSW 
Climate Research Centre, 2009), available at <http://www.ccrc.unsw.edu.au/Copenhagen/Copenhagen_
Diagnosis_LOW.pdf> (visited 22 February 2011), Fig. 13.
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ter from mountain glaciers. At the present time, the melt water from continental ice 
sheets in Greenland and Antarctica as a third relevant process is only starting to 
grow,16 but that process is not known accurately. The melt water from floating sea ice 
cover will not change the sea level. The best estimate of the sea level rise by 2100, 
taking note of the presently known processes, is between 18 and 59 cm.17 A higher 
rise cannot be ruled out if the continental ice sheets begin to melt faster after a 
threshold temperature increase. This is one of the most important scientific uncer-
tainties remaining today.
Besides global warming, it is envisaged that the hydrological cycle will change. It is 
probable that heavy rainfall events will become even heavier leading to increased 
flooding. At the same time, dry spells would become longer and more intensive. 
Water and food security would be threatened in the areas affected by these phenom-
ena. Sea level rise would adversely affect human ways of life, especially in the dense-
ly populated coastal areas in South Asia. The acidification of ocean surfaces might 
lead to changes in plankton growth and in the food chain there, including fish spe-
cies. In Europe the summertime drying of the Mediterranean region would become 
stronger. In areas of high technology the excessive rain events might cause non-
availability of electricity and communications as well as destruction of structures. It 
is possible that there will be further surprises concerning the sustainability of the 
worldwide ecosystems. All of these require more research, as do the interactions 
between them.
How do we know this, and what is the degree of uncertainty in the future projec-
tions? The concept of scientific research is to take observations from nature, and then 
to attempt to understand why the observations are as they are. In the case of climate 
the essential question to be asked is: why does the climate system work as we observe? 
Our understanding will be expressed as physical and chemical laws. The laws take 
the form of mathematical formulae or, more generally, (computer) models of the 
surrounding world. The model is probably a good one if it can reproduce the past 
observations. Such a model will also be a useful tool for predicting future changes, if 
we insert into them the envisaged changes in the main driving components of nature. 
In this way we can project likely climates in the future. The main physical driving 
component is the changing composition of atmosphere – the most important factor 
being the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations. 
Clearly, in the case of the earth-atmosphere system, human observations cannot 
cover the whole globe and cannot be continuous in time. Our understanding of 
natural processes is not complete, either. The models are merely approximations of 
the true nature of the natural world. However, science is also able to express the 
uncertainty of its results. This is given as numerical confidence limits. Confidence is 
16 See ibid., Fig. 8, 9 and 10.
17 See Solomon et al., Climate	Change 2007, supra note 1, Table SPM.3.
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increased when independent research projects yield similar results. Regarding projec-
tions of the global mean temperature change for 2100 (relative to 1980–1999), the 
best estimate we have is between +1 and +6 degrees, +3 degrees Celcius being the 
most probable value (rounding off the decimals).18 A substantial part of the uncer-
tainty range comes, however, from unknown socio-economic factors like human 
population growth on the planet towards the end of the century and from the choice 
of the energy palette (i.e. fossil versus non-fossil).
3 The relationship between science and politics
The peer-review system of scientific publishing gives to the scientific society the 
backbone to integrate individuals’ results with the existing, vast amount of informa-
tion collected by others. For scientists as a whole, the peer-reviewed literature serves 
as the basic, qualified material from which to isolate the real truths of any scientific 
issue, including climate change. This is a continuous process as more observations 
become available, new and better theories are developed and research tools become 
better. This is also the world on which the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate 
Change19 (IPCC) builds its findings.
It is important to understand that the way of producing an assessment report in the 
IPCC process follows scientific traditions of research and publication. Only peer-
reviewed publications are considered except in few cases where such literature is not 
abundant enough. Writers are selected based on their professional skills. They come 
from all of the continents of the world and are close to one thousand in number. 
There are three subsequent reviews of the text in order to accommodate views of all 
reviewers into a balanced product. The short Summaries for Policymakers are the 
part of the assessments that are approved in final IPCC Plenary meetings with all 
governments present, agreeing about the content of the Summaries.
Political negotiations and decisions concerning regional adaption to or global mitiga-
tion of human-induced climate change require solid and unequivocal scientific in-
formation as background material. This is obvious as the decisions about adaptation 
and especially mitigation are extremely far-reaching, influencing global economy and 
relations between sovereign countries. The evidence concerning the negative impacts 
of the human-induced climate change must be so clear and concrete that there re-
mains no reasonable doubt about the necessity of the counter actions. And yet, as 
18 Ibid.
19 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the leading international body for the assess-
ment of climate change. It was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and 
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the 
current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. 
The UN General Assembly endorsed the action by WMO and UNEP in jointly establishing the IPCC 
(‘Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind’,UNGA Res. 43/53 (1988)’). 
IPCC initiated its work in 1988. 
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the science is expressing its best and honest understanding of future conditions, there 
are always certain scientific uncertainties in the analyses and calculations which just 
must be accepted.
Therefore, it is clearly important to have the scientific and political processes sepa-
rated from each other. Accordingly, since the beginning of the 1990s, the IPCC 
process has periodically produced assessment reports that each time contains the best 
understanding of past, present and future climates as evident on the basis of the most 
recent and credible science. One may notice that in the media and blogosphere there 
is a lot of criticism against the credibility of the findings of the IPCC assessment 
reports. Sometimes this criticism may seem to be scientifically based. It is of utmost 
importance to understand that such criticism has no place in the science unless it has 
first been published in the peer-review literature. The peer-review serves as a best 
achievable guarantee that valid data and valid methods are used and finally the con-
clusions are based on real facts. Otherwise any criticism is taken as unproven indi-
vidual opinions or views arising from various groups of interest. 
Interestingly, an error in the last IPCC Assessment Report (2007) received wide 
publicity that was suggested to cast considerable doubt about the whole Report 
covering almost 3  000 pages. The given timetable of the melting of the Himalayan 
glacier was surely in error, but actually so much in error that the given value could 
not reasonably be taken seriously. It was probably a human mistake and actually 
pointed out that obeying the reviewing rules must be followed more carefully. Steps 
into such direction have already been taken by the governing body of IPCC.
The IPCC Summaries for Policymakers for each assessment are approved in the final 
IPCC plenary meetings with all governments of the world present, thus creating the 
required joint and undisputable scientific basis for further political actions. This 
scientific background information from the IPCC process about future climates is 
in the form of ‘what if ’ scenarios. The science is able to estimate the future climates 
under different plausible development options concerning global energy consump-
tion and under different assumptions concerning paths of global population increase. 
The essential point here is that the future climate is largely dependent on socio-
economic choices of the countries. The IPCC outcome will offer sufficient back-
ground material for the policy-makers to choose on and decide between various 
policy options to handle the obvious risks connected with the business-as-usual way 
of changing the contents of the atmosphere. The general principle to act so as to cause 
no harm to nature was accepted already in 1992 in the UN Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, also known as the Rio Summit or Earth Summit.20
20 See <http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html>.
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4 Conclusion
To sum up, the great challenge for the governments, separately and jointly, is to make 
far-reaching decisions about how to satisfy the global energy needs without causing 
irreversible harm to the nature we live in. Use of fossil fuels is in the focus of these 
considerations, but energy saving, better technologies and renewable energy sources 
clearly are part of the solutions. The decision-making takes place in a situation where 
there remains scientific uncertainty concerning the outcome of the decisions. The 
logical motivation to proceed, however, comes from the precautionary principle 
which is also mentioned in the declaration of the Rio 1992 Summit.21 Later, in the 
Copenhagen (2009) and Cancún (2010) Conferences of Parties this principle was 
translated into an explicit expression about the upper limit of allowable global mean 
temperature increase (2 degrees Celcius), with reference to the preindustrial condi-
tions. The precautionary principle has also been translated into the language of 
economy via scientific analyses of future global economies while adapting to future 
conditions under a mitigation or non-mitigation policy.22 According to that study, 
an early mitigation, even if costly, is clearly more economical than a reactive, purely 
adaptive option. 
21 UN Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/
CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 876.
22 Perhaps the most influential so far being the so-called Stern Review: Nicholas Stern, The	Economics	of	
Climate	Change:	The	Stern	Review (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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the development oF international 
environmental law
Daniel	Bodansky1
1 Introduction
International environmental law is a relatively new field, but its rules and standards 
are now voluminous. A current treatise on the principles of international environ-
mental law runs to more than 1  000 pages,2 detailing rules of virtually every descrip-
tion on virtually every area of the subject. Until recently, international environmen-
tal law was arguably considered a narrow specialty field within the general context of 
international law. Today, it has become a field in its own right, with sub-specialties 
on chemicals, climate change, freshwater resources, marine pollution, sustainable 
development, wildlife law, and so forth.
The sheer number of international environmental norms that have arisen is remark-
able, given the inherent awkwardnesses of the international legal process. Interna-
tional law lacks a legislature to create law, a judiciary to interpret and apply law, and 
an executive to enforce law. Some of the fundamental questions concerning the in-
ternational legal process that might be asked include: how have international envi-
ronmental norms emerged?; what are the obstacles to cooperation which need to be 
overcome, and how has international environmental law addressed these?; to what 
extent is behaviour affected by international environmental norms, and why?; and 
what are the means by which international environmental norms are implemented 
and enforced? 
1 Lincoln Professor of Law, Ethics and Sustainability, Sandra Day O’Conor College of Law, Arizona State 
University, email: Daniel.Bodansky@asu.edu. Prof. Bodansky delivered the keynote address during the 
2010 UNEP – University of Eastern Finland Course on Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Adapt-
ed and reproduced by permission of the publisher from Chapters 2, 6, 8 and 9 in Daniel Bodansky, The	
Art	and	Craft	of	International	Environmental	Law (Harvard University Press, 2010), Copyright by the 
President and Fellows of Harvard College.
2 Philippe Sands, Principles	of	International	Environmental	Law (2nd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).
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2 The development of international environmental law
2.1 The broad picture
International environmental law has grown erratically, in a pattern familiar to po-
litical analysts: a problem is discovered, often with alarm, as a result of a dramatic 
event such as an oil spill; public interest is aroused, leading to new initiatives; envi-
ronmental legal responses spread to other countries through a process of mimicry; 
the difficulties and the true, often hidden, costs of addressing the problem gradually 
become apparent; the public becomes discouraged, bored, or diverted by the emer-
gence of a new issue; and the issue becomes quiescent, continuing to be addressed in 
a routine, ‘administrative’ manner.3 
While this model could be applied to particular environmental issues, it can also be 
applied to the entire history of international environmental law, in the emergence of 
which three such cycles or waves can be discerned: firstly, a ‘conservationist’ stage, 
focusing on the protection of wildlife, stretching from the late 1800s through the 
mid-1900s; secondly, a ‘pollution-prevention’ stage, spanning the so-called environ-
mental revolution of the 1960s and early 1970s;4 and, thirdly, a ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ phase, beginning in the mid-1980s5 and continuing6 to the present day.7 
International environmental law arguably originated in the conservation and nature 
protection movement of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe and 
North America. Although this conservation movement had a national rather than an 
international focus, the international dimension of conservation received some at-
tention – in particular, this attention focusing on problems in respect of migratory 
species (mostly birds) and commercially-exploited species found in common areas 
such as the oceans (fish, fur seals, and cetaceans). In 1868, a German ornithological 
meeting proposed the development of an international treaty on bird protection; and 
this initiative culminated in the eventual adoption in 1902, by twelve European na-
tions, of the Convention to Protect Birds Useful to Agriculture.8 
3 Anthony Downs, ‘Up and Down with Ecology: The “Issue-Attention Cycle”’, 28 Public	Interest (1972) 
38–50. 
4 Marked by the Stockholm Conference, the establishment of the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP), and the negotiations of numerous multilateral agreements, particularly in the field of marine 
pollution. On the Stockholm Conference and the establishment of UNEP, see Donald Kaniaru, ‘The 
Stockholm Conference and the birth of the United Nations Environment Programme’ in Marko Berglund 
(ed), International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2005, University of Joensuu-UNEP 
Course Series 2 (University of Joensuu, 2006) 3–22 at 3.
5 With the work of the Brundtland Commission (see later in this paper).
6 Through the 1992 Earth Summit (UN Conference on Environment and Development) and the 2002 
Johannesburg Summit (World Summit on Sustainable Development).
7 For a consideration of major milestones in the history of international environmental law, see Ed Couzens, 
‘Individuals and Disasters: the Past and the Future of International Environmental Law’ in Marko Ber-
glund (ed), International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2005, University of Joensuu-
UNEP Course Series 2 (University of Joensuu, 2006) 71–96.
8 Convention to Protect Birds Useful to Agriculture, Paris, 19 March 1902, into force 6 December 1905, 
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This initial stage in the development of international environmental law was signifi-
cant, but had a number of limitations. Firstly, its focus of interest was narrow in that, 
while some conservationists did advocate nature preservation as an ‘end’ in itself, 
early conservation efforts did not reflect a generalized interest in environmental 
protection or pollution. Instead, the conservation movement’s dominant ethos was 
anthropocentric and utilitarian, emphasizing the rational use of natural resources by, 
and for, humans. For example, early efforts at bird conservation, including the 1902 
Paris Convention, attempted to distinguish between those birds viewed as useful to 
agriculture, particularly in the control of insect pests, from those that were ‘noxious’.9
Secondly, in conserving nature, the early conservation movement tended to focus on 
direct threats – in particular, the hunting of wildlife – rather than indirect threats 
such as habitat loss, introduction of non-native species, and pollution. 
Thirdly, states adopted conventions in a piecemeal, ad hoc manner, and there was 
not much development of institutions. Even as late as 1940, for instance, the Con-
vention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere 
(Western Hemisphere Convention)10 failed to provide for regular meetings of the 
parties or for any other institutional follow-up. As a result, it became a ‘sleeping 
beauty’11 – its excellent substantive provisions virtually devoid of influence.
2.2 Initial development
Despite the achievements of the conservation movement, the environment remained 
marginalized in international affairs as late as 1945, the year the United Nations was 
established. Significantly, the UN Charter12 made no reference whatsoever to envi-
ronmental protection or nature conservation, nor did states establish a UN special-
ized agency focused on the environment. International environmental issues did not 
come into their own until the late 1960s, as part of a more general upsurge of inter-
est in the environment often referred to as the ‘environmental revolution’. 
available at <http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE000067.txt> (vis-
ited 15 August 2011). The 1902 Convention was followed by several bilateral treaties, including the 1916 
Migratory Birds Convention between the United States and Great Britain (for Canada) (adopted at 
Washington D.C., 16 August 1916, amended in 1979 and 1995) and a similar agreement in 1936 be-
tween the United States and Mexico (Convention between the United States of America and the United 
Mexican States for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, adopted at Washington D.C., 
10 September 1936, into force 11 October 1955).
9 Schedule I of the Convention is entitled ‘[u]seful birds’; Schedule II is entitled ‘[n]oxious birds’.
10 Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Washington 
D.C., 12 October 1940, into force 1 May 1942, available at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
treaties/c-8.html> (visited 15 August 2011).
11 Simon Lyster, International	Wildlife	Law (Grotius, 1985) at 124 (characterizing the Western Hemisphere 
Convention as a ‘sleeping treaty’). The depiction of the Western Hemisphere Convention as a ‘sleeping 
convention’ has been retained in Michael Bowman, Peter Davies and Catherine Redgwell, Lyster’s	Inter-
national	Wildlife	Law (2 ed., Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 242.
12 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
index.shtml>.
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The environmental movement of the 1960s differed from its predecessors in several 
ways. Firstly, in contrast to the conservation movement, environmentalism in the 
1960s was a mass movement. Secondly, it focused on broader issues of economic 
growth, pollution, population and technology, rather than merely on the conserva-
tion of nature. Finally, it moved away from the earlier focus on economics and science 
– on the rational utilization of natural resources – and toward a more zealous, anti-
establishment orientation, part of the new politics that marked the zeitgeist of the 
1960s.
Arguably, the first multilateral pollution problem to receive international attention 
was that of oil pollution from tankers. In 1954, a conference organized by the Inter-
national Maritime Organization13 adopted the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL),14 which established coastal 
zones within which tankers could not discharge oil except in very limited quantities. 
Following the Torrey	Canyon oil spill off the English coast in 1967 – the first major 
accident involving the new generation of supertankers – maritime and coastal states 
quickly adopted two conventions to address accidental discharges of oil: one recog-
nized the right of coastal states to intervene,15 and the other established a liability 
regime.16 A series of further tanker accidents helped spur the negotiation of the 1973 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),17 
which addresses not only oil pollution, but also other types of vessel-source pollution, 
including sewage and garbage. In addition, states adopted two conventions in 1972 
limiting the dumping of wastes at sea, one regional (focusing on the North Sea)18 
and the other global.19
13 See <http://www.imo.org>.
14 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, London, 12 May 1954, into 
force 26 July 1958, 327 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 3, available at <http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/
libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE000135.txt> (visited 15 August 2011).
15 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 
Brussels, 29 November 1969, into force 6 May 1975, available at <http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/
libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE000111.txt> (visited 15 August 2011).
16 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, 29 November 1969, into 
force 19 June 1975, 973 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 3, available at <http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/
libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE000120.txt> (visited 15 August 2011); and International Conven-
tion on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 
December 1971, into force 16 October 1978, superseded by Protocol to amend the International Conven-
tion on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 
27 November 1992, into force 30 May 1996, available at <http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/
TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE001176.txt> (visited 15 August 2011). See also the website of the Interna-
tional Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds) at <http://www.iopcfund.org/>. 
17 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, first signed 2 November 
1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), adopted 17 February 1978. 
The combined instrument entered into force on 2 October 1983, 12 International	Legal	Materials (1973) 
1319, <http://www.imo.org>.
18 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Conven-
tion), Oslo, 15 February 1972, in force 7 April 1974, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 262.
19 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, London, 
13 November 1972, in force 30 August 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1294, <http://www.
londonconvention.org/>.
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2.3  Developments in the 1970s
A watershed in the development of international environmental law was the 1972 
UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm and popularly 
known as the Stockholm Conference, which was proposed by Nordic countries con-
cerned about transboundary air pollution, in particular the problem of acid rain.20 
The conference served as a major catalyst – perhaps the major catalyst – in the emer-
gence of international environment law. Everything about the Stockholm Confer-
ence21 was big: it was attended by 6  000 persons, 114 countries, 400 non-govern-
mental groups, and 1  500 journalists; it generated 100  000 pages of preparatory 
documents and 40 tonnes of conference documents.22 In addition to the official 
conference, activist groups organized separate events – an Earth Forum and an even 
more radical Peoples Forum – popularly dubbed ‘Woodstockholm’.
One of the major outputs of the Conference was the Stockholm Declaration,23 which 
sets out sixteen principles for the preservation and enhancement of the human envi-
ronment. Most of these principles are seldom cited; the exception being Principle 
21, which articulated the responsibility of states to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction and control do not adversely affect other states or areas of the global 
commons. Principle 21 is now widely regarded as having become part of interna-
tional law, a view endorsed by the International Court of Justice.24
Another consequence of Stockholm was the UN General Assembly’s decision in 
December 1972 to establish the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP),25 
located in Nairobi, Kenya.26 Owing in part to opposition by the existing UN special-
ized agencies, the General Assembly did not give UNEP any management responsi-
bilities. Instead, UNEP was intended to play a coordinating and catalytic role. Al-
though it has never succeeded in fulfilling a coordinating function, due to its lack of 
leverage over other UN agencies, UNEP has played a significant role in helping to 
stimulate the development of international environmental law, particularly during 
the late 1970s and 1980s. Important UNEP initiatives have included its regional seas 
program,27 which protects the Mediterranean and Caribbean seas among others, as 
20 According to the United States Environment Protection Agency, ‘acid rain’ is ‘a broad term referring to a 
mixture of wet and dry deposition (deposited material) from the atmosphere containing higher than 
normal amounts of nitric and sulfuric acids’, and which can affect both animals and plants when depos-
ited. See <http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/what/> (visited 26 August 2011).
21 UN Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972.
22 On these and similar figures, see generally Tony Brenton, The	Greening	of	Machiavelli:	Evolution	of	Inter-
national	Environmental	Politics (Earthscan, 1994) at 36, 42–43.
23 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972, 
UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973), 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1416.
24 ICJ, ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, advisory opinions of 8 July 1996, available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&p3=4&case=95> (visited 22 August 
2011) paras 241–42.
25 See <http:www.unep.org>. 
26 See Kaniaru, ‘The Stockholm Conference’, supra note 4.
27 See <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/>.
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well as its sponsorship of treaty negotiations to protect the stratospheric ozone layer 
and to regulate international trade in hazardous wastes.
The Stockholm process also led, more indirectly, to the negotiation of several impor-
tant treaties. Among these treaties were the London Dumping Convention (regulat-
ing the dumping of hazardous wastes at sea);28 the World Heritage Convention;29 
and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES).30 None of these conventions was adopted at Stockholm, and all 
might have emerged even had Stockholm not occurred. But the intense interest in 
the environment generated by the run-up to Stockholm served as a catalyst in pro-
ducing this unusual surge in treaty-making activity.
2.4  Developments in the 1980s
The period after Stockholm was generally marked by a downturn of interest in the 
environment, at least compared to what came before and after. Interest in environ-
mental issues began to revive again only in the mid-1980s, as a result of the discovery 
of the Antarctic ozone hole in 198531 and the beginning of concern about global 
warming. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer32 was agreed 
to in the same year. The year 1987, in particular, witnessed two seminal events: (1) 
the adoption of the Montreal Ozone Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer,33 which has cut the use of ozone-depleting substances dramatically and is 
widely considered to be the most successful environmental agreement to date; and 
(2) the publication of Our	Common	Future34 by the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development (referred to as the Brundtland Commission), led by former 
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, which became a bestseller and 
popularized the concept of ‘sustainable development’. 
By 1988, environmental issues had become so prominent that Time magazine named 
the environment ‘Newsmaker of the Year’.35 The next several years saw a flurry of 
activity, including the adoption of the Basel Convention on the Transboundary 
28 See supra note 19.
29 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.
org>.
30 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
31 By Joseph Farman, Brian Gardiner and Jonathan Shanklin of the British Antarctic Survey. See <http://
www.theozonehole.com/>.
32 Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March 1985, in force 22 September 1988, 
26 International	Legal	Materials (1985) 1529.
33 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 16 September 1987, in force 
1 January 1989, 26 International	Legal	Materials (1987) 154, <http://www.unep.org/ozone/>.
34 Gro Harlem Brundtland, Our	Common	Future (Oxford University Press, 1987).
35 See, ‘Planet of the Year – Endangered Earth’, Time of 2 January 1989, available at <http://www.time.com/
time/covers/0,16641,19890102,00.html> (visited 26 August 2011).
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Movements of Hazardous Wastes in 1989;36 the London Amendment to the Mon-
treal Protocol in 1990;37 and agreements between the United States and Canada and 
among European countries to address the problem of acid rain.38 The process culmi-
nated in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
in Rio de Janeiro (popularly known as the Earth Summit) – one of the largest as-
semblages of world leaders ever – and the negotiation of the climate change39 – and 
biological diversity conventions.40
2.5  More recent developments
The more recent phase in international environmental law differs in important ways 
from the environmental movement of the 1970s. Firstly, it involves much more 
complex environmental problems such as dealing with the impacts of climate change 
and protecting biological diversity, whose solutions may require fundamental eco-
nomic and social changes rather than relatively simple pollution-prevention fixes.
Secondly, international environmental issues have assumed a more pronounced 
North–South (Developed–Developing) dimension. The problems of the 1960s and 
1970s, such as vessel-source pollution, ocean dumping, and acid rain, primarily in-
volved industrialized countries. However, problems such as climate change and bio-
logical diversity protection cannot be solved by developed countries alone; they re-
quire action by developing countries as well. As such, developing countries have 
played a much more central role in establishing these treaty regimes.
Thirdly, the current generation of environmental problems, such as climate change 
and loss of biodiversity, involve a high degree of scientific uncertainty. With respect 
to some issues, such as the dangers posed by genetically modified organisms, it is not 
clear whether a threat exists at all. As a result, techniques to address uncertainty have 
gained increasing prominence; of particular importance is the so-called precautionary 
principle, which urges action against environmental threats even in the face of sci-
entific uncertainties. The shift in emphasis toward precaution is reflected in the 
transformation of the international regime on ocean dumping in the 1990s from a 
negative-listing approach, which allowed wastes to be dumped unless a waste was 
36 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Basel, 
22 March 1989, in force 5 May 1992, 28 International	Legal	Materials (1989) 657, <http://www.basel.
int>.
37 The amendment to the Montreal Protocol agreed by the Second Meeting of the Parties (London, 27–29 
June 1990), into force 10 August 1990, available at <http://ozone.unep.org/Ratification_status/london_
amendment.shtml> (visited 15 August 2011).
38 A series of protocols adopted to the original 1979 Acid Rain Convention (Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, Geneva, November 13 1979, in force 16 March 1983, 18 International	
Legal	Materials (1979) 1442, <http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/>).
39 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
40 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
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prohibited, to a positive-listing approach, which prohibits dumping unless a sub-
stance can be shown to be safe.41 
The organizing principle of this third phase in the development of international 
environmental law has been sustainable development, which the Brundtland Com-
mission report defined as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.42 It reflects 
two general themes: integration and long-term planning. Firstly, environmental is-
sues should not be seen as stand-alone items – for example, merely adding a cata-
lytic converter here or a scrubber there – but as important aspects of economic and 
social decision-making more generally. Secondly, sustainable development focuses 
attention on the issue of intergenerational equity. It requires thinking in a long-term 
manner about how to manage resources sustainably, so that the resources will be 
available to future generations.
If the Stockholm Conference was the focal point of the second phase of interna-
tional environmental law, the Rio Summit filled that role for the third. Like Stock-
holm, Rio was huge – 13 000 participants from 176 states and 1 400 non-govern-
mental groups, including 103 heads of state. Like Stockholm, its outputs included a 
declaration of environmental principles (the Rio Declaration) and a detailed action 
plan (Agenda 2143). And, like Stockholm, its most significant results were not the 
conference outputs themselves, but the two treaties negotiated in parallel: the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Biological Diversity Conven-
tion.
3 Role-players in the international environmental process
3.1 The overall picture
The 2007 Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change had more than 10  000 participants. The word ‘participants’ is used advis-
edly because, when the present author served on the United States negotiating team 
in the late 1990s, a joke was that, out of the many thousands of people attending 
climate change conferences, only about a hundred actually did anything; and by the 
phrase, ‘did anything’, was meant ‘participated actively in the negotiations’. Many of 
the rest of the people at the meetings were, in our view, merely ‘hangers-on’; what 
they did while there – if anything – was something of a mystery.
41 See the 1972 London Convention, supra note 19; and the its 1996 Protocol (Protocol to the Convention 
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, London, 17 November 
1996, in force 24 March 2006, 36 International	Legal	Materials (2006) 1) which is in the process of replac-
ing, not amending, the parent Convention. 
42 Brundtland, Our	Common	Future,	supra note 34, at 43.
43 Agenda 21, UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992), available at <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/>.
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Our sense of self-importance, however, reflected a narrow view of the international 
legal process – that intergovernmental negotiations are at the center of the conference 
universe and that we, as government negotiators, were masters of that domain. Both 
assumptions are, of course, wrong. In fact, international conferences (much less the 
international environmental process more generally) are multi-ring circuses. They are 
trade shows, public relations and educational arenas, and quasi-academic confer-
ences. Intergovernmental negotiations occupy only a single ring. Moreover, even 
within that ring, government negotiators do not operate freely, being subject to a 
tight set of constraints emanating from a wide array of actors.
3.2  States
As the term ‘inter-national’ suggests, international environmental law operates large-
ly as a system of law between states. Although it aims ultimately to change the private 
behavior that is responsible for most environmental problems, its rules apply prima-
rily to states, and few of these rules create rights or duties for companies, individuals 
or other non-state actors.
Understanding state behavior is, of course, complex, but a useful starting point is to 
think of states – like individuals – as being rational actors, seeking to advance their 
own (state) interests. Thus, in transboundary pollution cases, downstream states 
typically favor strong action because they are the ones suffering the ill effects, while 
upstream states have an interest in continuing to pollute because the environmental 
damage is an externality. Similarly, with respect to global pollution problems, states 
have an interest in undertaking collective action, yet each individual state has an 
interest in free-riding, so long as it can do so without incurring a penalty.
The assumption that states have identifiable, stable interests that they pursue ration-
ally is incomplete in two ways, however. Firstly, states are motivated not only by 
self-interest but also by normative considerations about what might be the right or 
proper course; that is, they respond to what social scientists have termed a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ as well as a ‘logic of consequences’.44 Secondly, states are complex 
entities with many constituent parts, often with very different interests and beliefs 
of their own. As a result, it cannot be assumed that national interests are a given. 
Instead, interests may often be contested and contingent, being the outcome of do-
mestic political processes which involve complex interactions between different sub-
state actors: rival agencies within executive branches; checks and balances between 
the executive, legislative and judicial branches; lobbying by business and environ-
mental groups; and public opinion more generally. A state’s position on an environ-
mental issue such as climate change, the treatment of genetically-modified organ-
isms, or whaling, emerges from the complex interaction of these sub-state actors 
44 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering	Institutions:	The	Organizational	Basis	of	Politics (The 
Free Press, 1989).
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– environmental groups raising concerns and creating a demand for public regula-
tion, businesses lobbying officials in the different branches and levels of government, 
and government actors themselves interacting within strata of bureaucratic politics.
3.3 International institutions
In addition to states, international institutions play important roles within the inter-
national environmental process. Although international environmental law lacks an 
institution with general governance functions, like the World Trade Organization,45 
a multitude of institutions play significant roles, some global and others regional or 
bilateral; some focused on a particular issue area such as forestry or whaling and oth-
ers with a broader mandate; some scientific in orientation and others focused on 
capacity-building or policy-development more generally.
In analyzing international institutions, they can be arrayed along a spectrum, based 
on their degree of autonomy from states. At one extreme, some international institu-
tions serve merely as intergovernmental forums; while others operate as autonomous 
actors. International law uses the concept of ‘legal personality’ to denote the point 
along this spectrum at which an international institution is considered sufficiently 
autonomous to be said to have a separate legal existence and to be able to act in its 
own right for certain legal purposes – asserting claims, entering into treaties, and 
exercising other implied powers that are necessary for it to fulfill its functions.
The international institution with the broadest competence over environmental is-
sues is the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). In contrast to UN 
specialized agencies such as the World Health Organization,46 UNEP lacks a separate 
treaty basis and instead derives its authority from the UN General Assembly (which 
created it). UNEP is a comparatively small institution, with a small budget. It plays 
a largely informational and catalytic role, helping to spur the negotiation of treaties 
on biological diversity, hazardous wastes, and ozone depletion, and providing secre-
tariat services. 
Perhaps the most distinctive types of international environmental institutions are 
those established by individual multilateral environmental agreements. Virtually 
every treaty creates a conference of the parties (CoP) which meets on a regular basis 
and is open to all parties. The decision-making authority and procedures of CoPs 
will vary from treaty to treaty. Although none has general legislative authority, some 
have limited authority (usually by a two-thirds or three-quarters majority vote) to 
adopt new rules that bind all of the treaty parties except those that file a specific 
objection. In addition, multilateral environmental agreements also typically provide 
for a permanent secretariat – in some instances, an existing institution such as UNEP 
45 See <http://www.wto.org>.
46 See <http://www.who.int>.
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and in other instances a new one – and some establish specialized bodies to provide 
scientific advice or to consider issues relating to implementation and compliance.
3.4 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
Generally, non-governmental actors exercise influence in one of two ways: either by 
persuading government decision-makers; or by changing their calculus of costs and 
benefits. Sometimes, NGOs might exercise influence by providing information, 
policy analysis, and scientific and technical expertise. The Red List of Threatened 
Animals of the World Conservation Union (IUCN),47 which is a sui generis organi-
zation composed of both government agencies and non-governmental groups, for 
example, is an important source of scientific information about which animal species 
are declining, threatened with extinction or vulnerable. 
Environmental NGOs also seek to exert influence by claiming to represent the ‘pub-
lic’ interest, rather than private interests. At times, these claims may be dubious; but, 
even so, significant segments of populations appear to accept the image of NGOs as 
disinterested defenders of the environment, thereby furnishing the NGOs with le-
gitimacy. Organizations with large memberships also claim to represent their mem-
bers, who may represent significant portions of populations. Finally, a few of the 
larger NGOs do have considerable financial resources at their disposal.
Most commonly, NGOs exercise their influence with respect to national govern-
ments. They lobby their government to support a policy internationally or to imple-
ment its international obligations domestically, or they work in alliance with NGOs 
in other countries to influence foreign states. NGOs seek to influence national gov-
ernments not only at home, through the domestic political process, but also within 
international forums. Most major multilateral environmental negotiation sessions 
are now attended by numerous NGOs, which monitor their own governments’ posi-
tions and statements to guard against potential backsliding; and also work closely 
with sympathetic delegations from other countries. In some issue areas where NGO 
influence is high, such as whaling, a state may invite a few of its NGOs to participate 
on its national delegation as observers.
Typically, NGOs take part in international institutions as observers rather than as 
full participants. In a few cases, however, NGOs have attained quasi-official status 
internationally. The aforementioned IUCN is the most prominent such example. It 
initiated the negotiations toward the CITES, prepared the first draft of the agree-
ment, and continues to be a key source of information about which species should 
be protected. Further, it now serves as host of the Ramsar Wetlands Convention48 
secretariat.
47 See <http://www.iucn.org> generally; and <http://www.iucnredlist.org/> specifically. 
48 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, 2 Febru-
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Finally, NGOs may try to influence businesses through publicity and consumer pres-
sure. In some cases, NGOs have relied on public confrontation. A prominent exam-
ple was the Greenpeace campaign against the sinking of the Brent Spar oil platform 
by Shell.49 Increasingly, however, NGOs have sought to work in cooperation with 
industry to develop voluntary codes of conduct. A leading sectoral example of this 
is the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC),50 which NGOs initiated in response to the 
failure at the 1992 Rio Conference to adopt a binding forest agreement.
3.5  The business sector
Businesses can play two roles in the international environmental process. Firstly, the 
business sector can be the object of international regulation – not directly, since in-
ternational law applies only to states, but indirectly as the ultimate regulatory target. 
Secondly, the business sector can be a subject, actively seeking to shape the develop-
ment and implementation of international environmental law in either positive or 
negative ways. 
Sometimes companies adopt environmental measures proactively, even before gov-
ernment regulations are adopted. For example, a number of major companies, in-
cluding British Petroleum, General Electric, and DuPont, have adopted their own, 
voluntary greenhouse gas emissions targets. Some apparently do so because they 
believe that a green image will help them in the marketplace; the thinking being that 
consumers will reward them through their purchasing decisions. Others may believe 
that regulation is inevitable and that beginning to adjust now will lower their costs 
over the long run, or that their actions might help shape the governmental regula-
tions which eventually ensue. Finally, some may reflect the environmental values of 
the company’s leadership. The environmental initiatives of Wal-Mart, for example, 
seem to be attributable in part to a desire to counteract criticisms of the company’s 
labour practices, thereby improving its image in the marketplace; and in part to the 
environmental values of the Walton family.
4 International standard-setting
4.1  The traditional sources of international law
The canonical statement of the formal sources of international law – Article 38 of 
the International Court of Justice Statute51 – identifies three sources of interna-
ary 1971, in force 21 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.
org>.
49 See Peter J. Spiro, ‘New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” 
Marketplace’,18 Cardozo	Law	Review (1996) 957–969 at 964.
50 See <http://www.fsc.org>.
51 Statute of the International Court of Justice, annex to the Charter of the UN, available at <http://www.
icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0> (visited 16 August 2011).
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tional law: treaties, custom, and general principles. These sources are treaties, which 
are explicit agreements in writing; custom, which is generated through the regular 
practice of states, engaged in out of a sense of legal obligation;52 and general princi-
ples, which are norms that reflect fundamental propositions of law, shared by legal 
systems around the world.
The central difference between treaties on the one hand and custom and general 
principles on the other is that treaties are the product of a purposive process of ne-
gotiation, whereas customary norms and general principles emerge through more 
diffuse processes. All three are typically classified as ‘hard law’; in contrast to a wide 
variety of norms which do not qualify as ‘legal’ in character, including resolutions of 
international organizations, conference declarations, and business codes of conduct. 
The UN General Assembly, for example, lacks legislative authority, and so its resolu-
tions have the status of recommendations. For the same reason, neither the Stock-
holm Declaration nor the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development are 
in themselves legal in nature; both would have that status only if they were to be 
incorporated into a treaty, or were deemed to constitute norms of customary inter-
national law. Business codes of conduct are developed by non-state actors, without 
any formal lawmaking authority at all.
4.2 The traditional sources in more detail: treaties
From the inception of international environmental law, treaties and other forms of 
negotiated agreements have been the predominant means of achieving international 
cooperation. According to one recent compilation, states have negotiated more than 
1 000 multilateral environmental agreements and 1 500 bilateral instruments on a 
wide variety of subjects: in no particular order, protection of the stratospheric ozone 
layer, prevention of dangerous anthropogenic climate change, mitigation of acid rain, 
control of hazardous waste exports, regulation of trade in wildlife, protection of 
wetlands, prevention of oil pollution, and many others.53 Indeed, in the mid-1990s, 
environmental treaties were proliferating so rapidly that some worried about ‘treaty 
congestion’.54
Negotiated agreements offer several advantages over more informal mechanisms of 
international cooperation, in that they enable states to address issues in a purposive, 
rational manner; they promote reciprocity by allowing states to delineate precisely 
what each party is expected to do; they provide greater certainty about the applicable 
norms than non-treaty sources of international law, because of having a canonical 
52 The rules of diplomatic immunity, for example, evolved over centuries through the repeated interaction 
of states.
53 Ronald B. Mitchell, International Environmental Law Database Project, available at <http://iea.uoregon.
edu/page.php?file=home.htm&query=static> (visited 16 August 2011).
54 See, for instance, Edith Brown Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the 
Emergence of a New World Order’, 81 Georgetown	Law	Journal (1995) 675–693 at 697–702.
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form; and, finally, they allow states to tailor a regime’s institutional arrangements and 
mechanisms to fit particular problems.
Traditionally, treaties were comparatively static arrangements that memorialized the 
rights and duties of the parties as agreed at a particular point in time. Today, envi-
ronmental agreements are usually more dynamic arrangements, which establish on-
going regulatory processes. The result is that, in most environmental regimes, the 
treaty text itself represents simply the ‘tip’ of the normative ‘iceberg’. The majority 
of the norms are adopted through more flexible techniques, which allow interna-
tional environmental law to respond more quickly as new problems and new knowl-
edge emerge.
One approach, which has been used extensively in international environmental law, 
to building treaties gradually is the ‘framework convention – protocol approach’. 
Initially, states negotiate a broad framework convention, which serves to establish the 
basic architecture of the regime; including, for example, the regime’s objective, prin-
ciples, basic obligations, and institutions. Thereafter, protocols are negotiated which 
build upon the parent agreement through the elaboration of more specific (and 
costly) commitments.
The framework convention – protocol approach has several rationales. Firstly, it al-
lows states to address problems in a step-by-step manner rather than all at once. 
Secondly, states tend to be more willing to join a framework convention because it 
does not contain stringent obligations; as a result of which they can begin to address 
a problem without waiting for a consensus to emerge on appropriate response meas-
ures. For example, when both the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (LRTAP)55 and the Vienna Ozone Convention were adopted, many states 
remained unconvinced of the need for action. Nevertheless, even such sceptical states 
were willing to acquiesce in the adoption of these conventions since the conventions 
did not commit their parties to taking any specific actions.
In addition, although framework conventions are themselves weak, they are able to 
create ‘positive feedback loops’ which facilitate the deepening of the regime through 
the adoption of protocols which contain specific substantive commitments. Firstly, 
the framework convention can help reduce uncertainties and produce agreement 
about the relevant facts – about who is doing what to whom – by requiring states to 
submit national reports and by encouraging scientific research and assessments. The 
institutions established by the framework convention often play a catalytic role in 
this process by collecting data, providing technical assistance, and issuing reports. 
Secondly, the framework convention (and, in particular, the regular meetings of the 
parties) can help to generate normative consensus by providing ongoing fora for 
55 See supra note 38.
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discussion and negotiation, serving as focal points for international public opinion, 
and building relationships of trust amongst participants. Finally, when states do 
eventually decide to act, framework conventions increase their capacity to do so by 
ensuring that basic institutions and decision-making processes are in place. The 
theory is that once a framework convention is adopted, the international lawmaking 
process will begin to take on a momentum of its own. States that were initially re-
luctant to undertake substantive commitments, but which acquiesced in the seem-
ingly innocuous process set in motion by the framework convention, are likely to 
feel increasing pressure not to fall out of step as that process gains momentum.
4.3 The traditional sources in more detail: custom and general principles
In contrast to treaties, the two main types of non-treaty norms – customary law and 
general principles – are not created through purposeful acts of law-making and do 
not possess canonical forms. Instead, they emerge through less well-defined, more 
informal processes – and thereby raise a number of theoretical puzzles. Such puzzles 
include questions such as: how do non-treaty norms emerge; to what extent, for 
example, do customary norms emerge as a result of calculations by states of their 
rational self-interest; to what extent are they imposed by powerful states; and to what 
extent do they reflect psychological needs for order and regularity? Further, do non-
treaty norms have any effect on behavior, and, if so, how and why? Further, what 
does it mean to say that a norm is part of customary international law or is a gen-
eral principle of law; and where does the ‘binding’ character of these norms come 
from? Finally, should non-treaty norms be followed; are they legitimate sources of 
obligation; and do they have any claim to obedience?
Although the concept of customary international law is often viewed as mystifying, 
the emergence and application of social norms through informal, decentralized proc-
esses is in fact a commonplace occurrence. Language provides a good illustration of 
this, since every time we speak we apply a complex set of customary rules of grammar 
and usage – rules that have not been legislated or enforced by any centralized body 
but, instead, have emerged and evolved through the regular practice of language-
users and are enforced through a diffuse set of social sanctions.
According to the orthodox account of customary international law, the customary 
law-making process involves two elements: firstly, consistent state practice; and, 
secondly, a sense of legal obligation (or opinio juris). When many states can be ob-
served to have behaved in a consistent manner for a significant period of time, and 
when this consistent, long-standing practice manifests a belief about what the law 
requires, then customary international law can be said to have been created.
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4.4 Soft law
Conference resolutions, business codes of conduct, and the like are not legal norms. 
Instead, they are usually classified as ‘soft law’. Like hard law, they are normative: 
they are intended to guide or influence behavior by providing reasons for actions to 
be taken. The fact that the UN General Assembly, for example, adopted a resolution 
calling for a moratorium on high seas driftnet fishing56 can be seen as a reason to stop 
using driftnets. The resolution provides a standard of evaluation. Compliance serves 
as a justification for one’s own actions, and violation is a ground on which to criticize 
others. Moreover, like hard law, these non-legal instruments are social creations; be-
ing the products of identifiable processes of norm-making. From this perspective, 
soft law does not simply represent the absence of law; rather, it represents a sort of 
‘legal purgatory’. Unlike hard law, however, soft law does not create legally-binding 
obligations.
5 Implementation, compliance and effectiveness
Translating policy into action is notoriously difficult. Many policies are characterized, 
as Richard Elmore once quipped, by ‘grand pretensions, faulty execution and puny 
results’.57 Because international environmental law typically aims to control not 
merely state conduct but also private conduct, its implementation poses particular 
challenges.
States serve as the primary transmission belt for putting international environmental 
rules into effect, with international environmental agreements generally imposing 
obligations on states and relying on states to implement their commitments. For this 
reason, the success of treaties such as the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol,58 
and CITES depends on the degree to which they are ‘domesticated’. Some treaties 
spell out the duty to implement explicitly; but, even in the absence of any explicit 
provision, the rule of pacta sunt servanda59 – the foundation of international treaty 
law – requires states to do whatever is necessary to implement their treaty obligations. 
Implementation is not simply a technical, top-down process, involving directives 
from the government. Rather, in practice, it is a political process in which industry 
groups and environmental organizations all participate to varying degrees. Industry 
can contribute positively by providing expertise in designing technically feasible and 
56 ‘Large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing and its impact on the living marine resources of the world’s oceans 
and seas’, UNGA Res. 45/215 (1991).
57 Richard F. Elmore, ‘Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation’, 26 Public	Policy (1978) 
185–228 at 186.
58 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
59 This Latin maxim, observed also in many national legal systems, means that ‘contracts are served’ or 
‘promises must be kept’.
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cost-effective approaches; but it may also seek to weaken implementation measures 
in order to reduce its own adjustment costs. Public participation is also an increas-
ingly integral part of the national implementation process.
Treaties vary considerably in how much freedom they give states in the choice of 
implementation methods. In most cases, international law gives states significant 
discretion as to the choice of implementation methods. A typical formulation found 
in many treaties simply requires states to take ‘appropriate’ measures; which allows 
each state to take into account its own legal system, regulatory culture, and other 
national circumstances in determining what measures may be ‘appropriate’. At the 
far extreme, treaties establishing an obligation to achieve some overall result, such as 
the national emissions targets in the Kyoto Protocol, give states almost complete 
flexibility in determining how they will reach the required outcome – whether by 
means of education, emission limits, product standards, subsidies, taxes, voluntary 
agreements with industry, and so forth. At the other end of the spectrum, some 
agreements set forth quite specific obligations of conduct that leave little discretion. 
For example, MARPOL60 requires that flag states prescribe precise rules for the con-
struction and design of oil tankers, and to prohibit and sanction violations of these 
standards by vessels operating under their authority.
A threshold issue in treaty implementation which often arises is that of whether 
implementation requires national legislation. For a variety of reasons, sometimes the 
answer will be ‘no’. A treaty may focus on governmental actions such as reporting, 
which can be performed by the executive branch on its own authority, without any 
need for legislative approval. Alternatively, under a country’s constitution, treaties 
may have the force of domestic law directly, making additional legislative implemen-
tation unnecessary; or existing legislation might provide the necessary authority for 
implementation of a treaty’s obligations. Even when implementing legislation is re-
quired, however, the adoption of legislation is usually only the first step in the im-
plementation process. Most treaties require also various types of administrative im-
plementation; such as further rule-making to give greater specificity to general 
legislative mandates, monitoring and assessment, preparation of reports, issuance of 
permits, and the investigation and prosecution of alleged violations.
In contrast to legislative and administrative implementation, judicial implementa-
tion of international environmental law remains comparatively rare. A notable excep-
tion was a Philippines case which applied the principle of intergenerational equity61 
to allow a group of children to challenge timber licences issued to log in old growth 
forests.62 
60 See supra note 17.
61 The principle that the rights and interests of future generations should be given consideration alongside 
those of present generations.
62 Minors Oposa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Supreme Court Reports Annotated 
(G.R.) No. 101083, (S.C. July 30, 1993), reprinted in 33 International	Legal	Materials (1994) 174.
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Even in the absence of international enforcement, many (if not most) states do im-
plement their international environmental obligations almost as a matter of course. 
Many causal factors help to account for this practice of self-implementation: bureau-
cratic routines, calculations of self-interest, a sense of normative commitment, or 
severe pressure (or even litigation) by environmental groups. 
6 Conclusion
It might be asked, in conclusion, whether international environmental law has been 
successful; and whether it is on the right track. Certainly, in many respects interna-
tional environmental law falls short of these two goals. But although it has failed so 
far to solve many pressing problems, such as climate change, it has also had some 
notable successes. In achieving these successes, it has displayed impressive ingenuity, 
developing a wide range of mechanisms to set standards and promote implementa-
tion. 
It remains to be seen whether the world will be able to move beyond the third stage 
of its development, as discussed above,63 and become a coordinated whole instead of 
being characterized by piecemeal development.
Ultimately, international environmental law ought not to be seen as a panacea, but 
rather as a process to encourage and enable international cooperation. It represents 
a part – and only a part – of the solution to the environmental problems facing the 
world. 
63 See supra Part 2.1.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)2 and its Kyoto Protocol3 are tackling one 
of the humankind’s greatest contemporary challenges. The ultimate objective of these 
two multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) is to prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic climate change4 against the backdrop of continuously increasing global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, already observable impacts of climate change, and 
alarming projections on the extent of the damage that will follow if the negotiations 
fail and global GHG emissions are not reduced. 
Not surprisingly, the UNFCCC process has attracted widespread public interest. The	
Earth	Negotiations	Bulletin	(ENB) responds to the need for transparency and reliable 
information through neutral and authoritative daily reports on various MEA nego-
tiations, including the UNFCCC. After each negotiating session, the ENB pro-
duces a comprehensive summary and analysis of the outcomes, thus helping nego-
1 LL.M (Univ. of Helsinki) LL.M and Ph.D. (London School of Economics and Political Science). Post-
Doctoral Researcher, University of Eastern Finland. Team leader/writer for the Earth	Negotiations	Bulletin 
and team leader of the ENB team following UNFCCC negotiations in 2009–2010. E-mail: kati@iisd.
org.
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
3 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
4 According to Article 2, the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to ‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system’. 
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tiators and observers keep track of progress. The IISD estimates that the ENB is used 
by approximately 125  000 policymakers and other stakeholders.5
This paper considers the important role of independent reporting, and in particular 
the role of the ENB at the UN climate change negotiations and other MEA proc-
esses. It first discusses the role of transparency and access to information in MEA 
negotiations in general. The paper then describes the ENB’s history, objectives and 
how it is produced. It concludes with thoughts on the ENB’s role in promoting 
transparency of the UNFCCC and other MEA negotiations. 
2 Public participation in MEA negotiations
Transparency, possibilities for public participation and access to information play an 
important role in global environmental governance. One of the essential arguments 
is that public participation leads to better environmental decision-making.6 While 
democracy remains a contested notion in the international context,7 public partici-
pation in environmental decision-making can also be defended by the democratic 
argument that people have the right to be consulted over issues that affect their 
lives.8 The three pillars of public participation are reflected in Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration),9 which empha-
sizes the importance of access to information, participation in environmental deci-
sion-making and access to justice in environmental matters. Accordingly:
[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by 
public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities 
in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation 
by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and admin-
istrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.10
5 IISD, ‘Supporting Transparency and Accountability’, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/enbvol/enb-fund-
ing.htm> (visited 17 March 2011).
6 Jeremy Wates and Seita Romppanen, ‘The Aarhus Convention: A Legally Binding Framework for Promot-
ing Procedural Environmental Rights’ in Tuula Honkonen and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environ-
mental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review 2009, University of Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 9 (Uni-
versity of Joensuu, 2010) 101–123 at 103.
7 For discussion on the changing role of legitimacy and democracy in international law, see Kati Kulovesi, 
The	WTO	Dispute	 Settlement	System:	Challenges	 of	Environment	 and	Legitimacy (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, forthcoming 2011), Chapter 1; Gerry Simpson, Great	Powers	and	Outlaw	States:	Unequal	Sovereigns	
in	the	International	Legal	Order (Cambridge University Press, 2004); David Held, Models	of	Democracy 
(2nd ed., Polity Press, 2003).
8 Wates and Romppanen, ‘The Aarhus Convention’, supra note 6, at 103.
9 UN Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/
CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 876.
10 Ibid.
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The principle has been further operationalized through the 1998 Aarhus Convention 
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Jus-
tice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention),11 developed within the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe and currently ratified by 44 Parties.12 
The emphasis of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration is on the national level where 
states are required to introduce transparent and participatory policies and provide 
access to justice.13 As Hey indicates, transparency, participation and access to justice 
remain controversial with respect to global institutions.14 Article 3(7) of the Aarhus 
Convention requires, however, that its Parties promote the Convention’s principles 
‘in international environmental decision-making processes and within the frame-
work of international organizations in matters related to the environment’.15 Guide-
lines have been developed on the application of the three pillars of the Aarhus Con-
vention in international fora.16 These Almaty Guidelines recognize that providing 
international access opportunities in environmental matters, and establishing and 
strengthening procedures that enable the taking of these opportunities, generally 
improves the quality of decision-making and the implementation of decisions.17 
According to Morgera, the (then draft) guidelines ‘contain several innovative con-
cepts as to public participation in international fora’; and ‘have the potential, even 
as a non-binding instrument’ to promote a systematic approach on the matter’.18
In practice, non-state actors frequently take part in international environmental 
governance. Since its creation in 1972, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) has welcomed non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to participate in 
its various activities.19 For international environmental governance and interna-
tional law in general, the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro ‘marked a watershed’ concerning public participation 
as hundreds of NGOs followed the preparatory committees and contributed to the 
development of Agenda 21,20 the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
11 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, Aarhus, 25 June 1998, in force 30 October 2001, 38 International	Legal	Materi-
als (1999) 517, <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/>.
12 ‘Status of ratification’, available at <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.htm> (visited 9 April 2011).
13 Ellen Hey, ’Global Environmental Law’, 19 Finnish	Yearbook	of	International	Law (2008) 5–28 at 23.
14 Ibid.
15 On the relevance of the provision, see Wates and Romppanen, ‘The Aarhus Convention’, supra note 6, at 
118–119.
16 Decision II/4, ‘Almaty Guidelines on Promoting the Application of Principles of the Aarhus Convention in 
International Forums’, UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.2 (2005); and Decision III/4, ‘Promoting the 
Application of the Principles of the Convention in International Forums’, UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2008/2/
Add.6 (2008). See also Elisa Morgera, ‘An Update on the Aarhus Convention and Its Continued Global 
Relevance’, 14 Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	Law (2005) 138–147.
17 Almaty Guidelines, para. 12.
18 Morgera, ‘An Update on the Aarhus’, supra note 16, at 146.
19 Olivier Deleuze, ’The Role of Major Groups and Stakeholders in Environmental Negotiations and Gov-
ernance’, International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review (2009) 127–135 at 128.
20 Agenda 21, UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992).
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ment as well as the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity.2122 Some 
10 000 NGOs were also reported to have attended the Rio Conference and since 
Rio, ‘NGO involvement in environmental policy making has mushroomed at all 
levels’.23 The three Rio Conventions and many other MEAs involve NGOs and 
other non-state actors in their negotiating processes and even implementation.24 The 
UNFCCC, for instance, has created procedures to allow NGOs and other non-state 
actors to observe the negotiations.25 The UNFCCC Secretariat has also prepared 
informal guidelines on NGO participation.26 
However, even with the possibility of attending negotiating sessions, it may be dif-
ficult for NGOs and other observers to follow everything important that is going on. 
The annual sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC and 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP) involve a large number of agenda items and informal negotiating groups. The 
most recent UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún included the sixteenth ses-
sion of the COP, the sixth session of the CMP 6, the 33rd sessions of the Subsidiary 
Bodies, fifteenth session of the Ad	Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments 
for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 15) and the thirteenth ses-
sion of the Ad	Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
UNFCCC (AWG-LCA 13). Each of the six bodies established a number of informal 
negotiating groups to work through their busy agendas. Following the daily develop-
ments is therefore a difficult task and highlights the role of daily updates by the ENB 
in promoting transparency.
Indeed, it is not only observers who may find it difficult to keep track of develop-
ments in MEA negotiations in general and in the UNFCCC negotiations in par-
ticular. Also smaller delegations and developing countries experience various chal-
lenges. As Chasek indicates, the proliferation of sustainable development and 
environmental negotiations since the UNCED ‘has stretched the capacities and 
budgets of many countries around the world’.27 The fact remains that ‘[n]ot every 
21 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
22 Farhana Yamin, ‘NGOs and International Environmental Law: A Critical Evaluation of Their Roles and 
Responsibilities’, 10 Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	Law (2001) 149–
162 at 151.
23 Ibid.
24 For instance, private actors play an important role in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. See Kati 
Kulovesi, ‘The Private Sector and Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Experiences, Challenges and 
Prospects’, 16 Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	Law (2007) 145–157.
25 UNFCCC Art. 7(6); Rules 7 and 30 of the UNFCCC Draft Rules of Procedure for the Conference of 
the Parties and its Subsidiary Bodies, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/2 (1996); and Decision 18/CP.4 ‘At-
tendance of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations at contact groups’ , UN Doc. FCCC/
CP/1998/16/Add.1 (1999).
26 Guidelines for the participation of representatives of non-governmental organizations at meetings of the 
bodies of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2003), available at <http://
unfccc.int/resource/ngo/coc_guide.pdf> (visited 17 March 2011).
27 Pamela Chasek, ‘NGOs and State Capacity in International Environmental Negotiations: The Experience 
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country can afford to send a large delegation to a negotiating session’28 and the situ-
ation is particularly problematic for developing countries.29 This generates a number 
of problems – Chasek highlights, inter alia, problems related to continuity in terms 
of following the process and difficulties experienced by small delegations when de-
veloping their negotiating positions.30 A number of capacity-building initiatives have 
been developed – and are needed – to address these problems. Also the ENB can play 
a role in leveling the playing-field by providing information on the intricacies of 
multilateral negotiation.31 
Events at the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen serve to under-
line the importance of transparency in the UN climate change negotiations. The 
Conference was, in many ways, a historic event and subject to unprecedented public 
attention. More than 110 heads of State and government attended the joint High-
level segment of the COP and CMP at the end of the Conference.32 Furthermore, 
nearly 40 000 observers applied for accreditation, far exceeding the capacity of the 
conference venue in the Bella Centre. Access to the venue was further restricted dur-
ing the High-level segment.33 This gave rise to numerous complaints concerning 
transparency from organizations that normally participate in the UNFCCC nego-
tiations as observers.34 During the final plenary session, the ‘undemocratic nature’ of 
the negotiation process and the small friends-of-the-chair group that produced the 
Copenhagen Accord35 were heavily criticized by countries including Venezuela, Bo-
livia, Cuba, Nicaragua and Tuvalu.36 Ultimately, no agreement was reached to adopt 
the Copenhagen Accord but Parties agreed merely to ‘take note’ of the text.37 
The problems in Copenhagen were more complex than questions concerning access 
to information and public participation. While these were major concerns for observ-
ers unable to access the Bella Center, the debates surrounding the Copenhagen Ac-
cord also touch upon questions concerning the inclusiveness of the negotiating proc-
ess for UNFCCC Parties and the principle of sovereign equality. In this respect, the 
ENB’s role can be seen as being limited to recording and reporting the events as they 
of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin’, 10 Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	
Law (2001) 168–176 at 168.
28 Ibid. at 169.
29 Ibid. at 170.
30 Ibid. at 170–171.
31 Ibid. at 170–172.
32 For a detailed description of the events in Copenhagen and the discussions on transparency, see Marko 
Berglund and Kati Kulovesi, ‘Climate Change Negotiations Simulation’, in this Review. See also ‘Sum-
mary and Analysis of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen: 7–19 December 2009’, 
12(459) The	Earth	Negotiations	Bulletin, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12459e.html> (visited 
17 March 2011).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Decision 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th sess., UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), Addendum.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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transpired – the fundamental questions concerning inclusiveness and power in inter-
state cooperation are more complex than the scope of this paper. The focus is, instead, 
on the role of the ENB in promoting transparency and access to information in the 
UNFCCC process in particular.
3 Brief history of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin
The ENB has provided independent reporting from multilateral environmental ne-
gotiations since the 1992 UNCED in Rio. The ENB began when three individuals 
from the non-governmental organization community – Johannah Bernstein, Pame-
la Chasek and Langston James (‘Kimo’) Goree VI – started to produce daily reports 
during the five weeks of the Fourth Preparatory Committee meeting for the UNCED 
in March 1992.38 They then raised funds to publish the daily ‘Earth Summit Bul-
letin’ from the UNCED.39 
After the Rio Conference, the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD) approached the Earth Summit Bulletin team, asking them to continue report-
ing from the Rio follow-up negotiations.40 The IISD is a Canada-based policy re-
search institute with its head office in Winnipeg and branches in Ottawa, Ontario, 
New York and Geneva. The publication was subsequently renamed the ‘Earth Nego-
tiations Bulletin’ and the IISD Reporting Services has continued to publish it for 
nearly 20 years. Two of the founders remain actively involved, with Kimo Goree 
being the Director of the IISD RS and Pamela Chasek the Editor of the ENB. 
Both the ENB and the number of environmental negotiation processes it covers have 
grown over the years. In the past two decades, the ENB has reported from more than 
3 000 meetings and it regularly covers international negotiations involving biodiver-
sity, chemicals, climate change, desertification, forests, oceans, and a number of 
other environmental issue-areas. The ENB receives funding from a number of gov-
ernments and some international organizations.41 
4 ENB production
The ENB is typically a two-page, double-sided publication that is distributed each 
day to participants at MEA negotiations. However, given the complexity of the ongo-
ing UNFCCC negotiations, the ENB daily report at climate change-related meetings 
38 Description of the history of the IISD RS on their web site, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/about/about.
htm> (visited 7 January 2011). See also Chasek, ‘NGOs and State Capacity’, supra note 27.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 At the end of 2010, the ENB’s sustaining donors were Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, 
Germany, Italy and the US. General support for the ENB was also provided by Australia, Finland, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UNEP.
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is usually three to four pages long. The bulletins are sent automatically to the email 
of those people who have subscribed; and they are also available online, together with 
a dedicated meeting website containing photos and other daily updates.42 After each 
meeting, the ENB team produces a summary and analysis of the negotiations and 
main outcomes. The summary report is distributed electronically two to three days 
after the meeting. ENB reports are usually translated into French and Spanish, and 
sometimes also into Japanese. It is the present writer’s understanding that the reports 
are widely used by delegates when preparing their own reports back at home.43
The ENB is normally written by a team of consultants selected for each meeting from 
a roster of experts. The ENB team consists of approximately 60 experts from more 
than 30 countries.44 ‘ENBers’ are typically lawyers, Ph.D. candidates, academics and 
other professionals with expertise on international environmental and sustainable 
development issues, combined with a keen interest in MEA negotiations and travel. 
ENB writers’ diverse geographical and professional backgrounds play an important 
role in ensuring that the teams understand both the political sensitivities and techni-
cal complexities of each negotiating process. The ENB climate team, for instance, 
has this year included members from Argentina, Finland, Germany, Kenya, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Russia and the US. Several of them are lawyers, but the team also 
has adaptation/development policy, biodiversity and forestry experts. From time to 
time, the ENB recruits new consultants to the roster through an open process that 
tends to be highly competitive. New writers receive training before they start writing 
for the ENB.
Strict style guidelines and rigorous editing are keys to ensuring that ENB reports are 
as objective and accurate as possible. The key is that the ENB focuses on painting a 
balanced picture of the parties’ positions and interventions, but refrains from making 
value judgments. In other words, it describes what happened in negotiation proc-
esses without evaluating parties’ positions or taking a stand on what the outcome 
should be. Another one of the ENB’s key objectives is to provide comprehensive 
reporting from all key meetings held during the day. At big meetings, such as the 
annual UN climate change conference, this ought to assist observers and small del-
egations in particular to maintain an overall picture of progress in various negotiating 
groups. 
42 The ENB can be found online at <http://www.iisd.ca>.
43 See similarly, Chasek, ‘NGOs and State Capacity’, supra note 27, at 172 and 174. Chasek outlines results 
of the ENB reader survey carried out at 11 UN Meetings in 1998, showing, inter alia, that 37 per cent 
of respondents usually or always use the ENB as assistance in writing reports.
44 For information on the ENB team, see <http://www.iisd.ca/about/team/> (visited 17 March 2011).
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5 Conclusions: the ENB’s role in international negotiations
The availability of accurate information is important for MEA negotiations as, inter 
alia, it enables interested individuals and organizations critically to assess progress 
and outcomes. This is exactly where the ENB has come to play an important role 
over the years – it appears to be widely read and appreciated by academics and profes-
sionals working on international environmental issues.45 In many processes, delegates 
have in fact come to rely on information contained in the ENB and they sometimes 
refer to ENB reports in their interventions and own reporting.46 The ENB is also 
often cited in academic journals and other publications and the IISD estimates that 
the ENB is used by approximately 125  000 policy-makers and other stakeholders.47
The focus on transparency, and on the dissemination of objective and accurate infor-
mation is, in the present writer’s view, what sets the ENB apart from other publica-
tions typically distributed at the UN climate negotiations. For example, Eco,48 pub-
lished by the Climate Action Network, and the TWN	Bulletin,49 published by the 
Third World Network, differ from the ENB in that they seek to influence the out-
come of the negotiations, criticize countries’ positions and promote certain political 
views. Both of these publications obviously have their own important and comple-
mentary roles to play in promoting transparency. At key meetings, such as the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, the mass media has also played 
a significant role. 
Placing the ENB’s role in a broader perspective, the need for initiatives promoting 
transparency of international negotiations is best understood in light of the impor-
tant challenges confronting international law and governance in a globalizing 
world.50 Changes since the end of the Cold War are putting into question the tra-
ditional, state-centered focus of international law.51 International environmental law 
in particular has been in the frontline, engaging non-state actors, such as non-gov-
45 See Chasek, ‘NGOs and State Capacity’, supra note 27, at 172–174, outlining results of the ENB reader 
survey carried out at 11 UN meetings in 1998. The results showed that: 18 per cent of all respondents 
(and 25 per cent of developing and transition countries) usually or always use the ENB as assistance in 
writing statements; 37 per cent of all respondents (and 39 per cent of developing and transition countries) 
usually or always use the ENB as assistance in writing reports; 53 per cent of all respondents usually or 
always use the ENB to follow negotiations they are unable to attend; and 44 per cent of all respondents 
usually or always use the ENB to follow negotiations in a parallel working group at a meeting they are 
attending. 
46 Ibid. 
47 IISD, ‘Supporting Transparency and Accountability’, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/enbvol/enb-fund-
ing.htm> (visited 17 March 2001).
48 See <http://www.climatenetwork.org/eco-newsletters>.
49 For more information, see <http://www.twnside.org.sg/>.
50 For a comprehensive overview of the changing nature of international law and the increasing importance 
of concepts such as legitimacy, transparency and public participation, see Chapter I of Kulovesi, The	WTO	
Dispute	Settlement	System,	supra note 7. For a similar argument on the changing nature of international 
law, see also Philippe Sands, Lawless	World:	America	and	the	Making	and	Breaking	of	Global	Rules (Allen 
Lane/Penguin Group, 2005) 7–15.
51 Ibid.
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ernmental organizations, private companies and other organizations. Indeed, as in-
ternational law has expanded and deepened its reach, international negotiations have 
come to have direct and important implications for the lives and livelihoods of mil-
lions of individuals all over the world.52 This is particularly true for the UNFCCC 
process, given that the Convention has 194 parties and addresses a global problem 
with fundamental ecological, economic and social consequences. As international 
law concentrates on collaboration between states, it lacks sophisticated mechanisms 
to promote access to information, public participation and transparency – the es-
sential values underpinning democratic societies and necessary ingredients for pro-
ducing legitimate outcomes.53 The ENB can be seen as an innovative response to 
some of the ensuing challenges. More fundamental changes to international environ-
mental governance may well be necessary in the future, but few would contest the 
argument that the ENB has played a significant role in promoting transparency in 
multilateral environmental negotiations during the past two decades.
52 Ibid.
53 For analysis, see Veijo Heiskanen, ‘Introduction,’ in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen (eds), The	
Legitimacy	of	International	Organizations, (United Nations University Press, 2001) 1–44 at 2.
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change regime
Tuomas	Kuokkanen1
1 Introduction
International law includes a number of pair concepts. Some of these are binary 
oppositions,2 like binding and non-binding law, while others can be mutually support-
ive, like jurisdiction and merits. In an environmental context, there are many such polar, 
parallel or synergic approaches. Take, for example, the tension between the exploitation 
of natural resources and the protection of the environment. Moreover, states might have 
different interests depending on whether they are downstream or upstream countries; 
coastal or maritime countries; producing countries or user countries and so on. 
Within the climate change regime, there are various juxtapositions and tensions. This 
paper will examine such pair concepts, using the term ‘perspective’ in order to capture 
a wide spectrum of different instances. By dismantling the climate change regime 
into basic elements and approaches it ought to become easier to understand how the 
regime works. 
2 Perspectives in the climate change regime
2.1 Climate change
Earlier environmental agreements and declarations in the 1960s and 1970s made a 
distinction between man and nature. This distinction was highlighted by introducing 
1 Professor of International Environmental Law, University of Eastern Finland; Counsellor, Ministry of the 
Environment of Finland; e-mail: Tuomas.Kuokkanen@uef.fi. 
2 In his book, Martti Koskeniemi examines such polar oppositions strands. See Martti Koskenniemi, From	
Apology	to	Utopia.	The	Structure	of	International	Legal	Argument.	Reissue	with	New	Epilogue (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).
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the concepts of biosphere and technosphere. While the biosphere refers to natural 
world, the technosphere refers to the world of tools and artifacts. Later on, this dis-
tinction turned out to be too rigid and elementary as it gave an impression that 
human activities are separate from the surrounding natural environment.3 In the 
1980s and 1990s, the attention was extended from environmental protection to 
management of ecological processes. Man was thereby integrated back to nature so 
to speak. Yet, the distinction between man and nature still implicitly remained. 
The climate system is seen in a dynamic manner as ‘the totality of atmosphere, hydro-
sphere, biosphere and geosphere and their interaction’.4 As climate change involves 
natural phenomena, the challenge for the international community is to manage the 
human impact in order to combat climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 
Adverse effects of climate change are considered as changes in the physical environ-
ment or biota which are attributed directly or indirectly to human activities and 
which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productiv-
ity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic sys-
tems or on human health and welfare.5 Thus, this dualistic approach can be seen as 
a two-way street: nature (climate) is to be protected from man and man is to be 
protected from nature (adverse effects). 
2.2 Sustainable development
The doctrine of sustainable development began to reconcile the dichotomy between 
environment and development by recognizing that the two are inseparable.6 The new 
paradigm was to optimize short-term economic interests and long-term environmen-
tal concerns. This did not, though, lead to a harmony of interests. Rather, the recon-
ciliation brought the two elements under the framework.
The climate regime is based on sustainable development thinking. According to Art. 
3(4) of the Climate Change Convention, the parties ‘have a right to, and should, 
promote sustainable development’. Several other sustainable development principles, 
such as the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities are reflected in 
the Convention.
The Climate Change Convention is not purely environmental but encompasses 
economic and development considerations. Take, for example, Article 2 which deals 
3 For discussion, see Tuomas Kuokkanen, International	Law	and	the	Environment:	Variations	on	a	Theme 
(Kluwer Law International, 2002) at 241.
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int> , later on ‘Climate Change Con-
vention’ or ‘Convention’, Art. 1(3).
5 See Art. 1(1) and 1(2) of the Climate Change Convention. 
6 See Gro Harlem Brundtland, Our	Common	Future (Oxford University Press, 1987) 20: ‘[T]he “environ-
ment” is where we all live; and “development is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within 
that abode. The two are inseparable”’.
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with the objective of the Convention. The Article first takes an environmental ap-
proach by stating that the ultimate objective of the Convention is to achieve ‘stabi-
lization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous antropogenic interference with the climate change’. This approach 
is balanced by economic development approach by specifying that ‘[s]uch a level 
should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt natu-
rally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner’.
The integration of environmental and economic considerations is one of the main 
themes of the doctrine of sustainable development. From the environmental point 
of view, the purpose of the integration has been to shift the focus from environmen-
tal effects to various economic sectors, such as energy, industry, transport and agri-
culture. For the environmental field, these sectors have represented real problems to 
which environmental considerations should be integrated. At the same time, the 
economic sector has begun to consider the environmental sector from a business 
point of view. Indeed, the business sector saw the protection of the environment as 
potentially profitable. Thereby, a parallel process of economization of the environ-
mental sector has begun to develop. 
This dual integration is reflected in the Kyoto Protocol.7 For example, Art. 2 of the 
Protocol lists various economic sectors, such as energy, agriculture and forestry, where 
Annex I parties shall implement and further elaborate policies and measures. In ad-
dition, the Protocol introduces three market-based mechanisms: joint implementa-
tion according to Art. 6, clean development mechanism under Art. 12 and emission 
trading under Art. 17. Joint implementation means a project-based emission reduc-
tion mechanism between developed countries while clean development mechanism 
is a project base mechanism between a developed and a developing Party. Finally, 
emission trading deals with trading of emission units, so-called assigned amount 
units, between developed countries. The purpose of these so-called Kyoto mecha-
nisms is to enhance cost-effective emission reduction. 
Thus, interestingly enough, while environmental considerations were integrated into 
the economic sphere, business considerations where integrated into the environmen-
tal one.8 
2.3 Actors
There are several actors under the climate regimes. Parties can be divided into differ-
ent groups on the basis of their substantive obligations, geographical distribution or 
substantive interests. In addition to parties, several observer organizations participate 
7 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
8 For discussion, see Kuokkanen, supra note 3, at 287–338.
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in climate change meetings. Individuals may have different roles: they can be govern-
ment or non-government representatives or serve in their individual capacities as 
experts. 
Parties are divided in the Framework Convention and in the Kyoto Protocol into 
Annex	I	Parties and non-Annex	I	Parties. The original idea was that Annex I Parties 
are industrial Parties while non-Annex I Parties are developing country Parties. This 
division is based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility9 and 
to the idea that industrial countries should take the first step. For this reason, Annex 
I Parties have more stringent mitigation obligations. 
Even though this distinction is important it does not tell the whole story of actors in 
the climate regime. For example, in the Annex I group there are Parties undergoing 
the process of transition to a market economy10 which have a certain amount of 
flexibility under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, the current 
country groups are not necessarily carved into stone. For example, in the negotiations 
concerning the future regime one question has been what the status of major emitters 
will be. 
Different groups are used also for other purposes. For example, the bureau members 
are elected using the traditional United Nations regional groups: African states, Asian 
states, Eastern European states, Latin American and the Caribbean states and the 
Western European and Other states. In the substantive negotiations, there are differ-
ent groups based on substantive interests. The main groups are Group of 77 and 
China comprising over 130 developing countries, the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) including approximately 43 low-lying and small island countries, the Least 
Developed Countries (LEG), European Union and its 27 member states, the Um-
brella Group comprising non-EU industrialized countries11 and the Environmental 
Integrity Group including Mexico, the Republic Korea and Switzerland. 
In addition to Parties, observers play an important role in the climate regime. Ac-
cording to Art. 7(6) of the Climate Change Convention and Art. 13(8) of the Kyo-
to Protocol, the United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atom-
ic Energy Agency, as well as any state member thereof or observers thereto not Party 
to the Convention or Protocol, may be represented as observers at sessions. Any body 
or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, 
which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed 
the Secretariat of its wish to be represented as an observer, may be so admitted unless 
9 See, for instance, Tuula Kolari, ‘The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in Multilat-
eral Environmental Agreements’ in Ed Couzens and Tuula Kolari (eds), International	Environmental	
Lawmaking	and	Diplomacy	Review 2006, University of Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 4 (University of 
Joensuu, 2007) 21–54.
10 These so called economies in transition (EITs) include Russia and the Eastern European countries.
11 Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the 
United States.
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at least one third of the Parties present object. In 2010, altogether 1  495 intergov-
ernmental and non-governmental organizations had an observer status.12
The increasing role of observer organizations underlines the role of civil society and 
private sector. This shift has been characterized as a participatory revolution in inter-
national environmental law.13 It should be noted that the climate change regime is 
not traditional diplomacy between state representatives, but also dialogue and work 
with a broad range of stakeholders.14 For example, the operation of the clean devel-
opment mechanism and technology transfer is very much based on the involvement 
of the private sector. 
Turning to individual negotiators, there appears to be both generalists and specialists. 
Generalists usually cover a number of international treaties or multilateral environ-
mental agreements. Therefore, they have a broader perspective on the negotiated 
items. Specialists have a particular competence on certain issues, like reporting issues 
or forest matters. As issues are interlinked and contextual, it is sometimes difficult to 
draw a line between general and particular. Indeed, many negotiators tend to be 
rather policy-makers than pure generalists or specialists.
2.4 Approaches
The climate change regime includes a number of different approaches. While many 
of them are interlinked and synergic, some of them seem to be antagonistic. By way 
of example, I discuss some of these approaches.
The climate change regime is based on the framework and specific approach. The 
purpose is that the Convention gives a framework under which more specific action 
can be taken. The Kyoto Protocol represents the first legal instrument relating to the 
Convention. As a short-term objective, the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol is to re-
duce overall emissions of greenhouse gases by the industrial country Parties by at least 
5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.15 The nego-
tiations on the post-2012 instrument are still pending.
12 See ‘Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings, Note by the Executive Secretary’, UN Doc. FCCC/
SBI/2011/6 (2011).
13 See Kal Raustiala, ‘The Participatory Revolution in International Environmental Law’, 21 Harvard	Envi-
ronmental	Law	Review (1997) 537–586.
14 See ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancún from 29 November 
to 10 December 2010. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth 
session’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011) para. 7:
Recognizing the need to engage a broad range of stakeholders at the global, regional, national and 
local levels, be they government, including subnational and local government, private business or 
civil society, including youth and persons with disability and that gender equality and the effective 
participation of women and indigenous peoples are important for effective action on all aspects of 
climate change.
15 Art. 3(1) of the Kyoto Protocol.
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While the climate change regime is predominantly focusing on future trends, the 
past conduct by Parties is noted as well. The ultimate objective of the Convention, 
according to its Art. 2, is to achieve ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system’. The debate on the historical emissions relates to the prin-
ciple of common but differentiated responsibility and to historical responsibility 
according to which developed countries should bear a special responsibility as the 
largest share of historical emissions has originated in these countries.16 Thus, the 
climate regime tends to be both	forward-looking and backward-looking. 
The Kyoto Protocol reflects a top-down approach as the reduction and control com-
mitments are divided among Annex I Parties with a view to achieve the above men-
tioned 5 per cent reduction. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord17 and subsequently the 
Cancún Agreements reflect rather a bottom-up	approach in sense that reduction and 
control measures are based on pledges by the Parties. As the Cancún agreements 
establish a review mechanism,18 this new approach has been called as a ‘pledge and 
review’ method. The climate change negotiations can be seen as an attempt to resolve 
the dilemma between the top-down and bottom-up architecture.19
Mitigation of greenhouse gases is the primary aim of the climate change regime, with 
the objective of combating the harmful effects on climate of the present system. 
However, Parties have recognized that full prevention of harmful climate change 
impacts is not possible, and that therefore adaptation to climate change is needed as 
well. These two avenues – mitigation and adaptation – are not in opposition to each 
other, but rather reflect the two sides of the climate change work. For example, in 
the financing and technology work, mitigation and adaptation are very much inter-
linked.
With regard to the mitigation measures under the Kyoto Protocol, one question 
during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords20 relating 
16 See ‘The Cancún Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Co-
operative Action under the Convention’, Decision 1/CP 16, in UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 
(2011) para. 34. (‘Acknowledging that the largest share of historical global emissions of greenhouse gases 
originated in developed countries and that, owing to this historical responsibility, developed country Par-
ties must take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.’)
17 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, Decision 2/CP.15, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th sess., UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), Addendum.
18 See decision 1/CP 16, paras 138–140. The first review should start in 2013 and should be concluded by 
2015.
19 See Daniel Bodansky, ‘A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime’, 
a working paper (2011), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773865> 
(visited 5 July 2011).
20 The Marrakesh Accords is a set of draft decisions that were adopted in the 7th Conference of the Parties, 
held in 2001 in Marrakesh. Formally, these decisions were adopted by the First Meeting of the Kyoto 
Protocol held in 2005 in Montreal. See ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventh session, 
held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties, Volume I’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2001).
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thereto was whether emissions reductions which a Party makes outside of its terri-
tory could be counted in its reductions or not. The Kyoto Protocol allows for both 
options. While the Parties are expected to take domestically policies and measures to 
achieve their quantified emission limitation and reduction targets, the Protocol also 
allows that developed Parties make additional emissions reductions abroad by using 
the flexible mechanisms.
International instruments are usually divided into legally	binding	or non-legally	bind-
ing21 categories. For example, international treaties are legally binding whereas rec-
ommendations by international organizations are non-legally binding. The picture, 
however, is not black and white. Some instruments might, namely, contain legal 
value even though they are formally non-legally binding. Such instruments have been 
labeled as soft	law while international treaties remain hard	law.
From the legal point of view, legally binding obligations are preferable as they give 
more certainty and can be regarded legitimate. Sometimes there is a flip side to this 
perception. Even though treaties are formally legally binding, they might contain 
provisions which are more aspirational. Moreover, sometimes adaptation and entry 
into force of legally binding instrument might take a long time. 
In the climate change regime, the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol 
represent legally binding instruments. In addition, there are a large number of deci-
sions by the Conference of the Parties of the Framework Convention and by the 
Meeting of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol. While they are not formally legally 
binding, they still have important value. For example, the Marrakesh Accords contain 
principles, rules, modalities and procedures for the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
The objective of the procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the 
Kyoto Protocol is to facilitate and enforce compliance with the commitments under 
the Protocol.22 The Compliance Committee is structured on the basis of this distinc-
tion into two branches: the facilitative branch and enforcement branch. Both 
branches have their own specific responsibilities for addressing questions of imple-
mentation. While the enforcement branch is responsible for addressing potential 
cases of non-compliance by developed countries with their emission targets, meth-
odological and reporting requirements and the eligibility requirements for participa-
tion in the Kyoto mechanisms, the facilitative branch is responsible for addressing 
21 For discussion, see, for example, Daniel Bodansky, The	Art	and	Craft	of	International	Environmental	Law 
(Harvard University Press, 2010) at 96–107.
22 See ‘Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol’, Decision 27/CMP.1, 
in Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on 
its first session, held at Montreal from 28 November to 10 December 2005. Addendum. Part Two: Action 
taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its 
first session, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (2005). 
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questions of implementation that do not fall under the mandate of the enforcement 
branch.23
2.8 Process and management
The distinction between process and substance plays an important role in the conduct-
ing of business in the meetings of multilateral environmental agreements. The rules 
of procedure might sound technical and appear more like secondary issues. In prac-
tice, however, they may have a profound importance.24 For example, it is common 
in a climate change meeting that there are long debates on the agenda issues, on 
transparency issues or on the meaning of consensus. These debates are not purely 
procedural but usually have an implicit link to substance.
Currently, there are two negotiating tracks in the climate regime: the Ad hoc Work-
ing Group on Further Commitments by Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol 
(AWG-KP) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention (AWG-LCA). The AWG-KP was established pursuant to Art. 
3(9) of the Kyoto Protocol, at the first meeting of the Parties to the Protocol held in 
Montreal in 2005. Two years later, parties established in the Bali meeting the AWG-
LCA to focus on the long-term cooperative action.25 The two negotiating groups 
have so far worked parallel with each other. Their mandate was extended in the Can-
cún meeting until to the Durban meeting to be held in late 2011. The crucial issue 
for the climate change regime is how to manage the relationship between these two 
negotiating tracks: whether to merge them or continue to work parallel. 
The climate change regime can be understood either narrowly in the sense that it 
means only the UNFCCC regime, or it can be understood broadly to encompass also 
other regimes having a climate connection. For example, the Montreal Ozone Pro-
tocol26 deals with hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) which are greenhouse gases. 
Other conventions and organizations, such as the Convention on Biodiversity27 and 
the International Maritime Organization28 have a climate link. While the UNFCCC 
23 See Sebastian Oberthür and René Lefeber, ‘Holding Countries to Account: The Kyoto Protocol’s Compli-
ance System Revisited after Five Years of Experience’, 1 Climate	Law (2010) 133–158.
24 See Cam Carruthers (ed.), Multilateral	Environmental	Agreement	Negotiator’s	Handbook, University of 
Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 5 (2nd ed., University of Joensuu, 2007) at 3-1: 
[A] negotiator should be familiar with the particular rules of MEA, he or she is working on, since 
there are invariably rules specific to each MEA, and in any case, knowing the rules of procedure 
may be critical to dealing with unexpected procedural moves by other Parties or a Chair, and which 
could have a dramatic effect on the outcome of negotiations. 
25 The Bali Action Plan.
26 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 16 September 1987, in force 
1 January 1989, 26 International	Legal	Materials (1987) 154, <http://www.unep.org/ozone/>.
27 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
28 See <http://www.imo.org>.
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regime seeks to manage climate change issues in a comprehensive way, this has turned 
out to be challenging as climate change is such an overarching and broad issue. Many 
of these outside activities are undertaken in coordination or cooperation with the 
UNFCCC. In some instances, however, it has been difficult to agree on a synergic 
or coherent approach. This has resulted in fragmented, or even contrasting, ap-
proaches between the UNFCC and other regimes. For example, a pending issue is 
whether to deal with hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) under the Montreal Protocol or 
under the Kyoto Protocol.
With regard to the outcome, it is common that after a climate change meeting there 
is a debate as to whether the meeting was a success or a failure. Opinions differ de-
pending on the perspective one takes. In terms of environmental effectiveness, many 
meetings have achieved only small progress. Such meetings have, therefore, been 
criticized for representing more symbolic than real progress. Despite these modest 
steps, most meetings have been regarded important in terms of regime building, 
which will later on produce tangible environmental results.
4 Conclusions
This paper has sought to discuss the existence of different perspectives within the 
climate change regime. Even though many of the concepts under the climate regime 
seem to be opposite, on a closer look they appear to be rather interlinked and com-
plementary. It appears that the regime includes both contrasting and mutually sup-
portive concepts. The purpose of this paper has been to identify these pair concepts 
in order to better understand how the climate change regime operates. 
With regard to the issue of whether these different perspectives can be identified in 
other fields of international law or international environmental law, one may note 
both similarities and differences. For example, questions relating to the framework/
specific approach, the top down/bottom up dilemma or the legally or non-legally 
binding issues are common to other regimes as well. The climate change regime 
encompasses, however, many unique aspects such as annex I countries and non-an-
nex I countries. Yet, it is difficult to give any general answer, as different concepts 
operate in a context.
The climate change regime can be seen as an attempt to manage various tensions, for 
example, between mitigation and adaptation, developed and developing countries or 
facilitation and enforcement. The question of how such tensions are settled is to be 
decided contextually in particular instances.
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Harri	Laurikka1	and	Anna-Pia	Schreyögg 2
1 Introduction
Pricing of the negative externalities of pollution has been identified as a key means 
for promoting environmental policy since Pigou,3 Coase,4 Dales5 and Crocker6 
developed the concept of emissions trading. Emissions trading can be described as a 
policy instrument for managing emissions through emission	targets and an opportu-
nity	to	trade emission	units, which encourages operational excellence and provides an 
incentive for the deployment of relevant technologies. Baumol and Oates7 showed 
that, under the assumption of perfect knowledge, pricing of pollution can be imple-
mented with two alternative means: either an emissions trading system, or an envi-
ronmental tax set by the government.
In the context of climate change mitigation, many countries, organizations and in-
dividual analysts have been supporting and actively promoting emissions trading 
systems (i.e. ‘a carbon market’) as a key means to price carbon emissions and to fos-
ter combating climate change in a cost-effective manner. From the earliest interna-
tional legal efforts in this area, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
1 Counsellor, Ministry of the Environment, Finland; e-mail: Harri.Laurikka@ymparisto.fi.
2 Advisor to the Ministry of Environment (BMU), Germany; e-mail: Anna.Schreyoegg@bmu.bund.de.
3 Arthur C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Macmillan, 1920). A pigovian tax is a tax placed on a 
negative externality to correct for a market failure.
4 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, 3 Journal	of	Law	and	Economics (1960) 1–44. 
5 John H. Dales, Pollution,	Property	and	Prices (University of Toronto Press, 1968).
6 Thomas D. Crocker, ‘The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems’, in Harold Wolozin 
(ed.), The	Economics	of	Air	Pollution (WW Norton, 1968) 61–68.
7 William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates, ‘The Use of Standards and Prices for Environmental Protection’, 
73 Swedish	Journal	of	Economics (1971) 42–54.
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(UNFCCC)8 included such references9 and a pilot phase, ‘activities implemented 
jointly’ (AIJ), was initiated in which the use of carbon markets was road-tested. These 
AIJ activities were undertaken on a voluntary basis in order to generate climate 
change mitigation benefits that would not otherwise occur. However, the AIJ did not 
lead to any carbon credits which consequently lead to a lack of incentives to develop 
the system.10 Nevertheless, they lead to first experiences as to how market-based 
mechanisms in developing countries could work. Soon after that, carbon markets 
were established – in Articles 3, 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (KP).11 Since 
then, they have been pushed most vocally in the UNFCCC negotiations by the 
European Union (EU), which also decided to establish its own emission trading 
scheme the – the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)12 – in 2003. The EU 
ETS is a domestic policy instrument to reach the emission reduction target the EU 
has taken on under the KP. The European Commission published relatively early on, 
in November 2006, a communication titled ‘Building a global carbon market’,13 
which was followed by the following statement of the Environment Council in De-
cember 2006: 
[the	Council	of	the	EU] EMPHASISES its commitment to developing a strong 
global carbon market by linking the EU ETS with other emission trading schemes 
at national or regional level; …14
This began a series of references in the subsequent Council Conclusions,15 in which 
the EU developed further its vision of how the global carbon market might look.
Developments since then have been tough for this vision. First, the 15th Conference 
of the Parties of the UNFCCC (COP-15) in December 2009 resulted only in the 
Copenhagen Accord,16 which made a vague reference only to the possibility of ‘use 
8 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
9 Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC states ‘…Efforts to address climate change may be carried out coopera-
tively by interested parties’ and Article 4(2)(a): ‘These [Annex-I] Parties may implement such policies and 
measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the 
objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph’.
10 Axel Michaelowa, ‘AIJ Cannot Function without Incentives’, in Pierce Riemer; Andrea Smith and Kelly 
Thambimuthu (eds): Greenhouse	Gas	Mitigation.	Technologies	for	Activities	Implemented	Jointly (2nd ed., 
Pergamon, 1998) 403–408.
11 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22. Article 3 enables countries 
to use units acquired through emissions trading for compliance. Article 6 establishes joint implementation 
mechanism. Article 12 establishes the clean development mechanism. Article 17 establishes international 
emissions trading. 
12 More information below in this paper or in European Commission Climate Action, ‘Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm> (visited 30 May 2011).
13 European Commission, Building a Global Carbon Market – Report Pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 
2003/87/EC, Doc. COM(2006) 676 final (2006).
14 Environment Council Conclusions 16941/06, 19 December, 2006.
15 Council conclusions are used to determine EU’s positions at ministerial level and state them publicly.
16 Decision 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th sess., UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), Addendum.
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of markets’ without clearly specifying the role, if any, of carbon markets and their 
related instruments. Second, the US Senate decided not to have a vote on any of the 
many different versions on the table for a federal cap-and-trade system in July 2010.17 
Third, US Congress elections in November 2010, in which the ruling Democratic 
Party lost much of the control it had enjoyed, created an even less emissions-trading-
friendly atmosphere in the US, and President Obama announced a ‘change in the 
course’ of dealing with climate change.18 Fourth, both Japan and South Korea de-
cided to postpone their respective plans for domestic emissions trading schemes in 
December 2010.19 Finally, the UN negotiations on carbon markets struggled in mak-
ing progress also in 2010 in Cancún.
Throughout their existence, carbon markets have faced harsh and fundamental criti-
cism. Carbon markets have been denounced as being ineffective in helping to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Furthermore, there have been accusations that 
carbon prices have been too low and unstable; and that they have ‘locked in’ the car-
bon economy.20 Some even say that emissions trading is fundamentally immoral due 
to the fact that environmental pollution is compensated monetarily.21 Finally, the 
recent crimes in Europe, such as phishing, hacking into computer systems and crimes 
with value-added tax, as well as a scandal related to a reuse of surrendered units, have 
been considered fundamental problems of the trading systems in general.22
A question may, therefore, have arisen for many as to whether 2010 marked the year 
of downturn for carbon markets23 in the climate change agenda. This paper consid-
ers recent developments and their implications for the vision of a global carbon 
market. As a first step, the development of the carbon market until 2010 will be 
reviewed. The current outlook for the carbon market will then be considered, par-
ticularly regarding regional emission trading systems. Third, respective decisions 
taken in Cancún in December 2010 will be discussed. Finally, in conclusion, some 
findings will be drawn. 
17 See e.g. Reuters, ‘Climate Bill in Doubt as Democrats Delay Action’ available at <http://www.reuters.
com/article/2010/07/22/us-climate-usa-idUSTRE66L4L520100722> (visited 4 April 2011).
18 See, e.g., Bloomberg Business Week, ‘Obama Moves away From ‘Cap and Trade,’ Seeks New Tools’, avail-
able at <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-04/obama-moves-away-from-cap-and-trade-seeks-
new-tools.html> (visited 28 January 2011).
19 See Section 3 of this paper.
20 See, for instance, Tamra Gilbertson and Oscar Reyes, Carbon	Trading	–	How	It	Works	and	Why	It	Fails 
(Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2009).
21 See, for instance, Michael J. Sandel, ‘It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute’, New	York	Times, 17 De-
cember, 1997; or more recently Pablo Solon, ‘Why Bolivia Stood Alone in Opposing the Cancún Climate 
Agreement’, Guardian, 21 December, 2010.
22 Tamra Gilbertson, ‘Fraud and Scams in the EU Emissions Trading System’ Carbon	Trade	Watch, 6 April, 
2011, available at <http://www.carbontradewatch.org/articles/fraud-and-scams-in-the-eu-emissions-trad-
ing-system.html> (visited 31 May 2011).
23 See, for instance, ‘Hopes for $2 Trillion Global Carbon Market Fade’, Reuters, 3 March 2010, available 
at <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6223KZ20100303> (visited 28 January 2011).
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2 Overview of the existing carbon market in 2010 
The carbon markets today consist of three separate market categories: compliance-
based allowance markets, compliance-based offset markets, and voluntary markets. 
In the first category, companies or governments can purchase emission allowances 
from other companies or governments in order to comply with their GHG emissions 
commitments. These commitments are either agreed in an international agreement 
between sovereign countries, as was the case, for instance, under the Kyoto Protocol; 
and/or they are imposed through national legislation on companies, as was the case 
with the EU ETS, for instance. Emission allowances are issued ex-ante and entitle 
their holders to increase GHG emissions by one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. 
Examples are international emissions trading24 established in the Kyoto Protocol 
with Assigned Amount Units (‘AAU trading’ in Figure 1 below); and the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), i.e. typical cap-and-trade systems. The 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)25 in the United States and the New 
Zealand Emissions Trading System (NZ ETS)26 also belong to this category, but 
with a difference in that they include ‘price caps’. A price cap means that if the price 
in the system increases, more allowances can be issued.
In the second category, companies or governments can purchase emission reduction 
credits stemming from projects or programmes cutting GHG emissions to comply 
with their emission reduction obligations. These credits are issued ex-post, i.e. when 
the emission reduction has been verified, and similarly to the allowances mentioned 
above can be used to offset one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent in own activities. 
Prominent examples are the clean development mechanism (CDM)27 and joint 
implementation (JI)28 of the Kyoto Protocol, in which UN rules are followed and 
the projects are registered by the UN. Another example is the New South Wales 
(NSW) Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme.29 Credit markets can be further catego-
rized into primary and secondary markets. The former covers transactions between 
the original owner of the carbon asset and a buyer, and the latter transactions with 
the same assets, for instance, in the exchanges.
In the third category, companies, governments and/or individuals offset their emis-
sions voluntarily; or voluntarily participate in a (legally binding or non-binding) 
24 Art. 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.
25 A scheme where ten US States have capped and will reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector 10 
percent by 2018. For more information, see <http://www.rggi.org/home>.
26 For more information, see <http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme>.
27 Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.
28 Art. 6 of the Kyoto Protocol.
29 The scheme reduces greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production and use of electricity. It 
achieves this by using project-based activities to offset the production of greenhouse gas emissions. For 
more information, see <http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au/>.
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scheme. Both allowances and offsets can be traded in these markets.30 The main dif-
ference is that the credits do not have to comply (although they oftentimes do any-
how) with the rules established by the UNFCCC or national governments. 
Carbon markets generally have grown rapidly since the coming into existence of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997. In particular, the beginning31 of the EU ETS in 2005 has 
been an important landmark in the development of GHG emissions trading also as 
national policies. The market in 2009 was over 12 times in volume and over 13 times 
in monetary terms as large as in 2005 (Figure 1). The carbon markets have been 
dominated by compliance-based markets, and, in particular, by the EU ETS which, 
in addition to the direct trading volume, has provided the most demand for CDM 
(see also Figure 2 further below) and JI credits. The year 2010 was in many ways 
challenging for the carbon market as a whole: the trading volume was some 13 per 
cent lower than in 2009, whereas the traded value grew by 1.4 per cent. Volumes 
dropped in particular in North America.32
Figure	1.	Growth	and	composition	of	the	global	carbon	market	2005–2009	in	MtCO2e.33
30 For instance, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) (See <http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/>) is a trad-
ing platform for allowances and credits, whereas the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) Program, (see 
<http://www.v-c-s.org/index.html>) for instance, provides a global standard and programme for the ap-
proval of credible voluntary offsets.
31 EU ETS was established in 2003, when the EU Emissions Trading Directive (2003/87/EC) was approved 
in the European Council. The first trading period was 2005–2007.
32 Based on data by Point Carbon; see <http://www.pointcarbon.com>.
33 Based on World Bank, State	and	Trends	of	 the	Carbon	Market	2007 (World Bank, 2007), available at 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21319781~pagePK:64257
043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html> and World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 
2010 (World Bank, 2010), available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/
Resources/State_and_Trends_of_the_Carbon_Market_2010_low_res.pdf> (both visited 28 January 
2011).
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Carbon markets, as of today, are far from establishing a uniform price level that 
would optimally inform investments across the systems. This is to a significant extent 
because not all units are allowed in all systems: AAUs, for instance, cannot be used 
for compliance within the EU ETS but for compliance with national emission reduc-
tion targets under the KP. AAU prices are negotiated individually and are not yet 
being traded on the market. The average prices in the carbon markets during 2006 
to 2010 have ranged from a few euros per tCO2e to almost €22/tCOe in the EU 
ETS (Figure 2). It can be seen that the EU allowances have been most highly priced 
assets in the market and that the secondary market prices of CDM credits have to a 
significant extent followed the EU allowance prices (correlation> 0.9). Prices in 
primary-CDM markets and, in particular, in JI have been less affected by EU allow-
ance prices. 
Figure	 2.	Average	 price	 level	 in	 €/tCO2e	 in	 different	 carbon	markets	 during	 2006–
2010.34
An important notion regarding the current market is that the dominating compli-
ance-based markets are only partly relying on UNFCCC decisions. The EU ETS – 
until now clearly the most influential carbon market globally – was, for instance, 
established as a policy instrument to meet the domestic emission reduction target of 
the EU agreed under the Kyoto Protocol. Since 2008, it has also been serving as a 
tool to reach a unilateral domestic emission reduction target that the EU has set 
unilaterally for 2020. RGGI and other state-level initiatives in North America have 
likewise been established in the absence of an internationally binding commitment. 
34 Based on data in Point Carbon 2011; see <http://www.pointcarbon.com>.
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3 Further development of regional carbon markets
The EU will continue to develop its ETS in the future. It has been enshrined in 
national legislation and continues to be the most important single EU-wide policy 
to cut emissions. The market was valued at some €72 billion in 2010.35 Emissions 
from air transport will be part of the scheme in 2012 and intensive preparations for 
their inclusion are ongoing at the time of writing. The EU ETS will be further ex-
panded to the petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium industries and to addi-
tional gases, such as nitrous oxide, in 2013. A series of important changes to the way 
the EU ETS works will take effect in order to strengthen the system, such as the 
increased use of auctioning and benchmarking in allocating emission allowances.36 
The EU ETS is linked to the emissions trading systems of Liechtenstein and Norway. 
Negotiations with Switzerland are ongoing for its possible inclusion from 2013 on-
wards.
Even if the outlook for any future US federal legislation currently seems problem-
atic, emissions trading can make further progress at the state level in North America. 
The RGGI has been in operation since 2008, but suffered from reduced prices and 
volumes in 2010. In December 2010, California decided to cut its GHG emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2020 and to establish a cap-and-trade system.37 California is likely 
– once the trading system is in operation – to become the second-largest carbon 
market in the world, following the EU ETS. According to an estimate by Point 
Carbon, the market will grow from $1.7 billion in 2012 to nearby $10 billion in 
2016.38 
The future Californian Scheme is planned to be part of the Western Climate Initia-
tive (WCI)39 which has ten other US and Canadian states as members. The key 
component of the WCI is a flexible, market-based, (inter)regional cap-and-trade 
program. The WCI’s current target is to reduce regional GHG emissions to 15 per 
cent below 2005 levels by 2020 (most other schemes use 1990 as a base year). The 
publication Design	for	the	WCI	Regional	Program40 was released in July 2010 to pro-
vide a roadmap to inform the WCI Partner jurisdictions as they implement the cap-
and-trade programme in their jurisdictions. Those expected to implement the pro-
gram when it begins in January 2012 comprise approximately two-thirds of total 
emissions in the WCI jurisdictions. When fully implemented in 2015, the pro-
35 Ibid.
36 For more information on EU ETS, see European Commission, ‘Climate Action’, available at <http://
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm> (visited 28 January 2011).
37 Reuters, ‘California Gives Green Light to Carbon Trade’ (17 December 2010), available at <http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6BG0J320101217> (visited 28 January 2011).
38 Data in Point Carbon 2011; see <http://www.pointcarbon.com>.
39 See <http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/index.php>.
40 Available at <http://westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/program-design> (vis-
ited 29 January 2011).
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gramme will cover nearly 90 per cent of the GHG emissions in WCI states and 
provinces.
In its recent five-year plan,41 China aims at cutting carbon intensity 17 per cent 
under 2010 levels by 2015. As part of that, six regional emissions trading schemes 
(Beijing, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai, and Tianjin) will be established 
by 2013 and a national scheme is targeted by 2015.42 It is uncertain at this stage to 
what extent these expectations will materialize, whether the schemes are based on 
cap-and-trade, and whether the systems allow linking to the international carbon 
market and, consequently, accept offset credits. The current targets are aimed at 
fulfilling China’s pledge to cut carbon intensity by 40–45 per cent from 2005 levels 
until 2020.43
Japan passed a ‘Basic Act on Global Warming’44 in the lower house of its Parliament 
in May 2010. However, in late December 2010, the government shelved the intro-
duction of a domestic emission trading system; apparently because of opposition 
from the industrial sector. The plans to implement a trading scheme were not 
scrapped altogether, but may turn out to be significantly different from a traditional 
cap-and-trade scheme.45 The earthquake and the tsunami in March 2011 and the 
consequent nuclear crises may, however, significantly affect Japan’s climate policy in 
the near future and thereby implementation of any domestic scheme. 
At the same time (well before the crisis, however), Japan has begun to develop a bi-
lateral offset scheme – to replace the CDM as Japan has decided not to join a pos-
sible second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol – with interested developing 
country partners. Japan has also proposed the possibility to use such national offset 
mechanisms in the context of the UNFCCC.46 To date, a total of 30 projects have 
already been chosen from developing countries in Asia and Latin America and close 
to 200 projects could be developed altogether. During 2010–2011 Japan plans to 
spend some 6 billion yen to promote these projects.47 Whether these credits may be 
used later in a domestic cap-and-trade system is uncertain, but Japan intends to use 
the credits to fulfill its emission reduction pledge under the UNFCCC.
41 See <http://www.gov.cn>.
42 PointCarbon, ‘China to Launch Emissions Markets in 6 regions by 2013’ (11 April 2011), available 
through <http://www.pointcarbon.com>.
43 PointCarbon, ‘China to Carve out Climate Policy Plan’ (12 January 2011), available at <http://www.
pointcarbon.com/news/1.1497242> (visited 28 January 2011). 
44 For an overview, see, for example, <http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/cc/bagwc/overview_bill.pdf> (visited 
29 January 2011).
45 Reuters, ‘Japan Shelves Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme’ (28 December 2010), available at <http://
www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6BR06120101228> (visited 28 January 2011).
46 Submission by Japan on new market-based mechanisms to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to pro-
mote, mitigation actions, 25 February 2011, available through <http://www.unfccc.int>.
47 PointCarbon, ‘Japan seeks more bilateral offset mechanism projects’ (06 April 2011), available through 
<http://www.pointcarbon.com>.
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In South Korea, a Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth48 entered into force 
in April 2010. The Framework Act enables the government to operate an emissions 
trading scheme. In September 2010, a list of some 470 companies and 1  570 instal-
lations that should participate in the scheme was set out, together with proposed 
targets for 2013 and beyond.49 The intention was to issue more than 90 per cent of 
allowances through free allocation. In December 2010, a vote in the Assembly was 
postponed until 2011. Similarly to the position in Japan, the industrial sector op-
posed the scheme50 and put pressure on politicians in this regard. However, in March 
2011 Korea unveiled detailed rules for a ‘Target Management Scheme’ (TMS) for 
1  564 sites releasing some 442 MtCO2e a year – which would cover about 60 per 
cent of Korea’s GHG emissions. The TMS is designed to be a preliminary-phase 
emissions trading scheme, before the introduction of a more permanent scheme on 
1 January 2015.51 Korean officials assure that the ETS will start between 2013 and 
2015 despite opposition from industry.52 
Australia has for a lengthy period discussed the introduction of a domestic emissions 
trading scheme. Legislation for the ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme’ (CPRS) 
failed to pass the senate three times and was postponed in May 2010. Federal elec-
tions in August 2010, however, changed the picture and the current government 
returned to the issue in February 2011 by proposing a carbon tax from June 2012 
followed by a cap-and-trade scheme in 3–5 years’ time.53
4 UNFCCC negotiations on carbon markets and the decisions 
in Cancún
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)54 is one of the most important tools 
and achievements of the Kyoto Protocol. To date more than 3  000 projects are reg-
istred and many more are underway.55 A market mechanism with a value of several 
billion euros emerged from the tough negotiations in Marrakesh in 2001. These 
48 Available, for instance, at <http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng;jsessionid=2XVAoj0GR5al5jBz
bf231tBLR5sfblXWqUKrdjsnkPDpRoPPZWg4k7g10127dywk?pstSeq=52136> (visited 29 January 
2011).
49 PointCarbon, ‘South Korea to forge carbon targets’ (28 September 2010), available through <http://www.
pointcarbon.com>.
50 Bloomberg, ‘South Korea Carbon Trading Bill Faces Opposition from Business Groups’ (11 January 
2011), available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-11/south-korea-carbon-trading-bill-
faces-opposition-from-business-groups.html> (visited 28 January 2011).
51 PointCarbon, ‘Korea unveils carbon scheme rules’ (21 March 2011), available through <http://www.
pointcarbon.com>.
52 Reuters, ‘South Korea to start emission trading in 2013–2015’ (7 February 2011), available at <http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/07/us-carbon-korea-idUSTRE7161II20110207> (visited 1 June 
2011).
53 ABC News, ‘Gillard unveils carbon price details’ (24 February 2011), available at <http://www.abc.net.
au/news/stories/2011/02/24/3147523.htm> (visited 21 April 2011).
54 Established in Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.
55 See UNFCCC, ‘CDM in Numbers’, available at <http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html> (visited 1 
June 2011).
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figures illustrate that the CDM has been a success in developing a new and global 
market for GHG emission reduction projects in developing countries. These projects 
generate, once registered by the UNFCCC, carbon credits that can be used for com-
pliance purposes in domestic emission trading schemes (such as the EU ETS) and/
or to meet national mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Since the 
purchase of carbon credits from CDM projects is typically less costly than emission 
reductions in developed countries (see, for instance, Figure 2), it is highly attractive 
to use these credits to meet parts of the emission reduction commitment. CDM 
credits can also be used to offset emissions on a voluntary basis, for example, to flights 
of individuals. 
The CDM has, arguably, created benefits for developing countries through its con-
tribution to sustainable development and the transfer of technologies. On the other 
hand, the CDM has faced much criticism56 for manifold reasons, inter alia, for its 
lack of environmental integrity and transparency, its undue governance structures, 
its lack of regional distribution and its cumbersome procedures. However, in the past 
years, the quality of CDM procedures has been improved step-by-step through sev-
eral COP/MOP decisions.57
The CDM functions as a pure offsetting mechanism which means that one reduced 
tonne of carbon dioxide allows the emission of one additional tonne carbon dioxide 
in developed countries. The CDM alone would, therefore, never be enough to solve 
the climate problem and it cannot be the only instrument used to involve developing 
countries into emission reduction efforts within the UNFCCC context.
Therefore, the EU and others have proposed since COP-13 at Bali to create one or 
more new market mechanisms within a post-2012 framework. These new mecha-
nisms would operate on a larger scale (for instance, on a sectoral or sub-sectoral scale) 
and would entail an own emission reduction contribution by developing countries. 
Only an ambitious part of the mitigation effort in the sector would be rewarded with 
carbon credits. 
This new approach would be intended to scale up mitigation efforts in both devel-
oped and developing countries and reduce transactions costs (compared to the 
CDM). Furthermore, it would incentivize the introduction of domestic cap-and-
trade schemes in developing countries. As in the CDM, this mechanism would 
function on a voluntary basis and would, at least partly, generate carbon credits for 
sale on the carbon market. This mechanism – in comparison to the existing CDM 
– would also recognize mitigation actions that developing countries increasingly 
56 See, for instance, CDM Watch, ‘Shortcomings of CDM’, available at <http://www.cdm-watch.org/?page_
id=24> (visited 1 June 2011).
57 See, for instance, Decision 3/CMP.6 ‘Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism’, in 
Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its 
sixth session, Appendum, Part Two, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.2 (2011).
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plan, and also implement, on their own. The CDM has also been limited to a project- 
or programme-level, whereas the new mechanisms would function on a broader scale 
(for instance, on a sectoral scale) to stimulate emission reductions on a larger scale. 
Therefore, they would ideally pave the way to low carbon economies. 
 
However, neither in Copenhagen nor in Cancún did parties manage to agree on the 
creation of new market mechanisms. Opposition came from different sides and with 
different arguments. The parties were able to agree on the following:
[The	Conference	of	the	Parties]	Decides	to consider the establishment, at its seven-
teenth session, of one or more market-based mechanisms to enhance the cost-
effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, taking into account the 
following […]58
The process is being continued but with a view to forwarding draft decisions to COP-
17. Therefore, parties were requested to submit their views on the matter. Further 
sessions to discuss modalities and procedures of the new mechanisms are being await-
ed in 2011.
 
In Cancún, parties were able to agree on several improvements to the CDM, the most 
important being the introduction of the use of standardized baselines. This allows 
now to use standardized baselines instead of setting a CDM baseline for each project 
which is costly and cumbersome. The use of standardized baselines could, therefore, 
also help in improving the regional distribution of the CDM since it makes the 
burdensome process of testing the additionality of a project much easier. 
Besides that, there is a firm safeguard in the KP decision (as part of the Cancún 
agreements) that the existing mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol should continue: 
Emissions trading and the project-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
shall continue to be available to Annex I Parties as means to meet their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction objectives in accordance with relevant deci-
sions of the CMP as may be further improved […]59
This was a long awaited signal to the carbon market, but not entirely sufficient since 
no binding emission reductions commitments – which are crucial to create demand 
– were agreed upon or announced. 
58 Decision 1/CP 16 ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
sixteenth session, Appendum, Part Two, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011) para. 80.
59 Decision 1/CMP.6, ‘Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its fifteenth session’, in Report of the Conference of the Par-
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its sixth session, Appendum, Part Two, 
UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.2 (2011) para. 6(b).
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All in all, carbon markets (CDM and JI) were quite prominent on the agenda in 
Cancún with two Conferences of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) processes; three Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Tech-
nological Advice (SBSTA) processes; one Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) 
process; and several sessions in both the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Com-
mitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-
LCA). 
However, due to the fact that a gap between the commitment periods is becoming 
very likely, there is currently a discussion underway if the market mechanism of the 
KP can continue in the absence of a second commitment period. 
5 Discussion
The development of carbon markets is obviously inevitably linked to the extent of 
international efforts to mitigate climate change – if there are no mitigation commit-
ments, in particular by developed countries, there are evidently no significant carbon 
markets. However, if one trusts the collective will of nations which was demon-
strated in Cancún in December 2010 to cut GHG emissions from their current 
trends, there are several reasons why the carbon market could be expected to grow 
further in the near future.
 
First, it remains of paramount importance that global climate policy remains cost-
effective. A recent report from UNEP shows that the current pledges given by coun-
tries for the UNFCCC are clearly inadequate to keep the global average temperature 
below 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels, which is the common endorsed 
goal of the global community in Cancún.60 Since there is an evident potential for 
mitigation investment in developing countries, in particular, due to the lower level 
of development and higher growth rate of their economies and since there is simply 
no room for wasting money in the fight against climate change, the original ideas of 
Pigou, Coase, Dales and others remain as valid as ever. Additionally, the long-term 
financing arrangements agreed in Cancún to facilitate those investments would 
greatly benefit from pricing carbon. This was also a clear message from the UN Sec-
retary General’s High Level Advisory Group on Climate Financing (AGF), which 
stated that:
[i]nstruments based on carbon pricing are particularly attractive because they 
both raise revenue and provide incentives for mitigation actions […].The Advi-
sory Group emphasized the importance of a carbon price in the range of US$20-
60 UNEP, The	Emissions	Gap	Report	–	Are	the	Copenhagen	Accord	Pledges	Sufficient	to	Limit	Global	Warming	
to	2°C	or	1.5ºC? (UNEP, 2010), available at <http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapre-
port.> (visited 29 January 2011).
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US$25 per ton of CO2 equivalent in 2020 as a key element of reaching the 
US$100 billion per year.61
Interestingly, the price level identified in the report is not significantly higher than 
the price in the EU ETS during 2009–2010. In addition, the report specifically states 
that ‘[t]he Advisory Group therefore recommends that the carbon markets be further 
strengthened and developed, while ensuring environmental integrity’.62 
Second, attempts to introduce a global or an international tax on carbon – the pol-
icy alternative of an emission trading scheme – did not particularly fly yet. Switzer-
land has presented a proposal in the UNFCCC calling for a financing scheme for 
climate adaptation based upon a global carbon tax of $2 per ton of carbon dioxide 
emitted. Countries emitting less than 1.5 tons of carbon dioxide per capita would 
be exempt from the tax.63 The AGF ‘did not take a firm view on the choice of instru-
ments to achieve carbon pricing’ (taxes vs. carbon markets), but it noted that carbon 
related instruments coordinated internationally ‘may present difficulties, however, in 
terms of political acceptability and incidence on developing countries’.64 
Third, the EU and many other countries and regions will continue to develop their 
regional systems or may establish new systems, as has been shown above. New sys-
tems will not necessarily rely on UN endorsed rules, especially in regard to the so-
phisticated CDM, and they may be very different from what we have seen until now. 
The market risks are becoming increasingly fragmented, and it may become an over-
whelming task in the medium term to attempt to link these heterogenic trading 
schemes with the ultimate goal of developing a more integrated global carbon mar-
ket. Nevertheless, it seems increasingly clear that any ambitious climate agreement 
under the umbrella of the UNFCCC would need the global carbon market as a tool 
to carry out its task – not vice versa. The carbon market will likely suffer from the 
failure of the negotiations, but will anyhow survive.
Finally, the market can and will be improved; most flaws identified in its operation 
until now are likely to be corrected. The COP decisions taken in Cancún to improve 
the CDM and JI contained a number of useful parts, such as the increased use of 
standardized baselines in the CDM. Similarly, the climate and energy package adopt-
ed in the EU in 2008 will provide many useful revisions to the EU ETS. The recent 
crimes in the EU ETS have aroused intensive attention and initiated improvement 
of the security of the registries. Likewise, the scandalous loophole with the recycled 
61 AGF, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, 5 
November 2010, available at <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/financeadviso-
rygroup> (visited 29 January 2011) at 5.
62 See ibid. at 6 and 13.
63 Funding Scheme for Bali Action Plan – A Swiss Proposal for Global Solidarity in Financing Adaptation, 
Submission to the AWG-LCA, 21 August 2008, available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/
awglca3/eng/misc02a01.pdf> (visited 21 April 2011).
64 AGF, Report of the Secretary-General’s, supra note 61, at 12–13.
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CERs has been closed by modification of the legislation. Carbon markets have been 
– and continue to be – on a steep learning curve.
6  Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that carbon markets are a success story and becoming 
more and more prominent as policy instruments worldwide. However, carbon mar-
kets and emissions trading are only useful in an environment where marginal abate-
ment costs of emission reductions differ. This will definitely be the case globally for 
the foreseeable future. The use of the carbon market in this environment hence in-
evitably addresses two basic questions: where should mitigation and investments take 
place and what the resulting total cost of mitigation action is. The more restricted 
developed countries are in spending their financial contribution to mitigation, the 
smaller share of this contribution will likely flow to developing countries and the 
larger share will flow to developed countries. This will increase the average cost of 
mitigation actions globally in the medium term. Prohibiting purchasing of emission 
units from developing countries would probably not increase the budgets in devel-
oped countries for mitigation action. As a result, more greenhouse gas emissions 
would likely be released to the atmosphere during the same timeframe.
All the Kyoto mechanisms were based on a principle that the goal was to offset emis-
sions. For the 2ºC target, this is not sufficient – we would need net reductions in 
emissions whenever possible. The development of future emissions trading systems 
must take this into account seriously. In fact, paras 80d and 80e of Decision 1/CP.6 
in Cancún were already an important move to this direction.
A vision of the global carbon market has not disappeared and does not seem to be 
disappearing. There are many reasons why the current market can be expected to 
grow. The magnitude of this growth is obviously affected by the climate negotiations 
under the UNFCCC – but not only by that.
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1 Introduction
The success or failure of multilateral environmental agreements depends in large part 
on the degree to which state parties comply with the commitments they make. It has 
been suggested that this is particularly the case in respect of the Kyoto Protocol2 to 
the UNFCCC,3 where states face ‘substantial economic and political pressures to 
delay or compromise on commitments’; and where the ‘implementation mechanisms 
are complex, involving joint implementation, emissions trading between developed 
states, and a clean development mechanism’ aiming at reductions in emissions in 
developing states.4
The compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol is based on four levels of rules which 
have developed through several steps. Initially, an enabling clause (Art. 18) in the 
Protocol mandated the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
1 Sebastian Oberthür is Academic Director of the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit 
Brussels; email: Sebastian.Oberthuer@vub.ac.be. René Lefeber is legal counsel in the International Law 
Division of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and holds a chair in International Environmental 
Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Amsterdam; e-mail: r.j.m.lefeber@uva.nl. They are both 
members of the enforcement branch of the Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol. This paper 
does not necessarily reflect the views of any of the aforementioned institutions. This paper is an updated 
and revised version of ‘Holding Countries to Account: The Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System Revis-
ited after Four Years of Experience’, 1 Climate	Law (2010) 133–158 with kind permission from IOS Press. 
The original paper is available online at <http://iospress.metapress.com/index/242752H81300601T.pdf>.
2 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
4 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International	Law	and	 the	Environment (3rd ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009) 249.
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to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) to approve appropriate and effective procedures and 
mechanisms to determine and address instances of non-compliance. On this basis, 
CMP-1 approved and adopted the procedures and mechanisms relating to compli-
ance under the Protocol (‘Compliance Procedures’).5 Further rules of procedure 
(‘Rules of Procedure’) were then developed by the Compliance Committee estab-
lished by the Compliance Procedures, and adopted by the CMP.6 In addition, the 
Committee has complemented and given effect to the Rules of Procedure by develop-
ing working arrangements.7
This paper argues that the Protocol’s compliance system provides an important prec-
edent in international climate policy and in global environmental governance more 
broadly. The compliance system is not merely an adjunct, but forms an integral part 
of the Protocol’s governance system and provides for an administrative review, by an 
independent international body, of state action to implement the Protocol. The 
system is arguably unique – even unprecedented – for multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs), especially because of its dual objective of enforcing compliance 
as well as facilitating and promoting compliance.8 Beyond its role in ensuring com-
pliance with the Protocol’s emission targets, the compliance system is an essential 
component in securing the accurate ‘measurement, reporting, and verification’ of 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Protocol and also the effective functioning of the 
Protocol’s carbon-market mechanisms. With five years of practical operation behind 
it (2006–2010), the compliance system has further matured and, it can be argued, 
has proved that an independent international review of state action can be efficacious 
in promoting compliance with an MEA – despite some weaknesses in the system 
having become evident during this period.
In negotiations on the future of the Protocol beyond its first commitment period 
(2008–2012) and on the future international cooperation on climate change more 
broadly, the rules and practice of the compliance system will continue to be relevant. 
Any future climate agreement implemented either to complement or to replace the 
Protocol will face challenges in securing compliance, preventing free-riding, and 
providing protection for the competitive positions of states participating in such an 
5 See Annex to Decision 27/CMP.1 ‘Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyo-
to Protocol’, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (2006) (hereinafter ‘Compliance Procedures’), at 
92. 
6 See Annexes to Decisions 4/CMP.2 and 4/CMP.4 ‘Compliance Committee’, UN Docs FCCC/KP/
CMP/2006/Add.1 (2007), at 17, and FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.1 (2009), at 14. Hereinafter, this 
paper refers to these ‘Rules of Procedure’ in their consolidated version available at 
 <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/3026.php> (visited 20 December 2010).
7 See Report on the Meeting, Plenary of the Compliance Committee, Third meeting, Doc. CC/3/2006/7 
(2006), at para. 5; see also Annual report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/6 (2006), 
at para. 11 (hereinafter ‘First Annual Report of the Compliance Committee’); all reports and other docu-
ments of the plenary of the Compliance Committee are available at <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
compliance/plenary/items/3788.php> (visited 20 December 2010).
8 See, for example, Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Kyoto Protocol: A Testing Ground for Compliance Theories?’, 63 
Zeitschrift	für	ausländisches	öffentliches	Recht	und	Völkerrecht (2003) 255–280.
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agreement. Although it might be that not all states support the continuation of an 
effective compliance system which utilizes an independent international body for 
review of state actions, the operational compliance system of the Protocol will pro-
vide an important benchmark for the discussions on how best to address these chal-
lenges. 
The argument in this paper develops by focusing on the main elements of the com-
pliance system and its functioning.9 Accordingly, Part 2 of the paper addresses the 
rules and practice regarding the institutional setup of the Compliance Committee. 
This is followed, in Part 3, by an analysis of the general procedures of the Committee, 
as well as the specific procedures applicable to its enforcement branch; and, in Part 
4, the ‘consequences’ to be applied in resolving problems of compliance. Part 5 dis-
cusses important interactions with other components of the Protocol; before an 
overall assessment is provided, in Part 6, of the compliance system during the first 
five years of operation. 
2  The institutional setup of the Compliance Committee
The Committee which is at the centre of the compliance system operates through 
four functional formations.10 It has twenty full members, as well as an alternate for 
each member. It operates primarily through its two branches, these being the enforce-
ment branch (EB) and the facilitative branch (FB), with ten members, and their 
alternates, serving in each. These branches address ‘questions of implementation’ (i.e. 
compliance problems). In addition, the chairpersons and the vice-chairpersons of the 
branches together form a four-member bureau; and all members (and alternate mem-
bers) together form the Committee’s plenary.
The bureau provides important overall guidance. Pursuant to the Compliance Pro-
cedures, it is responsible for allocating questions of implementation to the appropri-
ate branch, and for designating, as it considers necessary, members of one branch to 
9 A number of authors have analyzed the Compliance Procedures themselves, but analyses of the subsequent 
development and operation of the compliance system are rare. For some of the relevant literature, see 
Xueman Wang and Glenn Wiser, ‘The Implementation and Compliance Regimes under the Climate 
Change Convention and Its Kyoto Protocol’, 11 Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Envi-
ronmental	Law (2002) 181–198; Olav Schram Stokke, Jon Hovi and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Implementing	
the	Climate	Regime	–	International	Compliance (Earthscan, 2005); Christoph Holtwisch, Das	Nichtein-
haltunsverfahren	des	Kyoto-Protokolls,	Entstehung	–	Gestalt	–	Wirkung	(Duncker & Humblot, 2006); Se-
bastian Oberthür and Simon Marr, ‘Das System der Erfüllungskontrolle des Kyoto-Protokolls: Ein Schritt 
zur wirksamen Durchsetzung im Umweltvölkerrecht’, 13 Zeitschrift	für	Umweltrecht (2002) 81–89; René 
Lefeber, ‘From The Hague to Bonn to Marrakesh and Beyond: A Negotiating History of the Compliance 
Regime under the Kyoto Protocol’, 14 Hague	Yearbook	of	International	Law (2001) 25–54; René Lefeber, 
‘The Practice of the Compliance Committee under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (2006-2007)’, in Tullio Treves et al. (eds), Non-Compliance	Procedures	
and	Mechanisms	and	the	Effectiveness	of	International	Environmental	Agreements (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 303–317. 
10 Compliance Procedures, section II.
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contribute to the work of the other branch on a non-voting basis.11 Pursuant to the 
Rules of Procedure, the bureau furthermore determines the agendas for plenary meet-
ings in cooperation with the UNFCCC Secretariat (which also serves the Commit-
tee). Beyond what is provided for in the written rules, the bureau has proved crucial 
by determining the timing and organization of plenary meetings and guiding the 
preparation of associated documents.12
Although not explicitly provided for within the Compliance Procedures, the chair-
person and the vice-chairperson of each branch form a de facto bureau for their 
branch. The Rules of Procedure provide that the Secretariat is to draft the provi-
sional agenda for each branch meeting ‘in agreement with the chairperson and vice-
chairperson of the relevant branch’.13 In practice, however, the chairperson and 
vice-chairperson play more extensive roles in the organization and preparation of 
meetings. In order to facilitate decision-making of the branches, they have assumed 
responsibility for the production of draft decision texts. Exercising an (unwritten) 
set of responsibilities, the chairperson and vice-chairperson guide the elaboration of 
decisions and reports. 
Both branches are composed according to the same formula. That is, each branch 
has a member from each of the five UN regional groups, one nominated by a small-
island developing country, two nominated by developed countries (that is, parties 
listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC), and two nominated by developing countries 
(non-Annex I parties).14 In effect, 60 per cent of the members of the Committee 
and of each of its branches are nominated by developing countries.15 
The EB has exclusively defined functions. The EB is responsible for addressing cases 
of potential non-compliance by developed countries with, firstly, their emission 
targets (i.e. their emission-limitation or reduction commitments16); secondly, the 
key methodological and reporting requirements;17 and, thirdly, the eligibility re-
quirements for participation18 in the carbon-market mechanisms.19 In such cases, 
the branch is required to determine whether the party in question is in non-compli-
11 Compliance Procedures, sections VII.1 and II.7 respectively. The bureau has, during the first four years 
of the operation of the Committee, not made use of the latter provision.
12 See also Lefeber, ‘The Practice of the Compliance Committee’, supra note 9, at 304.
13 Rules of Procedure, rule 7.2.
14 Compliance Procedures, sections IV.1 and V.1. The terms ‘developed country’ and ‘Annex I party’ as well 
as ‘developing country’ and ‘non-Annex I party’ are used interchangeably throughout this paper, irrespec-
tive of the different connotations that either pair of terms may have in current political debates.
15 On the term of service of members and alternates (four years), see Compliance Procedures, sections IV.2 
and V.2; see also Decision 4/CMP.4, supra note 6.
16 Under Art. 3(1) of the Protocol.
17 Under Arts 5(1)/5(2) and 7(1)/7(4) of the Protocol.
18 Under Arts 6 (Joint Implementation), 12 (Clean Development Mechanism), and 17 (international emis-
sions trading) of the Protocol.
19 The mandate of the EB with respect to the carbon-market mechanisms does not involve any formal rela-
tionship with the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism or the Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee; see also infra, Part 5. 
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ance; and, if the finding is of non-compliance, it must apply ‘consequences’ (see also 
the discussion under Part 4 below). The EB is mandated also to decide on the ap-
plication of adjustments to inventories (for instance, where emission estimates are 
found to be lacking or incorrect20) and corrections to the database for the accounting 
of assigned amounts (for instance, where transfers of emission units are found to be 
recorded inappropriately) in situations where a related disagreement21 between an 
expert review team (ERT) and a party could not be resolved during the review of 
national greenhouse gas emission inventories.22 
By the end of 2010, the EB had considered questions of implementation with respect 
to four parties: Greece, Canada, Croatia and Bulgaria. The questions of implementa-
tion involved the compliance of these states with the methodological and reporting 
requirements; and with related eligibility requirements. The proceedings in these 
cases have created the main body of experience in the operation of the compliance 
system; and they will therefore be referred to throughout this paper.
The FB is essentially responsible for addressing any question of implementation that 
does not fall within the authority of the EB.23 This responsibility specifically includes 
an ‘early warning’ function with respect to questions of implementation regarding, 
firstly, emission targets prior to the end of the relevant commitment period; and, 
secondly, methodological and reporting requirements prior to the first commitment 
period.24 Rather than determining non-compliance in respect of any question of 
implementation addressed by it, the FB is to advise, facilitate and promote compli-
ance by applying various consequences which could be described as ‘soft’.25 So far, 
the FB has not had occasion to apply any. A submission made in 2006 by South 
Africa, on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, did not proceed to the merits (see 
further below in the present Part), and a request for clarification of the action the 
Committee could, more generally, take in relation to its facilitative function has so 
far not been addressed by the CMP.26 However, the FB decided in 2010 to develop 
its own practice and to take proactive action with respect to parties that did not 
submit their national communications on time.27 The FB initiated correspondence 
with Monaco on the delay in the submission of that country’s fifth national com-
20 See Decision 20/CMP.1 ‘Good Practice Guidance and Adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2, of the 
Kyoto Protocol’, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (2006) at 21.
21 That is a disagreement over the application of adjustments to inventories or correctionsto the database for 
the accounting of assigned amounts.
22 Compliance Procedures, section V.4-6; on the relationship with the ERT process, see also infra, Part 5.
23 The EB may also refer a question of implementation to the FB, but has not yet used this possibility; see 
Compliance Procedures, section IX.12; see also Rules of Procedure, rule 23.
24 Questions of implementation regarding emission targets after the end of the commitment period and 
regarding methodological and reporting requirements from the beginning of the commitment period fall 
under the authority of the EB.
25 Compliance Procedures, section IV.4-7. For the discussion of the consequences, see infra, Part 4.
26 See Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/17 (2009) (hereinafter ‘Fourth 
Annual Report of the Compliance Committee’), at para. 4(b).
27 See Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
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munication; and enquired as to whether it could provide any advice and facilitation 
in order to help the country meet its reporting obligations.28
The plenary of the Compliance Committee mainly has a coordinating and adminis-
trative function, in providing a link to the CMP, and is not involved in deciding 
questions of implementation. The plenary reports annually to the CMP; applies any 
general policy guidance given by the CMP; makes proposals to the CMP on admin-
istrative or budgetary matters; develops further draft rules of procedure for adoption 
by the CMP; and also performs any other functions which the CMP may assign to 
it.29 To date, the CMP has not given any policy guidance or assigned any other func-
tions to the Committee; although it has on two occasions adopted further rules of 
procedure, decided on the length and number of terms which alternate members 
may serve, and noted administrative and budgetary matter proposals.30 The plenary 
has served as a forum to discuss general matters and share information among mem-
bers and alternate members. The plenary has discussed procedural issues, such as 
alternates’ participatory rights, members’ privileges and immunities, conflicts of in-
terest, and the treatment of observers; and also substantive issues, such as delayed 
submission of parties’ reports, the functioning of the ERT process, and consistency 
in the review of parties’ reports by ERTs. The plenary has, furthermore, established 
a practice of exchanging information on the two branches’ respective activities in 
order to promote consistency in the application of the Compliance Procedures.31
The Committee’s decision-making rules aim to achieve a balance between, on the 
one hand, enabling the Committee to take decisions in cases where consensus cannot 
be reached; and, on the other, providing reassurance to developed countries, in par-
ticular, that the members nominated by them cannot be outvoted for political rea-
sons. The Committee, in all four of its functional formations, must attempt to take 
decisions by consensus; but it may, as a last resort, adopt a decision with a 75 per 
cent majority. Decisions also require a quorum of at least 75 per cent of the members. 
There is a further requirement for decisions of the EB stipulating that there be a 
simple majority amongst the members nominated by developed countries and a 
simple majority amongst the members nominated by developing countries.32 The 
risk of a stalemate is therefore particularly pronounced in the EB, as the opposition 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/6 (2010) (hereinafter ‘Fifth An-
nual Report of the Compliance Committee’), at paras 45–46. 
28 See letters from the FB Chairperson to Monaco from 28 July 2010 and 16 November 2010 as well as 
Monaco’s replies from 16 September 2010 and 2 December 2010, annexed to ‘Provisions related to fa-
cilitation: Advice and facilitation’, Doc. CC/FB/10/2011/2 (2011). Monaco eventually submitted its fifth 
national communication on 25 March 2011; see Status of submission and review of reports under the 
Kyoto Protocol, Doc. CC/9/2011/3/Rev.1 (2011).
29 Compliance Procedures, section III.
30 See Decision 4/CMP.2, supra note 6; Decision 5/CMP.3 ‘Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol’, UN 
Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 (2008), at 21; Decision 4/CMP.4, supra note 6; and Decision 6/
CMP.5 ‘Compliance Committee’, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/21/Add.1 (2010), at 20.
31 See agendas and reports of the meetings of the plenary, available at <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
compliance/plenary/items/3788.php> (visited 5 January 2011).
32 Compliance Procedures, section II.8–9.
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of merely two members nominated by developed countries would be sufficient to 
block a decision. 
That there are limitations on the Committee’s voting rules, and that there is a danger 
of its proceedings being politicized, are apparent from the failure of the FB to reach 
agreement on how to address a question of implementation submitted on 26 May 
2006 by South Africa in its capacity as Chair of the Group of 77 and China. This 
related to the alleged failure of fifteen developed countries to submit reports demon-
strating progress in achieving their commitments.33 The FB failed to reach a decision 
during the preliminary examination on whether or not to proceed with the question 
in respect of 13 of the 15 countries in question. Members disagreed on the implica-
tions of the fact that the submission, firstly, was not by a party on its own behalf 
through a representative duly authorized for this purpose; secondly, did not clearly 
and individually name the parties with respect to which it purported to raise a ques-
tion of implementation; and, thirdly, was not supported by concrete corroborating 
information and did not substantiate how the question related to any of the specific 
commitments of the relevant parties under the Protocol.34
The failure of the FB to reach agreement regarding the South African submission had 
an important educative effect for the Committee and contributed to preventing 
repetition of such a stalemate. An in-depth discussion of the FB’s failure resulted in 
enhanced member awareness that stalemates in decision-making constitute a serious 
threat to the Committee’s credibility. The discussion led also to provisions being 
included in the Rules of Procedure concerning minimum procedural standards for 
submission of questions of implementation.35 There has been no subsequent stale-
mate in decision-making in the Committee, with the overwhelming majority of 
decisions being adopted by consensus.
In order to minimize potential political interference, the functioning of the Com-
mittee rests upon the independence and neutrality of its members. According to the 
Compliance Procedures, members ‘shall serve in their individual capacities’,36 and 
the Rules of Procedure further specify that members shall ‘act in an independent and 
impartial manner and avoid real or apparent conflicts of interest’.37 Committee 
members may continue as delegation members to meetings under the Convention 
33 The submission of such reports is required by Art. 3(2) of the Protocol.
34 The FB was able to decide by majority not to proceed with respect to two developed countries which had 
in the meantime submitted their reports (Latvia and Slovenia); see Report of the Compliance Committee 
on the Deliberations in the Facilitative Branch Relating to the Submission Entitled ‘Compliance with 
Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol, reproduced in Annex IV of the First Annual Report of the Compliance 
Committee, supra note 7; see also Lefeber, ‘The Practice of the Compliance Committee’, supra note 9, at 
314-15; all documents of the FB are available at <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/facilita-
tive_branch/items/3786.php>. For an explication of the ‘preliminary examination’ of questions of imple-
mentation, see infra, Part 3.1.
35 See infra, Part 3.1.
36 Compliance Procedures, section II.6.
37 Rules of Procedure, rule 4.1.
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or the Protocol, but the Committee has recognized that in certain circumstances such 
a situation could lead to due process concerns and, therefore, that due diligence 
should always be exercised.38
With a view to ensuring such independence and neutrality, the plenary of the Com-
mittee has repeatedly, although unsuccessfully to date, requested that the CMP pro-
vide funding for the regular participation of all members.39 At present, only mem-
bers and alternates from developing countries, and from some low-income countries 
with economies in transition, are eligible to have their travel and subsistence ex-
penses reimbursed by the Secretariat. The members and alternates from most devel-
oped countries rely for such reimbursement on the party which nominated them; 
and some governments have questioned whether they should provide such reim-
bursement if they cannot instruct the member or alternate nominated by them to 
serve the interests of that state.40
The Rules of Procedure have further reinforced the importance of the independence 
and neutrality of members by requiring that each take a written oath of service before 
assuming their duties; and by establishing a complaint procedure for alleged conflicts 
of interest or incompatibility with the requirements of independence and neutrality. 
The oath requires members to declare any relevant interest in any matter under dis-
cussion before the Committee and to refrain from participating in the work of the 
Committee in relation to any such matter. The complaint procedure may result in 
the plenary suspending, or recommending that the CMP revoke the membership of 
a member who has been found to have materially violated the requirements of inde-
pendence and neutrality.41 
The role of alternate members has been further clarified in the Rules of Procedure so 
as to enable them to play a fully supportive role in the effective functioning of the 
Committee. Rules on independence and neutrality apply to alternates as they apply 
to members; and all alternate members are entitled to participate in the proceedings 
of the plenary and the branch to which they belong on an equal footing with mem-
bers, except that they may not cast a vote if the associated member votes.42 This en-
titlement – and encouragement – aims to ensure that alternates are kept fully in-
38 See Fifth Annual Report of the Compliance Committee, supra note 27, at para. 50. 
39 See ‘Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol’, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/6 (2007), (hereinafter ‘Second 
Annual Report of the Compliance Committee’), at para. 5; ‘Annual Report of the Compliance Commit-
tee to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol’, UN Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/5 (2008) (hereinafter ‘Third Annual Report of the Compliance Committee’), at 
para. 4(f ); Fourth Annual Report of the Compliance Committee, supra note 26, at para 4(c).
40 Personal experience of the authors.
41 Rules of Procedure, rule 4. A complaint was, for the first time, lodged on 28 December 2009 by Croatia 
in its comments on the final decision of the EB; in September 2010, the Committee agreed to refrain 
from considering the complaint on the merits pending its consideration by the CMP in the context of 
Croatia’s appeal against the final decision (see further below). See Fifth Annual Report of the Compliance 
Committee, supra note 27, at paras 53–63 and Annex II.
42 Rules of Procedure, rule 3. 
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formed and are able to replace a member effectively whenever this may be required. 
The active participation of alternate members has arguably had, generally, a positive 
impact on the consideration of questions of implementation and on the other busi-
ness of the plenary and the branches.43 
With the aim of shielding the quasi-judicial decision-making by the Committee from 
political interference, the Compliance Procedures further accord far-reaching powers 
to the Committee, thus limiting the residual powers of the CMP. As indicated ear-
lier, the CMP, which has delegated final decision-making authority on questions of 
implementation to the branches, is limited to considering the Committee’s reports, 
adopting further rules of procedure, providing general policy guidance, adopting 
decisions on administrative and budgetary matters, and deciding appeals.44 Besides 
the narrowly defined exception of appeals (further discussed below under Part 4), the 
CMP is not required to confirm the decisions of the branches on questions of im-
plementation, and cannot overrule such decisions, the latter being in contrast with 
the compliance systems of several other MEAs.45 Arguably, this reflected a strong 
desire by the parties who negotiated the system to minimize political interference, 
perhaps reflecting in turn the importance of the issue of climate change.
3 Procedures of the Committee and its branches for the 
consideration of questions of implementation
3.1 Triggering, allocation, and preliminary examination
The Committee must observe detailed procedural prescriptions, including strict 
timelines for the EB, when it considers questions of implementation. It appears that, 
in a trade-off for gaining a high degree of independence for the Committee, nego-
tiators were eager to ensure a high level of automaticity and due process for a party 
with respect to which a question of implementation is raised, especially as regards 
the proceedings of the EB. The Committee has successfully applied these proce-
dures.46
43 All reports and decisions, including details on attendance and participation in decision-making, are avail-
able at the Secretariat’s website.
44 Compliance Procedures, sections XII and III.2(d).
45 See, for example, Treves et al. (eds), Non-Compliance	Procedures,	supra note 9; Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-To-
bias Stoll and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Ensuring	Compliance	with	Multilateral	Environmental	Agreements 
(Brill Academic Publishers, 2006); United Nations Environment Programme, Compliance	Mechanisms	
under	Selected	Multilateral	Environmental	Agreements (UNEP, 2007), available at <http://www.unep.org/
pdf/delc/Compliance_Mechanism_final.pdf> (visited 5 January 2011).
46 While the Compliance Procedures themselves do not determine further specific procedures for the FB, 
rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure contains limited further provisions, which are not considered in this 
paper.
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The way in which a compliance procedure is triggered is fundamental to any compli-
ance system.47 Compliance problems must be introduced in the compliance system 
if they are to be addressed. Without appropriate triggering provisions, the effective-
ness of a compliance system will be diminished. In this respect, the experience of 
compliance mechanisms under other MEAs and international institutions suggests 
that it is rare for states to trigger judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings against other 
states; rather, it is actors other than states that trigger the compliance procedures.48
The compliance procedure of the Kyoto Protocol may be triggered in three ways. 
Firstly, the Committee may receive a question of implementation from an ERT; 
secondly, from a party with respect to itself (a ‘self-trigger’); and, thirdly, from a 
party with respect to another party.49 Furthermore, the Committee has defined 
minimum procedural standards for submissions of questions of implementation by 
parties, including that these must be signed by a duly authorized representative of 
the submitting state; and that they may not be submitted by one state on behalf of 
a group of states.50 These standards apply also to other official submissions and com-
ments made during proceedings, and may also be considered a matter of procedural 
fairness and due process for the party concerned (see also Part 3.2 below). They were 
included in the Rules of Procedure after the above-mentioned failure of the FB to 
reach agreement regarding the submission of South Africa on behalf of the G77 and 
China, a case in which lack of clarity on the applicable standards contributed to a 
stalemate in the FB (see supra	under Part 2). 
The practice of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system conforms to broader experi-
ence with comparable mechanisms under other MEAs and international institutions, 
in that Kyoto’s non-state ERT trigger has proved crucial. Due to their fundamental 
importance, the triggering provisions were one of the controversial issues during the 
negotiations on the Kyoto Compliance Procedures.51 While certain proposals for 
triggering action, such as by the Secretariat or non-governmental organizations, did 
not find sufficient support, it was agreed, after extensive discussion, that the Com-
mittee ‘shall receive, through the secretariat, questions of implementation indicated 
in reports of expert review teams’.52 This quasi-automatic channel has become the 
most important trigger: all questions of implementation on which the Committee 
has so far proceeded to the merits were received from ERTs. That is, by the end of 
47 See, for example, Francesca Romanin Jacur, ‘Triggering Non-Compliance Procedures’, in Treves et al. 
(eds), Non-Compliance	Procedures,	supra note 9, 373–388.
48 See, for example, Markus Ehrmann, ‘Procedures of Compliance Control in International Environmental 
Treaties’, 13 Colorado	Journal	of	International	Environmental	Law	and	Policy (2002) 377–443, at 382; and 
Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Legalized Dispute Resolution: In-
terstate and Transnational’, 54 International	Organization (2000) 457–488.
49 Compliance Procedures, section VI.1; on triggering of non-compliance procedures of MEAs, see Romanin 
Jacur, ‘Triggering Non-Compliance’, supra note 47.
50 Rules of Procedure, rules 2 and 18; see also rules 14–17.
51 Wang and Weiser, supra note 9, at 193-4.
52 Compliance Procedures, section VI.1.
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2010, no other trigger had been used, with the exception of the above-mentioned 
South African submission which was not addressed on the merits.
There are two steps required before the Committee may proceed to consider the 
merits of any question of implementation received. Firstly, the bifurcation of the 
Committee requires that a question of implementation be allocated according to each 
branch’s mandate; such allocation must be effectuated, by the Committee’s bureau, 
within seven days.53 Secondly, the responsible branch must, within three weeks, 
conduct a ‘preliminary examination’ in order to ensure that the question is sup-
ported by sufficient information; is not minimal or ill-founded; and, finally, is based 
upon the Protocol’s requirements. These criteria were designed to provide further 
insurance against potential misuse of the Compliance Procedures. Where the ques-
tion of implementation has been triggered by another party, the preliminary exami-
nation should include a check of the standards established in the Rules of Procedure, 
including the requirement that there be a signature of a duly authorized person. No 
preliminary examination is required where a party has itself triggered the question. 
The actual proceedings in a case may only start once the preliminary examination 
has led to a decision to proceed with a question of implementation.54
3.2 General procedures 
The general procedural provisions to be followed by both branches deal, in particular, 
with matters of due process, sources of information, expert advice, public participa-
tion, and transparency.
Several provisions are aimed at ensuring due process for the party concerned.55 The 
party concerned is entitled to be represented during the consideration of any ques-
tion of implementation; although it may not be present during the elaboration (that 
is, the process of discussion and drafting) and the adoption of a decision, at which 
points only the members of the Committee and the Secretariat staff may be present.56 
The party concerned is entitled to all of the information considered by the branch 
and may submit written comments on both such information and any decision of 
the branch. Any comment on a final decision submitted, which submission must be 
within forty-five days of the adoption of the final decision, is to be annexed to the 
annual report of the Committee to the CMP.57 Further provisions related to due 
53 Compliance Procedures, section VII.1; Rules of Procedure, rule 19. The Secretariat is to ensure proper 
notification of the members and alternates of the branches.
54 Compliance Procedures, section VII.
55 Section VIII, paras. 2, 6–9; Rules of Procedure, rules 9, 13 and 22.2.
56 Section VIII.2 and Rules of Procedure, rule 9.2.
57 By the end of 2010, all of Canada, Croatia, and Bulgaria had used this right. Canada challenged an aspect 
of the EB’s decision not to proceed further. Since the case was closed and there was no legal basis for reo-
pening the proceedings, Canada followed the suggestion that its submission be treated as a comment on 
the decision not to proceed further. Third Annual Report of the Compliance Committee, supra note 39, 
at para. 30 and Annex V; for the comments by Croatia and Bulgaria, see Fifth Annual Report of the 
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process concern the handling of information provided by the party concerned; and 
the use of other languages than English.58
In respect of information sources, the branches are to ground their deliberations on 
information provided by reports from ERTs, by the party concerned, by the party 
that submitted the question of implementation (if this is what happened), by the 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, by the CMP, by the subsidiary bodies, 
and by the other branch of the Compliance Committee.59 Relevant factual and 
technical information may also be submitted by competent intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations;60 however, by the end of 2010, no such organiza-
tions had taken this opportunity.
Expert advice may also be sought by the branches.61 If this option is chosen, the 
branch must define the questions on which the expert opinion is to be obtained, 
identify the relevant experts, and establish the procedures to be followed.62 Since 
many of the issues to be addressed by the branches are of a technical nature, such 
expert advice has proved to be crucial in the operation of the Committee.63
As for transparency, all branch decisions are made public. The same is true for all 
information which the relevant branch considers, although the branch may decide, 
either at its own initiative or at the request of the party concerned, to make certain 
information available only after the conclusion of the proceedings. All decisions, 
including both preliminary and final decisions, are required to contain a list of spe-
cific elements including conclusions and reasons for the decision.64 Each member 
and alternate member has a sworn duty under the Rules of Procedure not to disclose 
confidential information.65 Although ‘confidential information’ is not comprehen-
sively defined, it presumably includes information disclosed in confidence in closed 
meetings of the Committee; information subject to other confidentiality protections 
that is received upon request of the Committee; and information on discussions of 
Compliance Committee, supra note 27, at para. 30 and Annex II, and para. 38 and Annex III, respec-
tively.
58 Compliance Procedures, section VIII.6 and 9, and Rules of Procedure, rule 13.
59 Compliance Procedures, section VIII.3.
60 Compliance Procedures, section VIII.4. They should do so in writing after the preliminary examination: 
Rules of Procedure, rule 20.
61 Compliance Procedures, section VIII.5.
62 Rules of Procedure, rules 20 and 21.
63 The EB has obtained expert advice in all four of the cases it had addressed by the end of 2010, and the 
advice given played a significant role in the EB’s consideration of the questions of implementation with 
respect to Greece, Canada, and Bulgaria. See Final Decision (Party concerned: Greece), Enforcement 
Branch of the Compliance Committee, Doc. CC-2007-1-8/Greece/EB (2008); Decision not to Proceed 
Further (Party concerned: Canada), Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee, Doc. CC-2008-
1-6/Canada/EB (2008); Final Decision (Party concerned: Croatia), Enforcement Branch of the Compli-
ance Committee, Doc. CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB (2009); Final Decision (Party concerned: Bulgaria), 
Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee, Doc. CC-2010-1-8/Bulgaria/EB (2010).
64 Compliance Procedures, section VIII.6–7; Rules of Procedure, rules 12 and 22.
65 Rules of Procedure, rule 4.2.
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a decision in closed meetings (however, voting records will be publicly disclosed in 
the decision itself ). 
To enhance public	participation, meetings of the plenary and the branches (but not 
of the bureau) are open to the public, unless decided otherwise for ‘overriding’ rea-
sons – but only members and Secretariat officials may be present during the elabora-
tion and adoption of a decision. Since 2007, the Committee has admitted registered 
observers – any person may register as an observer66 – to attend the open parts of its 
meetings, has recorded its proceedings, and has made these available through internet 
access. The word ‘overriding’ has not been defined; as for practice, a vote on a pro-
posed decision to hold a plenary meeting in private, where the issue to be addressed 
was the alleged conflict of interest of an alternate member, did not achieve a quorum 
and was therefore not adopted.67
The use of electronic means of decision-making inevitably results in a somewhat 
restricted observation of the process by both the party concerned and the general 
public. Electronic means are used for the transmission, distribution, and storage of 
documentation, as well as for the elaboration and adoption of decisions.68 Only 
after much internal debate did the Committee agree to allow the use of electronic 
means for elaborating and taking decisions to facilitate its work between meetings 
– this being seen as necessary in order to comply with the tight timelines for the al-
location of a question of implementation,69 the preliminary examination, and the 
special procedures for the EB addressed below.
Despite there being only limited scope for discussion using this method, electronic 
means of decision-making had, by 2010, become the usual method used for taking 
decisions on allocation, preliminary examination, and expert advice. This has served 
to reinforce the important role of the chairperson and vice-chairperson of each 
branch in guiding the drafting of proposed decisions to be adopted by electronic 
means. However, decisions on the substance of questions of implementation have 
usually been drafted and discussed in face-to-face meetings and not by electronic 
means. In some cases, decisions elaborated in a meeting have been subsequently 
adopted through electronic means where there was no quorum for the adoption of 
the decision at the meeting itself. Such a decision was made in the case of the pre-
liminary examination of the submission by South Africa, discussed above, as well as 
in the case of the final decision on Croatia.70
66 Rules of Procedure, rule 9; working arrangements in: ‘Second Annual Report of the Compliance Com-
mittee’, supra note 39, at paras 15–17; on the review and the continued application of these arrangements, 
see Fifth Annual Report of the Compliance Committee, supra note 27, at para. 16.
67 See ‘Report on the Meeting’, Plenary of the Compliance Committee, Seventh meeting, Doc. CC/7/2010/5 
(2010), at para. 3; see supra Part 2.
68 Rules of Procedure, rule 11.
69 See also rule 19.1 of the Rules of Procedure.
70 ‘First Annual Report of the Compliance Committee’, supra note 7, at paras 19–25; ‘Report on the Meet-
ing’, Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee, Eighth meeting, Doc. CC/EB/8/2009/2 
(2009), at para. 6.
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3.3 Enforcement Branch procedures
The procedure of the EB follows a two-stage process. First, the party concerned has 
the opportunity to put forward its case in writing and, on request, through a hearing; 
on this basis, the EB either makes a preliminary non-compliance finding or takes a 
decision not to proceed further with the question of implementation. If a preliminary 
finding of non-compliance is made, the party concerned can request a review of the 
preliminary finding by providing further written arguments, which are to be consid-
ered by the EB before it adopts a final decision.71 The possibility to seek review of 
the preliminary finding provides an additional procedural safeguard, under the EB’s 
procedures, to the party concerned.72
Two main types of EB procedures exist, distinguishable by the strictness of the ap-
plicable timelines. The overall time limits of the regular EB procedures total a maxi-
mum of approximately 36 weeks. For questions of implementation related to eligibil-
ity for participation in the carbon-market mechanisms, expedited timeframes apply 
(adding up to about 17 weeks at the most).73 Whereas the EB may extend any of its 
normal timelines ‘when the circumstances of an individual case so warrant’,74 an 
extension is not possible in respect of the expedited procedures.75 
The EB procedures contain three additional ‘expedited procedures’ which are not as 
clearly defined. Firstly, a party which has been rendered ineligible by a decision of 
the EB from participating in the carbon-market mechanisms may request that its 
eligibility be reinstated by the EB, through an ERT or directly.76 If the EB receives 
an ERT report indicating that the party meets all eligibility requirements, it must 
reinstate the party’s eligibility, unless the branch considers that there is still a question 
of implementation. The relevant ERT report may arise from a regular review or, by 
71 Compliance Procedures, section IX.
72 Although not explicitly foreseen in the Compliance Procedures, the EB did also, in the cases of Greece, 
Croatia, and Bulgaria, establish a practice of allowing, at the meeting of the branch convened to elaborate 
and adopt the final decision, the party concerned to present its further written submission, and to respond 
to any related questions of the branch. Report on the Meeting, Enforcement Branch of the Compliance 
Committee, Fourth meeting, Doc. CC/EB/4/2008/2 (2008), at para. 5; Report of the Eighth meeting, 
supra note 70, at para. 5; Report on the Meeting, Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee, 
Tenth meeting, Doc. CC/EB/10/2010/2 (2010), at para. 7. However, the EB decided that it could not 
take into consideration any issues raised during the presentation of the further written submission which 
were not raised in that submission. Ibid. at para. 9.
73 Compliance Procedures, sections X and X.1; rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure grants additional time for 
communication with the party concerned.
74 Compliance Procedures, section IX.11.
75 In the cases of Greece, Croatia, and Bulgaria, which utilized the full expedited procedures, the final deci-
sions were adopted within, respectively, 16, 14 and 17 weeks. The procedural steps and relevant dates are 
given in the respective final decisions, which are available at the Secretariat’s website. The timelines ap-
plicable to the various steps of the EB’s regular and expedited procedures are depicted in Figure 1, at the 
end of the present paper.
76 Compliance Procedures, section X.2.
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request from the party concerned, from an expedited review for the reinstatement of 
eligibility.77 The party may also directly request the EB to reinstate its eligibility.78 
Secondly, a party that has been disentitled to transfer emission units following a 
decision of the EB that it is in non-compliance with its emission target may request 
that the EB to reinstate its eligibility.79 Reinstatement of eligibility may be request-
ed on the basis of the party’s compliance action plan (see Part 4 below) and addi-
tional information submitted to demonstrate that the party will, for the commitment 
period subsequent to the one for which it was found to be in non-compliance, meet 
its emission target. If the party demonstrates that it has, in the subsequent commit-
ment period, met its emission target then the EB is to reinstate its eligibility. This 
procedure has not yet been applied as the EB will only receive any questions of im-
plementation regarding non-compliance with emission targets from ERTs in the 
second half of 2015, at the earliest.80 The full application, relevance, and effective-
ness of this procedure will depend on whether further commitment periods will 
follow the first.
Finally, the EB has been mandated to make a decision, within twelve weeks, on any 
disagreement between the ERT and the party concerned about whether to apply 
adjustments to greenhouse gas emission inventories or corrections to the database for 
the accounting of assigned amounts.81 In contrast to the other parts of the mandate 
of the EB, its primary task in respect of such disagreements is not determining that 
the party concerned is not in compliance, but resolving the disagreement by deter-
mining the correct amount. By mid-2011, no such question of implementation had 
arisen, as the ERTs and the parties had been able to resolve such disagreements be-
tween themselves.82 It is reasonable, however, to assume that the very existence of a 
formal, high-level, compliance system contributes to the parties’ resolve to settle their 
differences with the ERTs.83
77 See Annex to Decision 22/CMP.1 ‘Guidelines for Review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol’, UN 
Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (2006), at 51, especially Part VIII.
78 By mid-2011, this reinstatement procedure had been invoked twice by Greece and Bulgaria, applying for 
such reinstatement on the basis of ERT reports resulting from regular reviews. Greece’s eligibility was 
reinstated in November 2008 and Bulgaria’s in February 2011. See Decision under Paragraph 2 of Section 
X (Party concerned: Greece), Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee, Doc. CC-2007-1-13/
Greece/EB (2008); and Decision under Paragraph 2 of Section X (Party concerned: Bulgaria), Enforce-
ment Branch of the Compliance Committee, Doc. CC-2010-1-17/Bulgaria/EB (2011). 
79 Compliance Procedures, section X.3–4.
80 See infra, Part 4.
81 Compliance Procedures, section X.5.
82 For example, the Netherlands eventually accepted a significant adjustment of its estimate of net CO2 
emissions from deforestation for the base year during the review of its initial report. See Report of the 
Review of the Initial Report of the Netherlands, UN Doc. FCCC/IRR/2007/NLD (2007) and Doc. CC/
ERT/IRR/2007/12 (2007), especially at para. 189.
83 See also infra, Part 5.
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4 ‘Consequences’ for the resolution of compliance problems
The FB and the EB have different sets of ‘consequences’ – sticks as well as carrots – 
available for resolving compliance problems. These consequences have been designed 
to utilize both the incentives and the disincentives that are built into the Protocol 
and its implementing decisions. The FB has more discretion in applying conse-
quences that are ‘softer’ in nature than the EB has in applying consequences that are 
‘stronger’ in nature.
According to its mandate, the FB can only apply ‘facilitative’ consequences,84 which 
are permutations on the provision of advice and facilitation of assistance, with the 
strongest of these measures seeming to be the formulation of recommendations. No 
cases have been considered by the FB on substance, and so no practice has yet 
emerged. 
The EB has, in contrast, little discretion in the application of the consequences at its 
disposal. According to its mandate, it must apply the consequences linked to three 
possible kinds of non-compliance.85 Firstly, where the non-compliance relates to 
methodological and reporting requirements, the EB must declare the party concerned 
to be in non-compliance and request that it submit a ‘plan’ to return to compliance. 
Secondly, where the non-compliance concerns the eligibility requirements, the EB 
must suspend a party’s eligibility or, in the case of initial eligibility, decide that a 
party is, ‘in accordance with relevant provisions under those articles’, not eligible. 
Thirdly, in case of non-compliance with the party’s emission target, the EB must de-
clare the party’s non-compliance, deduct 1.3 times the excess tonnes from the party’s 
assigned amount for the second commitment period,86 request the submission of a 
‘compliance action plan’, and suspend the party’s eligibility to sell emission units.87
The Compliance Procedures make similar provision for the ‘plan’ to remedy non-
compliance with methodological and reporting requirements and for the ‘compliance 
action plan’ to remedy non-compliance with an emission target. The EB is tasked 
with reviewing and assessing the plans as well as their implementation. The plans 
must contain an analysis of the causes of non-compliance; a description of the meas-
ures taken to restore compliance; and a timetable88 for the implementation of these 
84 Compliance Procedures, section XIV.
85 Compliance Procedures, section XV.
86 The rate for subsequent commitment periods remains to be determined; see Compliance Procedures, 
section XV.8.
87 These consequences have largely been copied over to the EU legislation that implements the overall EU 
target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 as regards emissions not covered by 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Nuno Lacasta et al., ‘From Sharing the Burden to Sharing the Effort: 
Decision 406/2009/EC on Member State Emission Targets for non-ETS Sectors’, in Sebastian Oberthür 
and Marc Pallemaerts (eds), The	New	Climate	Policies	 of	 the	European	Union:	 Internal	Legislation	and	
Climate	Diplomacy (VUB Press, 2010) 93–116.
88 Which must not exceed one year, for plans to comply with methodological and reporting requirements; 
or three years, for plans to comply with an emission target.
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measures.89 The Rules of Procedure specify that each of these ‘elements’ should be 
addressed in a separate section and that the party concerned must respond to any 
specific issues raised in the part of the final decision of the EB applying the conse-
quences.90
 
Only the consequences for non-compliance with the methodological, reporting, and 
eligibility requirements are of relevance until the EB receives a question of imple-
mentation related to emission targets. As all of the questions of implementation 
addressed by the EB by the end of 2010 concerned eligibility requirements (and by 
implication methodological and reporting requirements), the EB applied the conse-
quences for both forms of non-compliance in the cases where it adopted a final deci-
sion of non-compliance (namely Greece, Croatia and Bulgaria). 
As explained, no questions of implementation from ERTs regarding emission targets 
will reach the EB before the second half of 2015. Questions of implementation re-
garding emission targets become the EB’s responsibility only after the end of the 
relevant commitment period.91 The inventories of the last year of the first commit-
ment period (2012) are due to be submitted by 15 April 2014, and ERTs will then 
have up to one year to review these.92 Following this, parties may transfer and ac-
quire emission units during an additional period of 100 days in order to ensure 
compliance.93
The deduction rate of 1.3 times the party’s excess emissions, which is to be deducted 
from the party’s assigned amount for the second commitment period where the 
party is in non-compliance with its emission target for the first period, may be per-
ceived as a ‘penalty’ (in effect, if not in name). It is the argument of the present writ-
ers that it should not. Characterizing it as a ‘penalty’, or as ‘penalizing’ the party 
concerned, would be out of tune with the tenor of the negotiations process and the 
economics of climate change.94 The concept of imposing a ‘penalty’ for non-com-
pliance was a contentious issue in the negotiations on the Compliance Procedures; 
and it was eventually agreed that the ‘consequences’ (to be applied by the EB in case 
89 See Compliance Procedures, section XV.2–3 and 6–7 (also detailing the applicable timeframes).
90 Rules of Procedure, rule 25bis (also providing further guidance regarding the EB’s review and assessment 
of a plan). This provision was introduced after the submission of a ‘plan’ submitted by Greece that was 
not suitable for review and assessment, and was therefore considered inadequate by the EB. See Decision 
on the Review and Assessment of the Plan Submitted under Paragraph 2 of Section XV (Party concerned: 
Greece), supra note 78.
91 Falling within the mandate of the FB until then; see supra, Part 2.
92 See Decision 15/CMP.1 ‘Guidelines for the Preparation of the Information Required under Article 7 of 
the Kyoto Protocol’, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (2006), at 54; Decision 22/CMP.1, supra 
note 77.
93 Compliance Procedures, section XIII; the paper returns to this rather late entry of questions of implemen-
tation regarding emission targets in infra, Part 5.
94 For two examples of this more-than-widespread characterization, see Brunnée, ‘The Kyoto Protocol’, supra 
note 8, at 274; Anita Halvorssen and Jon Hovi, ‘The Nature, Origin and Impact of Legally Binding 
Consequences: The Case of the Climate Regime’, 6 International	Environmental	Agreements (2005) 157–
171 (even claiming that suspension of eligibility is punitive).
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of non-compliance, and the deduction rate in particular) would ‘aim at the restora-
tion of compliance to ensure environmental integrity’ and would ‘provide for an 
incentive to comply’.95 Proposals for consequences that had a penalizing ‘image’ 
(such as payments into a ‘compliance fund’) and which would have been difficult to 
enforce were rejected.96 However, in order to prevent a party from benefiting from 
non-compliance, the deduction rate needed to be a reflection of the opportunity 
costs of compliance: if a party could expect to gain significantly higher returns from 
leaving funds in a bank account or investing them elsewhere than in compliance 
measures, then the compliance system would arguably fail to provide an important 
incentive for compliance, and climate mitigation measures might be postponed. The 
agreed deduction rate, at the conclusion of the negotiations, was comparable to the 
compound interest rate in the InterBank market for a period of five years.97 Yet, as 
a result of falling interest rates since the adoption of the Compliance Procedures, the 
deduction rate currently surpasses the opportunity costs of compliance.
The Compliance Procedures do contain provision for appeal, although this is limited. 
A party may, within forty-five days of notification of the final decision, appeal to the 
CMP against a final decision of the EB relating to that party’s emission target.98 An 
appeal must relate to the appealing party’s emission target; and, as it must concern 
an alleged violation of due process, mere disagreement by the party concerned with 
the substance of the decision of the EB is insufficient ground for an appeal. Moreo-
ver, the bar for a successful appeal to the CMP has been set quite high: a CMP deci-
sion overriding the EB decision requires a 75 per cent majority of the parties present 
and voting. A feature which avoids the creation of a ‘perverse incentive’ to appeal 
against EB decisions is that the lodging of an appeal does not suspend the decision. 
As is normal with a successful appeal on a procedural ground, if the CMP considers 
that the party concerned has indeed been denied due process it does not have the 
authority to decide the question of implementation; rather, the question must be 
referred back to the EB.99 
A question of interpretation with respect to the admission of appeals concerns the 
requirement for the appeal to ‘relate to’ the appealing party’s emission target. There 
can be no doubt that an appeal against a final decision establishing a party’s non-
95 Compliance Procedures, section V.6; see also Jacob Werksman, ‘The Negotiation of a Kyoto Compliance 
System’, in Stokke et al. (eds), Implementing	the	Climate	Regime,	supra note 9, 17–37.
96 Wang and Weiser, ‘The Implementation and Compliance Regimes’, supra note 9, at 195–197.
97 The 12-month average of the 12-month LIBOR rate (London InterBank Offered Rate) for the period 
July 2000 to June 2001 was 5.142 per cent (which was well below the average of the rate in the preceding 
decade). On the basis of this average rate, the compound interest rate for a period of five years would be 
28.5 per cent. This rate approaches the thirty per cent deduction rate that was proposed by the President 
of the COP in his Core Elements Paper on 21 July 2001, and agreed to by the COP on 23 July 2001 (see 
Review of the implementation of commitments and of other provisions of the convention, UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/L.6 (2001)). Historical LIBOR rate information is available at <http://www.wsjprime-
rate.us/libor/libor_rates_history.htm> (visited 10 January 2011). 
98 Compliance Procedures, section XI.
99 Compliance Procedures, section XI.3 and XI.4. 
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compliance with its emission target after the end of a commitment period would so 
‘relate to’; but it is debatable whether a final decision which affects the establishment 
of the assigned amount of a party (for example, in the case of Croatia) or the eligibil-
ity of a party (for example, in the case of Greece) may also be considered as appeal-
able as ‘relating to’ a party’s emission target.100
Another question is whether the consequences of the Compliance Procedures are 
binding on parties to the Protocol. Article 18 of the Protocol provides that proce-
dures and mechanisms to address cases of non-compliance ‘entailing binding conse-
quences’ must be adopted by means of an amendment to the Protocol. During the 
negotiations of the Compliance Procedures, it was suggested that in order to provide 
for binding consequences from the beginning of the first commitment period they 
should be made part of the Protocol prior to its entry into force. This suggestion was, 
however, not adopted.101 The Compliance Procedures were instead adopted and ap-
proved by the CMP in the form of a decision that is not legally binding.102 It might 
therefore be argued that a concerned party is not bound by the application of con-
sequences, such as the suspension of eligibility by the EB.103 
There can be little doubt, however, that the application of consequences by the EB 
is effective even without a formally binding status for the consequences.104 The sus-
pension of eligibility105 means that the party concerned is no longer able to clear 
100 This question of interpretation formed part of the consideration of Croatia’s appeal against the final deci-
sion of the EB concerning the calculation of its assigned amount which the CMP initiated (but did not 
conclude) in December 2010. See Appeal by Croatia against a Final Decision of the Enforcement Branch 
of the Compliance Committee, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/2 (2010), and Appeal by Croatia 
against a Final Decision of the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee in Relation to the 
Implementation of Decision 7/CP.12, Draft conclusions proposed by the President, UN Doc. FCCC/
KP/CMP/2010/L.7 (2010).
101 The suggestion was, in fact, forcefully rejected by Australia, Canada, Japan and Russia, in particular. See, 
for instance Lefeber, ‘The Practice of the Compliance Committee’, supra note 9.
102 A proposal by Saudi Arabia to incorporate the Compliance Procedures into the Protocol through an 
amendment has since then remained on the agenda of the CMP. On the negotiating history, see Werks-
man, ‘The Negotiation’, supra note 95, at 31–32; Wang and Weiser, ‘The Implementation and Compliance 
Regimes’, supra note 9, at 197–198.
103 For some contributions to the debate on this aspect, see Brunnée, ‘The Kyoto Protocol’, supra note 7, at 
277–278; Geir Ulfstein and Jacob Werksman, ‘The Kyoto Compliance System: Towards Hard Enforce-
ment’, in Stokke et al. (eds), Implementing	the	Climate	Regime,	supra note 9, 39–62 at 57–58; Halvorssen 
and Hovi, ‘The Nature, Origin and Impact’, supra note 94. The Canadian government argued before a 
Canadian court in 2008, for instance, in a case brought by the NGO Friends of the Earth, that the con-
sequences are ‘not binding, as Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol requires that these be adopted by the 
Parties as an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol’. See ‘Memorandum of Fact and Law of the Respondent 
of 13 February 2008’, in Friends	of	the	Earth	v.	The	Minister	of	the	Environment (Federal Court, Court File 
No. T-1683-07), at para. 7.
104 And irrespective of the interpretation of Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol by individual parties such as 
Canada. However, see Halvorssen and Hovi, ‘The Nature, Origin and Impact’, supra note 94, at 166, 
arguing that the consequence can only be implemented by the non-compliant party itself. The apparent 
contradiction is resolved by distinguishing between the application of the consequence and its subsequent 
effect on the behaviour of the party concerned. It is not unusual for the effect of judicial rulings on the 
future behaviour of defendants to be uncertain.
105 As in, for example, the cases of Greece in 2008, Croatia in 2009, and Bulgaria in 2010.
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transactions of emission units through the International Transaction Log,106 admin-
istered by the Secretariat, and as a result the party is no longer able to use such 
transactions for the purposes of meeting its emission target. Any such transaction 
attempted could not be officially processed, and would be ignored by ERTs and by 
the Committee. Further, where the party concerned fails to meet its emission target 
for the commitment period, the Committee will apply the aforementioned deduc-
tion rate, which will lead to an automatic deduction from the party’s assigned amount 
for the subsequent commitment period.107 Similar reasoning applies to the resolution 
by the Committee of a disagreement between an ERT and a party. Hence the compli-
ance system utilizes the incentives and disincentives that the Protocol and its imple-
menting decisions have generated. Its consequences are self-enforcing, even though 
their continued effectiveness depends on the creation of subsequent commitment 
periods and their ratification by all relevant parties – which would be the case even 
if the Compliance Procedures had been adopted by means of an amendment to the 
Protocol.108
 
5 Main interactions with other building blocks of the Kyoto 
Protocol
As an integral component of the Protocol’s governance system, the compliance sys-
tem is closely related to the system of ‘measurement, reporting, and verification’ 
under the Protocol – in the Protocol’s context known as ‘reporting and review’ – and 
the carbon-market mechanisms. Measurement, reporting, and verification provide 
important input to, and benefit from, the compliance system. The compliance sys-
tem, and in particular the EB, fulfils important functions with respect to the carbon-
market mechanisms. Compliance with methodological and reporting requirements 
is a foundation for the proper functioning of the carbon market. Carbon-market 
mechanisms arguably provide a crucial way to achieve emission targets by enabling 
the acquisition of offsets. Suspending eligibility to participate in these mechanisms 
is thus a key ‘stick’ in the armoury of the Compliance Committee.109
106 The International Transaction Log serves to verify transactions proposed by registries to ensure they are 
consistent with rules agreed under the Kyoto Protocol. See UNFCCC, ‘International Transaction Log’, 
available at <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/registry_systems/itl/items/4065.php> (visited 26 October 
2011).
107 The deduction would occur irrespective of whether the Party concerned might, as has been suggested, 
have a legal basis for arguing that they are not bound by the deduction; see Ulfstein and Werksman, ‘The 
Kyoto Compliance System’, supra note 103, at 58. The basis for such an argument seems to be weakened 
by the fact that the CMP adopted the Compliance Procedures by consensus.
108 Sebastian Oberthür, ‘Die Wirksamkeit von Verrechtlichung: Die Compliance-Mechanismen internation-
aler Umweltregime’, in Klaus Jacob et al. (eds), Politik	und	Umwelt, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonder-
heft 39/2007 (2007) 73–93, at 88; Lefeber, ‘From The Hague to Bonn’, supra note 9, at 52–54; for a 
similar line of argument, see Brunnée, ‘The Kyoto Protocol’, supra note 7, at 278.
109 See supra Part 4.
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The ERT process and the compliance system are two elements of a comprehensive 
approach towards implementation of, and compliance with, the Protocol. The review 
process, which takes up to one year, constitutes a first step (facilitative in nature) in 
the attempt to ensure compliance with the Protocol. During the review, ERTs are 
able to provide advice and recommendations, and the parties under review have the 
opportunity to address and resolve problems identified by the ERTs with the imple-
mentation of the Protocol.110 It is only in those cases where serious implementation 
problems remain unresolved during the ERT process that a question of implementa-
tion will be indicated in the ERT report submitted to the Committee. 
Considering the institutional arrangements of the Protocol’s governance system, it is 
not surprising that the ERT process is the most significant trigger of the Compliance 
Procedures. As at the end of 2010, all EB proceedings had arisen from questions of 
implementations raised by ERTs. A functioning ERT system is arguably therefore an 
essential precondition for the proper functioning of the Committee; and the Com-
mittee has, accordingly, kept the functioning of the ERT system under close review 
(receiving regular updates on the ERT process from the Secretariat).111
The Committee provides an important further service to the carbon-market mecha-
nisms by policing compliance with the eligibility requirements for participation in 
these markets. Ensuring compliance is important if the incipient carbon market is 
to function as intended. The eligibility requirements apply only to developed coun-
tries and comprise the proper establishment of the assigned amount, the existence 
and proper functioning of a national system to estimate net greenhouse gas emis-
sions, the existence and proper functioning of a national registry for accounting of 
transfer of emission units, and compliance with core reporting obligations.112 Eligi-
110 Decision 22/CMP.1, supra note 77; see also Clare Breidenich and Daniel Bodansky, Measurement,	Report-
ing	and	Verification	in	a	Post-2012	Climate	Agreement (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2009), 
available at <http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/mrv-report.pdf> (visited 10 January 2011); Pew 
Center, Verifying	Mitigation	Efforts	in	a	New	Climate	Agreement, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 
Post-2012 Climate Policy Brief (2009), available at <http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/brief-veri-
fying-mitigation-efforts-in-new-climate-agreement-october2009.pdf> (visited 5 January 2011); UNFC-
CC, Kyoto	Protocol	Reference	Manual	on	Accounting	of	Emissions	and	Assigned	Amounts (2008), available at 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/08_unfccc_kp_ref_manual.pdf> (visited 10 January 2011).
111 See the Annual Reports of the Compliance Committee, supra notes 7, 26, 27 and 39; ‘Description of the 
Elements of the Review Process under Article 8 and Synthesis of the Information Regarding the Review 
of National Systems’, Plenary of the Compliance Committee, Doc. CC/5/2008/2 (2008). The ERTs and 
their reports, and the UNFCCC roster of experts from which ERT members are drawn, have proved very 
useful, if not essential, to the Committee’s task of assessing questions of implementation. In the first four 
cases addressed by the EB, the EB drew on expert advice from the ERT as well as the UNFCCC’s roster 
of experts. The branch sought expert advice in accordance with Section VIII.5 of the Compliance Proce-
dures; see supra Part 3.2. As indicated earlier, in the cases of Greece, Canada, and Bulgaria the expert 
advice constituted a major input into the EB’s decisions. The ERT system and its infrastructure (including 
the roster of experts) is thus important not only as a triggering mechanism for questions of implementa-
tion, but also for decision-making on those questions in the course of the compliance proceedings.
112 See Decision 3/CMP.1 ‘Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism as Defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol’, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (2006), at 6, para. 31 of 
Annex; Decision 9/CMP.1 ‘Guidelines for the Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol’, UN 
Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (2006), at 2, para. 21 of Annex; and Decision 11/CMP.1 ‘Mo-
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bility is established ‘quasi-automatically’ sixteen months after the submission of the 
initial report of a party that establishes its assigned amount, unless the EB finds that 
the party does not meet the eligibility requirements.113 By the end of 2010, all Annex 
B parties to the Protocol (that is, all developed-country parties with emission targets), 
except Croatia, had achieved initial eligibility. A party remains eligible until such 
time as the EB suspends its eligibility after finding114 that it no longer complies with 
one or more of the eligibility requirements.115
6 An assessment after five years of practice (2006–2010)
During the first five years of its operation, from 2006 to 2010, the Compliance Com-
mittee learned much from experience in applying its rules. It realized significant 
achievements, such as the full development and implementation of the compliance 
system that existed only on paper in 2006. However, the operation of the Commit-
tee during this period has also revealed several difficulties and weaknesses which point 
to the need for further improvement of the compliance system. A full assessment of 
the operation of the system would be beyond the scope of this paper, but a number 
of considerations are highlighted.
The first two years of the Committee’s operation mainly involved the elaboration of 
further Rules of Procedure to fine-tune the functioning of the Committee. This proc-
ess was influenced by the lessons learned from the experience of the FB with the 
submission of South Africa, on behalf of the G77 and China, in 2006.116 The Rules 
of Procedure and working arrangements improved the Compliance Procedures and 
made the effective functioning of the Committee possible.
Since the end of 2007, the EB has demonstrated its ability effectively to resolve 
cases of non-compliance within the framework of the applicable rules. By the end of 
2010 the EB had addressed questions of implementation with respect to Greece, 
Canada, Croatia, and Bulgaria. Both Greece and Bulgaria made successful efforts to 
return to compliance, after which their eligibility was reinstated and the EB closed 
their cases.117 Canada was able to resolve the issue at hand before a preliminary find-
ing was adopted.118 The resolution of the question of implementation in the case of 
Croatia is pending at the time of writing. In August 2011, Croatia withdrew its ap-
dalities, Rules and Guidelines for Emissions Trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol’, UN Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (2006), at 17, para. 2 of Annex.
113 As happened in the cases of Greece in 2008 and Croatia in 2009.
114 As happened in the case of Bulgaria in 2010.
115 Paras 32, 22, and 3 in the Annexes to Decisions 3/CMP.1, 9/CMP.1, and 11/CMP.1, respectively, supra 
note 112. A list with the eligibility status of Annex B parties is available at <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_pro-
tocol/compliance/items/2875.php> (visited 10 January 2011).
116 See supra Part 2.
117 See Decision under Paragraph 2 of Section X (Party concerned: Greece), supra note 78; Decision under 
Paragraph 2 of Section X (Party concerned: Bulgaria), supra note 78.
118 See Decision not to Proceed Further (Party concerned: Canada), supra note 63. 
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peal, announced that it would submit a plan to remedy its non-compliance and re-
quested reinstatement of its eligibility. Both the submission of the plan by Croatia 
and a decision of the enforcement branch on a possible reinstatement were pending 
as of the time of writing (September 2011). The experience gained with the questions 
of implementation with respect to Greece and Canada enabled the plenary of the 
Committee, on the basis of a ‘stock-taking exercise’ of the EB, to propose addi-
tional Rules of Procedure, which were by and large adopted by CMP-4.119
The Compliance Procedures also represent a significant incentive for parties to avoid 
compliance problems and to attempt to resolve problems during the ERT process. 
No question of implementation has arisen from ERTs with respect to the reporting 
deadlines regarding either the initial report or the subsequent annual inventory sub-
missions. This contrasts with the more common disregard of reporting deadlines for 
national communications under the UNFCCC and the Protocol, which disregard 
does not in itself constitute a question of implementation to be indicated by ERTs 
(but which could be raised by parties using the triggering mechanisms).120 Further, 
an analysis of the working of the ERT process prepared for the Committee (focusing 
on national systems) confirmed that parties have in general worked hard to resolve 
implementation problems identified by the ERTs during the review stage. It is worth 
reiterating that only in a few instances could these problems not be resolved, turning 
into questions of implementation that were listed in ERT reports and forwarded to 
the Committee.121 It may also be noted that no disagreement between an ERT and 
a party regarding actual emission figures and their adjustments had reached the Com-
mittee by mid-2011. Arguably, the natural tendency of states to argue for favourable 
estimates has been balanced by the prospect of having to defend those estimates 
before the Committee.
The major gap and weakness in the operation of the compliance system is the lack 
of mobilization of its facilitation function. As noted above,122 the FB has not yet been 
called upon to address any question of implementation in substantive proceedings. 
It is possible that part of the facilitative function of the overall system is being ef-
fectively discharged through the ERT process; yet the FB has not been able to address 
Canada’s potential non-compliance with its emission target, even though this is an 
issue that appears to fall squarely under its ‘early-warning’ function.123 Only parties 
119 Report on the Meeting, Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee, Sixth meeting’, Doc. CC/
EB/6/2008/3 (2008), paras 6–9; Decision 4/CMP.4, supra note 6.
120 Delays in the submission of national communications by developed-country parties to the Protocol are 
notified to the Committee under Decision 22/CMP.1, supra note 77, at Annex, para. 139. The CMP has 
so far not responded to the request by the Committee contained in its second annual report to specify 
what action the Committee may take in this respect; see Second Annual Report of the Compliance Com-
mittee, supra note 39, at para. 4(b); see also supra Part 2.
121 Description of the Elements of the Review Process under Article 8 and Synthesis of the Information 
Regarding the Review of National Systems’, Plenary of the Compliance Committee, Doc. CC/5/2008/2 
(2008).
122 See supra Parts 2 and 4.
123 See supra Part 2.
88
The Experience of the First Five Years of the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System
are able to trigger the early-warning function (through either the self-trigger or the 
party-to-party trigger) leaving no basis for ERTs to indicate in their reports a question 
of implementation that relates to potential or likely future non-compliance. No 
question of implementation of this kind has to date been raised by a party. The in-
ability of the FB to address, let alone to resolve, Canada’s potential non-compliance 
has led to criticism of the compliance system as a whole.124
Developed-country parties to the Protocol, as a group, seem to be on course to 
achieve the overall target of reducing their greenhouse gas emissions ‘by at least 5 per 
cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012’, as is required by 
the Protocol’s Article 3(1) in spite of Canada’s declaration in public that it does not 
intend to meet its emission target. The Canadian government has made it clear that 
it does not plan to give effect to the necessary domestic policies and measures to 
achieve its target and has also voiced reservations about using the carbon-market 
mechanisms to this end.125 According to data released by the UNFCCC in 2010, the 
2008 emissions of the developed-country parties to the Protocol with emission tar-
gets were almost 17 per cent below 1990 levels. As a side-effect of the economic 
downturn in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the level of emissions in Central and 
Eastern European Countries ‘with economies in transition’ was almost 37 per cent 
below 1990 levels; while other developed-country parties were, counted together, 
slightly above 1990 levels (less than one per cent). Of these, the 15 states which were 
members of the European Union in 1997 appear to be heading toward fulfilment of 
their joint emission target (as notified under Art. 4 of the Protocol).126 Amongst the 
remaining developed-country parties to the Protocol – Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland – no state is as far 
from compliance with its emission target as is Canada.127 Further, no one of the par-
ties in this category has publicly backed away from its Kyoto target by calling it, as 
Canada has, ‘unrealistic’ and ‘unachievable’ and by putting forward an emission 
target for 2020 that is less ambitious than its Kyoto target.128
124 See Peter J. Murtha, ‘Effective International Compliance Is Needed to Avoid “Dangerous Anthropo-
genic Interference” with the Climate System’, in 8 INECE Special Report on Climate Compliance (2009). 
125 See Minister of the Environment, A	Climate	Change	Plan	for	the	Purposes	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	Implemen-
tation	Act (Environment Canada, 2007), available at <http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/ed-es/p_123/pre_eng.
htm> (visited 11 January 2011); see also René Lefeber, An	Inconvenient	Responsibility	(Eleven Interna-
tional Publishing, 2009) 10–11.
126 See also European Environment Agency, Annual	European	Community	Greenhouse	Gas	Inventory	1990–
2007	and	Inventory	Report	2009 (EEA, 2009), available at <http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/euro-
pean-community-greenhouse-gas-inventory-2009/> (visited 11 January 2011); European Environment 
Agency, Greenhouse	Gas	Emission	Trends	and	Projections	in	Europe	2009 (EEA, 2009), available at <http://
www.eea.europa.eu/publications/eea_report_2009_9> (visited 11 January 2011).
127 ‘Report of the Centralized In-depth Review of the Fourth National Communication of Canada’, UN Doc. 
FCCC/IDR.4/CAN (2009). See also the review reports of the fourth national communications of other 
developed countries under the UNFCCC, available at <http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_nat-
com/idr_reports/items/4056.php>, and the fifth national communications of developed countries, avail-
able at <http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/items/4903.php> (both 
visited 11 January 2010).
128 For 2008 emission figures, see ‘National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990–2008’, 
Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/2010/18 (2010); see also ‘Annual Compilation and Ac-
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It might be possible to improve the capacity of the compliance system to address, 
and resolve, potential or likely future non-compliance with emission targets might 
be improved. Assuming that parties will continue to be hesitant to use the party-to-
party trigger, ERTs could be instructed to indicate a question of implementation 
where a party departs too far from a compliance trajectory. Alternatively, the Compli-
ance Committee could be mandated regularly to review parties’ performance with 
respect to their emission targets. In either case, further consideration is surely war-
ranted to identify the appropriate branch to handle this and the adequate conse-
quences to be applied. Under the rules currently in place, the early-warning function 
falls under the mandate of the FB, but the FB does not currently have the authority 
to go beyond issuing recommendations.129
Two additional observations might be made on the future relevance of the compliance 
system in terms of a projected future in which, firstly, no second commitment period is 
established under the Kyoto Protocol; and, secondly, its provisions are not incorporated 
into a new post-2012 agreement. Obviously, even in such a projection there would be 
little reason to discard the compliance system of the Protocol before the completion of 
the current compliance cycle. Parties will continue to have commitments under the 
Protocol – and the compliance system can continue to hold them accountable (even 
though the deduction rate would lose much of its sting) and can continue to fulfil its 
other important functions (including resolving disagreements between ERTs and par-
ties; and ascertaining eligibility to participate in the carbon-market mechanisms). Fur-
ther, any alternative to the Kyoto Protocol which contains international commitments 
would face the challenge of holding parties accountable (in respect of their emission 
mitigation and reporting); that alternative might also need to resolve disagreements over 
reported data; and it is likely to need to ensure the functioning of the carbon-market 
mechanisms. The Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system has proved its ability to make a 
significant contribution to meeting the related functional demands; and its overall de-
sign and its individual elements thus establish an important benchmark.130
7 Conclusion
The compliance system has developed to form an integral part of the overall govern-
ance system of the Kyoto Protocol. It fulfills several functions which are central to 
counting Report for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol’, Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. FCCC/
KP/CMP/2010/5 (2010); the review reports of the fourth national communications of developed coun-
tries, including an assessment of the effects of planned policies and measures, are available at the Secre-
tariat’s website.
129 See also Murtha, ‘Effective International Compliance’, supra note 124. Building a regular review function 
into the compliance system would incorporate the proposal by the United States and other parties to 
establish a public implementation review under a new post-2012 agreement.
130 As mentioned in the introduction, engaging in a more detailed discussion on how the compliance system 
might be adapted – or replaced – within the context of a post-2012 regime would be beyond the scope 
of the present paper.
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the functioning of the Protocol in general, beyond merely addressing problems relat-
ing to the fulfilling of emission targets. Even though the system is activated only once 
there is already a problem, its existence provides an important incentive to devel-
oped-country parties to achieve compliance, not least with the methodological and 
reporting requirements. In particular, the system is of great assistance to the ERT 
process and it supports resolution of disagreements between ERTs and individual 
parties. Furthermore, the compliance system plays a crucial role in the governance 
of the carbon-market mechanisms, especially as regards the determination and fulfil-
ment of the eligibility requirements. 
The strength of the compliance system is unique among MEAs. Driven by strong 
concerns about the participation of ‘free-riders’ in the Protocol, the enforcement 
component (including the consequences available for addressing compliance prob-
lems) goes far beyond the means available in other MEAs and, for that matter, many 
other international institutions. The core strength of the compliance system can be 
found in the incentives and disincentives which have been generated by the overall 
design of the Protocol and its implementing decisions. Although parties have not 
made the consequences legally binding, as they could have done by adopting an 
amendment to the Protocol, the consequences can be effectively applied as long as 
states do not withdraw from the Protocol and as long as new commitment periods 
follow.
There are other features which can be described as notable – and even as unprece-
dented. The emphasis on enforcement has led to the twin institutional setup of the 
two branches. The enforcement function has raised concerns about a potential po-
liticization of the Compliance Committee and thus provided a rationale for the 
far-reaching independence of the Committee from the CMP, as well as an emphasis 
being placed on the independence and impartiality of Committee members. The 
independence of the Committee, combined with concerns about politicization, 
fuelled demands for the inclusion of explicit and detailed safeguards of due process, 
as enshrined in the Compliance Procedures. Finally, these concerns, combined with 
the economic repercussions of the decisions, especially those of the EB, reinforced 
requests for a high degree of automaticity and predictability of the procedures, in-
cluding rigid timelines. Overall, the imperatives toward protection of the parties and 
the political independence of the Committee took precedence over political oversight 
of the Committee.
Since the adoption of the Compliance Procedures in 2005, the compliance system 
of the Protocol has evolved from a ‘paper tiger’ to a fully operational system with a 
functioning Compliance Committee at its centre. The Committee has elaborated 
Rules of Procedure and working arrangements that have enabled the application of 
the Compliance Procedures in practice. The operation of the compliance system has 
also generated experience of its crucial functions within the Protocol’s overall govern-
ance system. The EB has proved its ability to effectively address and resolve cases of 
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non-compliance in respect of both methodological and reporting requirements, as 
well as the functioning of the carbon market. On the downside, the facilitative func-
tions of the compliance system have yet to be used, and remain to be further devel-
oped.
As remarkable as the compliance system of the Protocol is, it is uncertain whether it 
will continue to be effective and ultimately be able to ensure parties’ compliance with 
their emission targets. Whereas the compliance system may be considered strong 
when compared with that of other MEAs, and indeed many other international in-
stitutions, it is unclear whether it is strong enough to bring about and restore compli-
ance in the face of significant economic and political incentives to defect.131 In the 
event of a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol being negotiated, parties which are 
likely to be in non-compliance in the first commitment period might well be able to 
negotiate second-commitment-period targets which compensate for projected de-
ductions. Above all, the uncertain future of the Protocol casts doubt on the compli-
ance system’s ability to effectively address non-compliance with emission targets; and, 
to some extent, it also casts doubt on the future of the compliance system in general.
Evaluation of the rules and practice of the Kyoto compliance system has clear rele-
vance for international environmental law and governance generally.132 To engage in 
detail with the broader debates about the need and options for a reformed or new 
compliance system for any post-2012 climate agreement is beyond the scope of this 
paper.133 Nevertheless, the analysis of the compliance system is relevant to those 
debates. Investigating both the need for and options for a future compliance system 
would require considering the potential form and content of a post-2012 climate 
regime (which might deal with emission mitigation for both developed and develop-
ing countries, emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries, new and existing carbon-market mechanisms, financial assistance and 
investment, technology cooperation, and so forth), which is itself highly uncertain. 
It can be argued that an in-depth understanding of the existing compliance system 
of the Kyoto Protocol and its achievements would provide valuable (and perhaps 
131 It is not suggested that strength be equated with success. While compliance mechanisms of other MEAs 
might be weaker, they might at the same time be as – or even more – successful.
132 For some examples of the large and expanding literature on implementation and compliance in interna-
tional environmental governance, see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The	New	Sovereignty:	
Compliance	with	International	Regulatory	Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1995); George W. Downs, 
David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, ‘Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Co-
operation?’, 50 International	Organization (1996) 379–406; Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson 
(eds), Engaging	Countries.	Strengthening	Compliance	with	International	Environmental	Accords	(MIT Press, 
1998); David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff (eds), The	Implementation	and	Effective-
ness	of	International	Environmental	Commitments:	Theory	and	Practice (MIT Press, 1998); Kal Raustiala 
and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’ in Walter Carl-
snaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook	of	International	Relations (2002) 538–558; 
Daniel Bodansky, The	Art	and	Craft	of	International	Environmental	Law (Harvard University Press, 2010), 
especially chapters 10 and 11.
133 For two relevant contributions, see Murtha, ‘Effective International Compliance’, supra note 124; and 
Pew Center, Verifying	Mitigation	Efforts,	supra note 110.
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even necessary) input into debates about how to enhance compliance with, and 
implementation of, future climate change-related agreements. There are good reasons 
to build on elements and functions that have proved effective and to look for pos-
sible improvements of less successful aspects of the current system. 
Whatever the future of the Protocol may be, the rules and practice of its compliance 
system remain relevant for future international cooperation on climate change and, 
more broadly, international (environmental) governance. As states continue to en-
gage in discussions on the future international framework for climate protection, the 
compliance system of the Protocol provides an important touchstone for their efforts 
to promote the fulfilment of commitments, prevent free-riding, and ensure that the 
carbon-market functions as designed. Beyond climate governance, the experience 
with the compliance system reinforces its significance as a precedent and standard 
for the independent review of state action to implement international requirements 
in the field of the environment and beyond.
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Figure	1. The	Enforcement	Branch	procedures.
Note 1. The timelines given are net of the time required for notification of the party 
concerned (preliminary examination, preliminary decision) and for receipt of communi-
cations from the party concerned (first and further written submission, request for hear-
ing) in accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure. Some of the timelines are 
conditional on previous steps (see the Compliance Procedures, sections IX and X).
Note 2. In practice, the EB has held the meetings for the hearing and for the elaboration 
and adoption of the preliminary decision in combination. It has also allowed the party 
concerned to present its further written submission on the occasion of the meeting for 
the elaboration and adoption of the final decision (see main text).
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this short paper is to offer a glimpse at how climate change issues may 
be seen from the UN Headquarters point of view. The key question is to find out 
‘how New York actually fits into the picture’, as often when discussing climate change 
in the UN context, commentators tend to focus on the process under the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)2 and its Kyoto Protocol.3 The 
idea here is, quite generally and in an introductory manner, to reflect on what the 
relevant UN instances or actors in New York are, regarding climate change; and on 
how they are engaged in work on climate change issues. The paper will also highlight 
some relevant events during the year 2010 in particular. Finally, a few concluding 
remarks will be made. 
1 LL.M (London School of Economics and Political Science), Doctoral candidate of international law 
(University of Helsinki). Currently Legal Officer at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, previ-
ously Associated Expert at the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Forum on Forests 
Secretariat and in the UN University Office at the UN in New York, concentrating on climate change 
and forest issues. Prior to those, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Environment of Finland on multilat-
eral environmental agreements. Email: Maria.Pohjanpalo@formin.fi. The views expressed in this article 
are those of the author and do not represent the official position of the Government of Finland, the 
United Nations or the United Nations University.
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
3 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
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2 Relevant UN entities in New York
2.1 The Secretary-General
The United Nations Charter4 established six principal organs of the United Nations: 
the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat.5 The UN 
family naturally is much larger, encompassing 15 agencies and several programmes 
and bodies.6
The present UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon considers climate change as 
one of the top priorities for action and he has a climate change support team to assist 
him in this work.7 The Secretary-General engages in higher political level work and 
is regularly in contact with the world’s leaders. Two main ad hoc initiatives in the 
field may be mentioned in this context.
Firstly, the High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, co-chaired by 
Prime Minister Zenawi of Ethiopia and Prime Minister Stoltenberg of Norway. The 
Group was launched in February 2010 and it submitted its final report to the Secre-
tary-General in November 2010.8 The mandate of the Group was to consider dif-
ferent possible finance streams, public, private, traditional and innovative, to scale 
up long-term financing for mitigation and adaptation strategies in developing coun-
tries, focusing on the sources of funds. The work was guided by the political com-
mitments contained in the Copenhagen Accord.9 
The Advisory Group concluded that it is challenging but feasible to meet the goals 
of the Accord. According to the final report of the Group, funding will need to come 
from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, includ-
ing alternative sources of finance, the scaling up of existing sources and increased 
4 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945.
5 Ibid. Art. 7. 
6 For a UN organizational chart refer to, for instance, <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/index.
shtml> (visited 30 March 2011) and for a more extensive description of the UN system’s structure, see, 
for instance, Tadanori Inomata, ‘Building Institutional and Managerial Foundation for Environmental 
Governance with the United Nations System – Towards a New Governance Structure for Environment 
Protection and Sustainable Development’, in Tuula Honkonen and Ed Couzens (eds), International	En-
vironmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2009, University of Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 9 
(University of Joensuu, 2010) 45–64.
7 Refer to <http://www.un.org/sg/priority.shtml> (visited 30 March 2011) for the list of his priorities for 
action.
8 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, 5 November 
2010. The report as well as other further information on the work of the Group, including the Terms of 
Reference of the Group may be found at <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/
financeadvisorygroup> (visited 21 February 2011).
9 Decision 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th session, 
UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), Addendum. The Copenhagen Accord contains, among 
others, a political commitment of approaching 30 billion USD for 2010–2012 and a goal of 100 billion 
USD a year by 2020. See para. 8 of the Accord.
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private flows. Grants and highly concessional loans are crucial for adaptation in the 
most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS) and Africa. Strong commitments to domestic mit-
igation and the introduction of new public instruments based on carbon pricing are 
important for mobilizing climate financing, both public and private. Instruments 
based on carbon pricing are particularly attractive because they both raise revenue 
and provide incentives for mitigation actions.
Secondly, the High-level Panel on Global Sustainability which was launched in Au-
gust 2010 must be mentioned. The Panel has met several times already. The Panel 
will deliver input to inter-governmental processes, including preparations for the UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio 2012), and the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC. In its work, the Panel has a strong emphasis on 
climate change, but it is not limited to it, as the scope is much wider. These other 
areas include food, water and energy security and poverty reduction. The mandate 
of the Panel is for 18 months and the Panel is to finish its work by the end of 2011. 
The Panel is co-chaired by President Tarja Halonen of Finland and President Jacob 
Zuma of South Africa. 
The final report of the work of the Panel will be published and it will include analy-
sis and recommendations. In the course of its work, the Panel will create platforms 
for discussion to generate input to its work. Given the Panel’s special focus on climate 
change, the Panel may also prepare additional policy briefs in ways to best address 
the climate negotiations process, taking into account its own time schedule.10
2.2 Relevant parts of the UN Secretariat 
Several parts of the UN Secretariat are particularly relevant to the work on climate 
change. In the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA),11 the Division 
of Sustainable Development12 in particular is important; but the UN Forum on 
Forests Secretariat and the Population Division, for example, also handle issues rel-
evant to different aspects of climate change. DESA has a specific working group on 
climate change, which convenes regularly to exchange information and joins working 
efforts of different divisions of DESA. 
2.3 UN specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes 
Many of the UN specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes have worked exten-
sively on climate change issues and are also represented in New York. These include, 
10 Further information on the work of the panel, including its composition, mandate and summaries of 
discussion that have already taken place may be accessed at <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/cli-
matechange/pages/gsp> (visited 21 February 2011).
11 See <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/index.html> (visited 30 March 2011).
12 See <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/csd/csd_index.shtml> (visited 30 March 2011).
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inter alia, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN Development pro-
gramme (UNDP), and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). They have a 
considerable focus on climate issues, the work being conducted according to their 
own priorities and programmes of work. 
As the work regarding climate change is somewhat spread out within the UN, coor-
dination of the work and representation is an important aspect. The UN Chief Ex-
ecutive Board for Coordination (CEB)13 is a high level UN coordination forum 
established by the Secretary-General. Its work includes climate change and the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs).14 In addition, the CEB High-Level Commit-
tee on Programmes (a mechanism for system-wide coordination) has a working 
group dedicated to climate change. 
The Secretariat of the CEB is located in New York and it has taken the lead in the 
UN system-wide coordination efforts in, for example, the previous Climate Change 
Conferences of the Parties. They continue their efforts for a common unifying view 
for the UN system. The CEB Secretariat convenes the higher level officials of the UN 
entities regularly to coordinate in order to better deliver as one UN. The UNFCCC 
Secretariat naturally services in different ways the negotiation process in particular; 
but in the wider UN system there are numerous UN entities that are important, for 
instance in the implementation phase of the outcome of the negotiations.
2.4 UN General Assembly
Returning to the principal organs established by the UN Charter, the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) in its recent 65th session (2010) dealt with, among many other 
matters, sustainable development issues. Its agenda item regarding sustainable devel-
opment included, among others: protection of global climate for present and future 
generations of humankind; implementation of the UN Convention to Combat De-
sertification15 and Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),16 so covering all of 
the so-called Rio Conventions.17 The UNGA adopted corresponding resolutions 
regarding each of the three Rio Conventions.18
13 The CEB has its own website containing further information regarding its work; see <http://www.unsceb.
org/ceb/home> (visited 21 February 2011).
14 See <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.
15 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or Deserti-
fication, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996, 33 International	Legal	
Materials (1994) 1309, <http://www.unccd.int>.
16 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
17 UNGA Agenda A65/251 (17 September 2010), Item 20 ’Sustainable development’: d), e), f ). By ‘Rio 
Conventions’ are meant conventions which were created at the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
18 UNGA Res. 65/159; UNGA Res. 65/160; and UNGA Res. 65/161 (2011).
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2.5 Economic and Social Council
The Economic and Social Council19 and its functional commissions, in particular the 
Commission on Sustainable Development and the UN Forum on Forests, may also 
be mentioned in this context. The work conducted within the ECOSOC contributes 
to different dimensions of climate change whereby different functional commissions 
report to the ECOSOC. As a central body regarding development policy, it also aims 
to carry out development commitments that have emerged from different UN con-
ferences and summits, including the implementation of the MDGs. 
3 Relevant events at the UN Headquarters
The year 2010 was marked as the International Year of Biodiversity. A High-level 
meeting of the UNGA contributed to that in September 2010, prior to the opening 
of the UNGA General Debate.20 Member States and other participants recognized, 
inter alia, that biodiversity and healthy ecosystems are an essential part of the solution 
to the challenges of climate change.21 They noted the substantial benefits to be 
gained from the coherent implementation of the three Rio Conventions as well as 
other biodiversity-related conventions. For example, initiatives for reduced emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+)22 could provide co-benefits for 
biodiversity and local livelihoods. They also highlighted that the Rio+20 Conference 
in 2012 provides timely opportunities to ensure that measures taken under the re-
lated conventions are mutually supportive.23
The High-level Summit on Millennium Development Goals was also organized in 
September 2010 in New York, partly parallel to the Biodiversity meeting. The MDG 
Goal 7 deals with ensuring environmental sustainability and it presents a target to 
reduce biodiversity loss; aiming to achieve, by 2010, a significant reduction in the 
rate of loss. The outcome document of the Summit24 recognizes, inter alia, that cli-
mate change poses serious risks and challenges to all countries, especially developing 
countries. The UN Member States commit themselves to addressing climate change 
in accordance with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC, including the 
19 See <http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/> (visited 30 March 2011).
20 See <http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/issues/biodiversity.shtml> (visited 30 March 2011) and ‘In-
ternational year of Biodiversity’, UNGA Res. 61/203 (2006).
21 High-level Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Biodiversity, 22 September 2010, New 
York, President’s Summary.
22 REDD aims to create a financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing 
countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable develop-
ment. ‘REDD+’ goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. For further information on 
REDD+, refer to, for instance, <http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/Default.aspx> (visited 
30 March 2011).
23 See supra note 21.
24 ‘Keeping the promise: united to achieve the Millennium Development Goals’, UNGA Res. 65/1 (2010).
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principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. It 
is also stated in the document that addressing climate change will be of key impor-
tance in safeguarding and advancing progress towards achieving the MDGs.25 In 
addition there is an extensive list of commitments to accelerating progress in order 
to achieve the MDG Goal 7, including references to all of the Rio Conventions and 
their implementation.26
Similarly to the biodiversity event, in 2009 there was a High-level event on climate 
change and a separate one regarding REDD+. As it can be seen from these examples, 
efforts to increase wider and high level political awareness and visibility regarding 
multilateral environmental agreements, including the climate change perspective, are 
taking place at the UN Headquarters.
Member States also undertook a two day High-level review of the Mauritius Strat-
egy27 for the Further Implementation of the Barbados Programme of Action for the 
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States28 in September 2010, 
during the 65th Session of the UNGA. The resolution regarding the review29 reaf-
firms the adverse effects and risks of climate change and sea-level rise to the SIDS 
and confirms that adaptation to these remains a major priority for SIDS. 
The UN Conference on Sustainable Development (RIO+20) was already briefly 
mentioned above, in the context of one of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panels. 
The first preparatory meeting of the Conference took place in May 2010 in New 
York. The second one will be in March 2011; and the third in 2012, immediately 
prior to the Conference in Brazil the same year. The final preparatory meeting is 
expected to focus on the outcomes of Conference. In addition, informal meetings 
will take place. 
The Division on Sustainable Development in DESA will serve as the Secretariat of 
the process. The main themes of the process are Green Economy and Institutional 
Framework for Sustainable Development.30 It is worth mentioning here that 2012 
will be quite an active and interesting year as, in addition to the RIO+20 Conference, 
the Commission on Sustainable Development will deal with biodiversity and it is 
also the year when the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period will end. 
25 Ibid. para. 26.
26 Ibid. para. 77.
27 Barbados Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.167/9 (1994), available at <http://www.unohrlls.
org/UserFiles/File/SIDS%20documents/Barbados.pdf> (visited 9 March 2011).
28 Mauritius Strategy, UN Doc. A/CONF.207/11 (2005), available at <http://www.sidsnet.org/docshare/
other/20050622163242_English.pdf> (visited 9 March 2011).
29 ‘Follow-up to and Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the 
Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States’, UNGA Res. 
63/213 (2009). Further detailed information on the review is available at <http://www.sidsnet.org/msi_5/
index.shtml> (visited 22 February 2011).
30 The Conference website provides detailed information, available at <http://www.uncsd2012.org/> (vis-
ited 22 February 2011).
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4 Concluding remarks
The focus at the UN Headquarters tends to be on a higher political level and the 
angle in general is somewhat wider, linking relevant multilateral environmental 
agreements, different processes and goals, in particular to sustainable development 
and the MDGs. The ‘UN Headquarters perspective’ can be seen as being more of a 
system wide approach; whereas the UNFCCC process, for example, is more targeted 
and mainly deals with issues on a perhaps more technical level.
It is important to acknowledge the different levels involved, as well as the links to 
other processes and discussions. However, it is also important to maintain a clear 
focus on the most relevant substance and deal with it at the most suitable forum. At 
least in the background, it is good to keep in mind the ‘big picture’; what is being 
considered, where and when. It is equally important to have the discussion channels 
open in order to take mutually supportive effective actions, avoid duplication or 
confusion and ensure the greatest possible synergies.
Taking into consideration this tendency to a system wide approach at the UN Head-
quarters level, it might be interesting to see whether for example the RIO+20 meet-
ing will somehow also address climate change in the context of one of its themes; 
institutional framework for sustainable development.31 Since the first Rio Confer-
ence in 1992, climate change as a topic has received increasing attention and it can 
also be seen as a cross-cutting theme, rather than just a separately focused one. There-
fore, in order to ensure the synergies and coherence regarding climate change deci-
sion making and work, it may also merit discussion on the institutional structures in 
relation to climate change. At the same time, however, the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
protocol are of course autonomous multilateral conventions, and their respective 
COPs are the forums where the Parties to these conventions take relevant decisions.
31 Ibid.
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1 Introduction
This paper describes technology transfer in the context of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),2 and explains why it has been 
a central element in the international response to climate change and the UNFCCC 
negotiations for many years. The paper does not delve into specific legal elements or 
the negotiating positions of different groups, but rather focuses on why technology 
transfer has become so important to developing and developed countries both. 
In its Fourth Assessment report,3 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) has estimated that, without concerted action, the global emissions of green-
house gases (GHGs) from the energy sector will grow between 40 and 110 per cent 
between the years 2000 and 2030.4 To keep the global average warming below the 
politically recognized target of two degrees celcius, however, global emissions must 
start declining by 2015 and decrease by some 50 to 85 per cent below the 2000 levels 
by 2050.5 Most emissions (and CO2, in particular) arise from the energy sector, 
implying that large changes to our energy systems are required at a time when de-
mand for the services that energy makes possible is increasing, particularly in devel-
oping countries. The development of more efficient, less carbon intensive energy 
1 Chief, Energy Branch, UNEP; e-mail: Mark.Radka@unep.org.
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
3 IPCC, Climate	Change	2007:	Synthesis	Report.	Contribution	of	Working	Groups	I,	II	and	III	to	the	Fourth	
Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change (IPCC, 2007), available at <http://
www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.
htm> (visited 27 January 2011).
4 Ibid., Section 3.1.
5 Ibid., section 5.4 Emission trajectories for stabilization, figure 5.1 and Table 5.1.
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technologies and their accelerated deployment at a large scale is hence of central 
concern. 
The changes required will be both challenging and costly; and, in describing them, 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) has referred to the need for a ‘technology 
revolution’ to occur.6 In its 2008 Energy	Technology	Perspectives	–	an	examination of 
different scenarios and associated projections of GHG emissions – the IEA examined 
the role of different technologies in reducing emissions. In the baseline scenario, 
emissions rise from 27 Gt in 2005 to 62 Gt in 2050; whereas if its aggressive BLUE 
Map scenario7 were to be realized, emissions would decline to 14 Gt by 2050 (see 
Figure 1), a reduction of 48 Gt that is consistent with the IPCC’s estimates of what 
is required to keep warming below 2 degrees. End-use energy efficiency accounts for 
36 per cent of the reduction, while a shift to renewable energy sources accounts for 
21 per cent and carbon capture and storage for 19 per cent. Nuclear energy and end-
use fuel switching are also important. The key point to note is that many different 
technologies are important if emissions are to be brought down to levels consistent 
with the objectives of the UNFCCC.
Figure	1:	Projected	CO2	emissions	2005–2050	under	IEA’s	baseline	and	BLUE	Map	
scenarios.
6 International Energy Agency, Energy	Technology	Perspectives (IEA, 2008).
7 IEA’s Blue	Map	Scenario assumes a completely different energy future in which the whole world partici-
pates fully. For example, it presumes that CO2 emissions from the energy sector are cut in half by 2050. 
The scenario is the starting point for technology roadmaps that show how such a future could be realized.
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The 2007 IPCC report makes the same point from an end-use perspective, pointing 
out that possibilities for reducing emissions exist in agriculture, buildings, energy 
supply, forestry, industry, transport and waste; and in developed and developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition (see Figure 2). It is in develop-
ing countries, however, where the growth in energy demand is greatest, and where 
much of the energy infrastructure will be put in place in the coming years. Energy 
investments are long lived, and choices made in the coming years will determine 
emission trajectories far into the future. To summarize, achieving the ultimate objec-
tive of the UNFCCC requires technological innovation and the rapid and wide-
spread transfer and implementation of technologies for mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Figure	2:	Emissions	reduction	potential	in	different	sectors.8
2 Technology transfer
2.1 Definition
The IPCC has defined technology transfer as a broad set of processes covering the 
flows of know-how, experience and equipment, and encompassing the diffusion of 
technologies and technology cooperation across and within countries. Technology 
transfer comprises the processes of learning to understand, utilize and replicate a 
technology, including the capacity to choose it and adapt it to local conditions, and 
to integrate it with indigenous technologies.9 Within the UNFCCC, much of the 
emphasis has been on measures that increase the diffusion of technologies across and 
within countries, particularly developing countries.
8 IPCC, Climate	Change	2007,	supra note 3.
9 IPCC, Special	Report	on	Methodological	and	Technological	Issues	in	Technology	Transfer (IPCC, 2000), avail-
able at <http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/tectran/index.php?idp=0> (visited 27 January 2011).
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Successful, i.e. sustainable, technology transfer requires a multi-facetted enabling 
environment that includes good macroeconomic conditions, the involvement of 
social organizations, existence of national institutions for technology innovation, and 
human and institutional capacities for selecting and managing technologies. Tech-
nology transfer is made easier when countries have national legal institutions that 
reduce risk and protect intellectual property rights, and the processes for establishing 
and enforcing codes and standards. Of particular importance is the ability to adapt 
and modify technologies and make them more suitable for specific conditions in the 
acquiring country.	Not all of these elements of what is sometimes referred to as the 
enabling	environment are easily addressed under the Climate Change Convention; 
but two elements which negotiations have emphasized are support for national in-
stitutions for technology innovation, and efforts that strengthen human and institu-
tional capacities for selecting and managing technologies.
2.2 Progress on Technology Transfer in the UNFCCC
In the period leading up to and immediately after the 15th Conference of the Parties 
(COP15) in Copenhagen, much progress was made on negotiating a technology 
transfer package. A consensus began to emerge regarding the creation of a Technol-
ogy Executive Committee which would oversee (in ways to be determined) interna-
tional technology transfer activities conducted under the Convention; and a Climate 
Technology Centre and Network which would undertake various activities aimed at 
promoting the transfer of climate-relevant technologies. The remainder of this paper 
offers recommendations for priority near-term actions based on different technology 
opportunities. It attempts to answer such questions as ‘Where might effort best be 
directed?’; and ‘Where is public money best spent?’. 
The good news is that the fundamental elements of the ‘toolkit’ for accelerating the 
uptake of existing climate-friendly technologies exist. For policy-makers, then, the 
question is how best to apply the various tools both domestically and internation-
ally, with the general aim of integrating climate policies into broader developmental 
and economic policies.
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2.3 Different support for different technologies
Figure	3:	Matching	support	measures	to	marginal	abatement	cost.10
It is important to recognize that different technologies face different sets of barriers 
that prevent their wider uptake in the market. McKinsey has prepared so-called 
marginal abatement cost curves that present the marginal cost of reducing GHG 
emissions for different types of technologies and other measures (see figure 3). Al-
though these curves neglect certain important costs and barriers,11 they provide a 
convenient means of identifying representative approaches for accelerating the dif-
fusion of various GHG technologies when these are arrayed by cost.
Some technologies that have negative economic cost – sometimes referred to as ‘no 
regrets options’ – are generally evidence of a market failure of some sort, various 
energy efficiency measures being typical. Here, interventions should aim at overcom-
ing barriers that prevent the market from functioning more efficiently. Examples 
include mandated efficiency standards for electrical appliances, lighting devices, and 
buildings. Transferring these ‘technologies’ often means changing polices and putting 
in place education, enforcement and information programmes which ensure their 
effectiveness. 
10 Author’s adaptation of Global GHG Abatement Cost Curve 2.1, in McKinsey and Company, Impact	of	
the	Financial	Crisis	on	Carbon	Economics (2010), available at <http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mck-
insey/dotcom/client_service/Sustainability/PDFs/ImpactFinancialCrisisCarbonEconomicsGHGcostcur-
veV21.aspx> (visited 25 August 2011) 5.
11 Not included, for example, are costs of changing policies and regulations, and costs of training and ca-
pacity-building efforts. 
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Low-cost reduction measures often yield some co-benefits, an example being affor-
estation, where emission reductions might also yield benefits in terms of flood pre-
vention. Incentives might be needed to make it economically attractive for landown-
ers to change their behavior. 
Moving along the marginal abatement cost curve, costs increase. Some renewable 
energy supply technologies are close to being competitive to conventional fossil fuel 
technologies, and require some sort of deployment support – such as a so-called ‘feed 
in tariff’ which guarantees a higher price to the generator of renewable electricity. 
Here the premise is that experience in manufacturing and deployment will bring 
eventual cost reductions both from scale and the cumulative learning. At the far end 
of the cost curve lie high marginal abatement cost technologies, many of them at this 
point in the research and development (R&D) stage and so not yet commercialized. 
Research and development support is the most appropriate public intervention for 
this group of technologies. The general point to make is that clustering technologies 
by marginal abatement cost suggests the policy support and treatment that hastens 
their market acceptance and – where it is a goal – their transfer across borders.
To support work on the Expert Group on Technology Transfer established under the 
UNFCCC, UNEP, the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL),12 and 
the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN)13 have examined features of 
existing mechanisms being used in projects having technology transfer as an objec-
tive.14 Some characteristics of successful efforts emerged from the analysis of case 
studies. 
Firstly, strong incentives for collaboration and shared interests must exist between 
the partners; along with stable, long-term funding support. Secondly, clearly defined 
missions and metrics naturally help, but the flexibility to respond to evolving condi-
tions is useful because technologies evolve – sometimes quickly – and efforts which 
aim to accelerate their transfer must be correspondingly nimble. Thirdly, given that 
most technologies are owned by the private sector while policy changes generally 
require government intervention, the participation of both public and private sectors 
is important. Fourthly, technology networks, in particular, seem to be most effective 
when they are closely connected to policy processes so that the members understand 
the opportunity for informing key policy decisions and have opportunities for inter-
action with policy-makers. Fifthly, approaches which take an integrated approach 
running across R&D, demonstration and deployment are generally more successful. 
Finally, open and efficient information-sharing almost always yields benefits. 
12 See <http://www.nrel.gov>.
13 See <http://www.ecn.nl/home/>.
14 UNEP, An exploration of Options and Functions of Climate Technology Centres and Networks (UNEP, 
2010), available at <http://www.unep.fr/energy/pdf/CTCN_UNEP-20101118_final.pdf> (visited 27 
January 2011).
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3 Linking technology transfer and finance
UNEP’s own work has further articulated the links between finance and technology 
transfer using climate technology investment projects as the basis for analysis. Doing 
so, there are three distinct categories of costs associated with climate projects. The 
first of these are the conventional, clearly understood, Business-As-Usual (BaU) costs 
of the default infrastructure; for example, the cost of a coal-fired power plant, shown 
at the bottom of the triangle in Figure 4.
Figure	4:	Matching	support	measures	to	marginal	abatement	cost.15
The second category encompasses the additional capital costs of building the low 
carbon or climate resilient infrastructure alternative, and is shown in the right side 
of the Figure 4. Finally, there are the soft costs related to putting in place the policies, 
institutions and skills needed for investment in the alternative technology. This cat-
egory UNEP refers to as readiness or initial transaction costs, which are shown on 
the left side of the triangle in Figure 4.16 
Each of these categories of costs has different barriers associated with it. For the soft 
costs, the real barriers come from lack of experience in both the public and private 
sectors to plan for, build, maintain and regulate climate technology projects. Training 
and other capacity development programmes, support for policy and legislative 
changes, and the other measures that make up typical development assistance pro-
grammes are the means normally used to remove these barriers. Pre-investment sup-
15 Source: UNEP archives.
16 See UNEP, Bridging	the	Gap:	Addressing	the	Lack	of	Early	Stage	Financing	for	Low	Carbon	Infrastructure	
Deployment	in	Developing	Economies (UNEP, 2011) for a more thorough presentation of this material.
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port can also include preparation of country investment strategies, assessment of 
renewable energy resources potential, technology needs assessments, and analysis of 
investment options for low-carbon development.
Where additional capital costs arise, the main barrier is that projects involving new, 
climate-friendly technologies are not financially viable unless the carbon externality or 
additional costs of adaptation can be paid for in some way. In other words, where the 
alternative technology is more expensive, the additional costs constitute a barrier for 
investment and any transfer of technology unless a means can be found to pay for them. 
These additional costs can be paid for through carbon markets, if they are operating 
effectively and the carbon price is sufficiently high. If not, some sort of funds transfer 
is needed, an example being mandated feed-in tariffs for renewable energy projects. 
The cost barrier in the BaU case is, in many instances, the difficulty many developing 
countries have in obtaining access to financing for technology-based projects given 
the overall investment climate, perceptions of risk, or other factors that retard inward 
investment, even for projects that would be financially feasible if undertaken else-
where. It can, of course, be argued that BaU capital costs lie outside the remit of 
climate finance and should be addressed through normal financing channels.
The first projects involving the transfer of a climate technology to a new country face 
proportionally higher readiness costs, a fact that should influence the design of any 
programme or effort aiming to support the transfer. Over time – as laws are enacted, 
policies changed, experience and skills gained – efforts aimed at developing readiness 
will grow to be less critical (see Figure 5).
Figure	5:	Phasing	support	brings	about	a	smoother	transition	to	full	scale	investment	in	
new	technologies.17
17 Source: UNEP archives.
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During the initial phase, however, the focus should be on building capacity and 
mobilizing first-movers to bring about early investments, ideally through ‘learning 
by doing’. By the time a country is ready for full-scale investment, the technology, 
markets and institutional capacities will be well enough established for investment 
to scale-up fully. 
If donors and their development partners adopt a phased approach, developing 
countries get support that is better tailored to their needs. Fast moving countries can 
go directly to full scale investment, where the scale of financing involved is expected 
to be much larger and on more commercial terms.18 Such fast moving countries 
might not even need support for financing underlying costs, but only for additional 
costs. 
As noted above, it is important that capacity-building and readiness activities are 
combined with investment activities; blending the two creates a better environment 
for learning in both the public and private sectors. The early experience with Na-
tional Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs)19 offers the clearest example of the 
consequences of not linking well the readiness and investment phases. On the whole, 
NAPAs have led to little direct investment or action but rather to frustration in de-
veloping countries. 
4 Building readiness in developing countries
As the preceding section has emphasized, the lack of underlying demand for and the 
capacity to absorb and deploy investment for new technologies makes providing 
readiness or pre-investment support to developing countries critical. Many solutions 
suggest themselves, and a few are offered below as examples.
First among these might be building capacity in developing countries to prepare 
low-emission development plans, low-carbon growth plans, or the equivalent, and 
linking these to so-called monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) provisions 
in the UNFCCC. Capacity-building efforts are rarely a poor investment, particu-
larly when, as noted above, they are linked to ‘learning by doing’ through a real 
project involving some transfer of technology. Up front capability-development and 
measures aimed at expanding ability to handle investment in clean energy technolo-
gies should be a priority.
18 The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), for example.
19 NAPAs provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority activities that respond 
to their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change. The main content of a NAPA is a list of 
ranked priority adaptation activities and projects, as well as short profiles of each activity or project. In 
principle, these help the development of proposals for implementation of the NAPA. Experience has been 
mixed, however, and many NAPAs have amounted to paper exercises only.
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Regional technology centres and climate change networks are now an agreed element 
of the UNFCCC.20 Although the details have yet to be worked out, centres and 
networks can play a powerful role in hastening the spread of superior technologies. 
There is good international experience from such approaches in the global effort to 
phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other substances that deplete 
the stratospheric ozone layer.21 Such centres can be helpful in developing national or 
regional technology roadmaps and market assessments, among other measures.
Evidence is growing that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has helped in 
the transfer of low carbon technologies to developing countries, particularly in the 
energy sector.22 Strengthening developing country capabilities for preparation and 
implementation of CDM projects continues to make sense even if there are uncer-
tainties about the future of the mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol’s second commit-
ment period. So-called programmatic CDM approaches that bundle many small 
GHG emission reduction interventions into a larger ‘project’ are particularly prom-
ising for least developed countries. 
5 Concluding reflections
Technology options for most developing countries have not yet been properly ana-
lyzed and conditions for expanding markets for newer technologies remain poorly 
understood in most instances. That said, there is increasing understanding of the 
importance of measures that increase readiness and the value of soft interventions, 
such as those that provide expert advice or strengthen networks of experts. There is 
also growing recognition of the need for a more differentiated approach to technol-
ogy transfer, one that is based on country groups and differences in national circum-
stances. Rarely is a ‘one size fits all’ approach successful when it comes to technology, 
and it should be no surprise, then, that the same is true when it comes to its transfer. 
Recent developments in the UNFCCC give cause for optimism that support meas-
ures agreed by Parties will indeed take these and other considerations into account 
in the technology mechanism agreed at COP16 in Cancun.23 Through the Technol-
ogy Mechanism decision, which is part of a larger decision taken under the Ad Hoc 
20 See The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Co-
operative Action under the Convention’, Decision 1/CP.16, in ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010. Addendum. Part two: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 
(2011), para. 117.
21 UNEP, Networking	Counts:	Building	Bridges	 for	a	Better	Environment.	Montreal	Protocol	Experiences	 in	
Making	Multilateral	Environmental	Agreements	Work (UNEP and SIDA, 2002), available at <http://www.
uneptie.org/ozonaction/information/mmcfiles/3947-e.pdf> (visited 27 January 2011).
22 UNFCCC, The	Contribution	of	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol	to	Technology	
Transfer (2010), available at <http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Reports/TTreport/TTrep10.pdf> (visited 
4 September 2011).
23 See Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 20, at para. 117.
113
Mikko Alestalo
Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action, parties agreed to establish a 
Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and a Climate Technology Centre and 
Network (CTCN). 
The Technology Executive Committee is mandated to maintain an overview of tech-
nology needs, technology transfer issues, and barriers, and provide guidance to the 
parties on technology transfer issues. The CTCN decision foresees a network of 
national, regional, sectoral and international technology networks, organizations and 
initiatives that provide advice and support to developing countries, including through 
capacity-building support and training and partnerships. Much needs to be worked 
out, but the trends are encouraging.
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1 Introduction
Small island developing states (SIDS) are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change. In some instances, their very survival is threatened.2 This vulnerability moti-
vated the formation of a coalition of SIDS, which, although diverse in economic, po-
litical, and geographic characteristics, decided to ‘pool their sovereignty’3 to form the 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to increase their individual influence and ef-
fectiveness in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)4 negotiations. Although its members are small in size and economic and 
political clout, AOSIS has proven an effective negotiating bloc in UNFCCC negotia-
tions by successfully employing a number of different negotiating strategies. 
Despite this, AOSIS operates at a distinct disadvantage within the negotiations, hav-
ing neither substantial emissions with which to leverage concessions, nor deep pock-
ets to fund technological innovation or adaptation activities. To the contrary, mem-
bers of AOSIS are desperately in need of both substantial emissions reductions and 
financing from other, more powerful participants in these negotiations. These une-
qual dynamics place AOSIS member states in an unenviable position; their participa-
1 BA (McGill); LLB (University College London); LLM (University of London); Lecturer at the Univer-
sity of the West Indies/College of The Bahamas LLB Programme and The College of The Bahamas’ Small 
Island Sustainability Programme; email: lrb1973@yahoo.co.uk. The author would like to thank the 
members (including the Chair) of AOSIS for their participation in the survey and their assistance with 
this paper.
2 For more detailed information, see IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (2007), available at 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf> (visited 15 June 2011).
3 Pamela S. Chasek, ‘Margins of Power: Coalition Building and Coalition Maintenance of the South Pa-
cific Island States and the Alliance of Small Island States’, 14 Review	of	European	Community	and	Inter-
national	Environmental	Law (2005) 125–137 at 126.
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
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tion in the negotiations constituting ‘an issue of equity, and of survival’.5 Although 
confronted by many disadvantages, it appears that most AOSIS negotiators surveyed 
are relatively satisfied with the progress the coalition has made to date, despite the 
traditional capacity constraints on its members.
This paper briefly considers the history of AOSIS in UNFCCC negotiations; the 
negotiating strategies it has employed; and the views of a selection of AOSIS nego-
tiators, articulated through an analysis of the results of a small survey of AOSIS ne-
gotiators who participated in the last UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) in 
Cancun, Mexico (COP 16).6
2 The history of AOSIS in UNFCCC negotiations
The formation of AOSIS is closely connected to the changing international approach 
to small island states. Grote has charted the evolution of international treatment of 
SIDS, and posits that there are three main eras of SIDS discourse.7 The first period, 
from 1972 to 1982, Grote argues, was one in which small island states first attracted 
international attention as part of an international movement for a new interna-
tional economic order to address structural disadvantages suffered by developing 
nations.8 Then termed ‘developing island countries’ (or DICs), these were widely 
defined by the 1974 Report of the Panel of Experts in New York, and included large 
islands such as Indonesia and the Philippines, while focusing on features of smallness 
(small territories with dense populations, remoteness from markets and exposure to 
natural disasters).9 One of the Panel’s foci was on the future viability of very small 
newly independent DICs as states in socioeconomic terms, citing their limited abil-
ity to deliver essential services and opportunities for their people.10 
The second era, from 1983 to 1992, saw a re-shifting of global power away from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),11 and a 
5 Tuiloma Neroni Slade, ‘The Making of International Law: The Role of Small Island States’, 17 Temple	
International	and	Comparative	Law	Journal (2003) 531–544 at 540. His Excellency Tuiloma Neroni Slade 
was the Chairman of AOSIS in 1997.
6 The survey represents a small number of AOSIS negotiators’ views, and is not intended to set out a gen-
eralized perspective of the views of all AOSIS members. The characteristics of AOSIS member states, and 
thus their views, are diverse (as this paper attempts to highlight), and so the survey results show only a 
snapshot of some negotiators’ views.
7 See Jenny Grote, ‘The Changing Tides of Small Island States Discourse – A Historical Overview of the 
Appearance of Small Island States in the International Arena’, 43 Verfassung	und	Recht	in	Ubersee (2010) 
164–191, available at <http://www.vrue.nomos.de/fileadmin/vrue/doc/Aufsatz_V2.pdfRUE_10_02.pdf> 
(visited 6 April 2011).
8 Ibid. at 165.
9 Ibid. at 170. 
10 Ibid. at 172.
11 UNCTAD was established in 1964 and works to promote ‘development-friendly integration of develop-
ing countries into the world economy.’ For more information on UNCTAD see <http://www.unctad.
org>.
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change in nomenclature to island developing countries (or IDCs), but with little 
progress towards addressing the special needs and problems of this group. Grote 
states that during this period, ‘the theoretical basis of the request for such recognition 
had finally become completely ineffectual, as developed countries were no longer 
prepared to accept invocations of historical responsibility as justification of their duty 
to promote the development of disadvantaged developing countries’.12
Grote argues that from 1992 onwards, climate change, and the vulnerability of the 
newly titled small island developing states to its effects, has regenerated interna-
tional interest in the special circumstances of this group, stating that climate change 
has ‘become their [ie: SIDS’] single most defining feature’.13 To vantage shifting 
international concerns, the emphasis of SIDS changed during these three periods 
from a focus on socioeconomic concerns in the 1970s, to geopolitical security con-
cerns in the 1980s, to an emphasis, beginning in the 1990s on economic and envi-
ronmental vulnerability.14 Campling states that as neoliberalism has become the 
hegemonic discourse of the day so ‘the weak and the marginalized are compelled to 
situate their concerns within this discourse’15 by emphasizing economic vulnerabil-
ities. International recognition of SIDS’ economic and environmental vulnerability 
to climate change has led to a measure of success for AOSIS within UNFCCC ne-
gotiations.16
The formation of AOSIS in 1990 coincided with what Bodansky has stated was the 
second ‘fault line’ in the UNFCCC negotiations between the North and the South;17 
the South arguing for greater representation, inclusion of not just environmental but 
developmental concerns into the climate change debate, and a movement of the 
negotiations away from the narrow confines of the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) scientific debate to the UN General Assembly, where developing 
countries enjoyed greater participation.18
AOSIS was formed during the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 by 24 
member states,19 and it set itself three initial goals related to the international nego-
tiations on climate change:
12 Grote, ‘The Changing Tides’, supra note 7, at 178–179.
13 Ibid. at 182.
14 Liam Campling, ‘A Critical Political Economy of the Small Island Developing States Concept – South-
South Cooperation for Island Citizens?’ 22	Journal of	Developing	Societies (2006) 235–285 at 239–241.
15 Ibid. at 243.
16 The special status of some states, including AOSIS states, as ‘particularly vulnerable’ to climate change is 
now being questioned within the G-77. See ‘Vulnerability is not a Beauty Contest’, CXXVII Eco	Newslet-
ter of 1 December 2010.
17 Although this paper refers to the ‘North’ and ‘South’ as a reference to what is commonly referred to as the 
global North and global South in multilateral negotiations, the author of this paper recognizes that these 
are over-generalized terms.
18 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The History of the Global Climate Change Regime’, available at <http://graduatein-
stitute.ch/webdav/site/iheid/shared/iheid/800/luterbacher/luterbacher%20chapter%202%20102.pdf> 
(visited 6 April 2011).
19 Chasek, ‘Margins of Power’, supra note 3, at 131. The World Conference was preceded the previous year 
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• to develop a common negotiating position for the intergovernmental negotiating 
committee deliberations for a framework convention on climate change;
• to highlight the special vulnerability of small island states to climate change; and
• to consider adaptation strategies and to ensure that the concerns of AOSIS were 
addressed in an ‘effective Convention’.20
AOSIS membership has since expanded to 42 states and observers from the African, 
Caribbean, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, Pacific and South China Sea regions.
21
Current AOSIS members21
Antigua and Barbuda Jamaica St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Bahamas Kiribati Suriname
Barbados Maldives Timor-Leste
Belize Marshall Islands Tonga
Cape Verde Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago
Comoros Nauru Tuvalu
Cook Islands Niue Vanuatu
Cuba Palau
Dominica Papua New Guinea
Dominican Republic Samoa
Fiji Singapore
Federated States of Micronesia Seychelles
Grenada Sao Tome and Principe
Guinea-Bissau Solomon Islands
Guyana St. Kitts and Nevis
Haiti St. Lucia
Current observer states
American Samoa Guam
Netherlands Antilles U.S. Virgin Islands
AOSIS is a coalition which works primarily through its member states’ diplomatic 
missions to the United Nations in New York; operates without a formal charter, a 
by the Small State Conference on Sea Level Rise organized by the Government of the Maldives. At this 
Conference 13 small island developing states and Brunei and Darussalam adopted the Male Declaration 
on Global Warming and Sea Level Rise (available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0009/000977/ 
097720eb.pdf> (visited 6 April 2011)).
20 John Ashe, ‘The Role of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in the Negotiation of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’ 23 Natural	Resources	Forum (1999) 
209–220 at 210. Since 1990, AOSIS has also been instrumental on issues beyond climate change, spe-
cifically in the area of sustainable development, and was the primary mover behind the 1994 Barbados 
Global Conference on Sustainable Development of SIDS which established the Barbados Programme of 
Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS (UN Doc. A/CONF.167/9, part I, Annex I (1994), 
available at <http://islands.unep.ch/dsidspoa.htm> (visited 6 April 2011)).
21 Source: <http://www.sidesnet.org/aosis/members.html> (visited 6 April 2011).
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budget or a secretariat;22 and is a member of the G-77 and China negotiating bloc 
within UNFCCC negotiations. Its member states represent approximately one-fifth 
of United Nations membership, and approximately one-quarter of developing states, 
but less than one per cent of the world’s land area.23 
There is no universal definition of a small island developing state; however, there are 
currently 51 SIDS included in the list used by the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA).24 However, not all members of AOSIS are 
listed, and not all UNDESA SIDS are members of AOSIS. AOSIS represents a di-
verse collection of states, prompting several authors25 to point out that some mem-
bers of AOSIS are neither small,26 islands,27 developing28 or even states.29 Given 
that some AOSIS members are not independent states, they are not all, therefore, 
members of the United Nations, and given some members’ political associations with 
larger, industrialized countries, some AOSIS members are also not members of the 
G-77. Some SIDS are also considered to be ‘least developed countries’, and so are 
also individually members of that UNFCCC negotiating bloc. 
Regionally, SIDS are also diverse, with Caribbean SIDS having over ‘four times more 
people than the Pacific SIDS, and nearly one-third higher gross domestic product 
per capita’.30 Even within regions, many SIDS are economic competitors, often with-
in the same industries, such as tourism, offshore banking, and fisheries.31 
22 Ibid.
23 Carola Betzold ‘Borrowing Power to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate Change 
Regime, 1990–1997’ (2010) 1–14, available at <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1603_1456.
pdf> (visited 6 April 2011) at 3.
24 See UNEP Regional Office for Latin American and the Caribbean, Climate	Change	in	the	Caribbean	and	
the	Challenge	of	Adaptation (UNEP, 2008), available at <http://www.pnuma.org/raiz/Climate_Change_
in_the_Caribbean_Final_LOW20oct.pdf> (visited 6 April 2011) at 3.
25 See, for instance, Ian Fry, ‘Small Island Developing States: Becalmed in a Sea of Soft Law’ 14 Review	of	
European	Community	and	Environmental	International	Law	(2005) 89–99 at 89; and Betzold, ‘Borrowing 
Power’, supra note 23, at 2.
26 Singapore, Cuba and Papua New Guinea have relatively large land masses. See also Liam Campling, ‘A 
Critical Political Economy’ supra note 14, at 249 who points out that although there is no universal 
definition of ‘small’ the Commonwealth and World Bank have described small states as having populations 
of less than 1.5 million.
27 Belize, Guyana and Suriname are part of mainland Central and South America.
28 Some authors have pointed to the relative prosperity of states like Singapore, The Bahamas and Barbados.
29 Some AOSIS member states are not fully independent. Some, like the Netherland Antilles, are dependent 
territories and some members like the Cook Islands and Niue are ‘freely associated’ with New Zealand, 
and others like the Marshall Islands and Palau with the United States. Some authors have argued that the 
very diversity of AOSIS has weakened its effectiveness in negotiations, and even that ‘failure to properly 
define the island states category in itself can be seen as a strategy to keep the discourse sterile’. See Grote, 
‘The Changing Tides’, supra note 7, at 165. However, Daniel Brindis, ‘What Next for the Alliance of Small 
Island States in the Climate Change Arena?’ 7 Sustainable	Development	Law	&	Policy (2007) 45 and 83 
at 1 has argued that AOSIS should in fact broaden its alliance to work with other vulnerable low-lying 
populations even at the sub-state level.
30 Chasek, ‘Margins of Power’, supra note 3, at 134.
31 Slade has argued that the characteristics of small island states can lead its citizens to display a ‘general 
reluctance to yield separate identity’ and they have a ‘natural instinct for independence and independent-
mindedness’. See Slade, ‘The Making of International Law’, supra note 5, at 533. See also Campling, ‘A 
Critical Political Economy’ supra note 14, at 251 who points out that smallness and remoteness can often 
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However, despite these differences, most SIDS share common geographic and socio-
economic vulnerabilities, which include:
• low-lying areas vulnerable to sea level rise and storm surges;
• geographic positions strongly affected by tropical storms and cyclones;
• high temperatures;
• scarce land resources;
• considerable dependence on scarce or depleted fresh groundwater resources;
• small natural resource bases, with nutrient depletion, soil loss, deforestation and 
biodiversity loss occurring;32
• concentrations of population and infrastructure along coastal areas;
• dependence on a narrow range of export products;
• susceptibility to international trade and commodity price fluctuations;
• small domestic markets and limited ability to develop economies of scale;
• limited opportunities for economic diversification;
• high transport and communication costs (particularly acute in archipelagic na-
tions); and
• weak institutional structures and limited human capacity.
Motivated by these common vulnerabilities, and, arguably, by ‘an acute sense of 
injustice’,33 AOSIS has managed to influence the UNFCCC negotiations in a man-
ner that some have described as a ‘force that outweighs the sum of its parts’.34
3 AOSIS achievements in UNFCCC negotiations
The appointment of AOSIS’s first Chairman, Robert van Lierop, to the Intergovern-
mental Negotiating Committee’s Bureau35 represented an early recognition of the 
voice of AOSIS during the formation of the UNFCCC negotiations. This afforded 
AOSIS an ideal opportunity to shape the agenda and, to a certain extent, to influence 
the outcome of negotiations leading to the UNFCCC. AOSIS achieved this by 
combining as a negotiating bloc to ensure effective participation within the negotia-
tions and by adopting 12 specific objectives.36 AOSIS was successful in ensuring that 
most of its 12 objectives were included within the Convention, including:
lead to social cohesion and less likelihood of violent political or social conflict, leading to more social and 
political resilience than other developing countries in the face of adversity.
32 See Jon Barnett, ‘Titanic States? Impacts andRresponses to Climate Change in the Pacific Islands’, 59 
Journal	of	International	Affairs (2005) 203–219 at 207.
33 W. Jackson Davis, ‘The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): The International Conscience’, 2 Asia-
Pacific	Magazine	(1996) 17–22 at 18.
34 Daniel Brindis, ‘What Next for the Alliance’, supra note 29, at 1.
35 Chasek, ‘Margins of Power’, supra note 3, at 132.
36 Ashe, ‘The Role of the Alliance’, supra note 20, at 212.
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• a preambular reference to the particular problems and special needs of SIDS;
• an indirect reference to SIDS within the Convention by the inclusion of the 
special needs of vulnerable countries in Art. 3(2);
• inclusion of the precautionary principle in Art. 3(3);
• inclusion of the goal of stabilization of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in Art. 4(2) 
(although a reference to ‘immediate and significant cuts’ in GHGs was not in-
cluded); and
• references to a funding mechanism and institutional mechanisms of the Confer-
ence of Parties (including a secretariat and a subsidiary body for science and 
technology).37 
AOSIS was not, however, successful in securing specific commitments for emissions 
reductions within the Convention itself, or a reference to the ‘polluter pays’ principle.38
Building on its relative success with the Convention, AOSIS called for an immediate 
start to negotiations on a new Protocol to include binding emissions reductions. 
AOSIS put forward a draft Protocol to facilitate negotiations as early as 1994;39 the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol40 being based upon the initial AOSIS draft.41 However, the 
20 per cent emissions reduction target proposed by AOSIS was not adopted, and 
much weaker emissions reductions replaced it within the Kyoto Protocol, marking a 
failure for AOSIS on one of its most important objectives.42 The failure to agree 
strong mitigation action, primarily because of economic concerns, has continued to 
plague the negotiations, leading some authors to argue that the shift from the pre-
dominance of environmental to economic concerns within the negotiations repre-
sents a decline in influence of the AOSIS coalition.43
37 For a detailed analysis of the achievement of the AOSIS objectives, see Ashe, ‘The Role of the Alliance’, 
supra note 20, at 211–215.
38 The ‘polluter pays’ principle broadly states that the person responsible for the pollution should be required 
to bear the costs of such pollution. However, it is debatable whether this has, in fact, crystallized into a 
principle of customary international environmental law, mainly because the extent of the costs which 
would be applicable remains unclear. For more information on the principle see, for instance, Philippe 
Sands, Principles	of	International	Environmental	Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 279–285.
39 Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The	International	Climate	Change	Regime.	A	Guide	to	Rules,	Institu-
tions	and	Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 38.
40 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
41 See Betzold ‘Borrowing Power’, supra note 23, at 7. AOSIS was also instrumental in the establishment of 
the Clean Development Mechanism to fund adaptation activities. The Clean Development Mechanism 
allows industrialized countries to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits which they can use to 
meet their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. CERs are earned by industrialized countries invest-
ing in emission-reduction projects in developing countries. Two per cent of the value of the CERs issued 
is levied and invested in the Adaptation Fund. For more information on the CDM mechanism, see 
<http://cdm.unfccc.int>.
42 Betzold ‘Borrowing Power’, supra note 23, at 7.
43 See Alexander Gillespie, ‘Small Island States in the Face of Climatic Change: The End of the Line in In-
ternational Environmental Responsibility’ 22 UCLA	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	&	Policy (2003–2004) 
107–129 at 128–129.
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Particularly during the period of 1990–1997, and even today, AOSIS can be consid-
ered a major player in the climate change regime. Its members have regularly been 
invited to chair negotiation groups, with Ambassador John Ashe from Antigua acting 
as Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I par-
ties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) group since 2009. This represents a meas-
ure of confidence in the individual negotiators themselves, who have managed to 
demonstrate strong capabilities within the negotiations, which is remarkable given 
the traditional negotiating constraints of small countries.44 Although a member of 
the G-77, AOSIS has adopted an independent position within the negotiations by 
calling for not only deep emissions cuts by Annex I parties, but for formal emissions 
cuts by developing countries as well.45 By circumventing traditional and competitive 
negotiating positions, and symmetric power relations which can arguably lead to 
deadlock,46 AOSIS has managed to build a respected reputation within the nego-
tiations. 
AOSIS’s success has been attributed to its sense of unity, leadership and the emerging 
consciousness within the international community of the importance of its cause.47 
AOSIS has also benefited from the multilateral process itself. Drumbl argues that the 
inclusive nature of the multilateral process provides, in some part, a sense of coop-
eration, as nations whose contributions are minimal may benefit from the agreement 
of larger developing countries such as Brazil, India and China, to less favorable terms 
than they might in bilateral negotiations.48 Zartman argues that asymmetric power 
relations within negotiations often lead to more mutually satisfactory outcomes than 
expected.49 In addition, AOSIS has successfully employed a number of negotiation 
strategies.
Carola Betzold identifies four strategies employed by AOSIS during 1990–1997 
which has allowed it to ‘borrow power’ in order to influence the negotiations.50 
Employing a discourse of vulnerability as part of a context-based strategy, AOSIS 
appealed to principles and morality, presenting their member states as ‘innocent 
44 For a consideration of such constraints, and ways in which they might be overcome, see Elizabeth Mrema 
and Kilaparti Ramakrishna, ‘The Importance of Alliances, Groups and Partnerships in International 
Environmental Negotiations’, in Tuula Honkonen and Ed Cozens (eds), International	Environmental	
Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2009, University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course Series 9 (Uni-
versity of Eastern Finland, 2010) 183–192.
45 See Slade, ‘The Making of ’, supra note 5, at 541.
46 William William Zartman, ‘The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation’ (Research Group in Interna-
tional Security, 1997), available at <http://id.cdint.org/content/documents/The_Structuralist_Dilemma_
in_Negotiation.pdf> (visited 6 April 2011) at 7. 
47 Jackson Davis, ‘The Alliance of Small Island States’, supra note 33, at 19–20.
48 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Northern Economic Obligation, Southern Moral Entitlement, and International 
Environmental Governance’ 27 Columbia	Journal	of	Environmental	Law (2002) 363–380 at 373.
49 William Zartman ‘The Structuralist Dilemma’, supra note 46, at 7. Zartman at 3 describes a new concept 
of power as action by one party intended to produce movement by another, so power is no longer defined 
by components (i.e. the control of resources) or by the result of negotiations, but as a purposeful action.
50 Betzold, ‘Borrowing Power’, supra note 23, at 1.
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victims’51 of the actions of other negotiation participants. AOSIS sought also to 
isolate obstructionist members and build coalitions with more progressive partici-
pants, such as the European Union, in a target based strategy.52 This strategy enjoyed 
limited success, as short-term cost concerns from the majority of industrialized coun-
tries outweighed the long-term benefits of deep emissions cuts. Bertzold points to a 
third strategy; of third party based support which AOSIS embraced in accepting both 
scientific and lobbying support.53 Slade argues that this openness to third party as-
sistance is characteristic of SIDS, displaying ‘pragmatism and reasonableness, prefer-
ring consensus building to obstruction and confrontation’.54 NGO support has been 
particularly useful for enhancing the coalition’s impact within UNFCCC negotia-
tions.55 Finally, Bertzold argues that AOSIS employed process based strategies, or 
‘learning to play the game’ strategies.56 For example AOSIS gained first-mover ad-
vantage by putting forward a draft Kyoto Protocol early on in negotiations, as this 
draft eventually formed the basis of the Kyoto Protocol.57 
Beyond the period 1990–1997, one may argue that AOSIS is still enjoying substan-
tial influence on the course of negotiations. In Cancún, AOSIS was successful in 
establishing a contact group to discuss a new draft legal form of the outcome from 
the long-term cooperative action (LCA) negotiations, including a new work pro-
gramme on Loss and Damage, and the establishment of an Adaptation Committee 
within the COP16 decision.58 There were also institutional and process successes by 
a reference to the prioritization of funding for SIDS in the new fast start finance 
fund, and representation of SIDS on the Board and transitional committee for the 
new green climate fund.59 However, the most important AOSIS goals60 have not 
found significant enough traction within the negotiations in recent years to be in-
cluded as firm commitments in COP decisions, although both the Copenhagen 
Accord61 and the Cancún COP16 decision do include a review of the long-term 2 
degree Celsius goal in 2015. The COP16 decision states that the 2015 review will 
51 Ibid. at 6.
52 Ibid. at 7.
53 Ibid. at 8. Of particular note is the support provided by the NGO Foundation of International Environ-
mental Law and Development (or FIELD).
54 Slade ‘The Making’, supra note 5, at 534. This openness has arguably also earned AOSIS a measure of 
resentment among G-77 partners, who may be suspicious of outside influence. 
55 See Yamin and Depledge, The	International	Climate	Change	Regime, supra note 39, at 38.
56 Bertzold, ‘Borrowing Power’, supra note 23, at 9.
57 Ibid. at 9.
58 ‘Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Con-
vention’, COP Draft decision -/CP.16, available at <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/
pdf/cop16_lca.pdf> (visited 22 June 2011).
59 Ibid.
60 In particular, a limit of global average surface temperature increases to well below 1.5 degree Celsius from 
preindustrial levels, global CO2 reductions of 45 per cent by 2020 and by 95 per cent from 1990 levels 
by 2050, and the peaking of global GHG emissions by 2015 in a legally binding agreement.
61 Decision 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th sess., UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), Addendum.
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consider strengthening the long-term goal on the basis of the best available scien-
tific knowledge, including in relation to the 1.5 degree Celsius goal.62
However, there is a general reluctance among industrialized countries to commit to 
deep emissions reductions unless all major economies do the same,63 and this dead-
lock within the negotiations continues to leave AOSIS negotiators in a difficult, and 
often frustrating, position. It is surprising, then, that most AOSIS negotiators appear 
to be satisfied with the progress the coalition has made to date, although it is clear 
that many of the negotiators consider that various capacity constraints hamper their 
negotiating positions.
4 Survey of AOSIS negotiators
4.1 Introduction
A survey of AOSIS negotiators was sent by email on 22 December 2010, and re-
sponses were accepted until 15 January 2011. Thirty responses were received, out of 
approximately one hundred and fifty AOSIS negotiators who attended week one 
and/or week two of the 2010 COP16 negotiations. This represents approximately 
20 per cent of active AOSIS negotiators who were contacted. Sixty per cent of the 
responders were male, and 40 per cent were female, with the most responders (40 
per cent) being between the ages of 46–55, followed closely (33.3 per cent) by re-
sponders between the ages of 36–45. Fourteen of the responders were from Pacific 
SIDS, eleven from Caribbean SIDS, and four from the AIMS region.64 There was a 
fairly even distribution of experience among responders (see below).
62 Paras 4 and 139(a) of ‘Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention’, COP Draft decision -/CP.16, supra note 58.
63 The author recognizes that the negotiating blocs and positions of industrialized and developing countries 
are complex and vary by issue. A recent Guardian article has highlighted the difficulty of the EU in com-
mitting to a 30 per cent emissions reduction because of global economic competitiveness issues. See 
‘Hopes of 30% cut in greenhouse gas emissions dashed’, Guardian of 10 February 2011, available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/feb/10/hopes-greenhouse-emissions-cuts-dashed> (vis-
ited 22 June 2011).
64 One of the responders did not specify.
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4.2 Reputation of AOSIS
The majority of responders (73.3 per cent) considered that AOSIS was well respected 
among UNFCCC negotiators.65 Forty-three per cent of responders considered that 
AOSIS was very effective in building alliances with other negotiating blocs/countries, 
and 40 per cent of responders considered AOSIS moderately effective in doing so.
65 The survey question referred to the reputation of AOSIS as a negotiating bloc, not the AOSIS negotiating 
positions.
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4.3 Priority goals
In terms of priority goals, 21 (72.4 per cent) of responders listed greater finance and 
direct access commitments for adaptation as their first priority, followed closely (56.7 
per cent) by a 1.5 degree Celsius limit with concomitant ppm limits and a 2015 
emissions peak.66 The majority of responders (51.7 per cent) considered that AOSIS 
had been moderately effective in achieving their two top priorities, and 27.6 per cent 
considered that AOSIS had been very effective.
4.4 COP negotiations
This series of questions asked how many negotiators were usually sent to COP ne-
gotiations, and how many negotiators the responders felt should be sent. In terms of 
representation at COP negotiations, 43.3 per cent regularly sent 4–5 negotiators. 
These numbers are consistent with the responders views of how many negotiators 
should be sent (41.4 per cent feeling they should send 4–5 negotiators). However, 
while 30 per cent sent 1–3 negotiators, and 20 per cent sent 6–10 negotiators, 34.5 
per cent of responders felt their country should send 6–10 negotiators. A slight ma-
jority of responders (51.7 per cent) stated that 1–2 of their negotiators regularly re-
lied on external funding to attend COP negotiations. 
4.5 Intersessional meetings
The position regarding how many negotiators were sent to intersessional negotiations 
contrasted more sharply with how many negotiators responders felt should be sent 
to intersessional meetings. While 80 per cent of responders stated that they sent 1–3 
negotiators to intersessional meetings, only 40 per cent of responders felt that they 
should send 1–3 negotiators, and 46.7 per cent considered that they should send 4–5 
negotiators instead. This disparity may be due to funding issues, with seventy per 
cent of responders stating that 1–2 of their negotiators relied on external funding to 
attend these meetings.
66 Note that participants were allowed to choose several priorities as ranking as number 1. The other two 
options, which were also highly subscribed to as number 1 priorities, were a legally binding second com-
mitment period under the Kyoto Protocol for Annex 1 countries (51.7 per cent) and a comprehensive, 
legally binding agreement for both Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries (46.7 per cent). Other priorities 
specified by individual responders were greater finance and direct access commitments for REDD+, finance 
for mitigation and a 350ppm emissions peak, capacity-building, technology transfer, nationally appropri-
ate mitigation action (NAMA) support, priority for SIDS generally, UNFCCC institutional monitoring 
of compliance, maximum financial commitments by industrialized countries, an international mechanism 
for loss and damage and fast start funding made available urgently for most vulnerable SIDS.
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4.6 Capacity constraints
Sixty per cent of responders stated that their inability to attend all of the intersessional 
meetings affected their negotiating capacity ‘a lot’, and 66.7 per cent felt that their in-
ability to attend all of the COP meetings affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’. The 
view of respondents was that funding issues also had a large capacity constraining effect, 
with 66.7 per cent of responders stating this affected their negotiating capacity ‘a lot’. 
The major capacity constraint felt by responders was a lack of numbers of participants 
to attend various meetings (79.9 per cent). Other capacity constraints included:
• lack of awareness/training on technical/scientific issues (40 per cent felt that this 
affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’);
• lack of local/regional data (30 per cent felt that this affected their negotiating 
position ‘a lot’); 
• lack of historical knowledge of the UNFCCC process/documents (20 per cent 
felt that this affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’); 
• integration/exchange of personnel/experience at the international/local level 
(51.7 per cent felt that this affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’); and
• lack of access/relationships with other negotiating blocs/countries (30 per cent 
felt that this affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’).67
67 Other capacity issues offered by responders were lack of good knowledge of English, lack of good negotiation 
skills, changing political agendas locally, lack of documentation (especially in French), lack of continuity of 
personnel at negotiations or change of focus on agenda items for personnel, space and time for negotiation, 
lack of technical expertise, logistics of accommodation to negotiation venue and visa issues.
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Only 10 per cent of responders felt ‘well prepared’ for intersessional and/or COP 
negotiations, and the majority, 79.3 per cent of responders, felt they were ‘adequate-
ly prepared’, whilst 10.3 per cent felt that they were ‘not well prepared’.68 
5 Conclusion
The capacity constraints felt by AOSIS negotiators are not unexpected. Developing 
countries, and especially small countries, often face capacity difficulties in multilat-
eral negotiations such as the UNFCCC negotiations. These constraints often include 
small delegations, limited staff and human capacity to attend the vast number of 
often simultaneous meetings, and the reliance on other countries or NGOs to rep-
resent their interests.69 As Chasek points out, many Caribbean countries have been 
forced to downsize their New York missions at the United Nations, leaving a smaller 
pool of potential negotiators.70 When negotiators are changed, it presents issues of 
continuity of representation and historical knowledge, which in turn may affect 
personal relationships with other negotiating blocs which may have been devel-
oped.71 
 
68 This latter percentage may be a function of the high number of responders (23.3 per cent) for whom 
COP16 was either their first COP or who had only been involved in negotiations for one year.
69 See Pamela Chasek, ‘NGOs and State Capacity in International Environmental Negotiations: The Expe-
rience of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin’, 10 Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environ-
mental	Law (2001) 168–176 at 168–169.
70 Ibid. at 170.
71 Ibid.
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Despite these pressures, it is interesting to note that most of the AOSIS negotiators 
who responded were satisfied with the performance of their negotiating bloc. AOSIS 
has consistently demonstrated a remarkable ability to make progress in the negotia-
tions despite the small size and relative powerlessness of its member states. This is no 
minor feat, for as a negotiating bloc, AOSIS has its internal tensions and has not 
been successful on all fronts. It appears, however, that despite constraints on its 
members, a combination of factors, including the early decision to pool resources, 
strong leadership, and the use of a variety of negotiation strategies, has benefited 
AOSIS as a negotiation bloc, and enabled it to not only actively participate in and 
influence the UNFCCC negotiations, but also to satisfy its various constituent mem-
bers as well. AOSIS’ management of its members’ interests and its successful nego-
tiating strategies can, therefore, serve as a demonstrative model as to how negotiating 
blocs can be effective for small states that may traditionally be marginalized in mul-
tilateral negotiations.72 Mrema and Ramakrishna state that ‘[f ]or smaller delega-
tions, [such] coalitions ensure and guarantee that their interests and priorities are 
considered; since, within such coalitions, delegations are able to gain trust and re-
spect and thus gain support for their ideas’.73
The performance of AOSIS confirms the view held in international law that multi-
lateral negotiations conducted within international organizations have been advanta-
geous for weaker states by enabling them to have a ‘greater impact on the initiation 
of multilateral conferences and the forming of MLTs [multilateral treaties]’.74 Blum 
notes that the use of coalitions in multilateral negotiations can afford weaker states 
more cost-effective participation, because they can share both efforts and resources 
which they would have to bear alone in bilateral negotiations.75
The near future, however, does not look bright for the coalition within UNFCCC 
negotiations. Despite limited success at the latest COP16/CMP6, the effects of the 
acrimonious nature of the negotiations in Copenhagen linger on.76 It was recently 
announced that the UN Secretary-General is to end his ‘hands on’ involvement with 
the international climate change regime in order to focus on broader issues of sustain-
72 Note Sewell’s and Zartman’s approach: ‘Power is the fundamental consideration in negotiations, underly-
ing other basic values such as well-being, interests, and even existence…’ in John W. Sewell and I. William 
Zartman, ‘Global Negotiations: Path to the Future or Dead-End Street?’, 6 Third	World	Quarterly (1984) 
374–410 at 383. Also see Kotzian, who argues that, depending on which frame is adopted in negotiations, 
appeals to norms and reasoning will have an impact when the arguing frame is utilized. Peter Kotzian 
‘Arguing and Bargaining in International Negotiations: On the Application of the Frame-Selection Mod-
el and Its Implications’, 28 International	Political	Science	Review (2007) 79–99 at 93.
73 See Mrema and Ramakrishna, ‘The Importance of Alliances, Groups and Partnerships’, supra note 44, at 
190.
74 Gabriella Blum, ‘Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law’, 49 Harvard	
International	Law	Journal	(2008) 323–379 at 341.
75 Ibid. at 341. However, note Blum’s assertion at 342 that multilateral negotiations are not always more 
beneficial to weaker states, and in some instances bilateral negotiations can be beneficial.
76 In fact, Navroz Dubash referred to the Copenhagen negotiations as ending in ‘almost [a] complete col-
lapse’. Navroz K. Dubash, ‘Copenhagen: Climate of Mistrust’, 44 Economic	and	Political	Weekly (2009) 
8–11 at 8.
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able development at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 2012.77 The UN Assist-
ant Secretary-General Robert Orr explained that ‘[i]t is very evident that there will 
not be a single grand deal at any point in the near future’.78 This development may 
signal a de-emphasis on the UNFCCC multilateral process for the next few years. 
Considering the urgency of the issue of climate change for SIDS, it may mean that 
AOSIS must allocate already overstretched resources to its sustainable development 
agenda, and push the issue of climate change through not only UNFCCC negotia-
tions but the Rio+20 forum as well.
77 The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (or Rio +20) will be held in Rio de Janeiro 
from 4–6 June 2012, twenty years after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment which was held in Rio de Janeiro from 3–14 June 1992. The Rio +20 Conference has adopted two 
themes: (a) a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication; and (b) 
the institutional framework for sustainable development. For more information see <http://www.earth-
summit2012.org>.
78 Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Ban Ki-moon ends hands-on involvement in climate change talks’, Guardian of 27 
January 2011, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jan/27/ban-ki-moon-un-cli-
mate-change-talks?INTCMP=SRCH> (visited 28 June 2011).
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Michael	Kidd1
1 Introduction
South Africa is a significant carbon emitter and has a role as setting an example 
amongst developing countries, especially Africa. South Africa, therefore, is an impor-
tant player in the climate change arena.2 This paper examines South Africa’s position 
on climate change, with a view to ascertaining whether the official pronouncements 
are backed up by appropriate action. Although the policy underpinning the approach 
is relatively new, there are several signs that suggest that the targets may be difficult 
to achieve. Is South African making all the right noises but, in reality, fiddling while 
the earth burns?
This study of South Africa is not just a parochial evaluation but is potentially relevant 
to other countries situated similarly as regards economic development – as one of the 
so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries, South 
Africa is becoming an important player on the international climate change plane. 
Moreover, several of the issues raised in this study are likely to resonate with the 
experiences of developing countries generally, not just those mentioned above.
1 B Com LLB LLM Ph.D (Natal), Professor of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South 
Africa. Email: Kidd@ukzn.ac.za.
2 See Fang Rong, ‘Understanding Developing Country Stances on Post-2012 Climate Change Negotiations: 
Comparative Analysis of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa’ 38 Energy	Policy (2010) 4582–
4591.
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2 Context: South Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions profile 
South Africa’s economy is energy-intensive and largely fossil-fuel powered.3 The 
most recent greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory in South Africa is for 2000, reviewed 
in 2009.4 In 2000, South Africa’s total GHG emissions amounted to 437.3 million 
tones CO2e.
5 The principal contributors to this amount were energy supply and 
consumption (78.9%), industrial processes (14.1 per cent), agriculture (4.9 per cent) 
and waste (2.1 per cent).6 If disaggregated by gas, 76.6 per cent is made up of carbon 
dioxide (CO2), 17.5 per cent of methane (CH4) and 5.5 per cent of nitrous oxide 
(N2O).
7
Viewed comparatively, Table 1 sets out South Africa’s comparative rank by emissions 
for different categories, by grand total and per capita. Figure 1 represents South Af-
rica’s comparative per capita emissions ranking for 2002 for energy and cement 
production (i.e. excluding net emissions from land use, land use change and forestry 
activities (LULUCF)) compared to selected countries and categories of countries. 
Figure 2 represents a comparison of emissions intensity, which divides emissions by 
economic output ($ of GDP), with GDP measured in international dollars on a 
power purchasing parity basis. This indicates that South Africa is a very inefficient 
user of energy.
These statistics demonstrate that South Africa is a significant contributor to GHG 
emissions internationally. According to the World Resources Institute’s analysis of 
the GHG emissions data for 2000, South Africa is ranked 19th in the top GHG 
emitting countries, the only African country in the top 25.8 
3 Department of Environmental Affairs, National	Climate	Change	Response	Green	Paper (2010) at 4 (here-
after referred to as Green	Paper). The Green	Paper appeared in GN 1083 in GG 33801 of 25 November 
2010.
4 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), Greenhouse	Gas	 Inventory	1990	 to	2000 
(2009), available at <http://www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/090812greenhouseinventory.pdf> (visited 8 De-
cember 2010).
5 Ibid. at iii. This figure does not include emissions or sinks relating to agriculture, land use change and 
forestry activities.
6 Ibid.
7 Calculated from figures provided in DEAT, Greenouse	Gas	Inventory,	supra note 4 at 87. Cf. Thapelo Letete, 
Mondli Guma and Andrew Marquard, Information	on	Climate	Change	in	South	Africa:	Greenhouse	Gas	
Emissions	and	Mitigation	Options (Energy Research Centre, 2010), available at <http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/
Information/Climate%20change/Climate_change_info-complete.pdf> (visited 18 February 2011). 
8 Kevin A Baumert, Timothy Herzog and Jonathan Pershing, Navigating	the	Numbers:	Greenhouse	Gas	Data	
and	International	Climate	Change	Policy (World Resources Institute, 2005), available at <http://pdf.wri.
org/navigating_numbers.pdf> (visited 18 February 2011) at 110. The 2000 data, although somewhat 
dated, although the source is particularly reliable. The United States Energy Information Administration 
ranks South Africa 11th internationally for carbon-dioxide emissions (which, it is important to note, is 
not the same as GHG emissions: see EIA analysis of South Africa’s statistics, available at <http://www.eia.
gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=SF> (visited 4 August 2011).
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Table	1:	South	Africa’s	GHG	emissions	world	ranking	by	indicator.9
Figure	1:	Comparison	of	2002	CO2	emissions	per	GDPppp	(2000	US$)	from	energy	
and	cement	production.10
9 Table sourced from Letete et al., Information	on	Climate	Change,	supra note 7, at 15.
10 Ibid. at 14. GDPppp is purchasing-power equivalent Gross Domestic Product.
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Figure	2:	Comparative	Emissions	Intensity.11
3 South African policy relating to climate change
3.1 Introduction
As indicated above, the major contributor to South Africa’s GHG emissions is the 
energy sector. In the light of this, discussion of the relevant policy must not only 
focus on that policy that is directly related to climate change, but also on the policy 
documents which focus more on energy. I will discuss the relevant policy documents 
in chronological order of their publication.12
3.2 White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa 1998 
The main objective of the White Paper was the integration of various energy-related 
policy processes and to provide policy stability for energy suppliers, investors and 
consumers.13 The White Paper does expressly consider the issue of climate change in 
11 Figure sourced from Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Long	Term	Mitigation	Scenarios:	
Strategic	Options	for	South	Africa (2007) at 3.
12 With the exception of the last two documents: I deal with the Climate	Change	Green	Paper last because it 
is effectively the ‘last word’ on climate change policy in South Africa at the time of writing and it segues 
neatly into the next section on legislation. 
13 Department of Minerals and Energy, White	Paper	 on	 the	Energy	Policy	 of	 the	Republic	 of	South	Africa 
(December 1998) at 17. Note that, in South Africa, a White Paper is a (national) government policy 
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the context of the UNFCCC14 and Kyoto Protocol,15 but the approach adopted is to 
‘monitor’16 international developments and to plan for possible ‘pressure on South 
Africa to take greater cognisance of its global environmental impacts [which] will 
undoubtedly increase’.17 Despite cognisance being taken of the climate change im-
peratives (likely in 1998 to have been far lower in profile than in 2010), the White 
Paper indicates that
to fulfil the national energy policy of making clean, affordable and appropriate 
energy available to all sectors of the population, a balanced least-cost mix of 
energy supply is promoted. Coal will therefore dominate other energy sources in 
South Africa for many years to come.18
Nevertheless, the White Paper also commits itself to 
a “no regrets” approach in the energy sector with regard to the potential global 
environmental impacts of energy activities. A “no-regrets” option is defined as 
that which decreases and minimises environmental impacts commensurate with 
cost effectiveness and positive cash flow.19
Overall, climate change is recognized in the White Paper as one of many factors to 
take into account in the development of energy policy, but clearly does not attach to 
it the degree of importance required today.
3.3 Integrated Energy Plan 2003
The integrated energy plan is aimed at ensuring that supply meets projected demand. 
Various scenarios are considered, which do take into account climate change consid-
erations.20 The dominant consideration, however, is clearly cost. In its conclusions, 
the Plan states that
coal remains the dominant primary energy source over the planning horizon. In 
all circumstances where cost is the major driver, coal generally emerges as the least 
expensive option. The use of such coal energy presupposes the increased use of 
document that is usually followed by legislation that gives effect to the policy directions therein. It has no 
legal status (by which I mean it is not justiciable in the courts). 
14 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
15 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
16 White	Paper at 93.
17 Ibid. at 92.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. at 93.
20 Department of Minerals and Energy, Integrated	Energy	Plan	for	the	Republic	of	South	Africa (2003) at 20.
138
South Africa’s Position on Climate Change: Fiddling while the Earth Burns?
clean coal technologies. Moreover, coal remains the largest indigenous energy 
resource currently available.21
Clearly, the ‘cost’ referred to does not take into account the myriad externalities relat-
ing to the mining and use of coal. To be fair, the plan does recognize a role to be 
played by renewable energy and indicates that the ‘current target for renewable en-
ergy is 10 000 GWhr by the year 2012’.22 For the year 2000, South Africa’s pri-
mary energy supply was approximately 4 782 PJ23 and final energy demand was 2 
363 PJ for the same year.24 The target for renewable energy, therefore, is 0.75 per cent 
of the supply and 1.5 percent of demand at the 2000 levels. This indicates the rela-
tively peripheral role to be played by renewable energy, especially if the 2000 levels 
of supply and demand will not remain at those levels, but will increase significantly. 
3.4 White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy for the Republic of South 
Africa 2003
This follows on from the 1998 White Paper, as that document pledged support for 
renewable energy. This was given added impetus by the Johannesburg Plan of Ac-
tion25 of 2002, which included the following goals:
Diversify energy supply by developing advanced, cleaner, more efficient, afford-
able and cost-effective energy technologies, including fossil fuel technologies and 
renewable energy technologies,… [and]
 With a sense of urgency, substantially increase the global share of renewable 
energy sources with the objective of increasing its contribution to total energy 
supply, recognizing the role of national and voluntary regional targets’.26
According to the White Paper, it sets out ‘Government’s vision, policy principles, 
strategic goals and objectives for promoting and implementing renewable energy in 
South Africa’.27 It has two further goals: to inform the public and the international 
community of the government’s goals, and how the government intends to achieve 
them; and to inform government agencies and Organs of State of these goals, and 
their roles in achieving them.28
21 Ibid. at 25.
22 Ibid. By way of comparison, according to International Energy Agency data, in 2008 Denmark produced 
58 426 GWh from renewable sources and Mexico 47 303 GWh. See <http://www.iea.org/stats/renew-
data.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=DK> and <http://www.iea.org/stats/renewdata.asp?COUNTRY_CODE= 
MX> respectively (both visited 8 December 2010).
23 Ibid. at 6. PJ denotes Peta Joules, which is 1015 Joules.
24 Ibid. at 7.
25 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 
(2002).
26 Ibid. para. 20(e).
27 Department of Minerals and Energy, White Paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the Republic of 
South Africa (2003) at 1.
28 Ibid.
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The overall vision of the White Paper is to increase the contribution of renewable 
energy to the energy mix, ‘thus contributing to sustainable development and envi-
ronmental conservation’.29 This is an admirable objective, but the vision is somewhat 
limited. The White Paper sets a rather conservative target:
10 000 GWh (0.8 Mtoe) renewable energy contribution to final energy con-
sumption by 2013, to be produced mainly from biomass, wind, solar and small-
scale hydro. The renewable energy is to be utilised for power generation and 
non-electric technologies such as solar water heating and bio-fuels. This is ap-
proximately 4% (1667 MW) of the estimated electricity demand (41539 MW) 
by 2013. This is equivalent to replacing two (2x 660 MW) units of Eskom’s 
combined coal fired power stations.30 
One of the shortcomings of the White Paper, in the view of the present author, is that 
renewable energy is seen in the ‘big picture’ largely as an energy source to feed ‘into 
the grid’, rather than a source that can power individual consumers’ needs. This is 
despite the fact that solar power, for example, is discussed in the document as being 
appropriate for use by individuals. ‘South Africa experiences some of the highest lev-
els of solar radiation in the World’31 and that average daily solar radiation in South 
Africa varies between 4.5 and 6.5 kWh/m2 (16 and 23 MJ/m2), compared to about 
3.6 kWh/m2 for parts of the United States and about 2.5 kWh/m2 for Europe and the 
United Kingdom.32 These facts suggest that far greater emphasis should be given to 
use of solar energy for domestic power generation (not just water heating), given that 
solar power is used extensively in Western Europe (with far lower solar radiation) for 
domestic generation, to such an extent that many users sell power back to the grid.
3.5 A National Climate Change Response Strategy for South Africa 2004
This policy document33 contains strategies 
designed to address issues that have been identified as priorities for dealing with 
climate change in South Africa. Whereas the national strategy must recognise 
international realities, including the growing pressure for quantified commit-
ments of some kind by developing countries, including South Africa, it must be 
seen within the context of the present economic realities of the country and the 
inequitable distribution of global wealth. Thus the point of departure reflected 
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. at 25. Eskom (Electricity Supply Commission, translated from Afrikaans) is South Africa’s parastatal 
electricity supply company.
31 Ibid. at 20.
32 Ibid., citing	G. Stassen Towards	a	Renewable	Energy	Strategy	for	South	Africa,	Ph.D Thesis, University of 
Pretoria (1996).
33 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, A	National	Climate	Change	Response	Strategy	for	South	
Africa (2004). 
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in this strategy is achievement of national and sustainable development objec-
tives, whilst simultaneously responding to climate change.34
The document contains objectives, and ‘interventions’ intended to meet those objec-
tives, as follows:35
• Create a synergy between national government objectives, sustainable devel-
opment and climate change.
• To enable the relevant national government departments to address climate 
change issues in South Africa.
0 Ensure that the relevant national government directorates and sub-direc-
torates have the capacity to carry out their assigned functions regarding 
climate change response, including the CDM.
0 Establish procedures for CDM projects.
• Offset South Africa’s vulnerability to climate change.
0 Extension of health protection and health promotion measures.
0 Water resource management and contingency planning.
0 Adaptation of rangeland practices.
0 Adaptation in agriculture.
0 Changes in forestry practices.
0 Protecting plant biodiversity
0 Protection of animal biodiversity
0 Protecting marine biodiversity
0 Formulate actions that will offset the economic vulnerability of South 
Africa to climate change response measures.
• Create a national greenhouse gas mitigation plan that furthers the process of 
sustainable development in South Africa in the light of CDM, technology 
transfer, donor funding and capacity building opportunities.
0 The efforts of all stakeholders will be harnessed to achieve the objectives 
of the Government’s White Paper on Renewable Energy (2003) and the 
Energy Efficiency Strategy, promoting a sustainable development path 
through coordinated government policy.
0 Initiating the Government’s joint implementation strategy for the control 
of exhaust emissions from road-going vehicles.
0 Implement a transport sector mitigation programme through the Na-
tional Department of Transport, in conjunction with the Government’s 
energy efficiency strategy (2003) and the joint implementation strategy for 
the control of exhaust emissions from road-going vehicles.
0 Develop and implement an appropriate coal-mining sector mitigation 
programme through the Department of Minerals and Energy and the 
mining industry.
34 At iii.
35 These objectives and interventions are taken verbatim from the document. The interventions are the sub-
bullet points.
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0 Implement sustainable industrial development through coordinated poli-
cies, strategies and incentives through the Department of Trade and In-
dustry and the various industry sectors.
0 Reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the agricultural sector through the 
National Department of Agriculture.
0 Facilitate the establishment and extension of forest schemes through the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and the forestry industry.
0 Optimise waste management practices to minimise the emissions of green-
house gases and develop a government position, through all relevant de-
partments and all spheres of government and industry, to implement a 
waste sector mitigation programme.
• Optimise South Africa’s potential to benefit from climate change mitigation 
by suitable international response and positioning.
0 Maintain an appropriate attendance at UNFCCC and related meetings.
• To ensure that government departments in all spheres work together on a 
cooperative basis in dealing with climate change.
0 Use the Government Committee for Climate Change to consolidate the 
government position.
• Ensure that South African environmental law provides for climate change 
issues.
0 Use the ongoing law reform process to ensure that climate change issues 
are provided for in South African legislation.
• Improve the level of education, training and awareness regarding climate 
change in South Africa and capacitate the government and other sectors to 
deal with climate change issues effectively to the benefit of the country.
0 Accelerate the process of relevant education, training, awareness and ca-
pacity building in South Africa to speed up the implementation of climate 
change response.
• Ensure that there is an effective and integrated programme of climate change 
research, development and demonstration in South Africa.
0 Set up a database of climate change related research, development and 
demonstration projects and integrate the research, development and dem-
onstration programme for South and Southern Africa.
• Identify and put in place an information handling system that incorporates 
greenhouse gas data.
0 Introduce greenhouse gas emissions into air quality legislation and put in 
place a national information handling system that incorporates greenhouse 
gas data alongside air pollution data.
• Ensure that South Africa gets the best possible access to available climate 
change funding.
0 Ensure that an investment friendly climate is developed and maintained 
to attract developed country partners to invest in climate change related 
projects in South Africa.
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0 Coordination of Climate Change donor funds that are procured for South 
Africa.
0 Involve the public sector and financing institutions linked to government, 
such as the Industrial Development Corporation and the Development 
Bank of South Africa.
The purpose of reproducing these objectives in full is twofold. First, it is interesting 
to assess how these objectives underpin (or do not underpin) future policy directions. 
Second, several of these objectives seem not to have been taken any further in the six 
years since they have been set out. It is interesting also to note that some of the objec-
tives are stated in a somewhat curious way. For example, under the heading ‘Inter-
national concerns’, the stated objective is to ‘optimise South Africa’s potential to 
benefit from climate change mitigation by suitable international response and posi-
tioning’, which is quite different from the usual view that mitigation will do anything 
but benefit a country. Many of these issues will be picked up further in this paper, 
but one final element that is worth noting at this juncture is the exhortation to gov-
ernment to integrate its response to climate change. Whilst this is a prerequisite, in 
the present author’s opinion, for an effective climate change response, on overall 
reflection it appears that this message has not been heeded. It still very much appears 
that the Department of Environmental Affairs is beating a lone drum in this re-
spect.36 
3.6 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios 2008
In March 2006, the Cabinet of the South African government commissioned a proc-
ess aimed at examining greenhouse gas mitigation options. The purpose of the Long 
Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) document37 was ‘to outline different scenarios 
of mitigation action by South Africa, to inform long-term national policy and to 
provide a solid basis for our position in multi-lateral climate negotiations on a post-
2012 climate regime’.38 
The scenarios were sketched between two limits: the ‘growth without constraints’ 
(GWC) limit and the ‘required by science’ (RBS) limit, the latter based on a reduc-
tion of emissions of between 30 and 40 per cent from 2003 levels by 2050. The 
document examines various interventions (referred to as ‘wedges’ in the document 
due to their shape if represented graphically) that can be used to reduce the GWC 
levels closer to the RBS level, although the gap cannot be closed completely, accord-
ing to the document. These ‘wedges’ include a wide variety of interventions, some of 
36 By this I am not suggesting that other government sectors, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
which is obviously involved in the international negotiations, are completely ignoring climate change. I 
am referring to government sectoral approaches, largely in relation to domestic developmental policy, 
where lip service may be paid to climate change concerns but there is not much, if anything, to suggest a 
departure from business as usual.
37 Energy Research Centre, Long	Term	Mitigation	Scenarios:	Technical	Summary (2007).
38 Ibid. at 2.
143
Michael Kidd
which can be implemented immediately and others introduced only later. They in-
clude responses ranging from the general, such as energy efficiency, to the more 
specific – such as the use of ‘cleaner coal’ in energy generation and changes in the 
transport sector including increased use of public transport and moving from road 
to rail for freight transport. 
The document highlights the important role that can be played by economic instru-
ments, including CO2 taxes and incentives for renewable electricity, solar water heat-
ing and biofuels. Interestingly, it was reported that a senior official in the Department 
of Environment told the Parliamentary Committee in a briefing on the scenarios 
document that it was the ‘first document to be published by the Department that 
spoke of climate change’,39 ignoring completely the National	Climate	Change	Re-
sponse	Strategy	for	South	Africa of 2004.	
3.7 Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity 2009
In January 2008, South Africa experienced the debilitating phenomenon of ‘load 
shedding’, where the available supply of electricity did not meet the demand. In 
order to avoid unpredicted blackouts, load shedding entailed particular areas expe-
riencing scheduled cuts in power supply for a specific period of time. As it turned 
out, the situation was not permanent, and things eventually returned to normal.40 
The spectre of load shedding, however, has not been permanently consigned to his-
tory and there are prospects of electricity supply battling to meet anticipated demand 
in the future, which is the context within which the Integrated Resource Plans (2009 
and 2010 – see below) must be considered.
The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for Electricity is required by electricity regula-
tions on new generation capacity in terms of the Electricity Regulation Act.41 Its 
significance to climate change policy is that electricity generation is a significant 
source of GHG emissions in South Africa. The IRP ‘gives effect to the following 
policy objectives’:42
(i) 10 000 Gwh (approximately 4 per cent of the energy mix) of renewable 
energy usage;
(ii) the implementation of Energy Efficiency and Demand Side Management 
through financial incentives scheme (sic); and
(iii) installation of one million solar water heaters.
39 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, available at <http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080610-climate-
change-and-long-term-mitigation-strategies> (visited 7 February 2011).
40 See Terence Creamer, ‘Why SA is load shedding when demand is peaking at a mere 33  000 MW’ Engi-
neering	News	Online of 24 January 2008, available at <http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/why-sa-
is-load-shedding-when-demand-is-peaking-at-a-mere-33-000-mw-2008-01-24> (visited 3 February 
2011).
41 Act 4 of 2006.
42 GN 1243 in GG 32837 of 31 December 2009 at 10.
144
South Africa’s Position on Climate Change: Fiddling while the Earth Burns?
The IRP contains a schedule of power-generation sources including two new coal-
fired power stations (Medupi and Kusile) and makes it clear (although not using 
express words to the effect) that coal remains the primary energy source. From the 
policy objectives stated above it is also manifestly clear that renewable energy sourc-
es are regarded very much as peripheral.
3.8 Integrated Resource Plan 2 2010
At the time of writing, the final IRP2 (as the 2010 Integrated Resource Plan is termed) 
has not yet been released. A draft was released in October 2010, amidst concerns about 
lack of transparency and public involvement in its formulation, as well as an expected 
‘bias’ against renewable energy.43 According to the draft IRP, its primary objective is 
‘to determine the long-term electricity demand and detail how this demand should 
be met in terms of generating capacity, type, timing and cost’.44 The IRP is based on 
certain assumptions: a GDP growth trajectory of on average 4.5 per cent over the next 
20 years which will require 41 346 MW of new capacity; at least 3420 MW of de-
mand side management programmes as well as gradual reduction in energy intensity 
due to, inter alia, increased energy efficiency.45 The plan anticipates bulk demand be-
ing provided principally by coal-fired generation (due, inter alia, to the low direct costs 
of coal and South Africa’s high coal reserves), despite the recognition of the external 
costs of such an approach. The bottom line is that renewable energy, although pro-
vided for in the plan, is still accorded a peripheral role.
3.9 Carbon Tax Discussion Document
This discussion document46 concludes that a carbon tax appears to be the most ap-
propriate economic instrument to reduce GHG emissions in the country. According 
to the document 
[w]hile it would not guarantee a fixed quantitative reduction in such emissions 
over the short term, a carbon tax set at an appropriate level and phased in over 
time would provide a strong price signal and certainty to both producers and 
consumers, acting as an incentive for more environmentally friendly behaviour 
over the long term.47 
Implementation of a carbon tax in South Africa should be ‘informed by’ the follow-
ing policy considerations:48
43 Leonie Joubert, ‘Energy policy’ Business	Day 12 July 2010, available at <http://www.businessday.co.za/
Articles/Content.aspx?id=114454> (visited 2 February 2011).
44 Executive summary of IRP 2010 at vi.
45 Ibid.
46 National Treasury, Reducing	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions:	The	Carbon	Tax	Option (2010), Discussion Paper 
for Public Comment.
47 Ibid. at 9.
48 Ibid. at 9–10.
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•  In the absence of an international climate change agreement and a global 
emissions pricing system, a partial, rather than full, internalisation of the 
externality should be targeted as an interim measure. 
•  While a carbon tax based on measured and verified emissions is preferred, a 
proxy tax can be considered and levied according to the carbon content of 
fossil fuels (i.e. a fuel input tax). A tax of R75 per ton of CO2 and with an 
increase to around R200 per ton CO2 (at 2005 prices) would be both feasi-
ble and appropriate to achieve the desired behavioural changes and emission 
reduction targets. 
•  The carbon tax should be introduced at a modest rate, which will increase 
over a set time period, giving taxpayers an opportunity to adjust to the new 
tax. 
•  The tax should, over time, be equivalent to the marginal external damage 
costs of carbon. 
•  Coverage should be comprehensive, covering all sectors. 
•  Relief measures, if any, should be minimised and temporary. The design of 
the tax needs to minimise the potential regressive impacts on low-income 
households and protect the competitiveness of key industries. Revenue recy-
cling to minimise the costs of the tax could be achieved through some form 
of tax shifting. The full earmarking of revenues is not in line with sound fis-
cal policy principles, although some form of on-budget funding for specific 
environmental programmes should be considered. 
The carbon taxes discussion document will be followed (in 2011 apparently) by a 
discussion document on emissions trading.49 Clearly, market mechanisms are an 
important component of a comprehensive response to climate change, as recognized 
in the Climate	Change	Green	Paper (see below). It is strange, however, that there is 
no direct reference in the Green	Paper to this document, and vice versa.
3.10 National Climate Change Response Green Paper 201050
The purpose of the policy outlined in the Green Paper, which appeared late in 2010, 
is to commit South Africa to making 
a fair contribution to the stabilisation of global greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere and the protection of the country and its people from the impacts 
of unavoidable climate change. It presents the Government’s vision for an effec-
tive climate change response and the long-term transition to a climate resilient 
and low-carbon economy and society – a vision premised on Government’s com-
mitment to sustainable development and a better life for all.51
49 Ibid. at 10.
50 GN 1083 in GG 33801 of 25 November 2010.
51 Ibid. at 5.
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The Green Paper sets out the following strategies that require implementation in 
order to achieve the country’s climate change response objectives:52
• Taking a balanced approach to both climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion responses in terms of prioritisation, focus, action and resource alloca-
tion.
• Prioritising the development and maintenance of the science-policy interface 
and knowledge management and dissemination systems to ensure that cli-
mate change response decisions are informed by the best available informa-
tion.
• The short-term prioritisation of adaptation interventions that address im-
mediate threats to the health and well-being of South Africans including 
interventions in the water, agriculture and health sectors.
• The prioritisation of mitigation interventions that significantly contribute to 
a peak, plateau and decline emission trajectory where greenhouse gas emis-
sions peak in 2020 to 2025 at 34 per cent and 42 per cent respectively below 
a business as usual baseline, plateau to 2035 and begin declining in absolute 
terms from 2036 onwards, in particular, interventions within the energy, 
transport and industrial sectors.
• The prioritisation of mitigation interventions that have potential positive job 
creation, poverty alleviation and/or general economic impacts. In particular, 
interventions that stimulate new industrial activities and those that improve 
the efficiency and competitive advantage of existing business and industry. 
In order to accurately identify these sectors and the job creation, industrial 
development potential of these, work will be done in order that the White 
Paper provides a clear understanding and prioritisation of these and their 
potential.
• Prioritising the development of knowledge generation and information man-
agement systems that increase our ability to measure and predict climate 
change and, especially extreme weather events, floods, droughts and forest 
and veld fires, and their impacts on people and the environment.
• The mainstreaming of climate change response into all national, provincial 
and local planning regimes.
• The use of incentives and disincentives, including through regulation and the 
use of economic and fiscal measures to promote behaviour change that would 
support the transition to a low carbon society and economy.
• Acknowledging that, with the energy intensive nature of the South African 
economy, the mitigation of greenhouse gases is generally not going to be easy 
or cheap and that Government must support and facilitate the mitigation 
plans of, in particular, the energy, transport and industrial sectors.
• The recognition that sustainable development is also climate friendly devel-
52 Reproduced verbatim from the document at 6–7.
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opment and that the more sustainable our development path is, the easier it 
will be to build resilience to climate change impacts.
• Recognise that measures taken by developed countries in their efforts to re-
spond to climate change may have detrimental effects on high carbon and 
energy intensive economies such as South Africa. These response measures 
may include trade measures including border tax adjustments, and could be 
reflected in a reluctance to trade in goods with a high carbon footprint. South 
Africa’s climate change strategy must recognise and address this and also cre-
ate mechanisms that will give high carbon sectors the support and time to 
move to lower carbon forms of production.
• Recognise that South Africa’s response to climate change will have major 
implications for both the Southern African region and for Africa as a whole 
and ensure that national responses are aligned to, support and operate as part 
of a broader regional response.
The Green Paper considers policy approaches in the context of, first, those sectors of 
South African society that most require adaptation (viz. water, agriculture and hu-
man health) and, second, those sectors where mitigation will be most important 
(energy, industry and transport). The document also considers three other important 
sectors – disaster risk management; natural resource sectors; and human society, 
livelihoods and services. The approach is to identify, for each of these sectors, the key 
challenges or impacts and then to set out the policy responses, which take the form 
of actions (for example, in the context of water, to ‘continue to develop and maintain 
good water management systems and institutions, from village through to national 
level, to ensure we achieve our equity objectives, and can sustain affordable provision 
of water to all’).53
Many of the identified actions involve increased research, investigation or ‘explora-
tion’ of various issues, which is not unexpected in a document such as this. There are 
also several actions involving developing awareness, the development of more issue-
specific plans and strategies, and increased investment in infrastructure – both main-
tenance and expansion. In light of the fact that this is not the place to evaluate each 
policy response individually, only certain of these responses will be highlighted here 
because they are noteworthy in the sense that they influence the overall policy frame-
work, or, as this is essentially a legal analysis, because they envisage direct legal re-
sponses.54
Responses that are interesting from a general policy-direction perspective primarily 
relate to energy. The Green Paper recommends that a ‘climate constraint’ be inte-
grated into the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) and the Integrated Resource Plan for 
53 Ibid. at 9.
54 Many of the actions identified may eventually have to be implemented by means of regulation. The cur-
rent exercise examines only those where there is a direct regulatory device mentioned or clearly envisaged 
in the stated policy response.
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Electricity Generation (IRP).55 It would probably be argued by the originators of 
these documents (IEP and IRP) that this has been done, but the extent to which this 
integration has been taken on board in a real, as opposed to window-dressing, man-
ner is a concern.
An important commitment is the recommendation to review and ‘scale up’ the 
10  000 GWh 2013 Renewable Energy target ‘in order that it can sustain long term 
growth in order to promote competitiveness for renewable energy with conven-
tional energies in the medium and long term’.56 Although this is a desirable direction 
if a genuine approach to reduction of GHG emissions is to be sustained, the absence 
of a more specific target may well permit minimal improvements in this regard, to 
the extent that any gains have an insignificant overall impact. 
Likely to be a contentious response is the suggestion that the potential for nuclear 
energy be explored and further developed.57 It is clear that nuclear energy will have 
to be included in discussions of the appropriate future energy mix for the country, 
but it is clear from widespread opposition to the proposed pebble bed reactor58 that 
any nuclear development will have to be well justified and demonstrably beneficial 
to South Africa’s interests.
It is also interesting that some of the stated policy responses (worded in such a way 
as to suggest that they are new initiatives, not bolstering of existing activities) are 
either clearly already being done (at least on paper) or are arguably contained in 
existing activities or regulatory requirements. For example, one of the responses is to 
‘ensure that a comprehensive biodiversity monitoring system is established that can 
provide timely information on specific risks’.59 The wording suggests that this is 
something that needs to be established in the future, but it is exactly what is pro-
vided for already in the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act60 in 
Chapter 3.
Responses requiring legal innovations are found throughout the document. Those 
that relate to improved implementation of, or the securing of compliance with, exist-
ing legislation are: the acceleration of the ‘finalisation and implementation of cost 
reflective water and water-use pricing including effluent charges’;61 and the ‘vigorous’ 
55 Green Paper §5.4.1
56 Ibid. at §5.4.7
57 Ibid. at §5.4.9
58 In 2004, Eskom announced that South Africa would build a pebble bed modular (nuclear) reactor. There 
was strong opposition to this (see, for example, John Yeld, ‘Pebble bed fuel gets go-ahead’, Cape	Argus 8 
of 30 January 2007. As costs mounted, and in the face of lack of investment, the South African govern-
ment decided to terminate the project in September 2010 (see government announcement, available at 
<http://www.southafrica.info/news/pbmr-mothballed.htm> (visited 4 August 2011).
59 Ibid. at §5.8.4
60 Act 10 of 2004.
61 Green Paper at §5.1.4
149
Michael Kidd
enforcement of compliance with water quality standards.62 The extension of existing 
regulatory mechanisms is envisaged in the recommendation to ‘reduce the incidence 
of respiratory diseases by improving air quality through reducing ambient particulate 
matter (PM) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) concentrations by legislative and other 
measures to ensure full compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards by 
2020’;63 the use of s 29(1) of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality 
Act,64 to manage GHG emissions from all significant industrial sources (i.e. sources 
responsible for greater than 0.1 per cent of total emissions for the sector) ‘in line with 
approved mitigation plans prepared by identified industries and/or sectors’;65 and to 
ensure that the Minimum Requirements for Landfills are revised and amended to 
reflect greenhouse gas mitigation considerations by 2012.66
The setting of mandatory (presumably legally required) targets and frameworks are 
also envisaged in several responses, without specifying existing legislation in terms of 
which this may be done: these include the development of renewable energy policy, 
legal and regulatory frameworks;67 and the setting of ‘ambitious and mandatory’ 
targets for energy efficiency – ‘made mandatory through available regulatory instru-
ments and other appropriate mechanisms’.68 The latter is something that can be done 
without much difficulty in order to reduce, not insignificantly, energy usage.69
The establishment of new legislative interventions is envisaged by several policy re-
sponses. This will necessitate research in order to develop appropriate legislation for 
the South African context, but this will be facilitated by the fact that several of these 
regulatory mechanisms are in place in other countries. The introduction of a carbon 
tax is placed on the agenda twice: one response urges the use of ‘market-based policy 
measures such as an escalating carbon tax to price carbon and internalise the external 
costs of climate change’;70 whilst a second suggests that South Africa ‘continue	 to 
develop and implement an escalating CO2 tax on all energy related CO2 emissions, 
including process emissions from the coal to liquid fuel process’.71 The United States 
is currently increasing legislative efforts to require energy efficiency.72
Various energy-efficiency measures are recommended, which will probably require 
new legislation: the development and implementation of ‘mandatory appliance label-
62 Ibid. at §5.1.11
63 Ibid. at §5.3.1. Such standards are set in terms of s9, 10 and 11 of the National Environmental Manage-
ment: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004.
64 See further discussion on this below.
65 Green Paper at §5.5.3
66 Ibid. at §5.9.21
67 Ibid. at §5.4.10
68 Ibid. at §5.4.13
69 See Lester R Brown, Plan	B	4.0:	Mobilizing	to	Save	Civilization (W. W. Norton & Company, 2009) at 
84–6.
70 Green Paper at §5.4.3
71 Ibid. at §5.5.4
72 John M Broder, ‘Obama orders new rules to raise energy efficiency’, New	York	Times of 5 February 2009, 
available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/us/politics/06energy.html> (visited 4 February 2011).
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ling for household appliances’;73 the introduction of ‘Minimum Energy Performance 
Standards (MEPS) for appliances and equipment, as well as proposals for manda-
tory energy rating labelling’;74 and the legislation of ‘requirements for the installa-
tion of energy management systems in large-scale office buildings’.75 Related to the 
latter is the recommendation to mandate the ‘National Home Builders Registration 
Council (NHBRC) to ensure that building construction conforms to green building 
requirements, including measures such as use of controlled ventilation, recycled 
material, [and] solar power’.76 The energy-saving benefits of so-called ‘green build-
ings’ are clear,77 and the European Union has a Directive on the energy performance 
of buildings which can provide South Africa with guidance in this regard.78 Also 
probably requiring new legislation will be the objective of promoting the ‘develop-
ment and implementation of appropriate standards and guidelines and codes of 
practice for the appropriate use of renewable energy, energy efficient and low carbon 
technologies’.79
Another legislative innovation will be the development of a ‘legislative policy and 
regulatory framework to support carbon capture and storage’.80 It is likely that the 
Australian lead in legislating for the storage of greenhouse gas will be instructive in 
this regard.81
Finally (on the legal theme), there are responses relating to reporting of emissions. 
The Green Paper recommends the development, implementation and maintenance 
of a ‘greenhouse gas emissions information management system in respect of the 
energy sector that provides accurate, up to date and complete information to the 
South African Air Quality Information System’s National Greenhouse Gas Inven-
tory hosted by the South African Weather Service’.82 Such a greenhouse gas emis-
sions information management system must provide ‘measurable, reportable and 
verifiable information on all significant interventions (i.e. interventions that reduce 
greenhouse gases by greater than 0.1% of emissions from the sector)’.83 A similar 
response requires the ‘mandatory submission of greenhouse gas emission data to the 
National Atmospheric Emission Inventory by all significant emitters and compilers 
of greenhouse gas emission related data and/or proxy data by 2013’.84
73 Green Paper at §5.4.15
74 Ibid. at §5.4.16
75 Ibid. at §5.4.17
76 Ibid. at §5.9.8
77 Brown, Plan	B	4.0,	supra note 69, at 87–91.
78 Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy 
performance of buildings.
79 Green Paper at §5.4.22
80 Ibid. at §5.4.23
81 See the Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Act 2006 (Cth); the Greenhouse 
Geological Sequestration Act 208 (Vic) and the Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld).
82 Green Paper at §5.4.19. See, further, Rina Taviv, Stanford Mwakasonda and Jongikhaya Witi, Developing	
the	GHG	inventory	for	South	Africa (2008). 
83 Green Paper at §5.4.20
84 Ibid. at §8.4.2
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As for governance, the Green Paper contains some important responses. The docu-
ment commits all government departments and all state owned enterprises – (i) ‘by 
2012, [to] conduct a review of all policies, strategies, legislation, regulations and 
plans falling within its jurisdiction or sphere of influence to ensure full alignment 
with the National Climate Change Response Policy’ (NCCRP); and (ii) by 2014, to 
‘ensure that all policies, strategies, legislation, regulations and plans falling within its 
jurisdiction or sphere of influence are fully aligned with the [NCCRP]’.85 Insofar as 
governance structure is concerned, the Green Paper envisages the formation of the 
Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, at executive (Cabinet) level. The 
Committee is intended to ‘foster the exchange of information, consultation, agree-
ment, assistance and support among the spheres of government with respect to cli-
mate change and government’s response to climate change’. Integration throughout 
government of climate change response actions is critical and it is important, there-
fore, that this Committee plays a central role to achieve this.
The Green Paper also deals with issues of resource inputs (for example, financing 
climate change responses) and monitoring, evaluation and review. As with most 
policies, the acid test will be the way in which the policy is translated into action. 
The implementation of the policy will ultimately, for the most part, have to be carried 
out by means of legislation, whether by means of using or amending existing laws 
(such as the Air Quality Act)86 or by enacting dedicated climate change response 
legislation. Several responses, as pointed out above, require further research or ex-
amination as to appropriate ways of addressing the issue in question, which suggests 
that a single enactment may be delayed too long (pending completion of all the 
underlying research and investigation) in order to be optimally effective. If climate 
change response is to use existing law, it is necessary to examine what the law cur-
rently entails as far as climate change is concerned.
4 South African law relating to climate change
Currently, South Africa has little in the way of legislation that directly addresses 
climate change issues, although there are some specific legislative provisions that can 
be used for that purpose and a legislative framework which arguably requires more 
pro-action by government in this regard.
At the apex of South Africa’s legal system is the Constitution, including a Bill of 
Rights, which ‘applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary 
85 Ibid. at §6.1
86  National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004.
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and all organs of state’.87 The Constitution includes the so-called ‘environmental 
right’88 which provides
Everyone has the right…
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that-
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resourc-
es while promoting justifiable economic and social development.
Added to this are the national environmental management principles in the Na-
tional Environmental Management Act,89 which principles revolve around the con-
cepts of people being at the centre of environmental management and sustainable 
development. Section 24 of the Constitution together with the national environmen-
tal management principles arguably requires the South African government to ad-
dress climate change and its possible impacts on South Africa, by means of legislation 
and other reasonable measures.
When it comes to addressing GHG emissions, the National Environmental Manage-
ment: Air Quality Act90 has potential. Although the Act contains no express refer-
ence to ‘climate change’,91 it does provide that an atmospheric emission licence must 
contain greenhouse gas emission measurement and reporting requirements.92 In 
addition, the Act provides for the declaration of ‘priority air pollutant’,93 and this 
section could be used to declare GHGs as priority pollutants. Priority pollutants 
would then be specially regulated by means of pollution prevention plans provided 
for in respect of the specific pollutants. This is, in fact, envisaged by the Green Pa-
per.94 At the time of writing, the power in s 29 has not yet been used for this pur-
pose, and it is important to note that it is a directory provision, not a mandatory one, 
so there is no compulsion on the Minister to make such a declaration.
87 Section 8(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.
88 Section 24.
89 Act 107 of 1998.
90 Act 39 of 2004. Hereafter referred to as the Air Quality Act.
91 There is an oblique reference in the Preamble.
92 Section 43(1)(l).
93 Section 29, which provides (in s 29(1)) that 
The Minister or MEC may, by notice in the Gazette-
(a)		declare any substance contributing to air pollution as a priority air pollutant; and
(b)		require persons falling within a category specified in the notice to prepare, submit to the 
Minister or MEC for approval, and implement pollution prevention plans in respect of a 
substance declared as a priority air pollutant in terms of paragraph (a).
94 See text corresponding to supra note 54.
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Also relevant is the Electricity Regulation Act,95 under which regulations were prom-
ulgated requiring the periodic production of the Integrated Resource Plans, as dis-
cussed above.96 The Act contains amongst its objectives the achievement of efficient, 
effective, sustainable and orderly development and operation of electricity supply 
infrastructure in South Africa; ensuring that the interests and needs of present and 
future electricity customers and end users are safeguarded and met, having regard to 
the governance, efficiency, effectiveness and long-term sustainability of the electric-
ity supply industry within the broader context of economic energy regulation in the 
Republic; and the promotion of the use of diverse energy sources and energy efficien-
cy.97 There is, however, no explicit reference to climate change considerations in the 
Act.
Finally, in 2010, the Minister of Finance announced in his budget speech a flat rate 
CO2 emissions tax on new motor vehicles, with effect from 1 September 2010.
98 
Although South Africa’s law relating to climate change is currently sparse, legislative 
innovation seems certain in the light of the Green Paper’s recommendations and 
South Africa’s commitments to GHG emissions reduction made on the interna-
tional plane, to which our attention now turns. 
5 South Africa’s recent role in international climate change 
negotiations
South Africa ratified the Framework Convention on 29 August 1997 and the Kyoto 
Protocol on 31 July 2002. It is a Non-Annex I party to the Convention.99 During 
the approach to the United Nations Climate Change Conference (incorporating 
COP15 and CMP5) in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009, South Africa was 
aligned with the common African position as set out in the Nairobi Declaration on 
the African Process for Combating Climate Change.100 The salient features of the 
declaration were commitments to 
• urge developed countries to set ambitious targets to reduce their emissions, 
by 2020, of at least 40 per cent below 1990 levels, and, by 2050, by between 
80 and 95 per cent below those levels, and to achieve the concentration of 
450 ppm of carbon dioxide equivalent in the atmosphere;
95 Act 4 of 2006.
96 Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity: GN R721 GG 32378 of 5 August 2009.
97 Section 2.
98 See National Treasury, Press	Release	 regarding	CO2	vehicle	 emissions	 tax (26 August 2010), available at 
<http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2010/2010082601.pdf> (visited 7 February 2011). 
99 Annex I parties are generally developed countries or countries with their economies in transition. Non-
Annex I parties are generally developing countries.
100 This document is available at <http://www.unep.org/roa/Amcen/Amcen_Events/3rd_ss/Docs/nairobi-
Decration-2009.pdf> (visited 4 February 2011).
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• urge developed countries to support Africa by providing finance, technology 
and capacity-building in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner;
• reaffirm African nations’ strong commitment that adaptation for climate 
change is the first priority at the national and regional levels; and
• agree that any African climate change mitigation efforts will be voluntary and 
will require adequate financing, technology and capacity support. 
Inter Press Service then reported that, the day before the Copenhagen Conference, 
South Africa broke ranks from the common African position and announced a (con-
ditional) 34 per cent reduction in GHG emissions from business as usual by 2020 
and 42 per cent by 2025.101 This ‘commitment’ will be discussed in more detail be-
low. The Conference itself was a frustrating process for those who expected a binding 
agreement, with the eventual compromise result being the Copenhagen Accord – a 
‘political rather than … legal’102 document which parties decided to ‘take note of ’ 
rather than adopt. Even this limited outcome, however, was only possible due to the 
breaking of an impasse through negotiations of a smaller group of 28 countries, fol-
lowed by an even smaller meeting involving the presidents of the BASIC countries103 
together with the President of the United States.104
The Accord ‘requires’ of developing countries (including South Africa) that nation-
ally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) that receive international support (for 
instance, funding and technical support) ‘will be subject to international measure-
ment, reporting and verification (MRV) in accordance with guidelines adopted by 
the Conference of the Parties’.105 As for NAMAs that do not receive support, devel-
oping countries are required to submit their mitigation actions in a defined format 
for compilation by the UNFCCC Secretariat; non-Annex I parties are required to 
‘implement’ the actions; and such actions will be subject to domestic MRV to be 
reported biennially.106
South Africa ‘associated itself ’ with the accord,107 but made it clear in its communi-
cation to the Secretariat that 
… the extent to which this action will be implemented depends on the provision 
of financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity building support 
by developed countries … [and] … requires the finalisation of an ambitious, fair, 
effective and binding multilateral agreement …
101 Servaas van den Bosch, ‘South Africa’s empty promise’ (15 December 2009), available at <http://allafrica.
com/stories/200912150890.html> (visited 4 February 2011).
102 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem’ 104 American	Journal	
of	International	Law	(2010) 230–240 at 235.
103 Brazil, South Africa, India and China.
104 Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference’, supra note 102, at 234.
105 Decision 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th sess., UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), Addendum, para 5.
106 Ibid.
107 Letter from South African Government to the UNFCCC Secretariat dated 29 January 2010.
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As for the future, and as will be expanded on further below, any commitment that 
South Africa has made to reducing GHG emissions is contingent on, inter alia, the 
finalization of a binding multilateral agreement. Since such agreement will have to 
include both the United States and China, prospects for such an agreement do not 
look good at the moment.
6 Analysis
6.1 Introduction
The 2010 National Climate Change Response Green Paper states as an objective that 
South Africa is aiming at a 34 per cent reduction in GHG emissions from business 
as usual by 2020 and 42 per cent by 2025.108 This corresponds to the announcement 
made the day before the Copenhagen Conference in late 2009. The first aspect to 
note about this objective is that it is not a reduction in absolute terms, but a reduc-
tion from ‘business as usual’, which is unrestrained growth. Emissions will, therefore, 
continue to grow, but at a lower rate than would have been the case in the absence 
of mitigation actions. The second observation is that this ‘commitment’ is contingent 
on international support (technology and funding) and the finalization of ‘an ambi-
tious, fair, effective and binding multilateral agreement’.109 In the analysis that fol-
lows, an evaluation will be made as to whether this is a realistic objective or whether 
it is an ‘empty promise’ behind which South Africa continues to fiddle while the earth 
burns. Several issues will be discussed here which may contribute to this evaluation.
6.2 Continued reliance on coal
In the 2003 Integrated Energy Plan, untapped coal reserves in South Africa are esti-
mated at 55 billion tonnes, and coal is regarded as ‘plentiful and inexpensive to 
exploit’.110 Various scenarios were raised in that plan, but notwithstanding different 
policy approaches envisaged in these scenarios, the Plan concluded that ‘coal remains 
the dominant primary energy source over the planning horizon’.111 This thinking has 
not changed in the intervening period and renewable energy is still seen as a fringe 
source. In the 2009 Integrated Resource Plan, central sources of electricity for the 
short- to medium-term are seen to be the Medupi coal-fired power station (the first 
unit of which will be commissioned in 2012), and the Kusile coal-fired station (the 
first unit of which to be commissioned in 2013). The IRP2 process, which is yet to 
see a final document, has been criticized on the basis that the drafters of the plan 
108 Green Paper at §4.
109 See supra note 107.
110 Department of Minerals and Energy, Integrated	Energy	Plan	for	the	Republic	of	South	Africa (2003) at §3.
111 Ibid. at §6.
156
South Africa’s Position on Climate Change: Fiddling while the Earth Burns?
assume that coal and nuclear are the only real power-generation options for the next 
few decades.112
In evaluating the suitability for South Africa of increased coal-fired energy generation 
(not only in respect of climate change), it is instructive to consider some of the char-
acteristics of the Medupi Power Station, as an example. When Medupi is fully op-
erational, it will be producing 4 800 MW of power (more than a tenth of total 
current capacity), and also producing of 30Mt of CO2.
113 It is scheduled to com-
mence operation in 2012, but to become fully operational only some time after that. 
Controversially, Eskom accessed a loan from the World Bank of US$3 billion in 
order to construct the project.114 The power station will reportedly require 14.6 Mt 
of coal annually for the next 40 years115 and will require enormous amounts of water 
in a region of the country which is already facing water stress.
Underlying increased future reliance on coal is the fact that coal is regarded as cheap. 
This notion ignores the externalities of mining and using coal. Ironically, at the time 
of writing, some concerns are being raised about the rising cost of coal internation-
ally, which may possibly impact negatively on the cheap coal assumption which 
underpins South Africa’s energy policy.116 The ‘cheap coal’ assumption is a fundamen-
tal foundation of the apparent assumption that coal-fired energy is necessary for 
development, which is considered in the next section. Before examining that, how-
ever, it is worth quoting the Minister of Energy Affairs in her budget speech of 2010, 
who stated that
[w]orking together with the Department of Science and Technology and through 
SANEDI (our energy research entity), we will find home grown scientific answers 
to the issue of carbon capture and storage as well as using	our	abundant	coal	re-
serves	to	produce	clean	forms	of	energy	to	reduce	greenhouse	emissions.117
With this kind of thinking in government, one wonders how realistic the emissions 
reduction targets are.
112 Joubert, ‘Energy policy’, supra note 43.
113 Carol Paton, ‘Hot Air v Action’, Financial	Mail of 29 July 2010, available at <http://www.fm.co.za/Arti-
cle.aspx?id=116438> (visited 7 February 2011).
114 Janice Roberts, ‘World Bank approves Eskom loan’, Mail	&	Guardian of 9 April 2010. For criticism, see, 
for example, Khadija Sharife, ‘South Africa: Country’s Dirty Secret – Eskom and the Medupi Power Plant’, 
available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201005140838.html> (visited 7 February 2011).
115 Jonathan Faurie, ‘Medupi project on track for scheduled delivery’, Engineering	News	Online of 5 Decem-
ber 2008, available at <http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/medupi-project-on-track-for-scheduled-
delivery-2008-12-05> (visited 7 February 2011).
116 Chris Yelland, ‘Analysis: Eskom pushing for coal price controls, mining regulation’, The	Daily	Maverick 
of 7 February 2011, available at <http://www.thedailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-02-04-analysis-eskom-
pushing-for-coal-price-controls-mining-regulation> (visited 7 February 2011).
117 2010 Budget Speech by Ms. Dipuo Peters, MP, Minister of Energy, 20 April 2010 at 5.
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6.3 Will burning more coal reduce poverty?
Government officials persist in insisting that development (or economic growth) is 
dependent on more cheap electricity (or, in other words, more electricity generated 
by coal).118 While this may appear to be intuitively self-evident, one must interrogate 
this notion in order to ask exactly what type of development is required or why eco-
nomic growth is so important. Ultimately, the government is concerned with reduc-
tion of poverty and increased employment.119 The crucial question must be, there-
fore, whether the type of development that needs substantially more cheap 
electricity is that which will address poverty and unemployment.
Economic analysis in recent years has indicated that modest growth in GDP has been 
accompanied by widespread substitution of labour by capital equipment.120 Moreo-
ver, ‘as the economy has become more capital-intensive it has also become more 
unequal, showing increasing job losses and increased labour productivity, with no 
‘trickle-down effect’ experienced by the poor’.121 In addition, the cheap cost of en-
ergy has resulted in the economy becoming highly energy-intensive, ‘with more 
energy used to produce equivalent levels of economic output than in most other 
countries’.122 In the light of these observations, it has been argued that ‘the trajec-
tory of growth must shift towards labour intensive industries, and away from the 
current emphasis on mining and refining and relatively high class consumer durables’ 
so as to ensure that the poor have access to productive assets.123
Some observations that might serve to add further doubt to the government’s line 
(which one commentator describes as ‘simplistic nonsense’)124 are:
Firstly, in the late 1980s, the 1990s and the early 2000s, when Eskom’s price of 
electricity was by far the lowest in the world, South Africa’s economic growth rate 
was low and its rate of unemployment was very high.
118 See Yelland, ‘Analysis: Eskom’, supra note 116, who puts it thus: the premise is that 
abundant, cheap coal for the generation of electricity in South Africa is good for Eskom, for com-
merce and industry, for the economy and the country and ultimately for the consumer. Eskom 
claims increases in the cost of coal will lead to an increased price of electricity, which has a negative 
impact on GDP and economic growth and, therefore, a negative impact on employment. 
119 See, for example, President Zumas’ State of the Nation Address of 11 February 2010.
120 H. Bhorat, S. Dieden and J. Hodge, The	Impact	of	Structural	and	Production	Method	Changes	on	Employ-
ment	Growth	of	Occupational	Groups	 in	South	Africa, 6 Trade and Industry Monitor (1998). See also 
Harald Winkler (ed.), Energy	Policies	for	Sustainable	Development	in	South	Africa.	Options	for	the	Future 
(Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town, 2006), available at <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/
ST/NE/Pess/assets/South_Africa_Report_May06.pdf> (visited 19 February 2011) at 79. 
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Neva Seidman Makgetla and Tanya Meelis, ‘Unpacking Unemployment’, 10 New	Agenda (2003) 87–107. 
See also Winkler, Energy	Policies,	supra note 120, at 79.
124 Yelland, ‘Analysis: Eskom’, supra note 116.
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Secondly, the artificially low Eskom electricity price enjoyed by BHP Billiton’s 
Hillside, Bayside and Mozal aluminium smelters in recent years, which was sig-
nificantly below the cost of electricity production, did not enhance the country’s 
economic growth or reduce the high rate of unemployment in South Africa.
On the contrary, in response to secret, low electricity price deals with Eskom, 
BHP Billiton imported bauxite to South Africa by ship, and exported cheap 
South African electricity around the world in the form of aluminium ingots. The 
fact that this was done at a time of electricity shortages and load-shedding in 
South Africa inhibited economic growth and caused job losses.125
As the present paper involves ultimately a legal analysis, one must be careful not to 
suggest that this is unassailable economic analysis. Far from it; the purpose of this 
brief discussion is not to argue that the government line is wrong, but to point out 
that many people have doubts about it126 and that it has not been adequately dis-
sected and explained. If increased coal-reliant energy generation is necessary to uplift 
the average South African, then the linkages between the action (burning coal) and 
the result (development of the type that increases employment and reduces poverty) 
need to be made more explicit than they have been. It would, seem, however, that 
there are alternative routes to poverty-reduction that do not rely on coal and these 
seem not to have been properly considered in the determination of energy and cli-
mate change policy.
Having raised concerns about some of the assumptions underlying South Africa’s 
energy (and hence climate change) policy, I turn now to considering aspects of South 
Africa’s mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
6.4 Mitigation: the example of transport
South Africa has committed itself to ambitious GHG emissions reduction targets 
and there are several sectors, as identified within the 2010 Green Paper, where miti-
gation will be most critical. Given that the timeframe within which these reductions 
are to occur is ten to fifteen years from now, it is necessary to consider how realistic 
these goals are in the context of what is currently happening in regard to mitigation. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the question in respect of all sectors 
in South Africa, but it is proposed to take one sector as an example. The sector in 
question is transport. In the Green Paper, transport is identified as ‘the most rapidly 
growing source of greenhouse gas emissions in South Africa, and [as being] the sec-
ond most significant source of greenhouse gas emissions’.127 In 2000, transport emis-
sions contributed 12 per cent of total energy emissions, and in 2004, transport was 
125 Ibid.
126 I have quoted only Yelland but his is not a lone voice.
127 Green Paper at §5.6
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responsible for 25.7 per cent of energy demand.128 84 per cent of transport energy 
use was contributed by road transport.129 
Among the specific objectives for addressing climate change in the transport sector 
in the Green Paper are to ‘continue to put in place transport policies and develop-
ments that result in a modal shift in passenger transport to public and low carbon 
forms of transport including plans to move freight from road to rail over time’,130 
and ‘encourage the integration of land use and transportation planning in cities in a 
manner that encourages public transport, non-motorised transport (walking and 
cycling) and promotes alternative communication methods such as telecommuting, 
in order to reduce long term transport fuel use patterns’.131 These objectives must be 
seen in the light of the fact that, between 1997 and 2004, the national percentage of 
people who used cars rose from 30 per cent to 45 per cent132 (and there is nothing to 
suggest that this percentage is not still increasing).133
Two principal aspects of the objective are moving freight from road to rail and in-
creasing public transport in an urban environment where there is a coherent trans-
port plan. Are such changes likely in ten to fifteen years? In the 1996 White Paper 
on a National Transport Policy134 there are numerous fairly vague statements of 
transport goals, highlighting improved infrastructure and noble ideals such as effi-
ciency, effectiveness and safety, but there are few express policy objectives to the ef-
fect, for example, that carriage of freight by road ought to be changed to rail convey-
ance. In the absence of any significant programme (if any at all) in respect of 
converting road freight to rail, what are the prospects of such a move being made 
within ten years, in such a way that there could be a positive result from an emissions 
perspective? There are currently 325  539 heavy vehicles registered to operate on 
South African roads.135 Significant numbers of these vehicles will be affected in the 
event that a policy is developed to convert road to rail. Leaving aside the development 
of an implementation plan for such conversion, the consultation that will be neces-
sary with the owners and operators of the heavy trucks currently carrying freight on 
South African roads will take time, which suggests it is unlikely that any significant 
progress will be made in this sector before 2020, by when South Africa intends to 
reduce emissions by 34 per cent.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid at §5.6.1
131 Ibid at §5.6.2
132 Marianne Vanderschuren, T. E. Lane and W. Korver, ‘Managing Energy Demand through Transport 
Policy: What Can South Africa Learn from Europe?’ 38 Energy	Policy (2010) 826–831 at 829.
133 Although growth in motor vehicle sales dropped off as a result (seemingly) of economic factors from 2008, 
the overall growth trajectory is still upward.
134 Department of Transport, White	Paper	on	a	National	Transport	Policy (1996).
135 ‘Live vehicle population as per the National Traffic Information System’, eNaTIS of 31 January 2011, 
available at <http://www.enatis.com/images/stories/statistics/livevehpopulationvehclassprov20110131.
pdf> (visited 7 February 2011). Heavy vehicles are those that have a gross vehicle mass of more than 3 
500 kg and exclude buses.
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As for public transport, South Africa is not renowned for comprehensive public 
transport systems, and probably the most widely-spread transport service, the pri-
vately owned minibus taxi, is not strictly a ‘public’ transport service. Whilst there are 
some efforts afoot in various public transport sectors to improve services (for exam-
ple, the minibus taxi recapitalization programme),136 these efforts are uncoordinated. 
As Walters observes
[a]t present each [public transport] mode is being dealt with from a ‘‘silo’’ ap-
proach which, if not dealt with firmly and timeously, will result in sub-optimal 
public transport systems in the main urban and metropolitan areas. One of the 
major challenges will therefore be to integrate the respective modes via inte-
grated transport plans and to render seamless public transport services across all 
transport areas. This will require significant consultation with the affected parties 
in an effort to convince such parties of the benefit of a systems approach.137 
This discussion demonstrates that efforts at transforming the transport sector in order 
to reduce GHG emissions will probably be starting almost from scratch, although 
there have been recent innovations in the form of a carbon tax on new vehicles.138 
This suggests that it will take significant effort to make a difference at least in the 
transport sector. 
6.5 Adaptation
The 2010 Green Paper	identifies three key adaptation sectors: water, agriculture, and 
human health. At the risk of sounding overly pessimistic, there are no shining bea-
cons on the international horizon suggesting that there will be a regime which pro-
vides for sufficient international, binding mitigation actions to reduce the GHG 
levels to acceptable levels. This suggests that adaptation will be relatively much more 
important than mitigation. Whilst the Green Paper identifies several strategic objec-
tives aimed at enhancing adaptation, most of these rely on further research and in-
vestigation. There are a few existing legal measures that are relevant to adaptation, 
predominantly in the water sector, and they almost all focus on better implementa-
tion and enforcement of existing water legislation.139 If legislation is to be improved 
or new legislation enacted in order to address adaptation concerns, those aspects 
requiring further investigation must be explored sufficiently soon in order that the 
research results can be applied in practice.
136 The taxi recapitalization programme is a government initiative to bring about safe, effective, reliable, af-
fordable and accessible taxi operations by the introduction of new taxi vehicles that will replace aging, and 
often unsafe vehicles that are currently used. It faces a great challenge due to enormous vested interests in 
the current capital invested in the industry.
137 Jackie Walters, ‘Overview of Public Transport Policy Developments in South Africa’, 22 Research	in	Trans-
portation	Economics (2008) 98–108 at 107.
138 See above, text corresponding to footnote 98.
139 See Green Paper at §5.1
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Clearly, an important facet of adaptation is disaster management, and this is recog-
nized in the Green Paper.140 South Africa does have disaster management legislation 
(the Disaster Management Act)141 but increased effort will have to be put into early 
warning, preparedness, emergency response and post-disaster recovery, particularly 
since climate-related disasters will not be completely unforeseen. 
7 Conclusion
South Africa has committed itself to ambitious and challenging GHG emission 
targets (in the absence of current international law requirements binding the coun-
try) for 2020 and 2025 (assuming its conditions are met). The initial commitment 
is to reduce emissions below the business-as-usual baseline by 2020, which is less 
than a decade away. Yet at the same time that these commitments are being made on 
the international plane, and reinforced in domestic policy, South Africa is also de-
veloping energy policy that seems to fly directly in the face of its climate change 
objectives. For the foreseeable future, South Africa’s energy mix will be overwhelm-
ingly coal-based. While some policy statements recognise, at least on paper, that coal 
has significant externalities, large swathes of the country are being prospected and 
mined for coal and even protected areas are not safe from the tentacles of the mining 
industry. It may well be that the targets will be achievable despite Medupi and Kusile 
and the recommissioning of certain ‘mothballed’ coal-fired power plants, but there 
is a strong suspicion in civil society that this is not the case. At the very least, the 
government needs to be more transparent and provide better, scientifically and eco-
nomically rigorous, justification for its policies and for the policies’ underlying as-
sumptions.
In any event, for South Africa to achieve its mitigation targets requires an integrated 
response. Up until now, it has appeared as if the climate change response agenda has 
been piloted by the Department of Environmental Affairs whilst other government 
departments (for example, Energy) have paid it lip service if they have acknowledged 
it at all. One would hope that the Interministerial Committee envisaged in the Green 
Paper will assist in this regard.
South Africa is one of the world’s highest emitters of greenhouse gases and the high-
est in Africa. Whilst it is important that it works together with other developing 
countries to develop an international structure that recognizes common but differ-
entiated responsibilities142 in an appropriate way, it ought certainly as a leading emit-
ter to demonstrate leadership in addressing climate change. International leadership 
140 Ibid. at §5.7
141 Act 57 of 2002.
142 The Rio Declaration recognizes this in Principle 7, noting that different countries have contributed in 
differing degrees to international environmental degradation. It is based on an idea of universal participa-
tion, whilst, essentially, relaxing duties and enhancing benefits (funding, for example) to those parties 
regarded as less responsible for the problem – see Philippe Sands, Principles	of	International	Environmen-
162
South Africa’s Position on Climate Change: Fiddling while the Earth Burns?
requires a coherent domestic approach and much work is still needed, in the present 
author’s view, for this to be in place.
It is hoped that this paper has contributed to an understanding of the increasingly 
important role played by South Africa in the international climate-change negotia-
tions, and how there seems to be an uneasy relationship between its international 
pronouncements and what is being done domestically to address climate change 
concerns. This may well echo what is happening in other countries on the develop-
ment path and, clearly, in those that are already regarded as developed. Probably the 
main lesson that other (particularly developing) countries can learn from this paper 
is that it is critical for any progress on climate change action that there be co-ordi-
nated response, as emphasized above.
Finally, and with the important purpose of recognizing that South Africa is not alone 
in dragging its heels on climate change, it is worth reiterating that South Africa’s 
emissions reduction targets are conditional on a realistic, binding multilateral agree-
ment on climate change being adopted. This, of necessity, must involve all countries, 
particularly some of those who have been most reluctant to make commitments up 
until now. As Fang correctly observes,143 South Africa and other prominent develop-
ing countries144 will not adopt legally binding targets in the absence of developed 
countries doing so.
tal	Law (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2003) 55–56. In the climate change regime, this is recog-
nized by the categorization of different countries into the different Annexes.
143 Fang, ‘Understanding Developing Country Stances’, supra note 2, at 4590.
144 Fang refers to the ‘Plus Five’: China, India, Brazil and South Africa (the BASIC) countries and Mexico.
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change and the carBon market
Natascha	Trennepohl 1
1 Introduction
Brazil has been a key player in the international negotiations on climate change, 
hosting the Earth Summit in 1992, which opened the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)2 for signature. Afterwards, the Brazil-
ian delegation presented during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol3 (KP) a 
proposal4 to set emission reduction targets based on historic emissions and its con-
tribution to the increase in temperature. In the sequence, the country signed the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1998 and ratified it in 2002. 
The KP established binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets to a 
number of industrialized countries in the commitment period from 2008 to 2012. 
Brazil, as an emerging economy, does not have mandatory targets under the Protocol. 
However, the country has been engaged in the climate negotiations, not only as part 
of the freshly established BASIC group,5 but also playing sometimes ‘the role of a 
1 Natascha Trennepohl is a lawyer and environmental consultant in Brazil. She is currently reading toward 
a Ph.D at the Faculty of Law, Humboldt University, and working at the International Climate Protection 
Division of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) 
in Berlin. She is a Research Fellow at the Earth System Governance Project, a core project of the Interna-
tional Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP), and she is a member 
of Brazil’s Voluntary Carbon Market Study Committee (established by ABNT). E-mail: natdt@hotmail.
com.
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
3 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22. 
4 This proposal is known as the ‘Brazilian Proposal’. See Implementation of the Berlin Mandate. Addi-
tional proposals from Parties. Addendum. Note by the secretariat, UN Doc. FCCC/AGBM/1997/
MISC.1/Add.3 (1997).
5 The BASIC group is a political alliance formed by Brazil, South Africa, India, and China. 
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“balancer” between Northern and Southern interests in the negotiations’.6 Recently, 
during the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the UNFCCC, held in 
Cancun in 2010, the Brazilian delegation was strongly engaged in the negotiations 
of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.7 
One year earlier, during the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copen-
hagen, Brazil showed itself as a progressive leader among emerging economies when 
former President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva brought up a voluntary commitment of 
reducing GHG emissions and, even more surprisingly, declared that Brazil would 
financially support developing countries if necessary. 
Back home, after the COP15 meeting, President Lula signed law 12.187 of 2009,8 
which not only sets an emissions reduction target but also establishes principles, 
objectives, and instruments of the National Policy on Climate Change (Política 
Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima, or PNMC for short). This law formalizes Brazil’s 
commitment of reducing between 36.1 and 38.9 per cent of its projected GHG 
emissions by 2020. Afterwards, at the time of the negotiations in Cancun, decree 
7.390 of 20109 was signed, regulating articles of the PNMC and detailing Brazil’s 
projected emissions for 2020.10 
In spite of the progress made in terms of political and legal commitment embodied 
in the Brazilian climate law, some challenges still need to be overcome before the 
National Policy and a domestic carbon market11 can be fully implemented. The 
process of setting and implementing mitigation measures not only has the participa-
tion of the government, but it also has the involvement of the private sector and 
civil society, pushing for action. The Brazilian Association of Technical Standards 
(Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas, or ABNT),12 for example, established a 
6 Ken Johnson, ‘Brazil and the Politics of the Climate Change Negotiations’, 10 Journal	of	Environment	and	
Development (2001) 178–206 at 192. The author analyses Brazil’s position in the climate negotiations in 
the 90s and concludes that ‘Brazil is not simply a protagonist of developing world interests’.
7 Timan Santarius et al. argue that ‘the Brazilians have their claim in the “success” of keeping the Kyoto 
Protocol alive at Cancun’. See Timan Santarius et al., ‘One Step Forward and Two Sideward: Regional 
Analysis of Climate Policy in 2010 and the Cancun Climate Conference (COP16)’, Heinrich	Böll	Stiftung 
(January 2011), available at <http://www.boell.de> (visited 20 January 2011) at 14.
8 Law 12.187 of 2009 was sanctioned by the President on 29 December 2009 and contains in its 13 articles 
the institutional framework and general guidelines of the National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC). 
Article 5 lists as NPCC’s guidelines the ‘commitments Brazil has undertaken under the UNFCCC, the 
KP and other documents on climate change the country may come to sign’. For the complete version, see 
‘Lei 12.187 de 29 de Dezembro de 2009’, available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br> (visited 31 January 
2011). 
9 According to ‘Decree no. 7.390 of 9 December 2010’, available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br> (visited 
31 January 2011). 6 o, 11 e 12 da Lei n o 12.187, de 29 de dezembro de 2009, which established the 
National Policy on Climate Change.
10 Articles 5 and 6 of Decree 7 390 of 9 December 2010 define an emissions reduction target between ap-
proximately 1.17 – 1.26 GtCO2eq by 2020, considering the business as usual scenario (3.2 GtCO2eq). 
11 Carbon markets are based on the trade of GHG emission reduction credits. They can be mandatory, based 
on a legal requirement, or voluntary. Law 12.187 of 2009 directly refers to Brazil’s domestic carbon mar-
ket as the Brazilian Market of Emission Reductions (MBRE).
12 See, generally, <http://www.abnt.org.br/>.
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Voluntary Carbon Market Study Committee to define a standard for this new mar-
ket within the national scenario.13 Additionally, it was reported in the Brazilian press 
that the adoption of a cap-and-trade system14 is being analyzed by a working group 
at the Ministry of Finance15. Therefore, the architecture and elements of other trad-
ing schemes, such as the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS),16 
may help Brazilian (and other) policy-makers to design national schemes and learn 
from positive examples.
In short, the structure of this paper will be as follows: firstly, Brazil’s position in the 
climate negotiations will be highlighted. Secondly, roles and responsibilities of key 
actors involved in the establishment of the National Policy will be presented. Third-
ly, the main characteristics of Brazil’s National Policy on Climate Change will be 
described. Fourthly, the current situation of the carbon market will be presented. 
Fifthly, special attention will be given to some design elements of the EU ETS that 
can be used as examples. Finally, conclusions will be drawn, showing a possible future 
development scenario for Brazil’s climate policy and the domestic carbon market.
2 Brazil in the climate negotiations 
Brazil’s position in the international environmental discussions has not always been 
as progressive as it is nowadays in the climate negotiations. In the early 70s, poverty 
was considered the main issue and ‘environmental protection should come only after 
a dramatic development of the country’s economy and an increase of the per capita 
income to the same level of developed countries’.17 
13 Karina Ninni, ‘Comissão vai normatizar mercado voluntário de carbono: Trabalho deve durar mais de um 
ano, de acordo com coordenador da comissão’, O	Estadão, São Paulo, 8 April 2010. 
14 Cap-and-trade is a policy tool, a market-based mechanism used to limit pollution. See Robert N. Stavins, 
‘Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments’ Discussion	Paper (Resources for the 
Future, 2001) at 20. Arnaud Brohé et al. explain cap-and-trade as ‘a system where the government defines 
a new set of property rights to use the atmosphere based on an emissions limit or cap. Then, after the 
distribution of the allowances between actors involved in the scheme, it allows trade in these allowances 
so that actors can choose to conduct abatement or b[u]y additional allowances’. See Arnaud Brohé et al., 
Carbon	Markets:	An	International	Business	Guide (Earthscan, 2009) at 42.
15 Marta Salomon, ‘Empresas terão de pagar por poluição acima das metas’, O	Estadão, São Paulo, 4 May 
2010. The State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2010 also refers to the fact that in Brazil ‘policy mak-
ers are considering introducing a domestic cap and trade scheme, primarily covering the energy, transport, 
industrial and agribusiness sectors’. See Alexandre Kossoy and Philippe Ambrosi, State	and	Trends	of	the	
Carbon	Market	2010 (The World Bank, 2010) at 32.
16 According to the European Commission Climate Action website, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) is ‘a cornerstone of the European Union’s policy to combat climate change and its key tool for reduc-
ing industrial greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively’. The system is also described as ‘being the first 
and biggest international scheme for the trading of greenhouse gas emission allowances’ and as ‘cover[ing] 
some 11 000 power stations and industrial plants in 30 countries’. See <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
ets/index_en.htm> (visited 1 February 2011).
17 Eduardo Viola, ‘Brazil in the Context of Global Governance Politics and Climate Change, 1989–2003’, 
VII	Ambiente	e	Sociedade (2004), 27–46 at 30.
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In the past decades, however, the economic reality in Brazil has changed and the 
country has become one of the fastest growing economies in the world. In 2010, for 
example, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 7.5 per cent ranked eighth 
in the world considering the GDP at purchasing power parity.18 In addition, it is 
also possible to note a change in relation to the perception of global environmental 
problems since Brazil has shifted its position from denying their importance to rec-
ognizing that cooperation and solidarity at the international level are the basis to deal 
with climate change.19
Ken Johnson analyzes the environmental debates in the 90s and argues that Brazil 
‘has taken a proactive role in the climate negotiations and has made a number of 
important contributions to the ongoing negotiations on global warming’.20 The 
author mentions the Brazilian proposal to set different targets for Parties based on 
historic emissions, as well as the Clean Development Fund proposal, which was 
changed and later adopted as the Clean Development Mechanism.21
Eduardo Viola also highlights Brazil’s key role in the climate negotiation process 
stating that ‘the launch of the CDM proposal implied a moment of remarkable col-
laboration between the American and Brazilian diplomacies’; which, however, did 
not last long since Brazil confronted the United States position several times during 
the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol and supported the European Union in the 
proposal for a strong compliance regime and for the inclusion of limits in carbon 
sinks. The author concludes by stating that ‘Brazil was a prominent country in ar-
ticulating the alliance between the European Union, Japan, and emerging countries 
that made possible the success in the final negotiation of the Protocol’.22
As mentioned in the introduction, Brazil ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, but it 
came into force only in 2005 after Russia’s ratification. Brazil continued to play a 
18 See Brazil’s profile in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). ‘The World Factbook’ available at <https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html> (visited 6 March 2011). According to the 
World Factbook, the GDP is the ‘value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given 
year’ and the GDP at purchasing power parity is ‘the sum value of all goods and services produced in the 
country valued at prices prevailing in the United States. This is the measure most economists prefer when 
looking at per-capita welfare and when comparing living conditions or use of resources across countries’. 
For detailed information about Brazil’s economic growth, see Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatís-
tica (IBGE) at <http://www.ibge.gov.br>.
19 Luiz Pinguelli Rosa quotes the last part of Lula’s speech at the 2010 annual meeting with the Brazilian 
Forum on Climate Change: ‘...we’re all in this together and only the solidarity and international coop-
eration will enable us to overcome the [climate] challenges’ (author’s free translation from original in 
Portuguese). See Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, ‘Reunião Anual com Presidente da República’, available at <http://
www.forumclima.org.br/index.php/eventos/reunioes/153-reuniao-anual-com-presidente-da-republi ca> 
(visited 12 December 2010).
20 Johnson, ‘Brazil and the Politics’, supra note 6, at 178–79.
21 See ibid. at 189 and 199–200. The Brazilian proposal argued that historic emissions should be taken into 
consideration because, despite the fact that annual emissions of non-Annex I countries are estimated to 
be equal to Annex I countries by 2037, the impact in temperature increase will only be equal in 2162. 
See Brazilian proposal, supra note 4, at 23. 
22 Eduardo Viola, supra note 17 at 40 and 43. 
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proactive role in the climate negotiations, but now focusing on a second commit-
ment period of the KP. The first commitment period expires in 2012 and, therefore, 
the debate on the future of the KP gained strength during COP13 in Bali (2007) 
with Brazil working to strengthen the regime under the UNFCCC and the KP, as 
well as actively participating in the discussions on emissions from deforestation.23 
During the COP15 in 2009, Brazil was also a key player in the climate negotiations, 
not only because of its voluntary emission reduction target and offer to financially 
support developing countries, but also due to its involvement in the design of the 
Copenhagen Accord.24 It is worth stressing that despite having voluntary emission 
reduction targets, Brazil still advocates the use of the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities,25 firmly supporting the maxim that industrialized coun-
tries are historically responsible for the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
in the atmosphere, and that developing countries must receive financial aid to imple-
ment mitigation actions. 
At the moment, the future of the Kyoto Protocol is uncertain and it seems unlikely 
that a new legally-binding agreement will be reached before the first commitment 
period expires in 2012. However, the outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
long-term Cooperation Action (AWG-LCA) takes note of the Nationally Appropri-
ate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) to be implemented by non-Annex I Parties (main-
ly developing countries) and formally acknowledges the pledges submitted to the 
Copenhagen Accord.26 Additionally, the outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) 
took note of the quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets to be imple-
mented by Annex I Parties and clearly stated that the Conference of the Parties agrees 
that ‘emissions trading and the project-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
shall continue to be available to Annex I Parties as means to meet their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction objectives’.27
As pointed out by Aldy and Stavins, the KP has been referred to as a ‘first step’ in 
addressing the problems caused by climate change and has been considered the first 
step in shaping the architecture of international climate policy. The challenge, now-
23 See Everton Vieira Vargas, ‘A mudança do Clima na perspective do Brasil’, Revista	Interesse	Nacional, Ano 
1 (2008), available at <http://interessenacional.com> (visited 6 March 2011). 
24 Decision 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th sess., UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010), Addendum.
25 On this principle, see Tuula Kolari, ‘The Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ in Tuula Kolari and Ed Couzens (eds), International	Environ-
mental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	2007, University of Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 7 (Uni-
versity of Joensuu, 2008) 21–54.
26 See Art. 49 of Draft decision -/CP.16. The AWG-LCA was established in 2007 during the COP13 to work 
on further negotiations under the UNFCCC. 
27 See Arts 3 and 6(b) of Draft decision -/CMP.6. Article 36 of the AWG-LCA outcome also takes note of 
the reduction targets to be implemented by Annex I Parties. The AWG-KP was established in 2005 to 
negotiate on further commitments of developed countries under the KP and beyond 2012.
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adays, according to the authors, ‘lies in deciding on the next step, in terms of both 
climate-related goals and the design of policies to implement those goals’.28 This 
scenario drives the attention to countries and their national policies and strategies to 
approach the problem and, consequently, to the actors involved in this process.
3 Actors in Brazil’s climate governance: roles and 
responsibilities29
At the federal level, there are two commissions to support the government with the 
implementation of the UNFCCC and the KP, namely the Interministerial Commis-
sion on Global Climate Change30 and the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change.31 
The former is composed of representatives of ten ministries and is responsible for the 
coordination of governmental actions in the field of climate change, advising the 
government on proposals for public policies and legal instruments related to mitiga-
tion and adaptation. The latter is composed of ministers, politicians (such as gover-
nors of states, mayors, and the president of the Chamber of Deputies), researchers, 
members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector and 
seeks to promote dialogue between government and society in climate change issues.
The Interministerial Commission provides data to the government in order to set the 
country’s official position in the negotiations of the UNFCCC. The Commission 
can, however, request assistance from, or establish partnerships with, public agencies, 
private entities, and representatives of civil society, aiming to develop strategies to 
deal with climate change. The Commission is also involved in the carbon market as 
the country’s Designed National Authority in charge of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) activities and has among its tasks32 to establish additional cri-
teria, analyze, and approve CDM projects.
In general terms, the CDM is a project-based mechanism mentioned in Art. 12 of 
the Kyoto Protocol that ‘allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries 
to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of 
CO2. These CERs can be traded and sold, and used by industrialized countries to 
meet a part of their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 33 As it can 
be seen, the CDM is a flexible mechanism that was designed with two main objec-
tives: to assist industrialized countries in achieving their GHG emission reduction 
28 Joseph E. Aldy and Robert Stavins, ‘Architectures for an International Global Climate Change Agreement: 
Lessons for the International Policy Community’, in Aldy and Stavins (eds), Architectures	for	Agreement:	
Addressing	Global	Climate	Change	in	the	Post-Kyoto	World (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 350–367 
at 350–351. 
29 On this topic see Natascha Trennepohl, ‘Climate Change in Brazil: the Impacts of Different Actors on 
the Creation of the National Policy’, Nova	Acta	Leopoldina 112, Nr, 384, 275–280.
30 See ‘Comissao Interministerial de Mudanca Global do Clima (CIMG)’ at <http://www.mct.gov.br>.
31 See ‘Forum Brasileiro de Mudancas Climaticas at <http://www.forumclima.org.br/>. 
32 See Art. 3 of Decree of 7 July, 1999.
33 See UNFCCC, ‘About CDM’, available at <http://cdm.unfccc.int> (visited 26 February 2011).
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targets and to promote sustainable development in the host countries, which in 
this case are developing countries. The CDM promotes finance flow from indus-
trialized countries to developing countries and it is, actually, the only mechanism 
in the KP scheme that provides for the participation of developing countries in 
the carbon market.
The other commission, the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change, has more participa-
tion from society and works to increase debate and to promote the development of 
CDM projects. The Forum must among its functions: encourage State Forums on 
Climate Change,34 hold public consultations in different regions of the country, and 
organize working groups to discuss specific topics on CDM, energy, deforestation, 
and vulnerability.
Since the CDM receives attention from the business sector, with companies looking 
for international funding and opportunities to participate in the carbon market, 
these players influence political decisions. Nevertheless, many executives may not 
know how to approach the risks and opportunities associated with climate change 
because of the complexity of the topic. It is clear, though, that by knowing and cal-
culating the risks and opportunities, companies have better chances to make wise 
investments and stay in the market.35 Therefore, due to the demand for information 
and expert advice, it is becoming more common to find in Brazil organizations of-
fering consultancy services on greenhouse gas emissions or facilitating the commerce 
of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)36 and investments in the carbon market. 
To illustrate this tendency in Brazil, two initiatives can be mentioned, namely the 
Businesses for the Climate (EPC)37 and the Brazilian Market of Emission Reduc-
tions (Mercado Brasileiro de Redução de Emissões, or MBRE for short).
Businesses for the Climate is a national platform launched in October 2009 by the 
Center for Sustainability Studies at Fundação Getúlio Vargas (GVces)38 with the 
objective of bringing together entrepreneurs to discuss practical solutions to a low 
carbon economy and its legal framework in Brazil.39 The platform was created to 
provide technical and scientific support to companies, hence focusing on training 
workshops and thematic roundtables to discuss topics like agribusiness, energy, for-
estry, industry, services, and transportation. Moreover, the intention is to connect 
34 State Forums on Climate Change have been created in several states in Brazil to promote the dialogue 
between government and society. See ‘Fóruns Estaduais’, available at <http://www.forumclima.org.br> 
(visited 27 February 2011).
35 Kimberly Packard and Forest Reinhardt, ‘What Every Executive Needs to Know About Global Warming’, 
78 Harvard	Business	Review (2000) 129–135 at 130.
36 CERs are credits generated from GHG emission reductions in CDM projects and can be traded in the 
carbon market. See supra note 33.
37 See ‘Empresas Pelo Clima’, available at <http://www.empresaspeloclima.com.br/> (visited 18 February 
2011).
38 For more information, see <http://www.ces.fgvsp.br/> (visited 17 February 2011).
39 Lucas Frasão, ‘Empresas querem definir regulação para o clima’, O	Estado	de	São	Paulo, São Paulo, 28 
August 2009 at H9. 
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with, and enable, experts and business representatives to give advice during the de-
cision-making process.
A previous business initiative was the establishment in 2004 of the Brazilian Market 
of Emission Reductions (MBRE), a partnership between the Ministry of Develop-
ment, Industry and Foreign Trade and the two Brazilian Stock Exchanges (BM&F 
Bovespa and BVRJ) to facilitate the commerce of CERs and, consequently, to stim-
ulate the development of CDM projects in Brazil. The MBRE is composed of ‘insti-
tutions, regulations, project registration systems and a business center, all undergoing 
consolidation in Brazil via BM&FBOVESPA’.40 The MBRE has had a database of 
registered projects and investors since 2005 through which foreign investors inter-
ested in acquiring carbon credits can either search for projects that match their in-
terests or disclose their intentions of purchase on the database and receive a notifica-
tion when a new project that fits their expectations is registered. The credits can also 
be acquired through online auctions held by the São Paulo Stock Exchange – BM&F 
Bovespa. 
To illustrate the activities of the MBRE, in September 2007 the first online auction 
of carbon credits held by the BM&F Bovespa sold approximately 808 tons of CERs 
and raised 13 million euros (€16.20 per tonne). The CERs were owned by the city 
of Sao Paulo from the capture of methane gas in one landfill.41 In September 2008, 
the second auction sold 713 tons of CERs from two landfills also owned by the city 
of Sao Paulo. This time, the winning bid reached the amount of €19.20 per tonne, 
totaling just over 13 million euros.42
Besides the aforementioned actions, there is also interaction between business initia-
tives and NGOs in Brazil. The Center for Sustainability Studies at Fundação Getúlio 
Vargas, which coordinates the Businesses for the Climate initiative, for example, 
supports the Climate Observatory, a network of non-governmental organizations 
dealing with the climate change agenda. The Climate Observatory has among its 
goals three key elements: to monitor the development of public policies related to 
GHG emissions; to monitor and influence international negotiations and the Brazil-
ian government position; and to promote dialogue between different actors, such as 
civil society, the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change, the media, government offi-
cials, and other social actors.43 
Among the NGOs that are more engaged with discussions on climate change, the 
Brazilian Forum of NGOs and Social Movements for the Environment and Develop-
40 See BM&F Bovespa at <http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br> (visited 18 February 2011). 
41 Ricardo Leopoldo. ‘Banco holandês paga R$ 34 milhões de reais por crédito de carbono’. Estadão, São 
Paulo, 26 September, 2007.
42 Plantão, ‘Leilão de créditos de carbono rende R$ 37 milhões para Prefeitura’,	O	Globo, São Paulo, 25 
September, 2008.
43 See Observatório do Clima at <http://www.oc.org.br> (visited 12 December 2010). 
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ment (FBOMS)44 has several members that participate in government commissions.45 
Furthermore, the FBOMS has 13 working groups developing activities in diverse 
areas, such as energy, environmental education, forest, sustainable tourism, climate, 
and so forth. The FBOMS was engaged in the discussions about international climate 
negotiations that preceded the COP15.46 
Concerning the carbon market, the FBOMS is listed by the Interministerial Com-
mission on Global Climate Change as one of the institutions that shall receive an 
invitation to comment on a CDM project before it is approved. In other words, 
before approving a CDM Project, the Commission requires that the project propo-
nents send invitations to certain institutions asking for comments on their project. 
The comments are then incorporated into the documentation and submitted with 
the CDM project proposal for the Commission’s approval.47
There is a certain level of interaction between the actors that are involved in the 
development of the climate policy in Brazil. In October 2009, for example, during 
a meeting to discuss Brazil’s position to be presented in Copenhagen, the Executive 
Secretary of the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change gave the President a docu-
ment48 with a compilation of opinions and comments from members and individu-
als that had participated in several events organized by the Forum. This document 
suggested measures that should be adopted as the country’s strategy at the COP15.
Similarly, representatives of Brazilian entrepreneurs handed the Minister of Environ-
ment an Open Letter on Climate Change signed by 22 companies with their volun-
tary commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The letter contained sugges-
tions for the government’s position at the COP15 with the entrepreneurs arguing 
that it is extremely necessary to have a delimited system with clear rules and obliga-
tions in order to invest in green technology.49 Additionally, several Brazilian entre-
preneurs joined the Corporate Leaders Group on Climate Change and together with 
other international companies signed a document demanding an ambitious, robust, 
and fair agreement to tackle climate change. The document was handed to the rep-
44 See Forum Brasileiro de ONGs e Movimentos Sociais para o Meio Ambiente e o Desenvolvimento at 
<http://www.fboms.org.br/> (visited 12 December 2010). The FBOMS has 608 members (as of Decem-
ber 2010).
45 For instance, the FBOMS has members in the previously mentioned Brazilian Forum on Climate Chan-
ge. See Fórum Brasileiro de ONGs e Movimentos Sociais para o Meio Ambiente e o Desenvolvimento at 
<http://www.fboms.org.br> (visited 12 December 2010).
46 See ‘Sociedade civil e governos debatem posições para as negociações sobre mudanças climáticas’, available 
at <http://www.fboms.org.br> (visited 27 February 2010).
47 See Art. 3(II) of the Resolution 1 of 11 September, 2003 amended by Resolution 7 of 5 March, 2008.
48 The document presents suggestions from different organizations and institutions, such as state and local 
forums and commissions, NGOs, entrepreneurs, representatives from the industrial and electricity sectors, 
and local governments. For more information see FBMC, ‘Diálogos Setoriais: contribuições à construção 
da posição brasileira’, Fórum Brasileiro de Mudanças Climáticas at <http://www.forumclima.org.br> 
(visited 12 November 2009).
49 See Fabricio Angelo, ‘E hora de tomar atitudes’, available at <http://www1.ethos.org.br> (visited 12 
December 2010).
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resentatives of governments at the United Nations meeting in New York in Septem-
ber 2009.50
There were also some NGOs which presented their suggestions to the Brazilian gov-
ernment concerning the country’s climate policy. A manifesto signed by several 
NGOs was sent to the Ministry of Environment, highlighting shortcomings of the 
National Plan on Climate Change, and influenced changes to the final version of the 
Plan, short before its presentation at COP14 in Poznań.51 A further example of the 
engagement of Brazilian NGOs in the discussion of the climate policy in Brazil is 
the suggestions presented by the Climate Observatory to the final text of one bill 
related to the National Policy on Climate Change.52
As it can be seen from the recent involvement of Brazilian NGOs with climate 
change topics,53 they are active and try to discuss, and participate in, the decision-
making process. There has been a noticeable increase in their involvement, calling 
for more responsibilities from the federal government, and for the establishment of 
concrete emission reduction targets for the country.
Apparently in response to the expectations of civil society, not only in Brazil, but also 
worldwide, concerning the adoption of GHG emissions targets, the Brazilian govern-
ment announced during COP15 its voluntary target to reduce GHG emissions by 
2020. 
4 Main features of Brazil’s national policy on climate change
As mentioned before, law 12.187 of 2009 sets Brazil’s emissions reduction target and 
establishes principles, objectives, and instruments of the National Policy on Climate 
Change (PNMC). Some principles were directly mentioned in the legal text54 and 
shall be observed during the implementation of the PNMC such as the ‘precaution-
50 ICLEI, ‘Em documento internacional, empresários brasileiros pedem acordo climático que favoreça eco-
nomia de baixo carbono’, International	Council	 for	Local	Environmental	Initiatives	 (ICLEI), São Paulo 
21.10.09, available at <http://www.iclei.org> (visited 30 October 2009).
51 Observatório do Clima, supra note 43. 
52 Ibid. 
53 According to Juliana Russar, most of Brazilian NGOs began to pay more attention to climate change 
discussions after the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 and the publication of the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC in 2007. See Juliana Russar, Panorama	de	atores	e	iniciativas	no	Brasil	
sobre	mudanças	do	clima (Vitae Civilis, 2008) at 27.
54 Art. 3 of law 12,187 of 2009.
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ary principle’,55 the ‘preventive principle’,56 the ‘citizen participation principle’,57 the 
‘sustainable development principle’,58 and the ‘principle of common but differenti-
ated responsibilities’. 
Article 3 of law 12.187 of 2009 adds that the measures adopted shall consider the 
different socio-economic contexts and distribute the financial burden across eco-
nomic sectors and populations in an equitable and balanced way. Sustainable devel-
opment is considered a central point in the measures to address climate change, seen 
as an important objective to be achieved. Consistent with this idea, during the state-
ment at the high-level ministerial segment of COP16, the Brazilian Minister for the 
Environment, Izabella Teixeira, reiterated the country’s commitment to promote 
sustainable development and argued that economic growth, social justice and envi-
ronmental protection can be a development strategy, making reference to Brazil’s 
economic growth and the decrease in poverty and in deforestation rates in the last 
year.59 
Article 7 of the National Policy refers to five institutional instruments to support its 
goals, which are: 
I  the Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, created to guide the 
development, the implementation, the monitoring and the evaluation of the 
National Plan on Climate Change60;
55 The principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (UN Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 
International	Legal	Materials (1992) 876.) stresses that ‘in order to protect the environment, the precau-
tionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postpon-
ing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’. Considering Brazil’s legislation, this 
principle is expressly stated in several decrees, such as Decree 5.591 of 2005, Decree 5.472 of 2005, 
Decree 5.377 of 2005 and so forth.
56 ‘The preventive principle requires action to be taken at an early stage and, if possible, before damage has 
actually occurred’ and, moreover, ‘the preventive approach has been endorsed, directly or indirectly, by 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration [principles 6, 7, 15, 18, and 24], the 1978 UNEP Draft Principles 
[principle 1] and the 1982 World Charter for Nature’. See Philippe Sands, Principles	 of	 International	
Environmental	Law	(Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 246–247.
57 Art. 225 of Brazil’s Federal Constitution clearly states that everyone has the right to live in an ecologi-
cally balanced environment, but also has the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future gen-
erations. The importance of public participation in environmental issues was stressed during the Earth 
Summit in 1992, being considered one of the key instruments for achieving the goals of the Agenda 21 
(Agenda 21, UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992)). See Natascha Trennepohl, Manual	de	Direito	Ambiental (Impetus, 2010) 
at 16.
58 Philippe Sands states that ‘the term “sustainable development” is generally considered to have been coined 
by the 1987 Brundtland Report, which defined it as “the development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’” and that ‘there can be 
little doubt that the concept of “sustainable development” has entered the corpus of international custom-
ary law, requiring different streams of international law to be treated in an integrated manner’. See Philippe 
Sands, supra note 56, at 253–254. 
59 Statement of Ms. Izabella Teixeira, Minister for the Environment of Brazil to the General Debate of COP-
16, available at <http://unfccc.int/statements/items/5777.php> (visited 13 December 2010). 
60 The Committee was established by Decree 6.263 of 21 November 2007.
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II  the Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change, previously 
mentioned as Brazil’s Designated National Authority;
III the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change, also previously mentioned;
IV the Brazilian Network of Research on Global Climate Change (called Rede 
CLIMA for short), created to produce and disseminate knowledge and tech-
nology related to climate change issues, as well as to produce data to support 
Brazilian diplomacy in international negotiations;61 and
V the Meteorology, Climatology and Hydrology Activity Coordination Com-
mission, created to coordinate, monitor and contribute to the evaluation of 
activities in these fields. 
In addition, Art. 6 of law 12.187 of 2009 lists eighteen instruments that can be used 
to implement the policy goals, including the National Plan on Climate Change; the 
National Fund on Climate Change; action plans designed to prevent and control 
deforestation; resolutions of the Interministerial Commission on Global Climate 
Change; fiscal measures; allocation of specific federal sums; financial and economic 
mechanisms already listed in the UNFCCC and in the Kyoto Protocol; the establish-
ment of preferential criteria in public calls for tenders, namely public-private partner-
ships, authorizations, permits, and concessions to explore public services, for propos-
als that provide GHG emissions reduction and offer the best options for saving 
energy, water, and natural resources; the use of inventories, assessment and any oth-
er surveys on GHG emissions; as well as the establishment of environmental stand-
ards and verifiable targets for reducing anthropogenic emissions of GHGs.
One of these instruments, namely the National Fund on Climate Change62 (Fundo 
Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima or FNMC), is expected to play an important role 
in financing mitigation and adaptation measures. Law 12.114 of 2009 states that 
revenue for this new fund shall come from various sources, such as contributions 
from national and international organizations, loans from financial institutions, al-
locations in the annual federal budget, and designated sums in agreements or con-
tracts signed with governmental bodies. It is also mentioned that up to 60 per cent 
of the amount received by the Ministry of Environment from oil exploitation shall 
be sent to the climate fund.63 It should not be forgotten that Brazil has discovered 
large quantities of deepwater oil reserves (estimated at more than 30 billion barrels) 
and intends to explore them in the next few years.64 In attempting to estimate the 
amount of money that would be received by the climate fund, the former Minister 
61 For more information see ‘Rede CLIMA’ at <http://www.ccst.inpe.br/redeclima/> (visited 18 February 
2011).
62 The FNMC was established by law 12,114 of 2009 and is regulated by Decree 7,343 of 2010.
63 Previously, in cases of large volumes of oil production or high profitability, contracts of exploitation could 
establish an additional payment to the government, of which 10 per cent would be sent to the Ministry 
of Environment to be used in the recovery of environmental damages caused by the oil industry. How-
ever, the PNMC included projects to prevent GHG emissions, as well as mitigation and adaptation 
measures, in the list of activities for which this allocation can be used.
64 Juan Forero, ‘Brazil Girds for Massive Offshore Oil Extraction: State-run Petrobras is Poised to Become 
a Major Global Player’, Washington	Post, 7 December 2009.
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of Environment said that the initial sum of public money to be sent to the FNMC 
may reach an average of one billion Brazilian reais per year (approximately 560 mil-
lion dollars).65 So far, the Fund has two hundred million Brazilian reais (approxi-
mately 114 million dollars) for investments in 2011.66 However, the FNMC is not 
the only source of funding for mitigation and adaptation measures.
Due to the close connection between Brazilian GHG emissions and deforestation,67 
the Amazon Fund68 is also an important financial source. Donations made to the 
Amazon Fund might be used in preventing, monitoring, and implementing other 
initiatives against deforestation of Brazilian forests. The fund has received 110 mil-
lion dollars from the Norwegian government and annual donations from this govern-
ment are expected until 2015. Additionally, during COP16, the German Develop-
ment Bank (KfW) signed a contract with the Fund’s manager (the Brazilian 
Development Bank – BNDES) to donate 18 million euros (approximately 30 million 
dollars).69 At the time of writing, there are six projects receiving ongoing resources 
from the Amazon Fund, mostly in activities to support the conservation and the 
sustainable use of the forest and the biodiversity.70
In order to achieve the reduction target indicated in the National Policy and a low-
carbon economy in the country, a sectoral approach has been chosen. Thus, sectoral 
plans, currently under elaboration by the government and expected to be discussed 
with the society and interested sectors through public consultation meetings,71 shall 
indicate initiatives related to energy, agriculture, transport, mining, healthcare serv-
ices, the chemical industry, the construction industry, the paper and pulp industry, 
and so forth. Decree 7.390 of 2010 provided the first five sectoral plans, focused on 
avoiding deforestation in the Amazon region and in the Cerrado Lands; expanding 
65 See Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia (SIPAM), ‘Projetos Aprovados Pelo Fundo Amazônia vão Recupe-
rar Áreas Degradadas’, at <http://www.sipam.gov.br> (visited 30 June 2010).
66 Portal Brasil, ‘Fundo Clima e Fundo Amazônia’, at <http://www.brasil.gov.br> (visited 13 December 
2010). 
67 According to Brazil’s Second Communication to the UNFCCC, CO2 emissions in 2005 in the country 
reached the amount of 1.6Gt, of which 77 per cent came from land use change and forest. See Brasília 
Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia, Segunda	Comunicação	Nacional	do	Brasil	à	Convenção-Quadro	das	
Nações	Unidas	sobre	Mudança	do	Clima (2010) at 15. 
68 The Amazon Fund was established in 2008, aiming to raise funds to support projects focused on preven-
tion and avoidance of deforestation in the Amazon region. See ‘Fundo Amazonia’, at <http://www.fun-
doamazonia.gov.br> (visited 25 February 2011).
69 BNDS, ‘BNDES e banco alemão KFW assinam contrato de US$ 30.6 milhões para o Fundo Amazônia’, 
available at <http://www.fundoamazonia.gov.br> (visited 12 December 2010). 
70 As of December 2010. See Fundo Amazonia, ‘Carteira de Projetos’, available at <http://www.fundo ama-
zonia.gov.br> (visited 12 December 2010).
71 See para. 1 of Art. 4 of Decree 7.390 of 2010. It can be added that during the annual meeting of the 
FBMC with the Brazilian President in October 2010, the representative of the Climate Observatory and 
the FBOMS stressed the importance of the participation of civil society in the elaboration process of the 
sectoral plans, arguing that some working groups were more open to receiving suggestions than others. 
For more information, see Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, ‘Reunião Anual’, supra note 19.
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investments in the energy sector; and focused on reducing emissions from agriculture 
and steel plants.72
The use of the sectoral targets as parameters for the Brazilian Market for Emissions 
Reduction (MBRE) is also mentioned in Decree 7.390 of 2010. Actually, law 12.187 
of 2009 stressed the importance of the carbon market in the country and stated that 
the National Policy on Climate Change shall encourage the development of the 
MBRE.73 However, the aforementioned law simply refers to the need for developing 
the carbon market in the country (article 4) and that the MBRE shall be operated in 
‘commodities, futures and stock exchanges, and in over-the-counter trading compa-
nies’ (Art. 9).
5 The current situation of Brazil’s carbon market 
At the core of what is popularly known as the carbon market are the three mecha-
nisms created by the KP to support Parties in achieving their commitments, namely 
the CDM, Joint Implementation (JI),74 and Emissions Trading.75
There is a bridge between the certificates traded in the European market and those 
from CDM projects.76 According to Franck Lecocq and Karan Capoor, the carbon 
market ‘encompasses both the generation	of	emission	reductions	(ERs)	through project-
based	transactions	where a buyer purchases ERs from a project that produces measur-
able reductions in	greenhouse gases (GHG), and trading	of	GHG	emissions	allow-
ances	 allocated under existing (or	 upcoming) cap-and-trade regimes such as the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)’.77 To give an idea of the financial 
flow in the carbon market,78 in 2009 the transactions of this market reached the 
amount of 143 billion US dollars, with a growth of 6 per cent compared to 2008.79 
72 Art. 3 of Decree 7.390 of 2010 lists the first five sectoral plans, which are Action Plan for Prevention and 
Control of Deforestation in the Amazon (PPCDAm); Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Defor-
estation in the Cerrado (PPCerrado); Ten-year Energy Expansion Plan (PDE); Low-Carbon Agriculture 
Plan; and Plan for Reducing Emissions from Steel.
73 See Art. 4 of law 12.187 of 2009.
74 The Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism works similarly to the CDM, but in these projects both parties 
involved have commitments under the KP. For more information see UNFCCC, ‘Joint Implementation’, 
available at <http://unfccc.int> (visited 28 February 2011).
75 Emission Trading is commonly referred as a cap-and-trade system. See supra note 14 for an explanation 
on how a cap-and-trade system works. See UNFCCC, ‘The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emis-
sions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation’, available at <http://un-
fccc.int> (visited 28 February 2011).
76 OECD/IEA, Dealing	with	Climate	Change:	Policies	and	Measures	in	IEA	Member	Countries	(OECD/In-
ternational Energy Agency, 2001), available at <http://www.iea.org> (visited 17 January 2011).
77 Franck Lecocq and Karan Capoor, State	and	Trends	of	the	Carbon	Market	2005 (The World Bank, 2005), 
available at <http://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/CarbonMarketStudy2005.pdf> (visited 11 March 2011) at 3.
78 The whole carbon market includes the transactions of project-based mechanisms (primary CDM, JI, and 
voluntary market), secondary CDM, and allowances markets (EU ETS, New South Wales, Chicago 
Climate Exchange, RGGI, AAUs).
79 Alexandre Kossoy and Philippe Ambrosi, State	and	Trends	of	the	Carbon	Market	2010 (The World Bank, 
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Brazil is deeply interested in the trade of CERs. Considering its actual participation 
in the carbon market, the country is responsible for 5 per cent of the expected emis-
sion reductions of the planet80 and ranks third in the number of registered CDM 
project activities by host party: 187 projects in total,81 which represent 6.5 per cent 
of the current CDM projects approved in the Executive Board.82 In fact, the Clean 
Development Mechanism was developed from a Brazilian proposal and the coun-
try was the first one to have a project approved. However, Brazil originally pro-
posed the creation of a fund to finance projects in developing countries to tackle 
climate change. Such projects would have been financed by industrialized coun-
tries that had not achieved their emission reduction goals.83 It can be added that 
Brazilian CERs have a good ‘reputation’ in the market and are in general more ex-
pensive when compared to Indian and Chinese CERs.84 
Regarding the CDM projects hosted by Brazil and organized by investor parties at 
the Executive Board until February 2011, Switzerland and the United Kingdom lead 
the ranking, followed by the Netherlands and Japan. In this scenario, only a few 
projects do not have an international participant and several projects have more than 
one country involved.85 
Moreover, the key buyers of Brazilian CERs have been companies from the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Japan.86 In 2004, a Memorandum of Understand-
ing was signed between Brazil and the Netherlands aiming to develop CDM projects 
through the financial support from the Netherlands CDM Fund, which could ex-
plain the immense involvement of the Netherlands in Brazil’s carbon market.87 
Considering the current CDM projects in Brazil by type of GHG, 67 per cent reduce 
CO2 emissions and 51 per cent of all projects are related to renewable energy.
88 It is 
2010), available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_
Trends_of_the_Carbon_Market_2010_low_res.pdf> (visited 11 March 2011) at 1.
80 As of January 2011, Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia, ‘Current Status of the Project Activities under 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in Brazil and the World’, available at <http://www.mct.gov.
br> (visited 28 February 2011). 
81 As of 8 March 2011. China ranks first and has 43 per cent of the registered project activities, followed by 
India with 21 per cent. See Registration at <http://cdm.unfccc.int> (visited 8 March 2011).
82 The CDM Executive Board supervises the operation of CDM projects and is responsible for developing 
procedures, adopting new methodologies, issuing CERs, maintaining the CDM registry and managing 
information of projects. For more information see <http://cdm.unfccc.int> (visited 25 February 2011).
83 Sebastian Oberthür and Hermann Ott, Das	Kyoto-Protokoll:	Internationale	Klimapolitik	für	das	21.	Jahr-
hundert (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000) at 222. 
84 GTZ, CDM/JI	Initiative	–	Country	Study	Brazil:	A	CDM	Market	Overview (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit - GTZ, 2008). 
85 See UNFCCC, ’Clean Development Mechanism’, available at <http://cdm.unfccc.int> (visited 28 Febru-
ary 2011). 
86 GTZ, CDM/JI Initiative, supra note 84.
87 European Commission, Brazil	Country	 Strategy	Paper	 2007–2013, available at <http://ec.europa.eu> 
(visited 12 November 2009). 
88 See ‘Current Status of the Project Activities under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in Brazil 
and the World’, supra note 80.
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worth mentioning that Brazil is known for its clean energy matrix, having 89 per 
cent of its electricity generated by renewable sources, of which 77 per cent by hydro-
electric plans. Additionally, 45 per cent of Brazil energy supply in 2007 was produced 
by renewable sources, an impressive number specially if compared to the world aver-
age (12.9 per cent).89
In the international discussions about GHG emissions and CDM, Brazil is already 
considered an important global player and regional leader, due to the amount of 
GHGs emitted by the country and the number of ongoing CDM projects, capable 
of becoming a strategic partner of the EU.90 In the national scenario, the next step 
is the implementation of the National Policy and the development of the domestic 
carbon market (the MBRE) since the country formalized its Copenhagen Accord 
commitment of reducing GHG emissions by 2020. In this case, lessons learnt from 
other emissions trading schemes can be used as an example during the process of 
structuring a national system.
6 Design elements of a trading scheme
Every emission trading scheme needs to have some basic elements to correctly work 
and reduce emissions of GHGs. These basic elements include a cap that limits GHG 
emissions, a difference in the abatement costs to motivate participants to trade, a 
reliable monitoring system to assure the environmental integrity of the system, a 
structure to promote enforcement, and provisions to protect the local environ-
ment.91
In addition to what was set by the Kyoto Protocol, there are European Community 
directives regulating the carbon market in Europe such as Directive 2003/87/EC92 
and Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. The 
former creates the scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the Com-
munity known as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and 
established to avoid distortions of competition and to preserve the integrity of inter-
nal markets.93 The latter deals with the use of CERs as a further measure to achieve 
the internal emissions reduction goal of each Member State. It is worth pointing out 
89 Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, ‘National Plan on Climate Change: Executive Sum-
mary’ (Brasilia, 2008) at 10.
90 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Towards an EU-
Brazil Strategic Partnership’ (30 May 2007). 
91 UNEP and UNCTAD, ‘An Emerging Market for the Environment: A Guide to Emissions Trading’, 
available at <http://www.unep.fr/energy/information/publications/risoe/pdf/EmissionsTrading-Feb03.
pdf> (visited 28 February 2011).
92 Amended by Directive 2004/101/EC of 27 October 2004, Directive 2008/101/EC of 19 November 
2008, Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 of 11 March 2009, and Directive 2009/29/EC of April 2009. 
93 See preamble 7 of the Directive 2003/87/EC, also called EU ETS Directive.
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that each Member State has a limit for the amount of CERs they can use in their 
domestic policy.94
Moreover, the EU ETS Directive provides only the bases for trading and details like 
contractual and tax law remain the responsibility of the Member States.95 At the 
European level, Member States have to publish National Allocation Plans indicating 
how many allowances will be issued in a certain period and how they will be distrib-
uted amongst installations. 
Thus, to better understand this environmental policy, it is worth studying a Na-
tional Allocation Plan (NAP) to see how and to whom the allowances were allocated 
in the first (from 2005 to 2007) and in the second phases (2008–2012) of the EU 
ETS.96 From the EU members, Germany’s National Allocation Plan was chosen as 
an example, in order to stress the lessons learnt since the beginning of the trading 
scheme.
The first key point in setting an emission trading scheme is the allocation of allow-
ances because ‘it ensures the effectiveness of emissions trading as an environmental 
policy instrument’.97 An accurate inventory or data collection of emissions is es-
sential. If some allowances are allocated through auctioning, the revenues can be used 
to support mitigation and adaptation measures. However, during the first period, 
also called the learning-phase, the German government decided to allocate free of 
charge 100 per cent of its allowances.98
The German NAP for the first phase (NAP I) had to consider the country’s reduction 
target in the second phase of the EU ETS (2008–2012), which corresponds to the 
first KP period. Therefore, the NAP I had to consider that Germany must reduce its 
GHG emissions by 21 per cent compared to 1990 levels by 2012. 
Concerning its structure, the NAP I was divided into a Macroplan, which defined 
the national emissions budget and the amount of allowances to be allocated, and a 
Microplan, which defined the methods and rules of allocation.99 It can be high-
94 Bruno Sabbag, O	protocolo	de	Quioto	e	seus	créditos	de	Carbono (LTr, 2008). 
95 Matthieu Wemaere and Charlotte Streck, ‘Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and EU Allow-
ances’, in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds), Legal	Aspects	of	Implementing	the	Kyoto	Protocol	
Mechanisms (Oxford University Press, 2005) 35–53 at 49.
96 The first phase of the EU ETS is also referred as the ‘learning phase’ and the second phase corresponds to 
the first commitment period of the KP. For further information on the EU ETS, see the European Com-
mission at <http://ec.europa.eu>.
97 Simon Marr, ‘Implementing the European Emissions Trading Directive in Germany’, in Freestone and 
Streck (eds), Legal	Aspects	of	Implementing	the	Kyoto	Protocol	Mechanisms (Oxford University Press, 2005) 
431–444 at 435.
98 See BMU, ‘National Allocation Plan for the Federal Republic of Germany (2005–2007)’, available at 
<http://www.bmu.de> (visited 22 October 2010). 
99 See ibid.
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lighted that the NAP I divided the reduction target per sector and listed the instal-
lations in a separate annex. 
An important step taken during the elaboration of the National Allocation Plan that 
can certainly be seen as a good example of governance was the dialogue with several 
sectors of society, including environmental groups, policy-makers, researchers, busi-
ness groups and so forth. The integration between federal and local authorities is also 
a fundamental part of the process. Another example is the description of installations 
subject to emissions trading divided into classes as it appears in the NAP I.100 
Concerning the compliance with the rules established by the EU ETS and the NAP 
I, a fine to be paid for each tonne of CO2 that was emitted beyond that permitted 
was set to discourage transgressions, especially because the fine was higher than the 
value of a carbon unit (tonne of CO2) in the market. The NAP I set a fine of €40 per 
excess tonne of CO2 emitted in the first phase and a fine of €100 per excess tonne 
emitted in the second phase. Besides the fine, it was also necessary to reduce the 
amount of emissions that were exceeded in the next year.101 
It is worth adding that banking and borrowing allowances were permitted within the 
first phase. Only banking is allowed between phase II and any subsequent periods.102 
The importance of having accurate estimations of GHG emissions and this banking 
system becomes evident when one thinks of the price crash of carbon units (end of 
2007).103 If emissions are not correctly estimated and there is an overallocation of 
units in the market, the environmental integrity of the scheme can be questioned. 
However, another crash is unlikely to happen, even after the recent economic down-
turn, because of the banking system between periods.104 Thus, the establishing of 
guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions is fundamental in 
any ETS to avoid overallocation of units. 
Nowadays, the EU ETS is considered the flagship of EU climate policy and can 
certainly constitute ‘a role model and testing ground for the development of other 
national, regional, and international GHG emissions trading schemes worldwide’.105 
Furthermore, Pohlmann adds that the establishment of the EU ETS was motivated 
100 See ibid.
101 See ibid.
102 Markus Pohlmann, ‘The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme’, in David Freestone and Charlotte 
Streck (eds), Legal	Aspects	of	Carbon	Trading (Oxford University Press, 2009) 337–366 at 351. 
103 According to the World Bank, the price of the European Union Allowances (EUAs), which are carbon 
credits traded in the EU ETS, went from a peak of over € 30 in April 2006 to under € 1 in early 2007. 
See Karan Capoor and Philippe Ambrosi, ‘State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2007’ (World Bank, 
2007), available at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:213197
81~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html> (visited 11 March 2011)s at 12. 
104 Markus Pohlmann, ‘The European Union Emissions’, supra note 102, at 354.
105 Ibid. at 339.
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by the Kyoto Protocol, but the scheme is independent and projected to last even if 
a new international agreement is not reached.106 
7 Conclusion
The future of the Kyoto Protocol is still uncertain. Consequently, it is not clear yet 
what will happen with market-based instruments such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism neither with the existing carbon markets. Moreover, it is unlikely that a 
new legally binding agreement will be reached at the international level before the 
KP first commitment period expires in 2012. However, the outcomes achieved in 
the COP16 from the negotiations held at the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP for-
mally acknowledge the pledges of emission reductions submitted to the Copenhagen 
Accord by both developed and developing countries.
Brazil has been a key player in the climate negotiations, not only as an important 
emerging economy, but also as a facilitator of the dialogue between north and south 
interests. The country has recently undergone a deep change in its attitude toward 
GHG emissions, culminating in the presentation of its reduction targets during the 
COP15. 
Despite the fact that Brazil ratified the Kyoto Protocol and strongly supports a second 
commitment period, the country does not have binding targets set by the Protocol. 
Moreover, the government emphasizes the fact that the commitments made to the 
international community through its submission to the Copenhagen Accord are 
voluntary.
Nevertheless, Brazil’s emission reduction target was included in the law that estab-
lished the main framework of the National Policy on Climate Change and now it is 
expressly mentioned in a national law (Law 12.187 of 2009). The process that led to 
the design of the National Policy and that changed Brazil’s position from not accept-
ing commitments to presenting voluntary pledges had the involvement of several 
actors and sectors of the society.
It is true, though, that some challenges need to be overcome before the National 
Policy can be completely implemented and Brazil’s carbon market shifts from trading 
CERs in the EU ETS to developing a national platform adequate to respond to the 
commitments made through its submission to the Copenhagen Accord and law 
12.187 of 2009.
In this sense, and considering the co  mplexity of structuring a carbon market, lessons 
learnt during the development of other trading schemes, like the EU ETS, may be 
106 Ibid.
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useful for policy-makers who are, or might be, considering setting this kind of scheme 
in their countries. In this scenario, important steps can be listed as examples and 
guide new frameworks, like the division of targets per sector, the clear rules for bank-
ing, borrowing, and non-compliance, as well as the development of guidelines for 
the monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions in order to avoid overallocation. 
PART IV
the interplaY Between climate 
change and BiodiverSitY
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1 Introduction
Our understanding of the possible effects of changing climates on aspects of the 
environment is increasing as more and more research is done in numerous different 
areas. Increasingly, research is illuminating such effects not only in respect of ter-
restrial environments but also in respect of marine environments, and showing how 
the oceans are not an immense, infinite resource scarcely affected by the doings of 
humankind. Rather, the marine environment is extremely limited and is directly 
affected – to its detriment – by anthropogenic activities. 
International governance of the marine environment is, however, uncoordinated, 
unwieldy, and arguably ineffective.2 Certainly, with the oceans struggling to deal 
with the cumulative effect of the multiple threats they face,3 and with present in-
ternational legal instruments apparently inadequate for dealing with these, the ‘new’ 
dangers posed by climate change are not likely in the short term to be dealt with 
through any international convention text of global scope. As such, the interna-
tional environmental lawyer or diplomat might do well to seek as much assistance as 
possible from obligations to be found in scattered instruments.
1 BA Hons LLB (Wits) LLM Environmental Law (Natal & Nottingham) Ph.D; Attorney, RSA; Associate 
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, RSA. Email: couzense@ukzn.ac.za or couzens.
ed@gmail.com. 
2 See, for instance, Louis J. Kotzé, ‘Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: An Oceans Govern-
ance Case Study’ in Ed Couzens and Tuula Honkonen (eds), International	Environmental	Law-making	
and	Diplomacy	Review	2008, University of Joensuu–UNEP Course Series 8 (University of Joensuu, 2009) 
11–30; and Michael Kidd, ‘International Fisheries: An Overview of the International Legal Response’ in 
Ed Couzens and Tuula Honkonen (eds), International	Environmental	Law-making	and	Diplomacy	Review	
2008, University of Joensuu–UNEP Course Series 8 (University of Joensuu, 2009) 31–38. 
3 See Part 3 of this paper.
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2  The freedom of the high seas
In 1608, Hugo de Groot (‘Grotius’) wrote a pamphlet entitled De	Mare	Liberum, in 
which he described the oceans as being:
… that expanse of water which antiquity describes as the immense, the infinite, 
bounded only by the heavens, parent of all things; the ocean which the ancients 
believed was perpetually supplied with water not only by fountains, rivers, and 
seas, but by the clouds, and by the very stars of heaven themselves; the ocean 
which, although surrounding this earth, the home of the human race, with the 
ebb and flow of its tides, can be neither seized nor inclosed; nay, which rather 
possesses the earth than is by it possessed.4 
Although primarily an argument made to entrench freedom of rights of navigation, 
this suggestion so influenced legal ideas over the centuries since it was made that it 
appears to have been only in relatively recent years that the world generally has been 
able to move away from it – and probably it has not moved away altogether.
Entrenching the idea of freedom of the high seas was the arbitral decision delivered in 
1893 in the Bering	Sea	Fur	Seals	Arbitration.5 In this matter the United States argued 
that it had a right to protect, while on the high seas, fur seals which returned periodi-
cally and seasonally to the territory of the United States. The tribunal held (with two 
arbitrators dissenting) that the US had no right of property or protection in the fur seals 
beyond a three mile limit (which at the time was considered to be the limit of a state’s 
territorial sea) and that it could not therefore exploit or conserve the seals exclusively. 
Birnie and Boyle emphasize that ‘[t]he importance of this decision to the develop-
ment of the law concerning conservation of marine living resources cannot be over-
stressed’ since, according to these writers, the decision: 
laid the twin foundations for subsequent developments over the next century’ in 
the sense that, firstly, ‘it confirmed that the law was based on high seas freedom 
of fishing and that no distinction was to be made in this respect between fisher-
ies and marine mammals despite the very different characteristics of the latter, 
which the tribunal had examined.6
4 See, for instance, Anthony D’Amato and John L. Hargrove, Environment	and	the	Law	of	the	Sea:	A	Report	
of	the	Working	Group	on	Ocean	Environment (United Nations Juridical Yearbook, 1974) at 1.
5 See ‘Award of the Tribunal of Arbitration constituted under the Treaty concluded at Washington, the 29th 
of February 1892, between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen of the United 
Kingdom of great Britain and Ireland’, in Tuomas Kuokkanen (ed.), Seminal	Cases	of	International	Envi-
ronmental	Law (Edita, 1999) 13–21; and Reports	of	International	Arbitral	Awards, Vol XXVIII 263–276 
(award of 15 August 1893), available at <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXVIII/263-276.pdf> 
(visited 29 August 2011).
6 Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International	Law	and	the	Environment (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 
2002) at 649–50.
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Given this history of legal freedom to act as one pleased on the high seas, and the 
fervour with which states have exercised this ‘right’ over the centuries, it is little 
wonder that from a 21st Century perspective the marine environment is in desperate 
trouble. In the next section of the present paper various of the problems faced by the 
marine environment are canvassed – together with possible links to changing cli-
mates.
3  Problems faced in the marine environment
3.1 General problems
The object of the present paper is not to attempt to establish the particular degree to 
which the world’s marine environments are in trouble – this would be almost impos-
sible to do given the extent to which environments differ and to which problems may 
be different in different locations. Nor is this intended to be a scientific paper. The 
aim in this Part of the paper is merely to establish that there is cause for serious con-
cern. What follow are a number of the problems which policy-makers and scientists 
have identified as issues of concern, arranged roughly alphabetically and without an 
attempt to order them according to levels of seriousness.
3.1.1 Acidification of the oceans
Much, perhaps one-third, of the carbon dioxide which is emitted into the atmos-
phere through anthropogenic means is ‘neutralized’ through absorption into the 
oceans.7 Unfortunately, this is not a ‘free service’ – the trade-off is that the chemical 
balance of the ocean is affected, as the pH level decreases.8
As well as direct damage, it appears that acidification has numerous poorly under-
stood side-effects, such as reducing the biocalcification of calcareous phytoplankton. 
It has been explained, in this regard, that calcium carbonate begins dissolving as pH 
balances decline, and that ocean acidification could therefore have harmful effects on 
the abundance of coccolithophores (abundant single-celled algae which use calcium 
to form their exterior scales and which have a vital ecological role, producing much 
of the planet’s oxygen, sequestering huge quantities of carbon, and acting as a food 
source for many oceanic animals).9 Increasing scientific research is showing, further, 
that there may be many unforeseen (and even unforeseeable) effects. As an example 
of this, recent research from a team at James Cook University in Queensland, Aus-
tralia has apparently demonstrated that an effect on young clownfish raised in water 
7 See ‘What is ocean acidification?’, available at <http://www.ocean-acidification.net/FAQacidity.html> 
(visited 28 August 2011). 
8 Ibid.
9 ‘Acid test for the seas’, NOVA: Science in the News (Australian Academy of Science), January 2008, avail-
able at <http://www.science.org.au/nova/106/106key.htm> (visited 7 October 2011). 
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that has been deliberately acidified is that they may find it more difficult to perceive 
predators.10 
3.1.2  Alien invasive species
When organisms are transported, either deliberately or accidentally, from one envi-
ronment to another, it often happens that they find the new environment to be 
suitable to them and they thrive. Often, however, the success of the transported or-
ganisms or species in the new environment comes at the expense of organisms or 
species in that environment, which may be poorly equipped to co-exist with the new 
arrival and may find themselves out-competed or predated upon. Invasive alien spe-
cies are most likely to find new homes, and consequently have their greatest impacts, 
in the warmer coastal areas which contain most life.
3.1.3  Coral bleaching
When coral reefs become exposed to heat, it seems, they die and leave stark white 
remnants of their former colourful selves – with rising sea temperatures appearing to 
be one of the major causes of this phenomenon.11
 
Bleaching occurs when the corals ‘are subjected to repeated and/or sustained stress-
es which exceed their tolerances’; and ‘when this occurs, the symbiotic algae living 
in the coral tissue are ejected … [t]he corals lose their colour and their white, cal-
cerous skeleton shines through the transparent tissue’.12 This is what is described 
as ‘bleaching’. Some levels of recovery do appear possible, but this is erratic and 
sometimes does not occur – even where recovery does occur, reefs appear to be left 
‘impoverished’.13 
Some estimates are that already at least 25 per cent of the world’s coral reefs have 
been either lost or severely damaged. The threats to them include pollutants from 
land-based activities; physical damage, especially from trawling; removal of vegeta-
tion, especially mangrove swamps, which affects their ecosystems; overfishing, which 
affects reef fish populations and eco-balances; and physical damage from increasing 
human visitors.14 The threat to the world’s marine environments of losing such 
critical ecosystems can hardly be overstated.
10 Stephanie Rogers, ‘Ocean acidification causes fatal attraction among fish’, 24 November 2009, available 
at <http://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/climate-weather/stories/ocean-acidification-causes-fatal-attrac-
tion-among-fish> (visited 7 October 2011). 
11 Christian Nellemann, Stefan Hain and Jackie Alder (eds), In	Dead	Water:	Merging	of	Climate	Change	with	
Pollution,	Over-Harvest,	and	Infestations	in	the	World’s	Fishing	Grounds (UNEP, 2008), available at <http://
www.unep.org/pdf/InDeadWater_LR.pdf> (visited 29 August 2011) at 28–29. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.
14 See, generally, Franklin Moore and Barbara Best, ‘Coral Reef Crisis: Causes and Consequences’, undated, 
available at <http://www.aaas.org/international/africa/coralreefs/ch1.shtml> (visited 28 August 2011).
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3.1.4 Eutrophication
Oversupplies of nutrients to marine environments, often due to excessive run-off of 
fertilizers or sewage, can cause excessive algal growth – paradoxically, this over-pro-
liferation of plant material can lead to the creation of hypoxic areas, which are mar-
itime ‘dead zones’ where the water has been starved of oxygen.
3.1.5 Habitat destruction
The fragmentation of habitats for numerous marine species results from habitat de-
struction (especially where this results from damage to coral reefs and to sea beds 
from bottom-trawling).
3.1.6 Increased human coastal development
The majority of the world’s major cities, which are the recipients annually of multiple 
new immigrants, are located either on major watercourses or on coastlines. Numer-
ous pollution problems originate from land-based sources – such as discharge, dump-
ing, eutrophication, run-off, sediment deposits, and sewage discharges.15 Coastal 
developments themselves will be affected by sea-level rise, causing numerous and 
often unforeseeable human settlement and migration issues.16 
Degradation of the marine environment can result, per Agenda 21,17 the ‘Global 
Blueprint for Sustainable Development’, from a wide range of activities on land. 
These activities include agriculture, construction of coastal infrastructure, forestry, 
human settlements, industry, land use, tourism, and urban development, all of which 
can affect the marine environment.18 According to Agenda 21, coastal erosion and 
siltation are issues of particular concern.19
3.1.7 Melting of glacial and polar ice and sea level rise
Rising sea levels are one of the most significant expected results of climate change, 
with consequent impacts on coastal dunes, coral reefs, fish stocks, human settlements 
and so forth. The melting of ice from glaciers and in polar regions appears to be both 
significant and occurring at an accelerating rate.20 There are numerous other reasons 
for changes in sea level, of course, including increased extraction of groundwater and 
seepage into acquifiers; circulation changes in both surface water and deep water and 
storm surges; subsidence in deltas and river basins; and the fact that warming of 
water causes it to expand.21
15 Nellemann et al., In	Dead	Water,	supra note 11, at 42–45.
16 Ibid.
17 See infra, Part 4.2.3, Agenda 21 (UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 13 
June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992), available at <http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agen-
da21/>), ‘Programme Areas’, ‘Integrated Management and Sustainable Development of Coastal and 
Marine Areas, Including Exclusive Economic Zones’, ‘Activities’, section 17.10.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Nellemann et al., In	Dead	Water,	supra note 11, at 32–33.
21 Ibid.
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3.1.8 Overfishing
Fish are concentrated in only 10–15 per cent (in which half of the world’s catch is 
caught) of the oceans – and the damage has been done. Probably at least 80 per cent 
of the world’s primary catch species are now exploited beyond their harvesting ca-
pacity.22 Incredible amounts of non-target species are discarded as ‘bycatch’ and there 
is serious consequent damage to these species not targeted as well as to species such 
as including the damage done to sea-bird and turtle populations. 
3.1.9 Pollution 
Generally, the major threats to the marine environment from pollution (in all its 
forms from raw sewage to heavy metals to acoustic pollution) are identified in Chap-
ter 17 of Agenda 21.23 It is there explained that land-based sources contribute 70 
per cent of marine pollution, and maritime transport and dumping-at-sea activities 
each contribute 10 per cent. It is explained that the pollutants which pose the great-
est threats to the marine environment are, in different degrees of importance in dif-
ferent national or regional situations, litter and plastics, metals, nutrients, oil/hydro-
carbons, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), radionuclides, sediments, sewage, 
and synthetic organic compounds. It is explained further that many of the con-
taminants originating from land-based sources are particularly damaging to the ma-
rine environment as they are characterized by bioaccumulation in the food chain, 
persistence, and toxicity.24 Marine pollution, per Agenda 21, is caused also by ship-
ping and sea-based activities, with approximately 600 000 tonnes of oil entering the 
oceans each year as a result of all of accidents, illegal discharges, and normal ship-
ping.25
3.1.10 Sea temperature changes 
As partially canvassed under other sub-headings, changes in sea temperature can have 
many effects. Glacier and polar ice melts will increase; for various reasons, sea levels 
will rise; alien invasive species are likely to be encouraged by warmer waters; and 
coral bleaching increases. Possibly the most ill-understood effects are likely to result 
from changes to thermohaline circulation – continental shelf ‘flushing’ and conse-
quent necessary nutrient recycling. Climate change may, it seems, have impacts on 
these necessary renewal processes.
22 There is a great amount of literature available on the depletion of the world’s fish stocks. See, inter alia, 
Richard Ellis, The	Empty	Ocean (Island Press/Shearwater Books, 2003); Ocean 2012 (an initiative coor-
dinated by the Pew Environment Group), available at <http://www.ocean12.eu>; Fish	Dependence	–	2011	
Update:	The	increasing	reliance	of	the	EU	on	fish	from	elsewhere (Ocean2012/Pew Environment Group, 
2011), available at <http://assets.ocean2012.eu/publication_documents/documents/104/original/2011_
Fish_Dependence_UPDATE.pdf> (both visited 29 August 2011); Daniel Pauly and Jay MacLean, In	a	
Perfect	Ocean:	The	State	of	Fisheries	and	Ecosystems	in	the	North	Atlantic	Ocean (Island Press, 2003); Royal 
Swedish Academy of Agriculture and Forestry, Fisheries,	Sustainability	and	Development:	Fifty-two	authors	
on	 coexistence	and	development	 of	fisheries	 and	aquaculture	 in	developing	and	developed	 countries (Royal 
Swedish Academy of Agriculture and Forestry, 2009); Nellemann et al., In	Dead	Water,	supra note 11; 
Colin S. Woodard, Ocean’s	End:	travels	Through	Endangered	Seas (Basic Books, 2000).
23 Heading ‘B. Marine environmental Protection’, ‘Basis for action’, section 17.18.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., section 17.20.
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3.2 Conclusion
Of course, it will probably always be possible to find commentators who do not agree 
that the picture is as gloomy as it might seem, or who argue that not all of the prob-
lems which appear serious are in fact so. Lomborg, for instance, has written that ‘the 
oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been astoundingly insig-
nificant’26 – and then goes on to argue, amongst other things, that oil is a natural 
substance which tends mostly to evaporate and causes less damage than is often 
thought;27 that the picture in respect of pollution of coastal waters ‘is one of rapid 
improvement’;28 that while hypoxia and eutrophication may be localized problems, 
the problems they cause are outweighed by the benefits to humankind of increased 
food production through fertilizer use;29 and that growing fish in fish farms will 
compensate for wild fish not available for capture because of over-fishing.30 
One can only wish that Lomborg was correct! Unfortunately, there really is not a lot 
to be said in support of his arguments – especially in respect of his points about oil 
and how fast it dissipates,31 pollution of coastal waters,32 and aquaculture.33 
In the final analysis, ‘the problem’ is not that each one of these problems exists – it 
is the potential cumulative impacts of these various causes that provide the most 
frightening possible consequences, where the impact of the combined whole may 
prove greater than is apparent from consideration of all of the different components 
separately. Although many of the individual dangers to the marine environment are 
not caused, but rather are exacerbated, by the effects of climate change, and they 
cannot be remedied by remedying climate change alone, finding solutions will be 
impossible unless climate change is considered as an integral part. 
26 Bjørn Lomborg, The	Skeptical	Environmentalist:	Measuring	the	Real	State	of	the	World (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2001) 189.
27 Ibid. at 191–194.
28 Ibid. at 194–195.
29 Ibid. at 195–201.
30 Ibid. at 106–108.
31 Original oil from the famous Torrey	Canyon spill in 1967 can apparently still be seen on the coastline of 
Cornwall. See, for instance, Patrick Barkham, ‘Oil spills: Legacy of the Torrey Canyon’, Guardian of 24 
June 2010, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/24/torrey-canyon-oil-spill-
deepwater-bp> (visited 28 August 2011). 
32 Where he really only gives a glib example or two of European beaches.
33 Where he simply gives gross tonnage figures and ignores any of the problems associated with aquaculture, 
such as the extent to which wild caught fish are needed to feed farmed fish in an inefficient and wasteful 
cycle; and the extent to which escapes and the spread of disease appear to be an unavoidable aspect of fish 
farming.
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4 Finding appropriate international law
4.1  The absence of dedicated international provisions
At present, unfortunately, there is no international convention which deals directly 
with climate change issues in the context of marine issues. However, ‘needs must’ 
and – at least until there is such a convention – the international environmental 
lawyer or negotiator seeking to protect the marine environment might consider mak-
ing use of those general provisions which could be brought to bear on the issue-area.
What follows in this section of this paper is a consideration of various sections, found 
in various international conventions, which might be used to combat negative cli-
mate change-related effects in the marine context. These have been considered under 
the general heading of international instruments in the form of ‘soft law instruments’ 
and ‘hard law instruments’. These two headings might also have been termed, respec-
tively, ‘declarations’, which obviously provide for general obligation; followed by 
instruments which provide for ‘specific duties’. Regional instruments have been con-
sidered at the end of the second category.
 
4.2  Soft law instruments
4.2.1 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, 1972
Although clearly soft law, the ‘Stockholm Declaration’34 has played an important role 
in the development of international environmental law as many multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements have built upon its achievements. In particular, the ten-year 
cycle of major environmental summits being held in the third year of each decade35 
began with this Conference.
Arguably, though, only one of the Declaration’s 26 principles appears to have become 
firmly entrenched36 – this being Principle 21,37 which may even more unfortu-
nately have achieved this status more for its non-environmental aspect than for its 
34 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), Stockholm, 16 
June 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973), 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1416.
35 The UNCHE in 1972; the World Charter for Nature in 1982 (UNGA Res. 37/7); UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 (see <http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html>); 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 (see <http://www.un.org/events/
wssd/>); and the Earth Summit (Rio +20) in 2012 (see <http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/>).
36 See Daniel Bodansky’s paper in the present volume of the Review, under Part 2.3 in that paper.
37 Principle 21 reads:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of interna-
tional law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion.
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being useful for environmental protection. In other words, it may be the aspect of 
entrenched sovereign rights which pleases states.38 Nevertheless, its ongoing repeti-
tion in different international instruments39 remains significant as the Principle 
clearly provides that states have a ‘responsibility’ to prevent ‘activities within their 
jurisdiction[s]’ from damaging ‘areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’. As 
many marine areas will be situated beyond national limits, this Principle might be 
useful to an argument that states have general duties to protect such areas.
Further, although not as entrenched a principle, it should not be forgotten that the 
Stockholm Declaration contains a principle directly pertinent to marine protection. 
Principle 7 read as follows:
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances 
that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and 
marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the 
sea.
4.2.2 UN General Assembly Resolution 37/7: World Charter for Nature, 1982
The World Charter for Nature is perhaps a more interesting document than it is 
often given credit for being – although clearly ‘soft law’, the General Assembly does 
appear to have made an effort to give its principles peremptory force.40 In this regard, 
Principle 14 records that ‘[t]he principles set forth in the present Charter shall be 
reflected in the law and practice of each State, as well as at the international level’ – 
the use of the peremptory word ‘shall’ being somewhat unusual in international 
environmental instruments. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell record that ‘this phraseology 
alone does not render this Charter binding’; but do also point out that ‘the distinc-
tion between “hard” and “soft” law becomes blurred as states begin to act on these 
recommendations or incorporate them in treaties’.41 
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell go on to argue that ‘[t]he Charter was clearly in-
tended by the UN majority to be a contribution to the creation of new binding 
38 It might be possible to draw a useful lesson from this: that coupling a limiting provision (the entrenching 
of state sovereignty) to general environmental protection might make it easier to persuade states to agree 
to a clause providing for environmental protection, even though such latter clauses might have the effect 
of limiting a state’s sovereignty. 
39 For instance, Rio Declaration (UN Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 
June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 876); the 
Biodiversity Convention (Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 
December 1993, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>) and the Pream-
ble of the Climate Change Convention (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://
unfccc.int>).
40 Patricia Birnie; Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International	Law	and	 the	Environment (3rd ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009) 69. 
41 Ibid.
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international law on conservation and, if systematically applied and elaborated, 
its rules could be transformed into customary international law’.42 
Part I of the World Charter is headed ‘General Principles’ and contains only five 
articles. The first two record that ‘[n]ature shall be respected and its essential proc-
esses shall not be impaired’;43 and that ‘[t]he genetic viability on the earth shall not 
be compromised’, with the ‘population levels of all life forms, wild and domesticat-
ed’, being at ‘least sufficient for their survival, and to this end necessary habitat shall 
be safeguarded’.44 The next two principles are interesting in that they both give 
specific mention to the marine environment. According to Principle 3, ‘[a]ll areas of 
the earth, both land and sea, shall be subject to these principles of conservation; 
special protection shall be given to unique areas, to representative samples of all the 
different types of ecosystems and to the habitat of rare or endangered species’.45 Ac-
cording to Principle 4, ‘[e]cosystems and organisms, as well as the land, marine and 
atmospheric resources that are utilized by man, shall be managed to achieve and 
maintain optimum sustainable productivity, but not in such a way as to endanger 
the integrity of those other ecosystems or species with which they co-exist’.46
4.2.3 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, one of the documents which emanated from the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), repeats 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, providing an example of how repetition 
can serve to strengthen a principle. The Rio Declaration, however, clearly slots into 
the sequence of soft law instruments; but Birnie et al. describe it as having ‘much 
greater legal significance than its 1972 predecessor’47 – in fact, they describe it as 
‘constitut[ing] at present the most significant universally endorsed statement of gen-
eral rights and obligations of states affecting the environment’.48 In their view, the 
value of the Declaration is ‘evidential’ in that it ‘tells us what states believe the law to 
be in certain cases, or in others what they would like it to become or how they want 
it to develop’.49 
No one of the Principles contained in the Rio Declaration mentions the marine 
environment specifically, but Principle 2 does refer, repeating Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration, to the ‘responsibility’ not to ‘cause damage to the environ-
ment … of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.50 Further, Principle 15 
42 Ibid. at 605.
43 Art. 1.
44 Art. 2.
45 Art. 3.
46 Art. 4.
47 See Birnie, et al., International	Law	and	the	Environment,	supra note 40, at 52.
48 Ibid. at 112.
49 Ibid.
50 Principle 2.
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contains the clearest exposition in a major international instrument of the precau-
tionary principle – albeit without using the word ‘principle’ in the text of the prin-
ciple. Instead, Principle 15 reads:
[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary	approach (own emphasis) 
shall be widely applied by [s]tates according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation.51
Fitzmaurice depicts this formulation of the principle as being ‘weak’ and non-con-
troversial52 – the corollary being that found in the World Charter for Nature of 
1982, which states that when ‘potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the 
activities should not proceed’.53 The cynical observer might argue that this says 
something about the nature of international environmental law, that the stronger 
formulation is to be found in the weaker instrument – and vice versa. This does not 
bode well for the international environmental lawyer hoping to find obligations 
which might be useful for combating the adverse effects of climate change in the 
marine environment. Still, whether weak or not, the Rio Declaration is often cited, 
has had an important influence and it will be interesting to see how it is built upon 
in future instruments.
Whatever the current status of the precautionary principle in international environ-
mental law, even given its more usual formulation as an ‘approach’ there can be little 
doubt that the concept is developing and – and that it provides a very persuasive 
rationale for humankind to proceed with great caution in interacting with the marine 
environment. In respect of climate change, it is even arguable that the entire regime 
for controlling emissions of greenhouse gases is based upon a precautionary approach 
– given the difficulty of providing firm evidence for the negative effects of these.
4.2.3 Agenda 21, 1992
Another document to emanate from the UNCED in 1992 was the lengthy global 
blueprint for implementation of sustainable development, Agenda 21. While obvi-
ously soft law, being a set of suggested considerations and methods which states 
might adopt in taking measures for environmental protection and sustainable devel-
opment, Agenda 21 remains important as an attempt to translate ‘theory’ into ‘prac-
51 Principle 15.
52 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Contemporary	Issues	in	International	Environmental	Law	(Edward Elgar, 2009) 8.
53 Ibid. at 9. According to Principle 11 of the World Charter for Nature: 
Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be controlled, and the best available tech-
nologies that minimize significant risks to nature or other adverse effects shall be used; in particu-
lar: … (a) … (b) Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded by 
an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh 
potential damage to nature, and where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the ac-
tivities should not proceed; …
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tice’. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 is headed: ‘Protection of the Oceans, all Kinds of 
Seas, Including Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and the Protec-
tion, Rational Use and Development of their Living Resources’. 
Agenda 21 describes the marine environment, ‘including the oceans and all seas and 
adjacent coastal areas’, as forming ‘an integrated whole that is an essential component 
of the global life-support system and a positive asset that presents opportunities for 
sustainable development’.54 According to Agenda 21, ‘[i]nternational law, as re-
flected in the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
… sets forth rights and obligations of States and provides the international basis 
upon which to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the marine and 
coastal environment and its resources’.55
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 is far too lengthy for consideration in this paper, but it is 
worth pointing out that under the sub-heading ‘International and regional coopera-
tion and coordination’, it is stated that:
[t]he role of international cooperation and coordination on a bilateral basis and, 
where applicable, within a subregional, interregional, regional or global frame-
work, is to support and supplement national efforts of coastal States to promote 
integrated management and sustainable development of coastal and marine ar-
eas.56
Clearly, such international cooperation would require coordination of international 
legal instruments. 
Further, in a different chapter of Agenda 21, under the chapter heading ‘Interna-
tional Legal Instruments and Mechanisms’,57 it is stated under the sub-heading 
‘Basis for Action’ that there is a recognition that ‘the following vital aspects of the 
universal, multilateral and bilateral treaty-making process should be taken into ac-
count’:
(a) [t]he further development of international law on sustainable development, 
giving special attention to the delicate balance between environmental and 
developmental concerns;
(b) [t]he need to clarify and strengthen the relationship between existing inter-
national instruments or agreements in the field of environment and relevant 
54 Ibid., ‘Introduction’.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., ‘Programme Areas’, ‘Integrated Management and Sustainable Development of Coastal and Marine 
Areas, Including Exclusive Economic Zones’, ‘Activities’, ‘17.10. (C) International and regional coopera-
tion and coordination’.
57 Chapter 39.
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social and economic agreements or instruments, taking into account the 
special needs of developing countries; …58
This is important in the situation the world faces in respect of the marine environ-
ment generally – potentially catastrophic and widespread environmental collapse, no 
single dedicated convention, and numerous conventions which might be able to play 
a role in enhancing protection.
4.2.4 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, 2002
The next major Declaration in the series which began with the Stockholm Declara-
tion is the Johannesburg Declaration,59 which was agreed to at the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002. This Declaration does not contain 
an article dedicated to the marine environment, but it is mentioned in Article 13, 
under the heading ‘The challenges we face’:
[t]he global environment continues to suffer. Loss of biodiversity continues, fish 
stocks continue to be depleted, desertification claims more and more fertile land, 
the adverse effects of climate change are already evident, natural disasters are 
more frequent and more devastating, and developing countries more vulnerable, 
and air, water and marine pollution continue to rob millions of a decent life. 
At present it is not possible to say that the Johannesburg Declaration takes the proc-
ess forward in any significant way – as Birnie et al. write, ‘the WSSD … added little 
by way of new policies and principles. Nonetheless, … [its] value lies in the further 
recognition of the contribution which conservation of biological diversity can make 
to the sustainable development process, and to poverty eradication in particular’.60 
Accompanying the Declaration was a Plan of Implementation,61 which is intended 
to: 
build on the achievements made since the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development and expedite the realization of the remaining goals. 
To this end, we [the Parties] commit ourselves to undertaking concrete actions 
and measures at all levels and to enhancing international cooperation, … These 
efforts will also promote the integration of the three components of sustainable 
development – economic development, social development and environmental 
protection – as interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars.
58 Ibid.
59 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development ‘From our origins to the future’, Johannesburg, 
South Africa, 4 September 2011, available at <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_
PD/English/POI_PD.htm>.
60 Birnie et al., International	Law	and	the	Environment,	supra note 40, at 611.
61 See Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/
CONF.199/20 (2002).
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The Plan does contain paragraphs62 which declare that ‘oceans, seas, islands and 
coastal areas form an integrated and essential component of the Earth’s ecosystem 
and are critical for global food security and for sustaining economic prosperity and 
the well-being of many national economies, particularly in developing countries’.63 
The Plan then states that ‘[e]nsuring the sustainable development of the oceans re-
quires effective coordination and cooperation, including at the global and regional 
levels, between relevant bodies, and actions at all levels to’ take certain actions, in-
cluding inviting states to ratify or accede to and implement the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, ‘which provides the overall legal frame-
work for ocean activities’;64 and to promote the implementation of chapter 17 of 
Agenda 21.65 
There are a number of sensible suggestions contained in the Plan for using interna-
tional legal instruments in a cooperative fashion, such as by encouraging states to 
‘establish an effective, transparent and regular inter-agency coordination mechanism 
on ocean and coastal issues within the United Nations system’;66 to ‘promote inte-
grated, multidisciplinary and multisectoral coastal and ocean management at the 
national level and encourage and assist coastal [s]tates in developing ocean policies 
and mechanisms on integrated coastal management’;67 and to ‘[s]trengthen region-
al cooperation and coordination between the relevant regional organizations and 
programmes, the regional seas programmes of the United Nations Environment 
Programme, regional fisheries management organizations and other regional science, 
health and development organizations’.68 
According to Chambers, however, the Plan of Implementation is ‘disappointing’ in 
that it ‘offers very few changes from the status quo and certainly nothing imaginative 
for a future vision of effective institutional arrangements’.69 Further, he suggests that 
while the Plan raises ‘important priorities’, it ‘proposes no new concrete actions’.70 
Unfortunately, the Plan is – as its soft law nature implies – long on aspiration and 
short on firm commitment. Something of its unrealistic nature can perhaps be seen 
in the suggestion that, ‘[t]o achieve sustainable fisheries, the following actions are 
required at all levels:71 [m]aintain or restore stocks to levels that can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield with the aim of achieving these goals for depleted stocks 
on an urgent basis and where possible not later than 2015 …’.72 This goal always was 
62 Ibid. paras 30–34.
63 Ibid. para. 30.
64 Ibid. para. 30(a).
65 Ibid. para. 30(b). See infra, Part 4.2.3, on the provisions of Agenda 21.
66 Ibid. para. 30(c).
67 Ibid. para. 30(e).
68 Ibid. para. 30(f ).
69 W. Bradnee Chambers, Interlinkages	and	the	Effectiveness	of	Multilateral	Environmental	Agreements (Unit-
ed Nations University Press, 2008) at 38.
70 Ibid.
71 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, supra note 61, at para. 31.
72 Ibid. para. 31(a).
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unrealistic and, at the time of writing in 2011, it is clear that there is no chance 
whatsoever of the goal being met. Quite simply, so little has been done that it is as 
though nothing has been done – while there may be the occasional regional or local 
success story, overall the world’s fisheries remain in deep trouble.73 
Ironically, the greatest long-term contribution which the Plan makes may lie in its 
failure and the lessons which can be learned from this – doubtless, this will be a 
topic for discussion at the next in the series of decade-cycled environment-related 
summits: Rio+20 in 2012.74 
4.3  Firm obligations in multilateral environmental agreements
Turning from consideration of soft law instruments which might be useful in com-
bating climate change-related negative effects on the marine environment, this paper 
now considers examples of firm obligations which might be used to the same pur-
pose. 
4.3.1 MARPOL, 1973/78
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships75 was adopt-
ed in 1973 by Parties ‘conscious’ of the need to preserve the human environment in 
general and the marine environment in particular; and ‘recognizing’ that deliberate, 
negligent or accidental release of oil and other harmful substances76 from ships consti-
tutes a serious source of pollution; and ‘desiring’ to achieve the complete elimination 
of intentional pollution of the marine environment by oil and other harmful sub-
stances and the minimization of accidental discharge of such substances.77 
The Convention of 1973 and the Protocol of 1978, known combined as ‘MARPOL 
73/78’, operate in practice through six Annexes. Parties are required to adopt An-
nexes I and II, but a State Party may declare that it does not accept one or all of the 
other Annexes. For purposes of the present discussion it is worth drawing attention 
to Annex VI, which was introduced by the Protocol of 1997 and which provides 
regulations concerning air pollution from ships.78 
73 See the discussion on overfishing in Part 3 supra and the general readings cited there.
74 Twenty years after UNCED, the United Nations ‘Earth Summit’ will be held in Rio in 2012. See the 
official website at <http://www.earthsummit2012.org/>. 
75 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, first signed 2 November 
1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), adopted 17 February 1978. 
The combined instrument entered into force on 2 October 1983, 12 International	Legal	Materials (1973) 
1319, <http://www.imo.org>. Amended by the Protocol of 1997 to amend the International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 2 November 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 17 Febru-
ary 1978, London, 26 September 1997.
76 Meaning ‘any substances which, if introduced into the sea, are liable to create hazards to human health, 
to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of 
the sea, and includes any substance subject to control by the present’: ‘Definitions’.
77 Preamble.
78 ‘Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships’, 26 September 1997, into force 19 May 2005.
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In 2008 the MARPOL Environment Protection Committee adopted amendments 
to Annex VI, committing Parties to the:
progressive reduction in sulphur oxide (SOx) emissions from ships, with the 
global sulphur cap reduced initially to 3.50% (from the current 4.50%), effective 
from 1 January 2012; then progressively to 0.50%, effective from 1 January 
2020, subject to a feasibility review to be completed no later than 2018.79
It is further intended that the limits applicable in Sulphur Emission Control Areas 
will from 1 July 2010 be reduced from the current 1.50 per cent to 1.00 per cent; 
and then be further reduced to 0.10 per cent, effective from 1 January 2015.80 Pro-
gressive reductions in nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from marine engines were also 
agreed to, with the most restrictive controls being on engines installed on ships con-
structed on or after 1 January 2016, and where those ships operate in Emission 
Control Areas. 
After adoption of the amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, International Maritime 
Organization81 Secretary-General Efthimios Mitropoulos was quoted as saying that 
the amendments represented ‘a monumental decision in IMO’s history, a decision 
that proves … that the Organization is … capable of dealing with all items on its 
agenda, [and] an organization that sets global standards in a global environment’.82 
The revised measures, according to the IMO, ‘are expected to have a significant ben-
eficial impact on the atmospheric environment and on human health, particularly 
that of people living in port cities and coastal communities’.
4.3.2  Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 1979
While this Convention83 was originally created because of concerns over the damag-
ing effects of acid rain,84 the effects of which are far more visible in terrestrial envi-
ronments, marine environments may also be affected. In fact, it has even been sug-
gested that acid rain might have a disproportionate impact on coastal waters; and 
that the impact of nitrogen and sulphur compounds from the atmosphere alters 
79 Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), 58th session, 6–10 October 2008, available at 
<http://www.imo.org/environment/mainframe.asp?topic_id=233> (visited 28 August 2011). The revised 
Annex VI entered into force on 1 July 2010, under the tacit acceptance amendment procedure.
80 Ibid.
81 See <http://www.imo.org>.
82 See Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), 58th session, supra note 79; and ‘IMO envi-
ronment meeting adopts revised regulations on ship emissions’, available at <http://www.worldshipping.
org/pdf/imo_release_on_annexvi.pdf> (visited 28 August 2011).
83 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Geneva, November 13 1979, in force 16 March 
1983, 18 International	Legal	Materials (1979) 1442, <http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/>.
84 ‘Acid rain’, per the United States Environment Protection Agency, is ‘a broad term referring to a mixture 
of wet and dry deposition (deposited material) from the atmosphere containing higher than normal 
amounts of nitric and sulfuric acids’, and which can affect both animals and plants when deposited. See 
<http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/what/> (visited 26 August 2011). 
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marine water chemistry, with increased acidity and lower pH reducing the oceans’ 
capacity to absorb carbon.85 
The Convention is a regional convention, but now has 51 parties86 including Cana-
da and the United States, the entire European Community and the Russian 
Federation,87 and therefore spans the entire northern half of the globe.
The usefulness of the general exhortation which provides that ‘[t]he Contracting 
Parties, taking due account of the facts and problems involved, are determined to 
protect man and his environment against air pollution and shall endeavour to limit 
and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution including long-
range transboundary pollution’,88 is obviously limited by the vague nature of the 
word ‘endeavour’ which follows the directive word ‘shall’.
However, there are a number of provisions in the Convention which might be useful, 
such as that ‘[t]he Contracting Parties … shall … develop without undue delay 
policies and strategies which shall serve as a means of combating the discharge of air 
pollutants …’;89 and that ‘… each Contracting Party undertakes to develop the best 
policies and strategies including air quality management systems …’.90
In pursuance of its mandate, the Convention’s Parties have adopted eight protocols. 
The most recent of these, the 1999 Gothenburg protocol,91 was signed by 31 Parties, 
of which 26 have ratified, and entered into force on 17 may 2005.92 The aim of the 
Protocol is to cut emissions of four pollutants (ammonia, nitrogen oxides, sulphur 
dioxide, and volatile organic compounds) by means of setting country-by-country 
emission ceilings which were intended to be achieved by the year 2010.93 Different 
requirements are imposed for different countries, assigned according to cost-effec-
tiveness, with the object being to achieve the environmental targets at the lowest 
overall cost for Europe as a whole.94 The Protocol is likely to be revised again. The 
importance of this lies in the fact that it shows that it is possible for states to adapt 
85 Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, ‘News Release: Acid Rain Has a Disproportionate Impact on 
Coastal Waters’, 7 September 2007, available at <http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=7545&tid=282&ci
d=31286&ct=162> (visited 27 August 2011).
86 Including, somewhat bizarrely, the Holy See as a signatory Party.
87 See ‘Status of ratification as of 1 March 2011’, available at <http://live.unece.org/env/lrtap/status/lrtap_
st.html> (visited 27 August 2011).
88 Art. 2 (‘Fundamental Principles’).
89 Art. 3 (‘Fundamental Principles’).
90 Art. 6 (‘Air Quality Management’).
91 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, 
Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone, Gothenburg, 30 November 1999, into force 17 May 2005, avail-
able at <http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1999%20Multi.E.Amended.2005.
pdf> (visited 29 August 2011).
92 See ‘Status of ratification’, available at <http://live.unece.org/env/lrtap/status/99multi_st.html> (visited 
27 August 2011).
93 UNECE, ‘The 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level 
Ozone’, available at <http://live.unece.org/env/lrtap/multi_h1.html> (visited 27 August 2011).
94 Ibid.
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to a new challenge, climate change, within the context of a convention which was 
not created initially for that purpose. 
4.3.3 Convention on Migratory Species, 1979
The Convention on Migratory Species (CMS)95 categorizes species of wild animals 
in much the same way the Convention on Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES),96 1973, does – but takes a different approach to the latter conven-
tion, as the CMS relies on voluntary subscription to its ‘obligations’ by way of Agree-
ments between Parties. CITES is prescriptive in creating categories of species which 
are then the subjects of strict prohibitions or restrictions on trade – the CMS is far 
more encouraging of states to act of their own initiative. This difference in approach 
is inevitable as CITES has only extremely limited jurisdiction within national terri-
tories, while the CMS attempts to encourage states to take steps within their borders.
The Preamble records that the Parties are:
CONCERNED particularly with those species of wild animals that migrate 
across or outside national jurisdictional boundaries; RECOGNIZ[E] that the 
States are and must be the protectors of the migratory species of wild animals 
that live within or pass through their national jurisdictional boundaries; [and are] 
CONVINCED that conservation and effective management of migratory species 
of wild animals require the concerted action of all States within the national 
jurisdictional boundaries of which such species spend any part of their life cycle; 
…
The migratory requirements of marine species are understood far less well than are 
those of terrestrial species, and it is important that whatever can be done to prevent 
disruption to migratory cycles be done. Much of what needs to be done will require 
actions to be taken within national jurisdictions, rather than in areas of open access.
The major obligation97 in the text is that Parties, acknowledging the importance of 
conserving migratory species ‘and of Range States agreeing to take action to this end 
whenever possible and appropriate’, agree to ‘paying special attention to migratory 
species the conservation status of which is unfavourable’, and agree to ‘taking indi-
vidually or in co-operation appropriate and necessary steps to conserve such species 
and their habitat’.98 
95 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 
November 1983, 19 International	 Legal	Materials (1980) 15, <http://www.cms.int>. Further on the 
Convention, see Aline Kühl and Elizabeth Maruma Mrema, ‘Impacts of Climate Change on Biodiversity, 
with a Focus on Migratory Species’, in the present Review.
96 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>.
97 Art. II (‘Fundamental Principles’).
98 Art. II.1.
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Climate change is not specifically mentioned in the text. However, there are a number 
of places where the obligations the Parties have taken on, even where exhortatory 
rather than mandatory, will require that the effects of climate change be considered. 
In this regard, for instance, the Parties ‘acknowledge the need to take action to avoid 
any migratory species becoming endangered’;99 and, ‘in particular’, ‘should promote, 
co-operate in and support research relating to migratory species’.100 Where such re-
search indicates migratory species to be endangered, these species ought to be listed;101 
and steps to conserve those species and, importantly, the habitats in which they live 
should be taken.102
4.3.4 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural 
Habitats, 1979
The Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats,103 
known as the Bern Convention, is intended to ensure cooperation between Euro-
pean states with the objective of ensuring conservation of wildlife in Europe. The 
Convention provides104 that ‘[e]ach Contracting Party shall take steps to promote 
national policies for the conservation of wild flora, wild fauna and natural habitats, 
with particular attention to endangered and vulnerable species, especially endemic 
ones, and endangered habitats’, and that ‘[e]ach Contracting Party undertakes, in its 
planning and development policies and in its measures against pollution, to have 
regard to the conservation of wild flora and Fauna’.105 Taking measures against pol-
lution, therefore, would require consideration of the effects of such pollution on the 
environment – including the marine environment.
Further, there is an obligation on each Party to ‘take appropriate and necessary leg-
islative and administrative measures to ensure the conservation of the habitats of the 
wild flora and fauna species, … and the conservation of endangered natural habi-
tats’.106 The Convention is of relevance to marine environments, taking (as it does) 
particular note of marine turtles, island biodiversity and migratory species issues. 
Recent measures adopted, in respect of climate change and marine environments, 
under the Convention are discussed later in this paper.107
99 Art. II.2.
100 Art. II.3(a).
101 Art. III (‘Endangered Migratory Species: Appendix I’). 
102 Arts III.4 and III.5.
103 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Bern, 19 September 1979, 
into force 1 June 1982, <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=104&C
M=1&DF=29/08/2011&CL=ENG> (visited 29 August 2011).
104 Art. 3.
105 Ibid.
106 Art. 4.
107 See infra under Part 5: Conclusion; and specifically at footnote 190. 
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4.3.5 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982
One of the most ambitious of all international Conventions, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)108 contains, unfortunately, no actual 
requirement to protect the high seas – although such a requirement might arguably 
be read into the Convention if many of its Articles are not to become nugatory.
Nevertheless, there are a number of obligations to be found in the Convention which 
might be used to combat activities with negative climate change-related implications 
for the marine environment, including the high seas. For instance, Art. 145 is head-
ed ‘Protection of the marine environment’ and states that ‘[n]ecessary measures shall 
be taken in accordance with this Convention with respect to activities in the Area to 
ensure effective protection for the marine environment from harmful effects which 
may arise from such activities’.109 The word ‘Area’ can be taken to indicate the high 
seas. 
Further, Art. 212, headed ‘Pollution from or through the atmosphere’, provides that 
‘[s]tates shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of 
the marine environment from or through the atmosphere, applicable to the air space 
under their sovereignty and to vessels flying their flag or vessels or aircraft of their 
registry, …’.110 While the tenor of this Article could be taken to imply that it envis-
ages pollution of the atmosphere from airplanes and seagoing vessels, pollution enter-
ing the atmosphere from land-based sources can clearly not be excluded.
4.3.6 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UNCLOS 
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995
This Agreement111 falls under the UNCLOS and represents an effort to manage and 
protect fish species of a particular nature. The Preamble records that the Parties are: 
[d]etermined to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks’ and are ‘[c]onscious of the need to avoid 
adverse impacts on the marine environment, preserve biodiversity, [and] maintain 
the integrity of marine ecosystems’.
Specific obligations in the text of the Agreement include that ‘[i]n order to conserve 
and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, coastal [s]tates 
108 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in 
force 16 November 1994, 21 International	Legal	Materials (1982) 1261.
109 Art. 145 (‘Protection of the marine environment’).
110 Art. 212 (‘Pollution from or through the atmosphere’). Article 222 provides for enforcement of Art. 212.
111 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 4 August 1995, in force 11 December 2001, 34 International	Legal	
Materials (1995) 1542, <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/fish_stocks_agree-
ment/CONF164_37.htm> (visited 2 February 2009).
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and [s]tates fishing on the high seas shall …112 apply the precautionary approach’;113 
‘assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental factors on 
target stocks and species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or de-
pendent upon the target stocks’;114 ‘protect biodiversity in the marine environment’;115 
and ‘promote and conduct scientific research and develop appropriate technologies 
in support of fishery conservation and management’.116 All of these selected obliga-
tions have direct and obvious relevance for preventing or managing negative climate 
change-related impacts on fisheries. A further obligation of relevance is that ‘[s]tates 
shall cooperate, either directly or through competent international organizations, to 
strengthen scientific research capacity in the field of fisheries and promote scientific 
research related to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks for the benefit of all’.117 
It is worth noting also the obligation118 that ‘[s]tates shall apply the precautionary 
approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine re-
sources and preserve the marine environment’;119 and that, 
in implementing the precautionary approach, [s]tates shall: … take into account, 
inter alia, uncertainties relating to the size and productivity of the stocks, refer-
ence points, stock condition in relation to such reference points, levels and dis-
tribution of fishing mortality and the impact of fishing activities on non-target 
and associated or dependent species, as well as existing and predicted oceanic, 
environmental and socio-economic conditions; …120
It is the final words here (‘existing and predicted oceanic, environmental and socio-
economic conditions’) which are relevant to the present discussion.
112 Art. 5 (‘General principles’).
113 Art. 5(c). The precautionary approach is to be applied in accordance with Article 6.
114 Art. 5(d).
115 Art. 5(g).
116 Art. 5(k).
117 Art. 14(3).
118 In Art. 6 (‘Application of the precautionary approach’).
119 Art. 6(1).
120 Art. 6(2)(c).
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4.3.7 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, 1991
This regional Convention121 currently has 45 Parties, including the European Un-
ion.122 Although regional, it is a globally influential Convention – and its application 
has arguably led, as noted on its website, to disputes between its Parties being ‘rare’.123 
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
often known as the ‘Espoo Convention’, provides124 that its Parties ‘shall, either in-
dividually or jointly, take all appropriate and effective measures to prevent, reduce 
and control significant adverse transboundary environmental impact from proposed 
activities’.125 The Convention then further provides that ‘[t]he Party of origin shall 
ensure that in accordance with the provisions of this Convention an environmental 
impact assessment is undertaken prior to a decision to authorize or undertake a 
proposed activity [] that is likely to cause a significant transboundary impact’.126 As 
many, if not most, anthropogenically induced climate change-related impacts on the 
marine environment will have a transboundary aspect to them, these obligations – 
albeit general in nature – are of obvious importance.
4.3.8 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991
The Antarctic Treaty, 1959,127 was not originally an ‘environmental’ Convention, at 
least in the modern sense, representing rather a political compromise in the face of 
competing territorial and access claims128 – however, it can also be seen as being 
‘inherently environmentally protective’ in its promotion of scientific investigation;129 
and in its prohibition of nuclear explosions and disposal of radioactive waste.130 
Obviously, so sensitive an environment as the Antarctic131 was worthy of greater 
protection than such indirect cover – and this was provided in 1991 with the Proto-
col on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.132 
121 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25 February 
1991, in force 10 September 1997, 30 International	Legal	Materials (1991) 802.
122 UNECE, ‘Parties to Espoo Convention take stock of 20 years of transboundary environmental impact 
assessment in UNECE region’, available at <http://www.unece.org/press/pr2011/11env_p24e.htm> (vis-
ited 27 August 2011).
123 Ibid.
124 Art. 2 (‘General Provisions’).
125 Art. 2(1).
126 Art. 2(3).
127 Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1 December 1959, in force 23 June 1961, 19 International	Legal	Materials 
(1980) 860.
128 This compromise is reflected in Art. IV, which is protective of territorial and other access claims.
129 Art. II.
130 Art. V.
131 For a discussion of the Antarctic environment, see Ewan McIvor, ‘Looking South: Antarctic Environmen-
tal Governance’ in Ed Couzens and Tuula Honkonen (eds), International	Environmental	Law-making	and	
Diplomacy	Review	2008, University of Joensuu–UNEP Course Series 8 (University of Joensuu, 2009) 
139–152.
132 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Madrid, 4 October 1991, in force 14 
January 1998, 30 International	Legal	Materials (1991) 1461.
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Generally, the Parties to the Protocol ‘commit themselves to the comprehensive 
protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosys-
tems’.133 It is then provided134 that ‘[t]he protection of the Antarctic environment 
and dependent and associated ecosystems … shall be fundamental considerations in 
the planning and conduct of all activities in the Antarctic Treaty area’.135 In order to 
achieve this end136 it is provided that ‘activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be 
planned and conducted so as to avoid’137 ‘adverse effects on climate or weather 
patterns’;138 ‘significant adverse effects on air or water quality’;139 and ‘significant 
changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic), glacial or marine environ-
ments’.140 All of these obligations are important, all concern environmental changes, 
and all provide useful arguments in favour of mitigating against dangerous anthro-
pogenic climate change.
A further set of obligations of relevance to the present discussion can be found in the 
Article dealing with impact assessment,141 which provides that: 
[e]ach Contracting Party, as far as possible and as appropriate, shall142 [i]ntroduce 
appropriate measures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed 
projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects of biological diversity 
with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, allow 
for public participation in such procedures;143
and shall ‘[i]ntroduce appropriate arrangements to ensure that the environmental 
consequences of its programmes and policies that are likely to have significant adverse 
impacts on biological diversity are duly taken into account’.144
Finally, of relevance is an obligation145 resting on the Contracting Parties to (the word 
used is the obligatory ‘shall’) implement the Convention ‘with respect to the marine 
environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under the law of 
the sea’.146
133 Art. 2 (‘Objective and Designation’).
134 Art. 3 (‘Environmental Principles’).
135 Art. 3(1).
136 Art. 3(2).
137 Art. 3(2)(b).
138 Art. 3(2)(b)(i).
139 Art. 3(2)(b)(ii).
140 Art. 3(2)(b)(iii).
141 Art. 14 (‘Impact Assessment and Minimizing Adverse Impacts’).
142 Art. 14(1).
143 Art. 14(1)(a).
144 Art. 14(1)(b).
145 In Art. 22 (‘Relationship with Other International Conventions’).
146 Art. 22(2).
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4.3.9 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992
The Convention on Biological Diversity represents an ambitious, and arguably far-
sighted, attempt to shift the approach taken in most multilateral environmental 
treaties away from a species- or issue-oriented focus to a holistic consideration of 
ecosystems and habitats. Twenty years after it came into existence, however, it must 
be said that it has not yet been embraced wholeheartedly enough to be seen as having 
achieved its aim. 
The Preamble is worth considering, in that the Parties express themselves as being: 
[c]onscious of the intrinsic value of biological diversity and of the ecological, 
genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aes-
thetic values of biological diversity and its components, … Conscious also of the 
importance of biological diversity for evolution and for maintaining life sustain-
ing systems of the biosphere, … Concerned that biological diversity is being 
significantly reduced by certain human activities, … Noting also that where there 
is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full sci-
entific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid 
or minimize such a threat, … Determined to conserve and sustainable use bio-
logical diversity for the benefit of present and future generations, …147 
Many of the themes present here have relevance for efforts to prevent dangerous 
climate change-related impacts on the marine environment, the biological relation-
ships within which are very poorly understood. Although not itself providing direct 
obligations, the Preamble is relevant as a guide to interpretation of the binding ob-
ligations within the main text of the Convention.
It is worth pointing out that Principle 21148 of the Stockholm Declaration makes 
another appearance149 in the Convention on Biological Diversity. The continued 
repetition in important conventions of the dualistic principle that states have the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
and developmental policies, but at the same time bear a responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to other states’ 
environments or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, brings the prin-
ciple ever closer to firm general acceptance. As time goes by, international environ-
mental law develops, and the importance of environmental protection becomes more 
widely accepted, it may be hoped that the aspect of protection of areas beyond na-
tional jurisdiction will become more pronounced. This will doubtless be to the ben-
efit of marine environment protection.
147 Preamble.
148 See supra under Parts 4.2.1 and 4.2.3.
149 Art. 3 (‘Principle’).
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Finally in respect of the Convention on Biological Diversity, it is worth noting that 
the jurisdictional scope of the Convention is such that its provisions are to apply150 
‘[i]n the case of components of biological diversity, in areas within the limits of its 
national jurisdiction’;151 and, ‘[i]n the case of processes and activities, regardless of 
where their effects occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area 
of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.152 
4.3.10 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change does not contain 
any provisions which specifically provide for protection of the marine environment. 
However, there is an important indirect reference to the need for this in the Pream-
ble, where the Parties express themselves as being ‘[a]ware of the role and importance 
in terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases’.153 
In the Convention, ‘sink’ is defined as meaning ‘any process or activity which re-
moves a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the 
atmosphere’;154 and ‘reservoir’ as meaning ‘a component or components of the cli-
mate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored’.155
 
The Convention then provides that: 
[a]ll Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances, shall156 … [p]romote sustainable management, and promote and 
cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and 
reservoirs of all greenhouse gases157 … including biomass, forests and oceans as 
well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems; ….158 
There are many reasons why the marine environment is worthy of protection, to 
prevent or repair damage through the effect of climate change, but it is important 
also to note this one – that healthy oceans have significant potential to act as carbon 
reservoirs and sinks.
150 ‘Subject to the rights of other [s]tates, and except as otherwise expressly provided for in this Convention 
… in relation to each Contracting Party’. Article 4 (‘Jurisdictional Scope’).
151 Art. 4(a).
152 Art. 4(b).
153 Preamble.
154 Art. 1 (‘Definitions’).
155 Ibid.
156 Art. 4 (‘Commitments’).
157 Where these gases are ‘not controlled by the Montreal Protocol’.
158 Art. 4(d).
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4.4 Regional instruments
Increasingly, states are turning from the difficulties of negotiating global scale con-
ventions toward the creation of regional instruments which mirror many aspects and 
techniques in their larger cousins; but which contain significant advantages such as 
greater levels of expertise, increased levels of interest, and the flexibility of smaller 
size. 
The effects of climate change on marine environments need to be addressed both 
globally and regionally if mitigation efforts are to be successful. 
While a number of regional conventions have already been discussed, such as the 
Espoo Convention159 and the LRTAP Convention,160 these were regional conven-
tions with potential global scope. There are also international legal instruments which 
are specifically regional in scope.
4.4.1 Regional Agreement on Climate Change (Central America), 1993
The Regional Agreement on Climate Change161 was entered into in 1993 by Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. It provides that its 
Parties ‘must protect the climate system to benefit present and future generations on 
the basis of equity and in conformity with their responsibilities and their capacities 
to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable the economic devel-
opment of the States to continue’.162 
4.4.2 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin, 1995
This regional convention, the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin,163 was entered into by Cambodia, Laos, 
Thailand, and Vietnam – and China and Burma have since become ‘partners’. The 
Agreement provides that one of its objectives is ‘[t]o protect the environment, natu-
ral resources, aquatic life and conditions, and ecological balance of the Mekong 
River Basin from pollution or other harmful effects resulting from any development 
plans and uses of water and related resources in the Basin’.164
The Mekong River empties into the South China Sea, and the further obligation165 
‘[t]o make every effort to avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful effects that might 
159 Supra Part 4.3.6.
160 Supra Part 4.3.2.
161 Regional Agreement on Climate Change, Guatemala City, 29 October 1993.
162 Art. 1 (‘Objective’).
163 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, Chiang Rai, 
5 April 1995, into force 5 April 1995, <http://www.mrcmekong.org>.
164 Chapter III (‘Objectives and Principles of Cooperation’). Article 3 (‘Protection of the environment and 
ecological balance’).
165 Art. 7 (‘Prevention and cessation of harmful effects’). 
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occur to the environment, especially the water quantity and quality, the aquatic 
(ecosystem) conditions, and ecological balance of the river system’ could well be used, 
given political will, to combat actual or potential effects on the marine environment 
from climate change.
4.4.3 Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles, 1996
The objective of the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation 
of Sea Turtles166 is to ‘promote the protection, conservation and recovery of sea turtle 
populations and of the habitats on which they depend, based on the best available 
scientific evidence, taking into account the environmental, socioeconomic and cul-
tural characteristics of the Parties’.167 In order to achieve this objective, each Party is 
required168 (the imperative word ‘shall’ being used) to ‘take appropriate and necessary 
measures, in accordance with international law and on the basis of the best available 
scientific evidence, for the protection, conservation and recovery of sea turtle popu-
lations and their habitats’.169 Such measures are required to include,170 ‘[t]o the extent 
practicable, the restriction of human activities that could seriously affect sea turtles, 
especially during the periods of reproduction, nesting and migration’.171 To afford 
this required level of protection without taking into account the potential effects of 
climate change on marine environments would be nonsensical.
The Convention currently has 15 Parties.172 The Convention provides an interesting 
example of how a regional convention might be used to achieve an object which 
would be more difficult to achieve through a global convention. The United States 
has not ratified the UNCLOS, but has ratified the Inter-American Convention for 
the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles – in which latter convention the Par-
ties ‘[r]ecogniz[e] the rights and duties of [s]tates established in international law, as 
reflected in the [UNCLOS], relating to the conservation and management of living 
marine resources’.173
4.4.4 Conclusion
These three examples of regional conventions provide examples of how states might 
be more willing to risk yielding sovereignty, in respect of climate change-related in-
ternational legal instruments, in the regional rather than the global context. States 
arguably feel that they have both more control and more direct interest in a regional 
context. 
166 Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, Caracas, 1 December 
1996, into force 2 May 2001, <http://www.iacseaturtle.org/>.
167 Art. II (‘Objective’).
168 Art. IV (‘Measures’).
169 Art. IV.1.
170 Art. IV.2.
171 Art. IV.2(c).
172 See ‘About the Convention’, <http://www.iacseaturtle.org/English/home.asp> (visited 28 August 2011).
173 Preamble.
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For the international environmental lawyer or diplomat wishing to see greater protec-
tion provided to the marine environment, in the climate change context, it might 
well be worth pursuing initiatives at regional rather than global levels.
5  Conclusion
The world faces unprecedented environmental challenges at the beginning of the 21st 
Century, with it becoming ever more apparent that the major cross-cutting issue is 
how to deal with the impacts of global-scale climate change. International environ-
mental law provides one of the most important instruments we have for responding 
appropriately to the challenges posed by climate change – and international legal 
instruments relating to the marine environment need to be at the core of these re-
sponses. The marine environment is not something that can be separated from ter-
restrial, or any other, environments – all are linked.
Unfortunately, there is currently no dedicated international environmental legal 
instrument dealing specifically with the marine environment and climate change. 
Given that the opportunities which have arisen to include protection of the marine 
environment in other global climate change-related Conventions have not been 
taken, it seems unlikely that the world can expect such a specific instrument to be 
put in place soon.
Nevertheless, protection of the marine environment is needed urgently – and the 
argument which this paper has tried to make is that there are already sufficient pro-
visions within extant multilateral environmental agreements, some of these provi-
sions being ‘soft’ in nature and others being arguably ‘harder’, for protective actions 
to be considered to be authorized. In other words, duties exist which ought to com-
pel states bound by them to afford the marine environment greater protection than 
is presently offered; and opportunities exist for states to compel others to take great-
er protective measures, where states feel that others are not complying sufficiently 
with their duties. 
Some guidance for how the health of coastal and marine ecosystems might be pro-
moted and improved, through integrated management, conservation and sustainable 
use of coastal and marine resources and ecosystems,174 is provided by the UNEP 
Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law for the 
First Decade of the Twenty-First Century (the ‘Montevideo Programme III’)175 of 
174 Art. 11 (‘Coastal and marine ecosystems’).
175 UNEP Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law for the First Decade 
of the Twenty-First Century, available at <http://www.unep.org/dec/docs/Development%20and%20Pe-
riodic%20Review%20of%20Environmental%20Law.pdf> and UNEP, ‘Montevideo Programme’, avail-
able at <http://www.unep.org/law/About_prog/montevideo_prog.asp> (both visited 28 August 2011). 
The Programme builds on the Montevideo I, 1982, and Montevideo II, 1993, programmes. 
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2001. This long-term guidance strategy is intended to ‘[p]romote the effective im-
plementation of international instruments and domestic laws and policies for the 
integrated management, conservation and sustainable use of coastal and marine re-
sources and ecosystems’.176
Specific recommended actions include the promotion of ‘respect for and effective 
implementation of the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Land-based Activities,177 the Straddling Stocks Agreement,178 and 
other international instruments relating to protection and sustainable use of coastal 
and marine resources and ecosystems.179 Further recommended actions include as-
sisting ‘governments and relevant international bodies in the implementation and 
further development of regional seas conventions, protocols and related action 
plans’;180 ‘[c]ollaborat[ing] with relevant international bodies on legal issues relating 
to the enhancement of the conservation and sustainable management of marine re-
sources, including fisheries’;181 ‘[s]tudy[ing] and, as appropriate, promot[ing] land 
use planning and the creation of marine protected areas for the integrated manage-
ment, conservation and sustainable use of coastal ecosystems’;182 ‘[e]xplor[ing] the 
means in law and practice, including through regional seas conventions, for improv-
ing the protection of coral reefs, wetlands, mangroves and other coastal and marine 
ecosystems’;183 and ‘[c]ollaborat[ing] with relevant international bodies in further 
integrating environmental considerations into rules relating to navigational safety’.184
Clearly, this list of recommendations for enhancing international environmental law 
would, if followed by states wishing to protect the marine environment, provide at 
least a basic blueprint for making effectual the aspirations of the legal instruments 
cited in the present paper. One of seven new ‘elements’ identified in 2007 as being 
‘challenges’ which need to be met under environmental law is, indeed, climate 
change.185 The recommendations are sensible, and could be used as a basic guide for 
taking action.
Ultimately, a multi-disciplinary and multi-medium approach is going to be needed 
if the marine environment is to be saved. As Agenda 21 puts it, a ‘precautionary and 
anticipatory rather than a reactive approach is necessary to prevent the degradation 
of the marine environment’ and this approach will require:
176 Art. 11 (‘Coastal and marine ecosystems’).
177 See <http://www.gpa.unep.org/>.
178 See supra Part 4.3.6.
179 11(a). A number of such instruments have been canvassed in the present paper.
180 11(b).
181 11(c).
182 11(d).
183 11(e).
184 11(f ).
185 See UNEP, ‘Montevideo Programme’, supra note 175. The other six elements are: poverty; access to drink-
ing water and sanitation; ecosystem protection; environmental emergencies and natural disasters; new 
technologies; and synergies among multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).
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inter alia, the adoption of precautionary measures, environmental impact assess-
ments, clean production techniques, recycling, waste audits and minimization, 
construction and/or improvement of sewage treatment facilities, quality manage-
ment criteria for the proper handling of hazardous substances, and a comprehen-
sive approach to damaging impacts from air, land and water ... Any management 
framework must include the improvement of coastal human settlements and the 
integrated management and development of coastal areas.186
An appropriate place and role in such a multi-disciplinary approach needs to be 
found for international environmental agreements. 
Of course, the world does not stand still while authors of papers speculate on what 
actions might be taken, and it is possible to find examples of recent actions taken 
under specific conventions to integrate climate change concerns into the work done 
under such conventions. At its 26th meeting in November 2009, for instance, the 
Standing Committee of the Bern Convention187 set up a Group of Experts on Bio-
diversity and Climate Change to ‘exchange information and review the effects of 
climate change in the biological diversity covered by the Convention, and to provide 
guidance to Parties in developing adaptation and management policies’.188 The aim 
of the Group is to ‘present to the Standing Committee specific proposals, guidance 
and/or Recommendations to help Parties address the challenges of climate change in 
the implementation of the Convention and its objectives’.189 To date, there have been 
seven recommendations190 made to Parties which have concerned climate change – 
some of these even preceding the formation of the Group of Experts.191
As an example, according to Recommendation 135 (2008), Contracting Parties to 
the Convention and Observer States are, respectively, recommended and invited to 
‘increase efforts to improve understanding of the linkages between biodiversity and 
climate change’; ‘make full use of the large potential for synergies and co-benefits 
between biodiversity conservation and climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
including ecosystem-based approaches’; ‘ensure that biodiversity considerations, in-
186 See supra Part 4.2.3, Agenda 21, ‘Programme Areas’, ‘Integrated Management and Sustainable Develop-
ment of Coastal and Marine Areas, Including Exclusive Economic Zones’, ‘Activities’, 17.21.
187 See supra Part 4.3.4.
188 See Council of Europe, ‘Bern Convention: Group of Experts on Biodiversity and Climate change’, avail-
able at <http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/nature/bern/climatechange/default_EN.asp> (visited 
28 August 2011).
189 Ibid.
190 These being: Recommendation 122 (2006) on the ‘conservation of biological diversity in the context of 
climate change’; Recommendation 135 (2008) on ‘addressing the impacts of climate change on biodiver-
sity’; Recommendation 142 (2009) on ‘interpreting the CBD definition of invasive alien species to take 
into account climate change’; Recommendation 143 (2009) on ‘further guidance for Parties on biodiver-
sity and climate change’; Recommendation 145 (2010) on ‘guidance for Parties on biodiversity and cli-
mate change in mountain regions’; Recommendation 146 (2010) on ‘guidance for Parties on biodiver-
sity and climate change in European islands’; and Recommendation 147 (2010) on ‘guidance for Parties 
on wildland fires, biodiversity and climate change’.
191 See supra note 188.
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cluding potential negative impacts, are taken fully into account in climate change 
adaptation and mitigation policies and measures’; ‘develop climate change adaptation 
activities for biodiversity’; and ‘continue to engage in the development and applica-
tion of further guidance to implement the Convention’.192
As a further example of recent work undertaken in bringing climate change concerns 
into the work of a body concerned with the protection of the marine environment, 
in May 2010 the 33rd Meeting of the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty193 endorsed a 
set of proposed measures to be forwarded to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change194 for that body to make use of in its global negotiations.195 
A further example of increasing integration of climate change concerns into main-
stream thinking, and of increasing connections with general environmental legal 
instruments, can be seen in that, at its 65th session in September 2010, the United 
Nations General Assembly convened as a high-level meeting and discussed the im-
portance of biodiversity, its role in sustainable development and its role in the fight 
against climate change, as a contribution to 2010’s being the ‘International Year of 
Biodiversity’.196 
An important step toward combining protection of biodiversity, including the ma-
rine environment, with efforts to address climate change has been taken in the crea-
tion of the Intergovernmental Science-policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosys-
tem Services (IPBES).197 According to the IPBES website, the initiative is intended 
to be ‘an interface between the scientific community and policy makers that aims to 
build capacity for and strengthen the use of science in policy making’; and it has been 
created in recognition of the lack of an ‘ongoing global mechanism recognized by 
both the scientific and policy communities that brings information together and 
synthesizes and analyses it for decision making in a range of policy fora such as the 
global environmental conventions and development policy dialogues’.198 It is in-
tended that IPBES will be ‘the mechanism that addresses the gaps in the science 
policy interface on biodiversity and ecosystem services’.199 According to the United 
192 Council of Europe, Recommendation No. 135 (2008) of the Standing Committee, adopted on 27 No-
vember 2008, on addressing the impacts of climate change on biodiversity, available at <https://wcd.coe.
int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Rec(2008)135&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=DG4-Nature&B
ackColorInternet=a3b811&BackColorIntranet=a3b811&BackColorLogged=EDF4B3> (visited 28 Au-
gust 2011).
193 See supra note 127.
194 See supra Part 4.3.10. 
195 See ‘Antarctic Treaty Governments Progress on Climate Change and Marine Protected Areas’ (15 May 
2010), available at <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/05/15/antarctic-treaty-governments-progress-on-
climate-change-and-marine-protected> (visited 28 August 2011).
196 See ‘High-level meeting of the General Assembly as a contribution to the International Year of Biodiver-
sity (22 September 2010)’, available at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/65/meetings/biodiversity.shtml> (vis-
ited 28 August 2011).
197 See ‘About IPBES’, available at <http://ipbes.net/about-ipbes.html> (visited 8 October 2011). 
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
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Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),200 a meeting of government representa-
tives in Nairobi in October 2009 had given ‘strong support’ for the idea that ‘an 
intergovernmental panel, similar to the one that has catalyzed political action on the 
issue of climate change,201 is now needed to galvanize a step change in respect to the 
management of biodiversity and ecosystems’.202 It remains to be seen how similar 
IPBES will be to the IPPC, and what linkages – formal or informal – there are be-
tween the two.203
 
This paper sought to give a brief overview of problems facing the marine environ-
ment; then to scan various possible obligations, both general and specific in nature, 
to be found in both global and regional legal instruments, which might be used in 
international legal efforts to enhance protection of the marine environment. Ulti-
mately, there seems no realistic prospect of the world gaining a dedicated global 
treaty protective of the marine environment in the near future. Given this, the effort 
was made – instead – to explain what legal obligations are extant in existing instru-
ments; and to make the argument that these might be used toward increased marine 
environment protection.
200 See <http://www.unep.org>. 
201 This being the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC), established by the World Meteoro-
logical Organization (WMO) and UNEP; see <http://www.ipcc.ch/>.
202 UNEP, ‘Support for New Panel for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Gathers Momentum’, 9 October 
2009, available at <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=599&Art
icleID=6340&l=en> (visited 8 October 2011). 
203 The first session of the IPBES plenary took place from 3 to 7 October 2011, in Nairobi. While appar-
ently successful in terms of the parties (apparently, there were 366 delegates present, with these represent-
ing 112 countries, two observers, five Intergovernmental organizations, 33 non-governmental organiza-
tions, three conventions and ten UN bodies and specialized agencies) and reaching agreement on many 
procedural issues, many matters were not decided. One aspect which vexed the parties in particular was 
the question of whether the IPBES platform has already been formally established by the UN General 
Assembly or not. The question was not decided and has been left open for the second plenary session. 
Further, there is currently uncertainty over the extent to which the UN Development Programme (UNDP 
– see <http://www.undp.org>), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO 
– see <http://www.unesco.org>), UNEP, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO – see 
<http://www.fao.org>), will each be involved in co-hosting and administering the platform. See, gener-
ally, IISD Reporting Services ‘First Session of the Plenary Meeting on the Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)’ available at <http://www.iisd.ca/ipbes/
sop1/> (visited 14 October 2011).
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ForeStS’ contriBution to SuStainaBle 
development and the role oF 
redd+ aS a catalYSt For a green 
economY tranSFormation
Niklas	Hagelberg 1
1 Introduction
The contribution of forests to development – ranging through construction mate-
rial, food, culture and energy – is undeniable, but has often been side-lined in devel-
opment decision-making. On the other hand, human economic development con-
tinues to have impacts upon the quality and extent of forest cover, both positively 
and negatively. Human expansion has partly caused the extensive decline in forests, 
which today remains at almost half of their original cover 8 000 years ago.2 Addi-
tionally, most remaining forests are disturbed, possess less biodiversity, and have a 
lower level of ecosystem functioning when compared to natural forest.3
Even though forests today still cover some 31 per cent of the global land area, the 
reduction of forest cover continues –, totalling approximately 13 million hectares4 
per year. Globally, however, forest cover is at the same time regaining by about 5 
million hectares per year. This growth is attributable to secondary forest being regen-
erated through reforestation, mainly in Asia.5
1 M.Sc. Forestry; Programme Officer, Division for Environmental Policy Implementation, UNEP; e-mail: 
niklas.hagelberg@unep.org.
2 World Resource Institute (WRI), The	Last	Frontier	Forests:	Ecosystems	and	Economies	on	the	Edge (WRI, 
1997) 8.
3 Ibid.
4 One hectare being equal to 10 000 square metres; or to 2.471 acres (one acre being equal to 4046.86 
square metres). 
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), State	of	the	World’s	Forests (FAO, 2011), 
available at <http://www.fao.org/forestry/sofo/en/> (visited 10 April 2011) at 3.
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as a Catalyst for a Green Economy Transformation
It appears that the decline in forest cover and quality contributes up to 17 per cent 
of annual human induced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.6 Due to this large 
share of GHG emissions, forests have moved upwards on the political agenda. Under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)7 ne-
gotiations, the initiative of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Deg-
radation and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks (REDD+)8 has gained support 
amongst many countries.9
It is estimated that the value of the ecosystem services10 and goods lost annually due 
to deforestation and forest degradation is in the range of US$ 3.7 trillion11 – almost 
10 times the estimated value of the trade in forest products at US$ 468 billion.12 
Moreover, many people are heavily dependent on forests for their livelihoods. Around 
350 million people live in or around forests, and some 1.6 billion people across the 
world depend to some extent on forests for their livelihoods.13
These numbers alone demonstrate the important contribution of forests to our econ-
omies. They also portray the gaps between current management of forests, and the 
magnitude of change needed to maintain the contributions by forests to sustainable 
development and to realize the potential contributions to a green economy. How-
ever, the concept of REDD+ holds great promise for transforming the ways in which 
forests are managed; and for increasing market income from forests while substan-
tially decreasing forest decline.14
This paper considers the ways forests may contribute to sustainable development; 
and the role which REDD+ might play in helping such contributions to be realized.
6 IPCC, Fourth	Assessment	Report,	Climate	Change	2007.	Synthesis	Report:	Summary	for	Policymakers (IPCC, 
2007), available at <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf> (visited 10 
April 2011) at 5.
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
8 REDD+ is an acronym used under the UNFCCC which in full stands for ‘reducing emissions from de-
forestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries’.
9 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 16th session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 
December 2010, Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 16th session 
(2010) at 4, 5, and 13–19.
10 On ecosystem services, see Leila Suvantola, ‘Ecosystem Services and Climate Change’, in the present 
Review.
11 UNEP, Annual	Report	 2010 (UNEP, 2011), available at <http://www.unep.org/annualreport/2010/> 
(visited 10 April 2011).
12 UNEP, Towards	a	Green	Economy:	Pathways	to	Sustainable	Development	and	Poverty	Eradication (UNEP, 
2011), available at <http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy> (visited 10 April 2011) at 160–162.
13 World Bank, Forests	Sourcebook	–	Practical	Guidance	 for	Sustaining	Forests	 in	Development	Cooperation 
(World Bank, 2008), available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFORSOUBOOK/Resources/
completeforestsourcebookapril2008.pdf> (visited 10 April 2011) at 1, 3, 15 and 16.
14 The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), The	Economics	of	Ecosystem	Services	and	Biodiver-
sity:	Mainstreaming	the	Economics	of	Nature:	A	Synthesis	of	the	Approach,	Conclusions	and	Recommendations 
of TEEB (TEEB, 2010) at 17. 
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2 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks 
(REDD+)
The importance of including forest carbon in the efforts to combat climate change 
has been recognized by scientists. Estimates for forest carbon stocks range between 
335 and 365 billion tonnes of carbon; and an additional 787 billion tonnes in the 
top one metre layer of soils.15 This is more than all carbon present in the atmos-
phere.16 Additionally, forests have been estimated to sequester an estimated 4.5 Gt 
of carbon annually,17 which is in the range of 14 per cent of the carbon proliferated 
by human activities. 
Whilst reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation was formally 
included in the 13th Conference of Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP13) meeting decisions in 2007, 
the international community had already recognized in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol18 
the importance of forests in combating climate change by including forests as a car-
bon source or sink in national carbon accounting.19
During 2008 and 2009, the Subsidiary Body on Technical Advice contemplated the 
issue of forest carbon, but no new COP decisions were made. In Cancun, at the 
COP16 (2010), further text was approved on REDD+. It focused on developing 
country parties, as a way to ‘find effective ways to reduce the human pressure on 
forests that results in greenhouse gas emissions, including actions to address drivers 
of deforestation’.20 The decision also encouraged developing country parties to con-
tribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking REDD+ activities 
(reference as above).21
The parties comprising the COP16 also recognized the importance of contributing 
to sustainable development, and avoiding adverse social and economic impacts.22 
Specifically, an outcome of COP16 was a request to countries to develop national 
strategies or action plans, forest reference emission levels and/or forest reference 
levels, national monitoring systems and systems for providing information on how 
15 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, ‘Chapter 21: Forests and woodland systems’, in Millennium	Ecosystem	
Assessment:	Ecosystems	and	Well-being:	Current	State	and	Trends (Island Press, 2005), available at <http://
www.maweb.org/documents/document.290.aspx.pdf> (visited 11 April 2011) 585–621 at 604–605.
16 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 16th session, supra note 9.
17 S. L. Lewis et al., ‘Increasing Carbon Storage in Intact African Tropical Forests’, 457 Nature (2009) 
1003–1006.
18 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
19 Vivian Holloway and Esteban Giandomenico, Carbon	Planet	White	Paper	–	The	History	of	REDD	Policy 
(Carbon Planet. 2009), available at <http://www.carbonplanet.com/white_papers> (visited 12 April 2011) 
at 5.
20 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 16th session, supra note 9.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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safeguards, such as transparency, respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous 
peoples and consistency with conservation objectives, are being addressed.23
The 2008 Eliasch	Review estimated the cost of halving deforestation rates, while si-
multaneously implementing related reforms and step-changes in the way forests are 
managed and utilized, at between US$17–33 billion per annum. The net benefits of 
halving deforestation have been estimated at US$3.7 trillion over the long term (net 
present value).24 However, these estimates do not account for the value of other 
ecosystem services such as water. Realizing the opportunity for forest mitigation also 
includes costs from foregone profits that would have been made if business had pro-
ceeded as usual. These include, for example, the reduction in timber trade and agri-
cultural product sales, as well as costs associated with implementing REDD+, such 
as establishing and monitoring carbons stocks and administrative expenses.25
In May 2010, approximately US$4 billion was committed to start REDD+ activities 
and raise the capacity of developing countries to implement and manage REDD+.26 
To support countries in building capacity while designing and implementing REDD+ 
activities, various programmes have been realigned or established. The main multi-
lateral programmes are:
• the Global Environment Facility (GEF5);27
• the Forest Carbon Partnership (FCPF);28
• the Forest Investment Programme (FIP);29 and 
• the UN-REDD Programme.30
In its programme strategy, the UN-REDD Programme has defined work areas which 
align with the COP16 request above. These include:
• monitoring, reporting, verification and monitoring;
• national REDD+ governance;
• engagement of indigenous peoples, local communities and other relevant 
stakeholders;
• ensuring multiple benefits of forests and REDD+;
23 Ibid.
24 Johan Eliasch, Eliasch Review	 –	Climate	Change:	 Financing	Global	 Forests (UK Office of Climate 
Change, 2008), available at <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/other/9780108507632/ 
9780108507632.pdf> (visited 12 April 2011).
25 Ibid.
26 Markku Simula, Financing	Flows	and	Needs	to	Implement	the	Non-legally	Binding	Instrument	on	All	Types	
of	Forests (2008), available at <http://www.un.org/esa/forests/pdf/aheg/finance/AGF_Financing_Study.
pdf> (visited 12 April 2011) at 6, 7 and 44.
27 <http://www.thegef.org>.
28 <http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org>.
29 <http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/forest-investment-program>.
30 <http://www.un-redd.org>.
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• transparent, equitable and accountable management of REDD+ payments; 
and
• REDD+ as a catalyst for transformations to a Green Economy.31
The sixth work area, ‘REDD+ as a catalyst for transformation to a Green economy’, 
explores the shift, or improvement of land and forest resources use, to one that low-
ers carbon emissions. In conjunction, this change should deliver other benefits, such 
as sustainable livelihoods, food security and other economic and ecological bene-
fits.32 The work area recognizes that the UNFCCC COP17 decisions33 emphasized 
‘the importance of contributing to sustainable development’.34 It also respond to the 
Cancun agreement, by supporting countries in instituting a ‘paradigm shift towards 
building a low-carbon society that offers substantial opportunities and ensures con-
tinued high growth and sustainable development, based on innovative technologies 
and more sustainable production and consumption and lifestyles, while ensuring a 
just transition of the workforce that creates decent work and quality jobs’.35
The first directive of the work area is to make the case for the catalytic role of REDD+ 
in a forest-based Green Economy transformation.36 The following section will ex-
plore the elements of this case.
3 Sustainable development and the role of REDD+ in 
realizing the Green Economy contributions of forests
The contribution of the forest industry to the global economy has been well re-
corded, and is estimated at approximately US$468 billion (adding 1 per cent of 
global gross value added). Formal employment in forestry, wood processing, pulp 
and paper, and the furniture industry is estimated at 18 million persons. Forests 
provide substantial employment, especially for the rural poor. The total employment 
estimates, including informal jobs, range from 119 million to 1.42 billion. What is 
not captured in these values is the economic value of services and goods that forests 
provide.37
31 UN-REDD Programme Draft: Support to National REDD+ Action Global Programme Framework 
Document 2011–2015 for the sixth UN-REDD Policy Board meeting, UN Doc. UNREDD/PB6/2011/
IV/2 (2011), available at <http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_
download&gid=4805&Itemid=53> (visited 12 April 2011) at 53 and 55.
32 Ibid.
33 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 16th session, supra note 9.
34 ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Coop-
erative Action under the Convention’, Decision 1/CP.16, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its 16th session, supra note 9, at Part D, preamble.
35 Ibid. at para 10.
36 UN-REDD Programme Draft, supra note 31, at 53 and 55.
37 UNEP, Towards	a	Green	Economy, supra note 12, at 160–162.
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Only in the last decade have the economics of forest ecosystem services, goods and 
biodiversity gained significant traction in political discussion, starting with the eco-
nomic valuation conducted by Costanza and the latest edition of The	Economics	of	
Ecosystems	and	Biodiversity (TEEB) reports. The economic value of forests services 
and goods has been estimated globally by Costanza et al at US$4.7 trillion per 
year,38 while TEEB has estimated the value of ecosystem services and goods lost due 
to deforestation at between US$2.5 and 4.5 trillion.39
The contribution of the value of forest ecosystem services and goods has started to 
be incorporated into national decision-making. For example, many of the largest 
cities in the world manage surrounding forests for the water services they provide. In 
Tokyo, Japan, the Metropolitan Government Bureau of Waterworks manages the 
forests in the upper reaches of the Tama River to increase the capacity of recharging 
water resources, thereby preventing reservoir sedimentation and increasing the water 
purification processing of forests.40
At the national level, Costa Rica provides an example of active government interven-
tion which results in both economic growth and a dramatic increase in forest cover. 
In 1995, the forest cover was down to 22.4 per cent; but by 2010, it had recovered 
to 51 per cent.41 The recovery of the forest cover was a result of targeted interactions. 
In the mid-1990s, Costa Rica put in place a series of policies and incentive mecha-
nisms, such as tax incentives and payment for ecosystem services, for land-owners 
who conserved and increased forests.42
India has recently approved a national mission for a Green India. This initiative 
strives to increase the forest/tree cover on five million hectares of forested and non-
forested land, and improve the quality of forest cover on another five million hec-
tares. Green India focuses on improving the delivery of ecosystem services, including 
biodiversity, carbon sequestration and hydrological services. It also aims at increasing 
forest-based incomes for three million forest-dependent families.43
The two examples above demonstrate that the contributions of forest services and 
goods to our economies and other sectors are both relevant and increasingly acknowl-
edged. Furthermore, the priority which governments are placing on conserving for-
38 R. Costanza, R. d’Arge, R. de groot et al. (1997). ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Na-
tural Capital’, 387 Nature (1997) 253–260 at 253–260.
39 UNEP, Annual	Report	2010, supra note 11.
40 Nigel Dudley and Sue Stolton, ‘The Role of Forest Protected Areas in Supplying Water to the World’s 
Biggest Cities’ in Ted Tryzna (ed.), The	Urban	Imperative (California Institute of Public Affairs, 2005) 
27–33.
41 See FAO, State	of	the	World’s	Forests (FAO, 1997); and FAO, State	of	the	World’s	Forests, supra note 5.
42 UNEP/Grid Arendal, Vital	Forest	Graphics	–	Stopping	the	Downswing? (UNEP, 2008), available at <http://
www.grida.no/files/publications/vital_forest_graphics.pdf> (visited 17 April 2011) at 13 and 56. 
43 Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, National	Mission	for	a	Green	India (2010), 
available at <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/GIM-Report-PMCCC.pdf> (visited 17 
June 2011).
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ests and increasing their area is now recognized as providing potential business op-
portunities, especially in terms of carbon credits.44
The potential role which forests can play in boosting our economies goes even fur-
ther. Forests could play a positive role in economic stabilization efforts, particularly 
through job creation and the rebuilding of a natural capital base. For each annual 
outlay of US$1 million in forest management (including agroforestry), 500 to 1  000 
jobs could be generated in developing countries. In addition, the total targeted pub-
lic investment in forestry could generate about 10 million new jobs around the 
world.45
Small- and middle-sized enterprises are often considered to be an effective way of 
increasing employment. In the forest sector, 80–90 per cent of enterprises are con-
sidered to be of small or medium size. They already provide over 50 per cent of for-
est sector employment in many countries.46 As much of the employment in the 
forest sector is still informal and the illegal trade in forest products is valued at US$15 
billion per year, governments also forego income from royalties and taxes.47 How-
ever, this income source could be reinvested into the forest sector, providing further 
income as well as regularized and valued jobs.
The internal rate of returns on restoration of ecosystem services ranges from 7 to 79 
per cent, providing for a good public and private investment.48 The Loess Plateau in 
China, roughly an area the size of France and home to more than 50 million people, 
is a good example of the socio-economic returns off ecosystem restoration. In a region 
that was poverty stricken, the plateau had been heavily degraded due to unsustain-
able farming practices and over-exploitation of the forest resources. A 10-year resto-
ration investment of more than US$520 million was able to rejuvenate the land, 
resulting in, firstly, a doubling of the income of the people living within the restora-
tion area; and, secondly, the lifting of 2.5 million people out of poverty. The employ-
ment rates increased and employment opportunities for women increased signifi-
cantly. During the second project period, the annual per capita grain output increased 
from 365kg to 591kg. The sediment loads to the Yellow River decreased by 100 mil-
44 TEEB, The	Economics	of	Ecosystems	and	Biodiversity	for	Local	and	Regional	Policy	Makers (2010), available 
at <http://www.teebweb.org/ForLocalandRegionalPolicy/LocalandRegionalPolicyMakersChapterDrafts/
tabid/29433/Default.aspx> (visited 5 September 2011) at 24 and 93.
45 C. T. S Nair and Rebecca Rutt, Creating Forestry Jobs to Boost the Economy and Build a Green Future 
(FAO, 2009), available at <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1025e/i1025e02.htm> (visited 10 March 
2011).
46 A. Molnar et al., Community-based	Forest	Enterprises	 in	Tropical	Forest	Countries:	 Status	 and	Potential. 
(International Tropical Timber Organisation, Rights and Resources Initiative and Forest Trends, 2007), 
available at <http://www.ibcperu.org/doc/isis/7405.pdf> (visited 24 April 2011) at 8.
47 See European Forest Institute, ’What is FLEGT?’, available at <http://www.efi.int/portal/projects/flegt/
what_is_flegt_/> (visited 24 April 2011).
48 Christian Nellemann and Emily Corcroran (eds), Dead Planet, Living Planet – Biodiversity and Ecosys-
tem Restoration for Sustainable Development. A Rapid Response Assessment (UNEP and GRID-Arendal, 
2010), available at <http://www.grida.no/files/publications/dead-planet/RRAecosystems_screen.pdf> 
(visited 24 April 2011) at 74.
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lion tons per year, thereby reducing the risks of flooding and, consequently, the cost 
of dam maintenance and damage repair.49
Two project level examples provide similarly good evidence as to the high potential 
socio-economic returns on investments in restoration and conservation of forests. 
The restoration of natural mangrove forests in Vietnam for US$1.1 million resulted 
in an annual saving of US$7.3 million in sea dyke maintenance. During a subsequent 
typhoon, the area apparently suffered significantly less damage than did neighboring 
provinces.50 In Indonesia, a valuation study of the Leuser National Park estimated 
that conservation and selective use would provide a higher long-term return (US$9.1–
9.5 billion) for the region, compared to more consumptive usage, including contin-
ued deforestation (US$7 billion).51
Beyond the traditional forest sector and improvements in the management of the 
multifunctionality of forests, there are contributions and opportunities which, due 
to association with other sectors, might be less well known to governments and the 
private sector. 
Where energy is concerned, in some countries wood and fibre account for the major-
ity of the energy consumed by people and industry. In Africa, for instance, it is com-
mon that more than 80 per cent of energy is forest based, mainly in the form of fuel 
wood and charcoal.52 It has been estimated that the annual trade in non-timber for-
est products (NTFPs) might be worth as much as US$11 billion; and the interna-
tional trade in wildlife products, for instance medicinal plants, at US$15 billion.53 
It appears that global sales of pharmaceuticals based on material from natural origins 
is worth US$75 billion per year.54 As more than 50 per cent of terrestrial biodiver-
sity can be found in forests, it is likely that forests will continue to play a role in 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries. The variety of species found in forests also 
provides a base for finding sustainable solutions in the agriculture, construction, 
energy and health sectors through biomimicry or biomimetics.55 Finally, the rate of 
growth in global tourism is enormous. In 2009, 880 million international tourists 
were recorded, as compared to 533 million in 1995.56 Forty percent of these jour-
neys were directed towards a developing country57 with tourists paying for experienc-
49 World Bank, Implementation	Completion	Report (IDA-26160), Report no. 25701 (2003).
50 TEEB, The	Economics	of	Ecosystems	, supra note 44, at 99.
51 TEEB, The	Economics	of	Ecosystem	Services, supra note 14.
52 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, ‘Chapter 21: Forests and woodland systems’, supra note 15.
53 Dilys Roe et al., Making	a	Killing	or	Making	a	Living?,	Wildlife	Trade,	Trade	Controls	and	Rural	Livelihoods 
(IIED, 2002), available at <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9156IIED.pdf> (visited 25 April 2011) at 5.
54 David Kaimowitz, Forests	and	Human	Health:	Some	Vital	Connections (Swedish CGIAR, 2005).
55 For more information, see <http://www.biomimicryinstitute.org>.
56 United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), Tourism	Highlights:	2010	Edition, available at 
<http://www.unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/highlights/UNWTO_Highlights10_en_HR.pdf> (visited 24 April 
2011) at 4.
57 Jonathan Mitchell and Caroline Ashley, Tourism	and	Poverty	Reduction:	Pathways	to	Prosperity (Earthscan, 
2010) 1.
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ing biodiversity, landscapes and wildlife. In 2007, US$295 billion were spent in 
developing countries – almost three times the amount of official development aid to 
these countries.58
4 REDD+ as a catalyst for change?
4.1 Introduction
As demonstrated above, forests already contribute significantly to sustainable devel-
opment and hold great potential to support transformation towards a low-carbon 
development path. 
As there are many forces that lead to deforestation, poor management of forest re-
sources and low efficiency in processing of forest goods, the question needs to be 
asked: from where would substantial investment to change the current consumptive 
paradigm originate? The annual bilateral and multilateral financial flows to forests 
are estimated at about US$1.9 billion. The official development aid (ODA) to forests 
includes about US$700 million for forest conservation. The contributions to forest 
investments by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), philanthropic organiza-
tions and the private sector are poorly known; but foreign-direct investments in the 
wood and paper industries were estimated at nearly US$18 billion in 2005.59
The estimated cost for halving deforestation ranges between US$17 and 33 billion 
per year, of which upfront capacity-building costs would be in the range of US$4 
billion over a period of five years, while the rest is the ongoing cost for reduction of 
deforestation and forest degradation.60 The estimate includes forest protection costs 
from adopting, implementing and administering policies that reduce forest emis-
sions.
Finance through REDD+ holds the promise of raising funds in the range of these 
estimates, while catalyzing change in the way forests are managed and utilized. The 
current donor pledges for REDD+ are also in the range of the upfront capacity-
building estimates by Eliasch.61 How any future REDD+ investments above those 
currently pledged will then be invested or distributed to stakeholders remains open. 
The perceived lesson learned from early activities indicates that there has to be strong 
benefit-sharing at the community level as a prerequisite for successful REDD+ im-
plementation.62
58 Ibid.
59 Simula, Financing	Flows	and	Needs, supra note 26, at 6, 7 and 44.
60 Eliasch, Eliasch Review, supra note 24.
61 See ibid.
62 World Bank, Harvesting	Knowledge	on	REDD-plus:	Early	Lessons	 from	 the	FCPF	Initiative	and	Beyond	
(World Bank, 2010), available at <http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartner-
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While investments in the upfront capacity-building, forest protection costs and 
benefit-sharing with communities are key, it is important to explore how these invest-
ments can have a knock-on effect, simultaneously supporting a transformation to-
wards a low carbon Green Economy.
The REDD+ strategy of the United States provides a good example of pledged 
REDD+ investments with the clear objectives of being part of low-carbon develop-
ment paths. This strategy supports host countries’ development of REDD+ schemes, 
in particular those being developed as part of economy-wide, low-emissions develop-
ment strategies (LEDS). It will support developing countries in their efforts to seek 
climate-friendly development opportunities across the entire cross-sectoral economy, 
ensuring that REDD+ strategies seek a truly fundamental shift in the development 
path of the forest sector toward a low-emissions future.63
This paper now turns to identify, and briefly discuss, four areas which, it is argued, 
are needed for REDD+ to have a catalytic contribution to a Green Economy, deliv-
ering the ‘step changes’ called for by the Eliasch	Review.64
4.2 Area 1: Strengthening of the knowledge base
The objective of strengthening the knowledge base is to set the foundation for ef-
fectively dealing with the multifunctionality of forests, and the consequences of inac-
tion (or business-as-usual). Furthermore, highlighting the opportunities for, and 
benefits of, improved management of forests’ economic, social and environmental 
outcomes. 
This step includes assessment of the economic value of forest ecosystems services and 
goods, climate change impacts on forest resilience (permanence of the emission re-
ductions), and the influences emanating from developments in other sectors, includ-
ing those from macro policies and programmes that have an effect on forests. 
4.3 Area 2: Scenario analysis and policy options
The objective of the analysis of scenario and policy options is to support participatory 
decision-making regarding agreement on future forest sector development options, 
and the related pros and cons. This will include scenario development and explora-
tion of options for addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, 
including options for overcoming governance barriers, and finance options for pub-
ship.org/files/Documents/PDF/Oct2010/FCPF%20Harvesting%20Knowledge%20Nov%2019%20
2010-revised.pdf> (visited 25 April 2011) 3–6 and 20.
63 US Agency for International Development, Strategic Choices for United States Fast Start Financing for 
REDD+ (2010), available at <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/climate/docs/UnitedStates 
REDD+Strategy.pdf> (visited 25 April 2011).
64 See Eliasch, Eliasch Review, supra note 24.
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lic forest services and goods, including potential REDD+ financing. The analysis of 
options will emphasize the socio-economic opportunities presented by forests.
While scenarios can be powerful for organizing and communicating large amount 
of information and different perspectives, scenario building will require extensive 
cross-sectoral stakeholder processes and capacity-building to help policymakers and 
stakeholders to think big.
4.4 Area 3: Creation of enabling conditions
The objective is to support the employment of enabling policy reforms, regulatory 
changes and implementation. 
Certain enabling conditions have been highlighted in the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme’s (UNEP) 2011 Green Economy Report65 as key conditions that 
make sectors attractive for investors and business. These are: 
• public investment and spending;
• market-based instruments;
• subsidy reform;
• regulatory frameworks; and
• international frameworks.
These enabling conditions will promote public investments and spending in greening 
the forest sector, while decreasing spending in areas that deplete forest assets. Chang-
es in investments are driven by a strong regulatory framework and enforcement 
thereof, including capacity-building. In order to prevent trade in forest products to 
move to countries with weaker regulatory frameworks, an international governance 
system is also needed. 
Setting in place enabling conditions will require focus across many sectors as to find 
synergies but also to prevent counter-productive measures in other sectors. A cross-
sectoral review of enabling conditions necessitates the participation of many minis-
tries including, planning and financial ministries.
4.5 Area 4: Financing and investments 
The objective is to catalyze growth in private Green Economy investments in forests. 
A combination of private sector and public financing and investments are envisioned. 
The multilateral sources such as the World Bank66 and regional banks, the Forest 
65 UNEP, Towards	a	Green	Economy, supra note12, at 160–162.
66 See <http://www.worldbank.org>.
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Investment Program,67 the Global Environment Facility,68 and the new mechanisms 
under the REDD+ initiative are envisioned as facilitating and lowering the entry risks 
for the private sector. 
As an example, investments in efficiency gains in the processing of forest goods could 
translate into tangible and measurable changes in the demand for forest raw materi-
als and in a clear transfer of environmentally-sound technologies to developing coun-
tries. As forest goods can be carbon neutral, if harvested sustainably, they provide a 
significant opportunity for improved national energy supply. 
Coupled with the notion that forest management and harvesting of forest goods is 
labour intensive, efficiency gains could provide a five-fold win-win situation due, 
firstly, to improved resource efficiency; secondly, to enhanced business opportunities 
through new market demand created by a low-carbon development trajectory (or 
replacement of carbon-intensive products in, for instance, energy and construction 
sectors); thirdly, to biodiversity conservation; fourthly, to climate change mitigation; 
and, fifthly, to the generation of decent jobs.
5 Conclusions
Today, forests already contribute to sustainable development, both through the serv-
ices they provide to various economic sectors and the products people use in their 
daily lives. This contribution is substantial and in the range of trillions of US dollars. 
Beyond climate change and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, improving forest management is key to achieving the objectives of the two 
other Rio conventions, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)69 and Unit-
ed Nations Convention on Combating Desertification (UNCCD).70 Furthermore, 
the links to livelihoods, job opportunities, tenure, water and energy, and so forth, 
call for cross-ministerial collaboration in national planning and policy-setting and in 
preparation for international negotiations.
REDD+ financing and the political attention forests have gained due to the climate 
change debate present an unprecedented opportunity to not only change deforesta-
tion and forest degradation rates, but to drive investment in forest-based natural 
capital while protecting biodiversity and creating decent and respected jobs. 
67 See <http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/node/5>.
68 See <http://www.thegef.org/>.
69 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
70 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or Deserti-
fication, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996, 33 International	Legal	
Materials (1994) 1309, <http://www.unccd.int>.
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While REDD+ holds a promise to improve forest management and mitigate climate 
change, the final success of REDD+ and its impact on sustainable development re-
mains to be seen. Without knowledge and focused cross-sectoral action on realizing 
the Green Economy opportunities that forests can provide, there is a danger that 
REDD+ will fail or at best only contribute to climate change mitigation and not to 
national development goals, or the paradigm shift called for by the UNFCCC 
COP16 agreements. 
The Joint Liason Group between CBD, UNFCCC and UNCCD is a welcomed start 
where forests should play a prominent role in the discussions. Further engagement 
with other multilateral agreements and processes, such as the Group of Twenty 
(G20), should be encouraged and actively promoted by forest-related ministries and 
individual public sector officials.
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BiodiverSitY, with a FocuS on 
migratorY SpecieS1
Aline	Kühl 2	and	Elizabeth	Maruma	Mrema3
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
There is growing evidence that climate change will become one of the primary caus-
es of loss of biological diversity within the 21st century. More than one-fifth of plant 
and animal species are likely to be exposed to an increased risk of extinction as a 
result of global warming of only 2–3 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.4 
It is evident that fauna and flora have already been significantly affected by recent 
climate change;5 amongst these being numerous migratory species, many of which 
are already suffering declines as a result of climatic changes.6
1 This paper is based on the CMS Scientific Council document ‘Climate Change: A Primary Threat for 
Migratory Species’, UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/ScC16/Doc.8 (2010) and on a lecture given by Elizabeth 
Maruma Mrema on the University of Eastern Finland – UNEP Course on International Environmental 
Law-making and Diplomacy on 20 August 2010. The views expressed are the authors’ own and do not 
necessarily reflect the position of UNEP/CMS Secretariat.
2 Associate Scientific and Technical Officer, UNEP Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) Secretariat; 
email: akuehl@cms.int (corresponding author).
3 Executive Secretary, UNEP Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) Secretariat.
4 A. Fischlin et al., ‘Ecosystems, their properties, goods, and services’, in M L. Parry, O. F. Canziani, J. P. 
Palutikof, P. J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson (eds),	Climate	Change	2007:	Impacts,	Adaptation	and	
Vulnerability.	Contribution	of	Working	Group	II	to	the	Fourth	Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	
Panel	on	Climate	Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 211–272.
5 G. R. Walther et al., ‘Ecological Responses to Recent Climate Change’, 416 Nature (2002) 389–395; 
Camille Parmesan and Gary Yohe, ‘A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate Change Impacts across 
Natural Systems, 421 Nature (2003) 37–42; Camille Parmesan, ‘Ecological and Evolutionary Responses 
to Recent Climate Change’, 37 Annual	Revíew	of	Ecology,	Evolution	and	Systematics (2006) 637–669.
6 R. A. Robinson et al., Climate	Change	and	Migratory	Species, British Trust for Ornithology Research Re-
port 414 (2005); C. Both, S. Bouwhuis, C. M. Lessells and M. E. Visser, ‘Climate Change and Population 
Declines in a Long Distance Migratory Bird’, 441 Nature	(2006) 81–83; A. P. Møller, D. Rubolini and 
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The process of animal migration is linked closely to climatic conditions. Heedless of 
national borders, migrants move between environments to take advantage of differ-
ent habitats and seasonally overabundant resources at different times of the year and 
during different parts of their life cycles. Many of their movements are directly 
driven by climatic cues, such as temperature or wind direction. Evolutionary selec-
tion pressure has been strong for animals to arrive at the optimal time at key sites, 
such as those for breeding, moulting, stop-overs or wintering. As climates change, so 
these spatial-temporal optima are likely to shift. Those shifts already being observed 
are outlined in the following sections of this paper. Species persistence will depend 
on how well and how fast they are able to adapt in already heavily fragmented and 
anthropologically influenced ecosystems.
1.2 Changes in the timing of migration
Migratory species are particularly vulnerable to climate change due to their complex 
life cycles, which often involves them crossing multiple biomes. Distinct responses 
to climate change have been observed in migratory populations, especially where 
birds are concerned. Temporal changes, specifically the advancement of spring migra-
tion, have been particularly frequently encountered in the northern hemisphere. In 
response to recent increase in spring temperatures, many migratory birds have been 
arriving earlier to breed.7 Similar observations have been made for fish.8 Being 
unable to arrive at the optimal time due to climate change has been linked to declines 
in breeding success.9 It is worth noting that relatively few data are currently avail-
able for the southern hemisphere. In contrast to elsewhere, the majority of birds 
studied here have delayed rather than brought forward their arrival and breeding 
dates.10 Further research is urgently needed to assess the impact this change in be-
havior is having on the status of bird populations in the southern hemisphere.
1.3 Changes in migration routes
Migration routes have significantly changed across the globe in response to climate 
change. Species have frequently adapted their migration distance and direction, lead-
A. Lehikoinen, ‘Populations of Migratory Bird Species That Did Not Show a Phonological Response to 
Climate Change are Declining’, 105 Proceedings	of	National	Academy	of	Science (USA) (2008) 195–200.
7 P. Gienapp, C. Teplitsky, J. S. Alho, J. A. Mills and J. Merilä, ‘Climate Change and Evolution: Disentan-
gling Environmental and Genetic Responses’, 17 Molecular	Ecology (2007) 167–178; Francisco Pulido 
and Peter Berthold, ‘Micro-evolutionary Response to Climatic Change’, in H. Caswell (series ed.), 35 
Advances	in	Ecological	Research.	Birds	and	Climate	Change (Elsevier, 2004) 151–183; Oscar Gordo, ‘Why 
Are Bird Migration Dates Shifting? A Review of Weather and Climate Effects on Avian Migratory Phenol-
ogy’. 35 Climate	Research (2007) 37–58.
8 A. L. Perry, P. J. Low, J. R. Ellis and J. D. Reynolds, ‘Climate Change and Distribution Shifts in Marine 
Fishes’, 308 Science (2005) 1912–1915
9 Peter Dunn, ‘Breeding Dates and Reproductive Performance’, 35 Advances	in	Ecological	Research	(2004) 
69–87; M. E. Visser, C. Both and M. M. Lambrechts, ‘Global Climate Change Leads to Mistimed Avian 
Reproduction’, 35 Advances	in	Ecological	Research (2004) 89–110.
10 Christophe Barbraud and Henri Weimerskirch, ‘Antarctic Birds Breed Later in Response to Climate 
Change’, 106 Proceedings	of	National	Academy	of	Science (USA) (2006) 6248–6250.
233
Aline Kühl and Elizabeth Maruma Mrema
ing to a move of species away from some of their current range states to new coun-
tries, where they did not occur previously. Migration distances have been shown to 
shorten even to the extent of a complete switch to a non-migratory lifestyle; and to 
lengthen as well as to shorten.11 The change of range states, which may sometimes 
result, may have profound implications for management structures, such as agree-
ments12 under the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals (CMS).13 In Denmark, for example, 35–40 per cent of bird species have 
been predicted to disappear in the next 80 years; but with a corresponding similar 
number of new bird species predicted to move to Denmark during this time.14 
Avian range shifts in the northern hemisphere have tended to move in a northerly 
direction; but with many exceptions in westerly, easterly and even southerly direc-
tions. It has been suggested that the ranges of migratory species may shift far more 
than those of non-migratory species.15
2 Factors influencing species vulnerability
Responses to climate change tend to be species-specific, making it difficult to iden-
tify individual policy interventions to reduce the impact of climate change on migra-
tory species. Despite the urgent need it has not yet been possible to make general 
recommendations for taxonomic or geographically clustered groups of species.16
While it is often technically feasible to predict the preconditions for species survival 
in a habitat for the future, it is currently extremely challenging to predict how veg-
etation and associated animal communities might move between habitats in today’s 
heavily anthropogenically altered and fragmented habitats.17 There are, however, a 
number of factors which have been identified to correlate with high species vulner-
ability, which are briefly outlined below and in Table 1.18 A more thorough assess-
ment of these factors can be found elsewhere.19
11 Cynthia Carey, ‘The Impacts of Climate Change on the Annual Cycles of Birds’, 364 Philosophical	Trans-
actions	of	the	Royal	Society:	Biological	Sciences (2009) 3321–3330.
12 ‘Agreements’ in this paper refers generically to all forms of CMS instruments concluded under Article IV, 
including Memoranda of Understanding.
13 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 
November 1983, 1651 United	Nations	Treaty	Series No. 28395. 
14 B. Huntley, R. E. Green, Y. C. Collingham and S. G. Willis,	A	Climatic	Atlas	of	European	Breeding	Birds	
(Lynx Editions, 2008).
15 J. T. Price and T. L. Root, ‘Climate Change and Neotropical Migrants’, 66 The	North	American	Wildlife	
and	Natural	Resources	Conference (2001) 371–379.
16 Fischlin et al., ‘Ecosystems, their properties’, supra note 4.
17 J. Faaborg et al., ‘Recent Advances in Understanding Migration Systems of New World Land Birds, 80 
Ecological	Monographs	(2010) 3–48.
18 See the end of this paper.
19 R. A. Robinson et al., Climate	Change	and	Migratory	Species, supra note 6; R. A. Robinson et al., ‘Travel-
ling through a Warming World: Climate Change and Migratory Species, 7 Endangered	Species	Research 
(2008) 87–99; W. Foden et al., ‘Species Susceptibility to Climate Change Impacts’, in J.-C. Vié, C. 
Hilton-Taylor and S. N. Stuart (eds), The	2008	Review	of	the	IUCN	Red	List	of	Threatened	Species (IUCN, 
2008).
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Long-distance migrants are thought to be more vulnerable than short-distance ones 
because – whilst away at their distant wintering grounds – they cannot predict when 
spring will start on their breeding grounds.20 This ‘mismatching’ becomes particularly 
problematic when the climate at one critical site changes in different ways to that of 
another site within the migratory route of a species. There is good evidence that some 
declines in avian species are already resulting from such ‘phenology mismatches’.21 Mis-
matching of species’ presence with food supplies, such as insects for birds or krill for 
cetaceans, is a further concern.22 The more specialized the diet of a migratory species 
is, the more likely it is to be at risk.23
Species which will reach natural barriers such as the Arctic Ocean as a result of their 
shift in range are likely to be particularly threatened with extinction. Polar species 
and those dependent on high elevation habitats, such as the black-necked crane (Grus	
nigricollis, CMS Appendix I), are likely to be at high risk. An increase of only a 1 
degree Celsius change in global temperatures has been estimated to reduce by more 
than 50 per cent the suitable habitat of birds breeding at high elevation.24
The sex determination process of many migratory reptiles (for example, marine tur-
tles) is temperature dependent. There is a significant risk that these species will suffer 
from skewed sex ratios, and possible consequent demographic collapse, due to rapid 
climate change. However, the lack of critical data makes it difficult to assess how 
individual species will be affected.25
There are many other broader climate-related threats which will have considerable 
impacts on migratory populations, often even outweighing the vulnerability factors 
outlined below and elsewhere.26 Changes in water regimes (for instance, drought 
and lower water tables) and wide-ranging habitat loss resulting from climate change 
have been identified as threats likely to affect the greatest number of terrestrial migra-
tory species.27 With such large-scale factors as habitat loss it is not a straightforward 
task to identify which geographic or taxonomic entity is likely to be hit hardest; 
detailed assessment and modelling being generally required.
20 C. Both et al., ‘Avian Population Consequences of Climate Change Are Most Severe for Long-distance 
Migrants in Seasonal Habitats’, 277 Proceedings	of	the	Royal	Society:	Biological	Sciences	(2010) 1259–1266.
21 Tim Jones and Will Cresswell, ‘The Phenology Mismatch Hypothesis: Are Declines of Migrant Birds 
Linked to Uneven Global Climate Change, 79 Journal	of	Animal	Ecology (2010) 98–108.
22 Dunn, ‘Breeding dates’, supra note 9.
23 Z. Vegvari, V. Bokony, Z. Barta, and G. Kovacs, G., ‘Life History Predicts Advancement of Avian Spring 
Migration in Response to Climate Change’, 16 Global	Change	Biology	(2010) 1–11.
24 N. L. Rodenhouse et al., ‘Potential Effects of Climate Change on Birds of the Northeast, 13 Mitigation	
and	Adaptation	Strategies	for	Global	Change	(2008) 517–540.
25 Nicola Jane Mitchell and F. J. Janzen, ‘Temperature-Dependent Sex Determination and Contemporary 
Climate Change, 4 Sexual	Development	(2010) 129–140.
26 See Table 1 at the end of this paper.
27 R. A. Robinson et al., Climate	Change	and	Migratory	Species, supra note 6.
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Fundamentally, the evolutionary potential of a species to adapt to contemporary 
climate change is critical to its survival. Those species whose migrations are depend-
ent on endogenous clocks and are genetically less flexible to switch to a different 
photoperiod, for example, are likely to struggle most to adapt to climate change.28 
Recent evidence from migratory blackcaps (Sylvia	atricapilla) suggests that micro-
evolution is feasible for birds which migrate short to average distances; and that, by 
migrating shorter distances, these birds are able genetically to adapt at sufficient 
speed to climate change.29 It has been demonstrated that, under intense selection 
pressure, birds can become resident and that this behavioural change is genetically 
controlled. Whether a species will persist and survive contemporary climate change 
will depend on their ecological and physiological traits, their evolutionary potential 
and in certain cases also on the efforts undertaken by humans to prevent their extinc-
tion. It is the last of these elements which multilateral environmental agreements, 
such as the CMS, can address. 
3 Addressing climate change through multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs)
Climate change has only in the last decade become a priority within international 
governance structures, despite growing evidence of the great potential impact of 
climate change and the presence of a dedicated treaty in the form of the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),30 which entered 
into force in 1994, and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol.31 Initial emphasis in the 1990s 
was placed on mitigation, which has been defined, by the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), as ‘[t]echnological change and substitution that reduce 
resource inputs and emissions per unit of output … [a]lthough several social, eco-
nomic and technological policies would produce an emission reduction, with respect 
to climate change, mitigation means implementing policies to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and enhance sinks’.32 
It is noteworthy that mitigation efforts are particularly important for marine species 
such as whales and dolphins since ocean chemistry is directly dependent on atmos-
pheric chemistry. Measuring from pre-industrial times until the 1990s, ocean acid-
ity has increased by approximately 30 per cent (corresponding to a 0.1 decrease along 
28 Carey, ‘The impacts of climate change’, supra note 11.
29 Francisco Pulido and Peter Berthold, ‘Current Selection for Lower Migratory Activity Will Drive the 
Evolution of Residency in a Migratory Bird Population’, 107 Proccedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences (USA) (2010) 7341–7346. 
30 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
31 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 International	Legal	Materials (1998) 22.
32 IPCC, ‘Annex I: Glossary. Working Group III’, available at <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/ar4-wg3.
pdf> (visited 10 November 2010). 
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the pH scale)33 and this is already affecting the physiology of krill, upon which many 
migratory cetaceans are critically dependent for food. Further, increasing acidifica-
tion of oceans poses a risk to the maintenance of coral reefs, which play a key nursery 
role for the oceanic ecosystem and which provide vital habitats and food for migra-
tory species such as turtles.34 
Mitigation instruments, such as the Kyoto Protocol under the UNFCCC, took a 
long time to negotiate, but have eventually led to significant momentum being 
gained within the financial and industrial sectors. However, the continuation of, or 
extension of, a commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 remains 
uncertain. Currently, the programme known as REDD+ (‘Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation’) is arguably the most promising biodiversity-relevant 
development under the UNFCCC, with the potential to create a vital financial 
mechanism for restoring and conserving forest habitat. It is envisaged as being a tool 
to enhance both climate change mitigation and adaptation, where adaptation has 
been defined as: 
[i]nitiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human sys-
tems against actual or expected climate change effects. Various types of adapta-
tion exist, [for example,] anticipatory and reactive, private and public, and au-
tonomous and planned. Examples are raising river or coastal dikes, the 
substitution of more temperature shock resistant plants for sensitive ones, etc.35
The devil remains, however, in the detail and negotiators need to pay the utmost 
attention to ensuring that, for example, now that the REDD+ decision was adopted 
at UNFCCC COP16 in Cancun,36 appropriate reference levels are agreed and that 
the implementation focuses on restoring and maintaining ‘functioning mature for-
ests’ and that plantations are much less eligible for REDD+ funding. Only unfrag-
mented mature forests can provide a habitat for species such as forest elephants, 
gorillas and forest-dwelling birds. Gorillas and elephants in turn contribute to the 
forest’s maintenance through many activities such as dispersing seeds and thus es-
sentially continuously ‘plant’ new trees. 
33 Scott C. Doney, ‘The Dangers of Ocean Acidification’, 294 Scientific	American (2006) 58–65.
34 Secretariat to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Scientific Synthesis of the Impacts of Ocean Acid-
ification on Marine Biodiversity, Technical Series No. 46 (2009). 
35 IPCC, ‘Annex I: Glossary’, supra note 32.
36 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 16th session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 
December 2010, Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 16th session, 
UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011).
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It is important to note that most of the key biodiversity-related MEAs, such as 
Ramsar,37 the World Heritage Convention,38 CITES39 and CMS do not contain 
specific provisions for climate change mitigation and adaptation despite the relevance 
of these two responses for species and other relevant issues covered by these instru-
ments.40 These MEAs, which were drafted and adopted during the 1970s,41 were 
inherently reactive as they embodied an ad hoc and fragmented approach to species 
and/or habitats which were already endangered; and they were not drafted with the 
intention of minimizing the effect of climate change, or of improving species’ adap-
tive capacity in responding to climate change. It is worth noting that at the time 
when these MEAs were negotiated the understanding of climate change and its im-
pacts on ecosystems was not as well developed as it is today. Nevertheless, these trea-
ties are today of fundamental importance in the climate change context because they 
place strong emphasis on restoring and maintaining ecosystem services.42 It is in-
teresting to note that even the Convention on Biological Diversity,43 which was 
adopted in 1992 with a holistic outlook including the precautionary principle44 and 
ecosystems management, did until 2000 not have any provisions for climate change 
adaptation or mitigation when there were specific calls for the CBD to address the 
interactions of biodiversity and climate change, not least in response to coral bleach-
ing events.45 However, only in 2004 was the first stand-alone decision on climate 
change and biodiversity adopted (decision VII/15).46 While UNFCCC is exclu-
sively aimed at climate change, it is silent on species conservation or biodiversity 
adaptation.47 Given that biodiversity and climate change-related considerations are 
so closely intertwined, it is surprising that parties did not develop closer linkages at 
the time. 
37 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, 2 Febru-
ary 1971, in force 21 December 1975, 11 International Legal	Materials (1972), 963, <http://www.ramsar.
org>.
38 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975, 11 International	Legal	Materials (1972) 1358, <http://whc.unesco.
org>. 
39 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington DC, 3 
March 1973, in force 1 July 1975, 993 United	Nations	Treaty	Series 243, <http://www.cites.org>. 
40 Arie Trouwborst, ‘International Nature Conservation Law and the Adaptation of Biodiversity to Climate 
Change: a Mismatch?’, 21 Journal	of	Environmental	Law (2009) 12–19.
41 Ramsar –1971, WHC – 1972, CITES – 1973, CMS –1979. 
42 On ‘ecosystem services’, see the paper by Leila Suvantola in the present Review.
43 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
44 The ‘principle’ is not contained within the text, but in the Preamble (which must guide interpretation of 
the Convention’s Articles) it is ‘noted’ that ‘where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of bio-
logical diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to 
avoid or minimize such a threat’. 
45 An Cliquet, Chris Backes, Jim Harris and Peter Howsam, ‘Adaptation to Climate Change – Legal Chal-
lenges for Protected Areas’, 5 Utrecht	Law	Review (2009) 158–175 at 159. 
46 ‘Biodiversity and Climate Change’, Decision VII/15, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/15 (2004).
47 UNFCCC, Arts 3(3), 4(1)(b) and (e)-(f ) refer to ‘precautionary measures to mitigate adverse effects of 
climate change’ as well as ‘measure to facilitate adequate adaption to climate change’.
238
Impacts of Climate Change on Biodiversity, with a Focus on Migratory Species
Nonetheless, parties to most of these treaties have in recent years given explicit at-
tention to the effects and impacts of climate change on biodiversity. This is visible 
from a number of recent decisions and resolutions48 which require parties to take 
actions and measures to mitigate climate change and to improve the ability of eco-
systems to adapt to the effects of climate change. Parties to the CBD have given 
particular attention to improving the knowledge base for climate change policy by 
establishing, in 2008, an ad hoc technical experts group on biodiversity and climate 
change adaptation which has led to the preparation of guidance documents for its 
parties49 and provided the content for decisions50 addressing the impacts of cli-
mate change on biodiversity.
The positive impact which the Ramsar Convention has had on the preservation of 
wetlands provides a good case study to illustrate its impacts on climate change. Wet-
lands include floodplains, mangroves and peatlands and are vital for both climate 
change adaptation and mitigation. Firstly, wetlands make a vital contribution to 
adaptation by reducing the impact of increasing rainfall, storms, glacier melting and 
even sea level rise. Secondly, wetlands need to be maintained to avoid carbon con-
tained within them from being released into the atmosphere. Peatlands deserve to 
receive particular attention in the climate change mitigation context because they are 
extremely rich in carbon; bogs, moors and even permafrost tundra having thick or-
ganic layers. Globally, these peatlands contain nearly 30 per cent of all land-based 
carbon (550 gigatonnes of carbon), which is equivalent to 75 per cent of all atmos-
pheric carbon or double the carbon stock contained in the forest biomass of the 
world.51 If these peatlands are drained, or otherwise destroyed, the carbon that has 
been stored here for thousands of years and which is normally covered by water 
would suddenly be exposed to the air; after which it would decompose and turn into 
48 ‘Climate Change and Wetlands: Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation’, Ramsar Wetland Convention COP 
Resolution VIII.3 (2002); ‘Climate Change and Wetlands’, COP Resolution X.24 (2008). See also ‘Bio-
diversity and Climate change’, CBD COP Resolution IX/16 (2008); ‘Climate Change and Migratory 
Species’, CMS COP Resolution 8.13 (2005); and ‘Climate Change Impacts on Migratory Species’, COP 
Resolution 9.7 (2008). Equally, the CMS related Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian 
Migratory Waterbirds Agreement (The Hague, 16 June 1995, in force 1 November 1999, <http://www.
unep-aewa.org>) adopted ‘The Effects of Climate Change on Migratory Waterbirds’, a MOP Resolution 
4.14 (2008). See also Resolution 4.14 (2010) on Climate Change under the Agreement on the Conserva-
tion of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and contiguous Atlantic area (ACCOBAMS) 
(Monaco, 24 November 1996, in force 1 June 2010, <http://www.accobams.org/>), concluded under the 
auspices of CMS. 
49 CBD Secretariat, Interlinkages	between	Biological	Diversity	and	Climate	Change.	Advice	on	the	integration	
of	biodiversity	conservation	into	the	implementation	of	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	
Change	and	its	Kyoto	Protocol, CBD Technical Series No. 10 (SCBD, 2003), available at <http://www.cbd.
int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-10.pdf>. See also CBD Secretariat, Guidance	for	Promoting	Synergies	among	
Activities	Addressing	Biological	Diversity,	Desertification,	 Land	Degradation	 and	Climate	Change, CBD 
Technical series No. 25 (SCBD, 2006), as well as Technical Series Nos 41–43, and 45–46. 
50 ‘Biodiversity and climate change’, CBD COP Decision VII/15 (2004); ‘Biodiversity and climate change: 
Guidance for promoting synergies among activities for biodiversity conservation, mitigating or adapting 
to climate change and combating land degradation’, COP Decision VIII/30 (2006); and ‘Biodiversity and 
climate change’, COP Decision IX/16 (2008).
51 F. Parish, et al. (eds), Assessment	on	Peatlands,	Biodiversity	and	Climate	Change:	Main	Report (Global En-
vironment Centre and Wetlands International, 2008).
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carbon dioxide, which would then be released into the atmosphere. It is therefore 
vital that peatlands are preserved, and the Ramsar treaty provides a good interna-
tional tool for achieving this preservation. 
Policies which are aimed at maintaining and creating protected areas, such as those 
under the CMS Agreements and the CBD, can also potentially play a vital role in 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. In many countries there is good overlap 
between the biodiversity value of a site and the carbon contained. Tools are being 
developed, for example by the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre,52 
which are aimed at estimating the carbon value of different habitats. The intention 
is that polygons, for example, can be drawn anywhere on the landscape and the 
carbon value can then be automatically calculated to guide policy decisions and to 
apply for REDD+ funding. Currently, the quality of data available is often too poor 
for such tools to guide the implementation of REDD+, but this situation is likely to 
improve in the coming years. Funding mechanisms such as the Lifeweb Initiative 
and the International Climate Initiative (ICI),53 which was launched by Germany 
during the 9th COP to the CBD in Germany in 2008, provide additional vehicles 
for protecting carbon-rich habitats. This promising financial support will no doubt 
improve species’ adaptive capacity to cope with climate change by improving the 
ecological network. 
Looking ahead, it is important to recognize that much of the climate change policy 
being drafted today is restricted by uncertainty surrounding how species and habitats 
will respond to contemporary climate change. Species-specific interventions are often 
not feasible due to a lack of knowledge; and also due to a lack of funds and time. 
This should not, however, be a factor which prevents action from being taken, as 
CMS Parties agreed in Resolution 9.754 on Climate Change and Migratory Species 
in 2008. Focusing on habitat protection and on building ecological networks may 
provide at least a partial viable solution to this dilemma. Despite uncertainty, it is 
clear that species will have the best chance of adapting to climate change if they are 
provided with the opportunity to move freely, even to migrate, within a functional 
network of a large variety of habitats. 
The parties to the CMS are currently not only placing emphasis on research, illustrat-
ing how migratory species can be used as early-warning indicators and on disseminat-
ing knowledge as to how migratory species are reacting to climate change, but are 
also preparing for a major policy shift towards ecological network development. The 
slogan for the 10th COP of the CMS, to be held in 2011, ‘Networking for Migra-
tory Species’, reflects this. Climate change is one of the major reasons for this shift 
in direction from a focus on species to more habitat-oriented conservation. Tools for 
52 See <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/>.
53 Lifeweb Initiative, <http://www.cbd.int/lifeweb/>.
54 ‘Climate Change Impact on Migratory Species’, CMS Resolution 9.7, Un Doc. UNEP/CMS/Resolution 
9.7 (2008).
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critical site identification have already been developed and are being implemented 
within the CMS Family, specifically under the African-Eurasian Waterbirds Agree-
ment.55 Efforts have been undertaken by the Zoological Society of London56 to 
identify those CMS-listed migratory species most threatened by climate change, in 
order to provide policy-makers with a starting point for priority action.57 This effort 
is assisted by IUCN,58 which is currently in the process of developing a ‘red flag’ 
warning mechanism for all Red List59 species to highlight those that are particularly 
vulnerable to climate change. These measures will allow policy-makers to home in 
on those regions and species which require most attention in the climate change 
context, while focusing on building ecological networks for biodiversity. 
4  The CMS and the changing nature of migration
CMS and its agreements have to adapt and become sufficiently flexible to adjust to 
the challenges posed by climate change, most notably the movement of species to a 
different set of range states. There are a number of minor legal concerns related to 
sufficient flexibility of the treaty, however. Most immediately, there is an urgent need 
for better monitoring of the impact of climate change on migratory species and ca-
pacity-building at the regional level to implement the many demanding climate 
change decisions under CMS (see Resolutions 9.7 and 10.19).60 
As outlined above, the interactions between climate change and biodiversity are 
complex61 and there is ample of regional variation. To respond to the growing eco-
logical and socio-economic threat that climate change poses, not only coherent in-
ternational policy is needed but also consistent implementation. This is currently 
lacking, not least due to a lack of financial mechanisms. For forests, peatlands and 
other carbon-rich habitats, REDD+ offers a positive incentive; however, for the ma-
jority of habitats such mechanisms are lacking. Closer synergies between the biodi-
versity-related treaties, especially on climate change, in close cooperation with UN-
FCCC and UNCCD62 would certainly be beneficial, especially if this collaboration 
55 The Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, the Hague, 16 June 1995, 
into force 1 November 1999, <http://www.unep-aewa.org/>.
56 See <http://www.zsl.org/>.
57 CMS, ‘Executive Summary: Climate Change Vulnerability of Migratory Species’, UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/
ScC16/Inf.8 (2010); and CMS, ‘Report: Climate Change Vulnerability of Migratory Species’, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CMS/ScC16/Inf.8.1 (2010).
58 See <http://www.iucn.org>.
59 The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species a comprehensive, objective global approach for evaluating the 
conservation status of plant and animal species; see <http://www.iucnredlist.org/>.
60 Supra note 54; and ‘Migratory Species Conservation in the Light of Climate Change’, CMS Draft Reso-
lution 10.19, Un Doc. UNEP/CMS/Resolution 10.19 (2011).
61 See also: W. Foden et al., ‘Species Susceptibility to Climate Change Impacts’, in J.-C. Vié, C. Hilton-
Taylor and S. N. Stuart (eds), The	2008	Review	of	the	IUCN	Red	List	of	Threatened	Species (IUCN, 2008).
62 UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or Deserti-
fication, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996, 33 International	Legal	
Materials (1994) 1309, <http://www.unccd.int>.
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focused on the collaboration between focal points and implementing agencies at the 
national level as called for by Resolution 10.19. 
It is not only the changing nature of migration which parties need to address, but 
also the changing nature of humans in response to climate change. There are climate 
change mitigation measures, such as renewable energy and dam constructions, which 
can have significant negative impacts on biodiversity and especially migratory species. 
However, if the locations for developments are carefully chosen to avoid ecologically 
sensitive areas such as migration corridors and if prior, during and after construction 
appropriate measures are taken,63 mitigation measures need not have any significant 
negative impact on the environment. Furthermore, there are ‘tertiary effects’ to con-
sider, which are the additional impacts on the environment as a result of humans 
responding to climate change. New shipping routes are opening up in Arctic waters, 
for example, due to warmer temperatures and retreating ice. This brings with it dis-
turbance and potential exploitation to previously less disturbed regions. Resolution 
10.19 aims to address these matters. However, further research and regional capaci-
ty-building is urgently needed to move forward on this specific emerging issue. 
There are also a number of legal matters which need to be addressed by parties in the 
light of climate change. While under CMS relatively thorough and strong decisions 
on climate change have been adopted by the parties since 1997,64 there is a need, 
for example, for the list of range states for each species to be updated regularly to 
reflect changes due to climate change; maybe even the Convention text itself needs 
to be amended or reinterpreted.37 With regards to updating the list of range states, 
this can easily be done given that consensus exists amongst all the decision-makers. 
In fact, a number of CMS agreements have been amended during the last decade to 
expand the taxonomic and/or geographic scope of agreements.65 With regards to 
the amendment or re-interpretation of the Convention, the matter is more complex. 
When CMS was drafted in the 1970s, climate change was not yet recognized as a 
serious threat in the international policy arena. Thus, the provisions of the Conven-
tion do not explicitly address climate change. Within the treaty provisions, there are 
a number of sections favouring adaptation. However, it has been argued that the 
definitions of ‘historic coverage’ (Art. I(1)(c)(4)) and ‘range’ (Art. I(1)(f )) could be 
63 See, for example, G. C. Ledec, K. W. Rapp and R. G. Aiello, Greening the Wind: Environmental and 
Social Considerations for Wind Power Development in Latin America and Beyond. (World Bank, 2011), 
available at <http://www.esmap.org/esmap/sites/esmap.org/files/Greening_The_Wind_LAC_ESMAP_
June%202011.pdf> (visited 12 October 2011).
64 See ‘Climate Change and Its Implications for the Bonn Convention’, CMS Recommendation 5.5 (1997), 
available at <http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop5/English/Rec5.5_E.pdf> (visited 12 October 2011); 
‘Climate Change and Migratory Species’, CMS Resolution 8.13, UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/Resolution 8.13 
(2005); CMS Res. 9.7, supra note 54; and CMD Draft Res. 10.19, supra note 60.
65 For more information, see Proceedings of the UNEP/CMS Technical Workshop on the Impact of Climate 
Change on Migratory Species: the Current Status and Avenues for Action, 6–8 June, Tour du Valat, Ca-
margue, France, UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/ScC17/Inf.12 (2011).
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seen as a legal obstacle to adaptation.66 This is connected to a wider matter amongst 
a number of multilateral environmental agreements, which is the inconsistency in 
the definition of ‘conservation status’ or similar measures indicating how threatened 
a particular population or species is across different treaties. To solve this matter, a 
concerted effort by all decision-making bodies of a number of biodiversity-relevant 
treaties is required.
5  Summary and conclusions
It appears that climate change is likely to become the greatest overall threat to global 
biodiversity, including migratory species. Many animal species are changing their 
migratory pathways, and their arrival and departure times in response to climatic 
change, and some are already showing that they will have difficulty in adapting fast 
enough to the rapid changes in conditions. Because the process of migration is 
closely linked to climatic factors, and therefore sensitive to climatic change, migra-
tory species are useful early indicators of the changes taking place. 
The wealth of studies recording research on how migratory species are reacting to 
climate change is growing continuously, but the current understanding is far from 
adequate in order to predict future trends and therefore cannot serve to guide policy 
sufficiently. What is certain, however, is that ecological networks should provide the 
fundamental building block for national and international environmental policy to 
maximize the opportunities given to species, in fact biological diversity in general, 
to adapt to the effects of climate change. It is this which the CMS COP10 in 2011 
called for – the use of ecological networks for migratory species, not least to assist 
species in adapting to climate change. If species are able to move relatively freely, and 
have access to well-connected habitat at the different stages of their lifecycles, there 
is a good chance that many of the species we see today might still be seen in abun-
dance in years to come. Whilst many migratory species are already declining due to 
the adverse effects of climate change, the hope is that at least some will be able to 
cope with climate change – perhaps even due to the very fact that they are migra-
tory, and are therefore able to move large distances. 
It is imperative that the parties to multilateral environmental agreements make eve-
ry effort to ensure that the right governance structures are in place to allow these 
species to make such moves. Not only are closer synergies between the biodiversity-
related MEAs and UNFCCC essential, especially at the national level, but also the 
closer integration of biodiversity concerns into the available financial mechanisms 
such as the Carbon Investment Funds. The responsibility lies with parties to ensure 
that any mitigation funds are being spent not only in a carbon friendly manner, but 
66 Ibid.
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also taking into account environmental concerns mandated by other treaties ratified 
by the very same parties. 
Table 1: Non-conclusive list of factors affecting the vulnerability of migratory species 
to climate change67
• site-specificity to breeding and non-breeding habitats (especially to sites that will 
change habitat composition due to climate change)
• specialist versus generalist species (e.g. in terms of habitat or prey)
• site fidelity of migratory populations to sites that will become smaller or disappear 
due to climatic changes (e.g. the reduction of marine turtle nesting habitat due to 
changes in sea level)
• barriers to dispersal
• site restriction and limited available habitat (e.g. species on mountain tops, Arctic)
• long-distance migrants
• small populations with a lower adaptive capacity
• slow life history species with a lower adaptive capacity
• exploited and overharvested species 
• sex-determination process (e.g. marine turtle sex-determination is temperature 
dependent)
• habitat-specific dependency of a species or population on a habitat type that is 
likely to become rare or modified due to climate change (e.g. coral reefs, sea grass 
pastures, Karoo in Southern Africa)
• sensitivity of population dynamics on environmental triggers (e.g. timing of 
mating, hibernation, migration)
67 Source: ‘Climate Change and Migratory Species’, UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/Conf.9.24 (2008) p. 5.
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1 Introduction
Climate change is intertwined with ecosystem services. Climate regulation is one of 
the ecosystem services adversely affected by human activities. It is generally accepted 
that climate change is a result of the collapse of the climate regulation service. Thus, 
climate change is rather a symptom than a phenomenon in itself. The more complex, 
and more concerning, fact is that climate change is contributing to the degradation 
of other ecosystem services due to the interrelated nature of these services. 
This paper will clarify the significance of ecosystem services; introduce some of the 
results of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (hereinafter MA) which relate to 
the interrelated nature of climate regulation service and other ecosystem services; 
consider some proposals as to how to regulate human activities in order to protect 
ecosystem services; and conclude by discussing shortly the benefits of a new concept 
in environmental law and environmental governance. The international nature of the 
challenge of protecting ecosystem services and their functioning is arguably self-ev-
ident, but will be considered in the conclusions.
2 The Millenium Ecosystem Assessment and a new perspective 
on environmental degradation
Ecosystem services have been increasingly discussed by environmental economists 
since the end of the 1990s, when Gretchen C. Daily raised the concept to broader 
scientific audience.2 By the early 2000s, legal scholars (in the United States in 
1 LLM, Doctor of Admin. Sc. (Environmental Law). Current position legal counsel of the city of Savon-
linna.
2 Gretchen C. Daily (ed.), Nature’s	Services	–	Societal	Dependence	on	Natural	Ecosystems (Island Press, 1997). 
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particular)3 had also begun to recognize the importance of the concept. However, it 
was the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment4 that brought the concept into the centre 
of environmental discourse as the report reached political decision-makers world-
wide. 
The MA was a United Nations initiative carried out between 2001–2005 by an as-
tounding number of authors (1 360) and reviewers (850).5 The purpose of the 
assessment was, firstly, to assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human 
wellbeing; and, secondly, to establish the scientific basis for actions needed to en-
hance the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems and their contributions to 
human well-being.6 What was examined was an overarching concept of ecosystems 
as dynamic complexes of plant, animal, and microorganism communities and the 
nonliving environment interacting as functional units. In this purpose, a full range 
of ecosystems was covered ranging from relatively undisturbed (natural forests) to 
landscapes with mixed patterns of human use, and finally to ecosystems intensively 
managed and modified by humans (agricultural land and urban areas).
The report established a concept of ecosystem services which is currently widely used. 
The ecosystem services were defined as the benefits provided by ecosystems. These 
services are divided into four categories: firstly, provisioning services which are famil-
iar to us and subject to private rights and pricing mechanisms, for example food and 
fibre, freshwater and fuel; secondly, regulation services that are less visible and usu-
ally subject to open access, for example air quality regulation, climate regulation, 
erosion regulation, natural hazard regulation, pest regulation, pollination, water pu-
rification, and water regulation. Thirdly, cultural services such as aesthetic values, 
See on ecological economists, for instance, Rudolf S. de Groot, Matthew A Wilson, and Roelof M. J. 
Boumans, ‘A Typology for the Classification, Description, and Valuation of Ecosystem Functions, Goods 
and Services’, 41 Ecological	Economics (2002) 393–408; Robert Costanza and Steve Farber, ‘Introduction 
to the Special Issue on the Dynamics and Value of Ecosystem Services: Integrating Economic and Eco-
logical Perspectives’, 41 Ecological	Economics (2002) 367–373 and Herman Daly and Joshua Farley, Eco-
logical	Economics:	Principles	and	Applications (Island Press, 2004), to name just a few from the beginning 
of the 21st century.
3 Key legal scholars were James Salzman and J. B. Ruhl. See early discussion in, for instance, James Salzman, 
Barton H. Jr. Thompson and Gretchen C. Daily, ‘Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and 
Law’, 20 Stanford	Environmental	Law	Journal (2001) 309–332; and J. B. Ruhl and R. Juge Gregg, ‘Inte-
grating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case Study of Wetland Mitigation Banking’, 20 
Stanford	Environmental	Law	Journal (2001) 365–391. See also J. B. Ruhl, Steven E. Kraft and Christopher 
L. Lant, The	Law	and	Policy	of	Ecosystem	Services (Island Press, 2007).
4 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA synthesis): Ecosystems	and	Human	Well-being:	Synthesis (Island 
Press, 2005). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was called for by United Nations Secretary-Gener-
al Kofi Annan in 2000 in his report to the UN General Assembly, ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the 
United Nations in the 21st Century’ (available at <http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/> (visited 
10 May 2011)). Governments subsequently supported the establishment of the assessment and the MA 
was initiated in 2001. The assessment was conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, with the 
secretariat coordinated by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and it was governed 
by a multistakeholder board that included representatives of international institutions, governments, 
business, NGOs, and indigenous peoples.
5 MA synthesis, supra note 4, at	VIII. 
6 Ibid. at V.
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cultural diversity, ecotourism, educational values, inspiration, recreation, religious 
values and spiritual values. Fourthly, supporting services which support all of the 
other services, for example nutrient recycling, photosynthesis, primary production, 
soil formation and water recycling.7
The outcome of the assessment was that over the past 50 years, humans have changed 
ecosystems more extensively and more rapidly than in any comparable period of time 
in human history. This has resulted in a substantial and largely irreversible loss in the 
diversity of life on Earth.8 It was reported that the changes to ecosystems have con-
tributed to substantial net gains in human well-being and economic development, 
but that these gains have been achieved at significant, and increasing, cost. Again, if 
these problems remain unaddressed, they will substantially diminish the benefits that 
future generations obtain from ecosystems, despite the overall objective of sustainable 
development as agreed in Rio in 1992.9 
The report stated that approximately 60 per cent (15 out of 24) of the ecosystem 
services evaluated in the assessment are being degraded or used unsustainably.10 The 
degradation of ecosystem services often causes significant harm to human well-being 
and represents a loss of a natural asset or wealth of a country. According to the report, 
the status of practically all regulating services is deteriorating. In 2005, global climate 
control was identified as the only positive trend due to actions taken since 1992.11 
However, this optimistic view is unlikely to be shared today. 
The most visible collapse of regulating services is perhaps that of natural hazard 
regulation. The capacity of ecosystems to buffer extreme events and their impacts has 
reduced due to loss of wetlands, forests and mangroves. The impact of natural hazards 
such as floods or storms is increased by the fact that people increasingly occupy 
coastal regions which are exposed to extreme events.12 This, in turn, has increased 
the economic loss as well as human suffering caused by natural hazards.
3 The interrelatedness of ecosystem services 
Most of the ecosystem services are interlinked. Increased pressure on one is likely to 
have impacts on another. Climate change is likely to increase the degradation of 
other ecosystem services. It has already been observed that recently climate change 
has impacted ecosystems in the form of changes in species distributions, changes in 
population sizes, changes in the timing of reproduction or migration events and 
7 Ibid. at 39–40.
8 Ibid. at 1.
9 UN Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/
CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 876.
10 MA synthesis,	supra	note 4, at 6.
11 Ibid. at 7.
12 Ibid. at 43.
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increase in the frequency of pest and disease outbreaks. For instance, many coral reefs 
have undergone major, although often partially reversible, bleaching episodes when 
local sea surface temperatures have increased.13 Coral reefs host significant fish 
populations which will be adversely impacted if coral reefs deteriorate. 
The potential future impacts which were identified by the MA report are that, by the 
end of the 21st century, climate change and its impacts may be the dominant direct 
driver of biodiversity loss and changes in ecosystem services globally. Harm to bio-
diversity will grow worldwide with increasing rates of changes to climates and in-
creasing absolute amounts of change.14 
Some ecosystem services in some regions may initially be enhanced by projected 
changes in climate. As climate change becomes more severe, the harmful impacts 
outweigh the benefits in most regions of the world.15 The balance of scientific evi-
dence suggests that there will be a significant net harmful impact on ecosystem ser-
vices worldwide if the global mean surface temperature increases more than 2 degrees 
Celsius above preindustrial levels (medium certainty). This would require CO2 sta-
bilization at less than 450 ppm.16
Most direct drivers of degradation in ecosystem services remain constant or are grow-
ing in intensity.17 Climate change is a rapidly increasing driver for degradation of 
biodiversity in all ecosystems, and thus also has impacts on most ecosystem services, 
but its impact is high only in the polar regions. Change of habitats has the biggest 
impact as a single driver. The impacts of ecosystem services degradation are most 
evident and direct on those sectors of the human population living in poverty. Half 
of the urban population in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America suffers 
from one or more diseases associated with inadequate water and sanitation. The 
declining state of capture fisheries is reducing an inexpensive source of protein in 
developing countries. Per capita fish consumption in developing countries, excluding 
China, declined between 1985 and 1997. Desertification affects the livelihoods of 
millions of people, including a large portion of the poor in drylands.18
The increasing impact of climate change on other ecosystem services may well have 
a worsening effect – a downspin – as the degradation of, for example, provisioning 
services of fisheries or food production suffer from changing climate conditions. 
Thus, the already degrading provisioning services degrade further. This brings the 
idea of adaptation to climate change into a different light. How can one adapt to the 
degradation of the entire basis of human wellbeing?
13 Ibid. at 70.
14 Ibid. at 17. 
15 Ibid. at 79.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. figure 13.
18 Ibid. at 13.
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Past responses to ecosystem degradation have yielded significant benefits, but these 
improvements have generally not kept pace with growing pressures and demands. By 
the time of publication of the MA there were more than 100  000 protected areas 
covering about 11.7 per cent of the terrestrial surface.19 Protected areas have an 
important role in the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Techno-
logical advances in production processes and increased energy and water efficiency 
have reduced the pressure on ecosystems.20 This, however, creates false sense of se-
curity, as the total demand for goods and services increases along with the number 
of people reaching western consumption standards even though per	unit pressure 
decreases. Substitutes can be developed for some but not all ecosystem services – 
water purification can be achieved with purification plants and pollination with 
rented domesticated bees as in United States – with significantly higher costs though 
–, but water retention, for instance, requires forest cover. Substitutes may also have 
other negative environmental consequences. Using the same examples, water purifi-
cation plants, for instance, use chemical processes to clean the water and use energy, 
while use of domesticated bees for fruit farm pollination requires transport and may 
pose a threat of spreading of, for instance, pests or disease to natural fauna.
4 The significance of economic recognition of the ecosystem 
services
Degradation of ecosystem services leads to the loss of non-marketed benefits pro-
vided by ecosystems. The economic value of these benefits is often high and some-
times higher than the marketed benefits.21 The total economic value associated with 
managing ecosystems more sustainably would most often be higher than the value 
associated with the conversion of ecosystems.22 Conversion of ecosystems may, 
however, still occur because private economic benefits are often greater for the con-
verted system and, most importantly, the non-marketed benefits do not generate 
income to the land owner who is making decisions over his/her land use.
The economic value of ecosystem services is revealed by scarcity. Scarcity is caused 
by over-exploitation or tradeoffs between ecosystem services. The price can be as-
sessed in the form of the costs of substitutes or lost income. The annual value of lost 
biodiversity and the related ecosystem services in 2000–2010 has been estimated to 
be 50 billion euros.23 At the current rate, seven per cent of the world’s gross na-
tional product is likely to be lost by the year 2050.24 A practical example can be 
19 Ibid. at 19.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. figures 3.2 and 3.3.
22 Ibid. figure 9.
23 The	Economics	of	Ecosystems	and	Biodiversity	–	Interim	report	(The European Communities, 2008), available 
at <http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/TEEB/TEEB_interim_report.pdf> (visited 13 January 2011) 
at 35.
24 Ibid.
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found in New York city, where the Catskill watershed water purification service was 
protected at the cost of 1.5 billion US dollars. However, the potential substitute in 
the form of a water purification plant would have cost four to five-fold – 6–8 billion 
US dollars in construction costs only and another 300 million US dollars annually 
as the running costs of the plant.25 
MA conclusions propose responses to the challenge of how to protect ecosystem 
services. They relate to five topics: economics, institutions, knowledge, social and 
behavioral aspects, and technology. A number of these proposals relate to barriers to 
successful responses, for instance to market failures and the misalignment of eco-
nomic incentives; to social and behavioral factors, including the lack of political and 
economic power of some groups that are particularly dependent on ecosystem ser-
vices or harmed by their degradation; to insufficient knowledge (as well as the poor 
use of existing knowledge) concerning ecosystem services and responses that could 
enhance benefits from these services while conserving resources; and to inability to 
recognize the value of ecosystem services.26 Accordingly, the MA proposed several 
responses to meet the mentioned challenges, inter alia: 1) institutional responses such 
as increased transparency and accountability of government and private-sector ac-
tivities and decisions with impact on ecosystems; 2) economic responses, including 
elimination of subsidies, to promote the use of ecosystem services (transformation 
of subsidies to payments for non-marketed ecosystem services) and greater use of 
economic instruments (taxes, fees) and market-based approaches in the management 
of ecosystem services (payments for ecosystem services and certification); and 3) 
lastly, but not least importantly, knowledge includes incorporation of nonmarket 
values of ecosystems in resource management decisions.27 
5 Examples of potential instruments for protection of 
ecosystem services
One potential instrument for enhancing the protection of ecosystem services that 
has been identified is market creation, where this provides income to the ecosystem 
service producer and charges those benefitting from the ecosystem service. This type 
of instrument has the benefit of providing an incentive: payment for producing or 
sustaining the service gives an incentive to the landowner to protect the service 
rather than to convert the land for another use, usually for the detriment of the 
ecosystem service provided by it in its natural state. At the same time, market creation 
attaches a price tag to the ecosystem service and thus serves to remind the user of the 
economic significance of the service. This increases awareness of its economic impor-
25 Gretchen C. Daily and Katherine Ellison, The	New	Economy	of	Nature	–	The	Quest	to	Make	Conservation	
Profitable (Island Press, 2002).
26 MA synthesis,	supra	note 4, at 92.
27 Ibid. at 93–98.
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tance and gives transparency to the cost effect of activities and decisions degrading 
the ecosystem service. 
There are hundreds of examples of payments for ecosystem services worldwide.28 
These often relate to fresh water, either for irrigation as in Australia,29 or for human 
consumption as in Central or South America.30 However, this may prove to be a 
double-edged sword: how can one address the injustice of the pricing mechanisms 
as the poor are most affected and less capable of paying more? In addition, the in-
creased price may act contrary to the objective and reduce the ethical commitment 
to protect the environment as the item in question comes to be seen as merchandise. 
Such a development has been witnessed for instance in Athens where the implemen-
tation of a water pricing mechanism reduced residents’ commitment to saving fresh 
water and in fact appeared to have the effect of increasing the use of water by private 
individuals.31 
One of the most efficient market creations so far witnessed concerned a single group 
of actors which faced a loss of income due to their unorchestrated actions. New 
Zealand was on the brink of seeing a total collapse of its fisheries in the 1980s. Con-
sequently, the state introduced a cap-and-trade scheme for all commercial fishing. 
An annual total catch was set jointly by scientists, government and fisheries industry 
and this annual quota was – and still is – distributed  to individual fishermen or 
companies. These actors trade amongst themselves according to an actual catch and 
restrain their fishing below the set total catch to avoid sanctions. This has proved 
successful and has made New Zealand a world leader in current fisheries manage-
ment.32 Environmental economists regard the evidence to date to suggest that in 
reasonably economic sophisticated markets market-based quota systems are poten-
tially effective instruments for efficient fisheries management.33 However, without 
the support of credible supervision and sanctions the quota system is less likely to be 
successful.
Another potential policy instrument which might be used to enhance protection of 
ecosystem services is the imposition of a duty to provide for an ecological compensa-
tion for the degraded service (often referred to as ‘offsetting’). Such an instrument 
28 James Salzman, ‘Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 New	York	University	
Law	Review (2005), 870–961 at 874.
29 Sharon Beder, Environmental	Principles	 and	Policies:	An	 Interdiciplinary	Approach (University of New 
South Wales Press, 2006).
30 Stefano Pagiola et al., Paying	for	Biodiversity	Conservation	Services	in	Agricultural	Landscapes, The World 
Bank Environment Department Paper 96 (World Bank, 2004), available at	<http://siteresources.world-
bank.org/INTEEI/Resources/PayingforBiodiversityConservationServicesinAgriculturalLandscapes.pdf> 
(visited 24 January 2010).
31 Dimitrios Zikos, ‘Urban Water Dilemmas under the Multi-Dimensional Prism of Sustainability’, 8 Trans-
actions	on	Business	and	Economics (2008) 413–422.
32 Richard G. Newell, James N. Sanchirico and Suzi Kerr, ‘Fishing Quota Markets’, 49 Journal	of	Environ-
mental	Economics	and	Management (2005) 437–462.
33 Ibid. at 460.
252
Ecosystem Services and Climate Change
has been long used in the United States where the conversion of a wetland site has 
been allowed only where the wetland functions of the converted area are substituted 
by rehabilitation or recreation of another wetland site.34 This has the benefit of 
sustaining the level of ecosystem functions, provided the offsetting takes place before 
the damage to the service is allowed and provided it is spatially connected to the af-
fected area (usually this would mean located in the same catchment area). Offsetting 
is an effective instrument only if the ecosystem services can sustain some level of 
degradation as the substitution does not take place on the spot.35 The biggest chal-
lenge has been the uncertainty of the effectiveness of offsetting.36
Furthermore, economic incentives can be used to initiate beneficial activities such as 
restoration of lost services or ecosystems as in the Australian Bush Tender scheme, 
where landowners are encouraged to submit auction bids for native vegetation ac-
tivities financed by the state. Successful bids result in management agreements which 
are binding on the landowner as well as subsequent landowners.37
What remains obvious is that there is no ‘one size fits all’ instrument available as the 
situations causing degradation of ecosystem services vary. One can identify at least 
three different scenarios: 1) a group of people acting in the same individual interest 
cause a cumulative degradation of a service which benefits them all (for instance, 
over-exploitation of fisheries); 2) one or more users of an ecosystem service exploit 
the service in a manner which causes degradation of another service (for instance, 
through the use of pesticides in agriculture leading to loss of pollinators; overuse of 
fertilizers resulting in the degradation of fresh water used for drinking or recreation; 
or logging leading to a loss of water retention and, consequently, to a reduction in 
the availability of fresh water); and 3) the land use being changed from ecosystem 
service use to another use (such as housing) and the ecosystem service produced by 
the ecosystem in its natural state thus being lost.
6 The value of the concept of ecosystem services
The new concept of ecosystem services benefits environmental law and governance 
by improving understanding of the significance of the environment and natural 
34 Jonathan Silverstein, ‘Taking Wetlands to the Bank: The Role of Wetland Mitigation Banking in a Com-
prehensive Approach to Wetlands Protection’, 22 Environmental Affairs Law Review (1994) 129–161; 
and J. B. Ruhl, Steven E. Kraft and Christopher L. Lant, The	Law	and	Policy	of	Ecosystem	Services (Island 
Press, 2007).
35 Louise Fromond, Jukka Similä and Leila Suvantola, ‘Regulatory Innovations for Biodiversity Protection 
in Private Forests’. 21 Journal	of	Environmental	Law (2009) 1–32, at 26.
36 Ibid. at 23.
37 Victoria Department of Sustainability and Environment, BushTender:	Rethinking	Investment	for	Native	Veg-
etation	Outcomes.	The Application	of	Auctions	for	Securing	Private	Land	Management	Agreements (The State of 
Victoria, 2008), available at <http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/E8653777854ADDC8C
A25747100005E2C/$File/BushTender_rethinking+investment_web.pdf> (visited 14 January 2011). See 
also on the scheme Fromond, Similä and Suvantola, Regulatory Innovations’, supra note 35, at 16–20.
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processes to individual good life (air quality, climate, food, pure water, and security). 
This concept simplifies the concept of climate change as well as the loss of biodiver-
sity into more easily comprehensible costs of life. It needs to be admitted that to an 
ordinary person the fact of climate change might not necessarily seem bad news: in 
many areas climates might even improve, distracting from the true picture of overall 
negative effects. The ecosystem services concept also, importantly, gives decision-
makers a better understanding of the true costs of environmental degradation. Eco-
logical accounting, such as the TEEB,38 also gives transparency to the costs which 
have been ignored and externalized so far.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the concept of ecosystem services ought to 
serve to shift attention from symptoms (obvious losses of biodiversity, observable 
climate change, visible pollution) to the real reasons (impacts of activities on ecosys-
tem services functions, conflicting interests and tradeoffs) and thus perhaps provide 
a move toward solutions such as recognition of a wider variety of policy instrument 
choices. In Australia, for instance, land clearance for agriculture was in the past re-
garded as a natural resource use issue. Now it is seen as a biodiversity issue, due to 
our better understanding of natural complexity. In effect, land clearance has led to 
the degradation of the land’s capacity for food production due to salination39 and, 
thus, it is also an ecosystem service issue.
The ecosystem services concept requires new types of regulation and regulatory in-
struments. Simple legislative prohibitions on degrading activities have generally 
proved insufficient worldwide. Instead, there is a need for instruments that would 
make supporting of the services economically more beneficial than is ‘ordinary’ trans-
formation of the ecosystem.
There is a strong need for international cooperation in the protection of ecosystem 
services due to the fact that ecosystem services are often shared on a regional scale by 
two or more states (catchment areas providing for water purification, fresh water or 
aquaculture), while some services benefit and are adversely affected globally. Some 
ecosystem services, such as fisheries, are by nature open access and, thus, no single 
state has the interest of protecting them alone. Moreover, in the global market, the 
financial benefits provided by ecosystem services in general, and provisioning ser-
vices, in particular, and the costs due to the degradation of ecosystem services do not 
meet. Most often the price of the product, such as tulips cultivated in Eastern Africa 
and sold in Northern Europe, does not cover the cost to the developing country 
caused by land conversion leading to diminished fresh water for local people and 
irrigation of local agriculture.
38 The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity Initiative, see <http://www.teebweb.org>.
39 Land clearing causes rise of the water level which in turn raises to the surface soil salt which occurs natu-
rally in the ground, a problem caused by Australian peculiar geological conditions. See Rosemary Lyster, 
Zada Lipman, Nicola Franklin, Graeme Wiffen, and Linda Pearson, Environmental	and	Planning	Law	in	
New	South	Wales (the Federation Press, 2007) at 288.
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The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment has resulted in the initiative for interna-
tional payments for ecosystem services, promoted by the UNEP.40 The initiative is 
based on the findings of the MA and it aims at responding to the very problem of 
the ‘polluter pays principle’ in international sphere, how to get the costs and benefits 
meet.41 The eighth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biodiversity 
(CBD)42 expressed its support to the initiative in order to push forward the effort to 
develop positive incentives to create financing for preventing the loss of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services. Development of payments to avoid deforestation would help 
to combat climate change. 
The awareness of ecosystem services and their nature may not need to result in spe-
cific international agreements on the very topic. Rather, the understanding of the 
state of ecosystem services and the reasons for it may help to develop existing regimes 
to better achieve the targets of biodiversity conservation, combating climate change 
and desertification as well as protection of our common resources such as the fisher-
ies while also finding ways of fairer sharing of the environmental costs – such as the 
international payments for ecosystem services.
40 See UNEP, ‘International payments for ecosystem services’, available at <http://www.unep.ch/etb/areas/
ipes.php> (visited 8 May 2011).
41 UNEP, IUCN with CBD, International	Payments	for	Ecosystem	Services	(IPES), available at <http://www.
unep.ch/ewtb/events/IPES Side Event Bonn/IPES SUM FINAL.pdf> (visited 8 May 2011). See also 
OECD, Paying	for	Biodiversity	–	Enhancing	the	Cost-Effectiveness	of	Payments	for	Ecosystem	Services (OECD, 
2010).
42 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993, 31 Inter-
national	Legal	Materials (1992) 822, <http://www.biodiv.org>.
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Marko	Berglund1	and	Kati	Kulovesi 2
1 Overview
1.1 Introduction
This paper sets out the elements and structure of the simulation exercise for the 
seventh University of Eastern Finland – UNEP course on Multilateral Environmen-
tal Agreements (MEAs). The exercise focused on some key procedural and substan-
tive issues related to ongoing negotiations, under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),3 on enhancing international climate 
change cooperation. The scenario placed participants at the United Nations Climate 
Change Conference in Cancún, Mexico and the 16th session of the Conference of 
the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 16).4 
The simulation scenario and the issues therein reflected recent actual work by the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC 
(AWG-LCA). The mandate of the AWG-LCA derives from the Bali Action Plan,5 
which calls for agreement on ‘a shared vision for long-term cooperative action, in-
cluding a global long-term goal for emission reductions’. Negotiations on a shared 
1 Senior Officer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland; formerly Programme Officer, Division of Environmen-
tal Law and Conventions, United Nations Environment Programme. Email: Marko.Berglund@formin.fi.
2 Post-Doctoral Researcher, University of Eastern Finland. Team Leader/Writer, the Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin/International Institute for Sustainable Development. Affiliated Research Fellow, the Erik Castrén 
Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki. E-mail: kati.kulovesi@gmail.
com.
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 
1994, 31 International	Legal	Materials (1992) 849, <http://unfccc.int>.
4 The exercise took place in August 2010. The actual UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun took 
place from 29 November to 10 December 2010.
5 Decision 1/CP.13 ‘Bali Action Plan’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 13th sess., UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (2008), Appendum.
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vision are closely linked to the other building blocks of the Bali Action Plan, name-
ly adaptation, finance, mitigation and technology and capacity-building. These issues 
form the key pillars of future climate change cooperation under the UNFCCC. They 
were also addressed in the Copenhagen Accord,6 which was negotiated at COP 15 
by a small group but which was not adopted by the COP due to lack of consensus. 
Deliberations on the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord focused on procedural 
issues; in particular, on the transparency and inclusiveness of its negotiating process. 
In the end, COP 15 agreed to ‘take note’ of the Copenhagen Accord; and to extend 
the AWG-LCA’s mandate for one more year, requesting it to report the results of its 
work for adoption by COP 16.7 During the simulation exercise, participants were 
asked to negotiate procedural and substantive issues resembling those that had played 
an important role in Copenhagen. 
1.2 Simulation objectives
Questions concerning process and the textual basis of Parties’ work play an important 
role in negotiations under MEAs, as is illustrated by recent developments within 
UNFCCC negotiations. The simulation exercise focused on the following issues:
1.  discussion and appreciation of the key elements of international climate 
change cooperation;
2.  understanding of the principles and practices of multilateral negotiation and 
appreciation of the value of procedural issues, including the rules of proce-
dure; and
3.  familiarity with specific substantive and drafting issues, as well as legal im-
plications of different types of instruments.
The simulation exercise was linked to questions concerning process and transpar-
ency. One of the tasks for the participants was to try to reach agreement on the 
process for finalizing negotiations on the Bali Action Plan at COP 16. At the same 
time, the simulation exercise touched upon some of the key substantive issues in the 
ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC. It also addressed the question concerning 
the legal form of the outcome, enabling participants to consider differences between 
various legal instruments.
1.3 Scenario
The scenario for the simulation exercise was set at COP 16 and partly resembled the 
situation in the beginning of the second week of the UN Climate Change Confer-
6 Decision 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 15th sess., UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010).
7 Decisions 1/CP.15 ‘Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention’ and 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, in UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/
Add.1 (2010).
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ence in Copenhagen, while also taking into account progress made during 2010. The 
task for the participants was to prepare for the arrival of the ministers at the end of 
COP 16 by aiming to reach agreement on the negotiating process during the High-
level segment; and to identify ‘crunch’ issues possibly requiring political input from 
the ministers. They also had to work to ‘clean up’ the negotiating text before the 
ministers’ arrival and provide clear options on issues where agreement without po-
litical input might not be possible. Participants were also required to consider the 
legal form of the AWG-LCA’s outcome. To complete these tasks, the exercise involved 
the establishment of three groups with the following basic set up and tasks:
• Group A: Informal consultations focusing on a proposal by the COP Presi-
dent to establish a small ‘Friends of the Chair’ group to negotiate ‘crunch 
issues’ during the High-level segment. 
• Group B: A contact group that focused on cleaning up text on a shared vision 
for long-term cooperative action so that the text would be ready for possible 
consideration by the ministers during the High-level segment.
• Group C: A contact group that focused on the legal form of the AWG-LCA’s 
outcome. 
Participants were given general instructions detailing the scenario and tasks of the 
three groups. They were also provided with individual instructions with information 
on countries, which they were asked to represent. Certain participants were also 
given specific roles, such as COP President, Co-Facilitator or Co-Chair or Secre-
tariat. The participants were asked to use a draft negotiating text by the AWG-LCA 
Chair (FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/8) as a basis for their substantive discussions
1.4 Introduction to the exercise8
Participants were instructed to play their part in the overall scenario for the simula-
tion, following both general and individual instructions. They were encouraged to 
cooperate to develop alliances and coordinated strategies. It was suggested that par-
ticipants consider developing joint proposals and making interventions on behalf of 
more than one Party, and that they consider using regional and negotiation groups 
as a point of departure. They were also asked to keep in mind their interests and 
positions on all issues, but to focus primarily on issues assigned to their own drafting 
group. 
Participants were encouraged to work hard towards their objectives, keeping in mind 
the draft rules of procedure being applied under the UNFCCC. They were also asked 
8 This section has benefited from insights from previous years’ exercises and published in previous editions 
of this Review, such as Cam Carruthers and Marko Berglund, ‘Negotiating Procedures: A Multilateral 
Simulation Exercise based on the Compliance Procedure under the 1996 Procedure to the London Con-
vention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution’ in Ed Couzens and Tuula Honkonen (eds), International	
Environmental	Lawmaking	and	Diplomacy	Review	2008,	University of Joensuu – UNEP Course Series 8 
(University of Joensuu, 2009), 241–256 at 244–245.
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to elaborate on their positions and to intervene in the drafting groups and plenary 
even when they had no specific instructions to do so. During the final day of the 
two-day exercise, participants were given the choice to ‘call their capital’ and receive 
further instructions from the exercise coordinators. 
Participants were also reminded that delegates to MEA negotiations often face situ-
ations similar to the simulation, where there is only limited time and opportunity to 
prepare, but objectives still need to be defined and strategies still need to be devel-
oped. Overall, the simulation was designed to be difficult, with failure to reach agree-
ment a real possibility. It must also be emphasized that the scenario was entirely 
hypothetical and, while being realistic, was not intended to reflect specific positions 
of particular Parties or the views of individuals. 
It was suggested to the participants that informal diplomacy is where most progress 
toward agreement on concepts is made; while drafting groups and plenary discus-
sions are often required for agreement on specific texts. Drafting often involves a fine 
balance between accommodation and clarity. Decision-making in plenary may be 
pro forma, but there can be surprises. Decisions in the plenary are critical and can 
sometimes move very quickly, at times shifting back and forth on an agenda, so that 
being prepared to make an effective intervention at any moment is essential. 
2 Instructions
2.1 General instructions
The following general instructions were provided to all participants:
1. At a minimum, please review the general and individual instructions and the 
key simulation documents.9
2. Each participant will be assigned a role as a representative of a Party, or as a 
Secretariat official. Additional confidential individual instructions will be 
provided to each participant.
3. Participants representing Parties	have been sent with full credentials from 
their governments to participate in the conference, using their confidential 
individual instructions as a guide. Parties should do their best to achieve the 
objectives in their instructions. They should develop a strategy and an inte-
grated rationale to support their positions. Do not share your confidential 
individual instructions with other participants. Do not concede to a fall-back 
position without a serious effort to achieve your primary objective (and not 
on the first day!). Consider consulting with others before the session, to 
9 See also Cam Carruthers (ed.), Multilateral	Environmental	Agreement	Negotiators’	Handbook, University 
of Joensuu – UNEP course series 5 (2nd ed. 2007, University of Joensuu); in particular, see sections 3.1, 
3.2, 3.3, 3.6, 2.4, 4.3 and 5.
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identify and coordinate with those who have similar instructions, and even 
prepare joint interventions. You should build alliances and try to support 
anyone with a similar position who is out numbered. You should try to 
identify participants with opposing views, and influence them both in formal 
negotiations, as well as in informal settings. At any time, you may receive 
supplementary instructions. Participants should, of course, always be respect-
ful of each other’s views and background. 
4. Participants playing the role of Secretariat officials will support the Presi-
dency and group Co-chairs, and join specific groups, in an advisory role only. 
Secretariat officials support the process and the Parties in any appropriate 
manner. Secretariat officials support the contact groups and work directly 
with the COP President, co-chairs, facilitators and rapporteurs, and respond 
to requests from Parties.
5. The Simulation Coordinators (Marko Berglund and Kati Kulovesi) may, as 
needed, play the role of the AWG-LCA Chair, UNFCCC Executive Secretary, 
and/or one of the designated senior government officials in a state’s capital 
authorized to provide supplementary instructions to their delegations. The 
Simulation Coordinators will remain as far as possible outside of the simulation 
and should not be consulted unless necessary. Questions on procedure, etc. 
should a priori be addressed to the COP Presidency, Contact Group Co-Chairs 
/ Co-Facilitators of the informal consultations or Secretariat Officials.
6. In the COP plenary and smaller groups, the COP President / Co-Chairs / 
Co-Facilitators sit at the head of the room, with the Secretariat officials beside 
them. Parties will be provided with a ‘flag’ or country nameplate (fold it 
twice, so the name is in the mid panel). To speak, please raise your ‘flag’ and 
signal the Secretariat official keeping the speakers’ list. Secretariat Officials 
will have their own name plates. 
7. The COP will begin work in plenary. The COP will establish two contact 
groups (Groups B and C) and one informal group (Group A) to consider 
specific issues.
8. The first task for Parties is to elect two Co-chairs for each of the two contact 
groups (Groups B and C) and one additional co-facilitator for the informal 
group (Group A). The usual practice for such groups is that one Co-chair is 
from a developing country and the other is from a developed country. For 
this exercise, selection should be based on informal consultations, and de-
cided by consensus given the fact that no voting rules have been adopted 
under the UNFCCC.
9. When the COP plenary breaks into the three groups, please join the group 
identified in your individual instructions. The groups will operate much like 
an informal drafting group (see the MEA	Negotiator’s	Handbook).
10. The three groups will begin their work in a plenary, and they must reach 
agreement on what to report back to the COP plenary. It is possible for the 
three groups to break into smaller drafting groups to work on text or to try 
to reach agreement on sensitive issues. Such drafting groups should be run 
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on an informal basis, with reference to participants by name not country. 
Each such group will select a facilitator to manage the meeting (see the MEA	
Negotiator’s	Handbook, on drafting, especially use of brackets).
11. Once elected, co-chairs and facilitators must play their roles throughout the 
negotiation simulation exercise, and refrain from openly taking positions. 
12. Please follow the draft rules of procedure of the UNFCCC provided in these 
materials. 
13. Please use only the materials provided, as well as advice and information from 
other participants, and don’t be distracted by internet resources or use any 
precedent found there or elsewhere (even though this is often a good idea in 
real life!).	
14. The exercise takes place over a two-day period. Participants are encouraged 
to consult informally in the evening of the first day (as often happens in real 
life) to from alliances and broker solutions.
2.2 Individual instructions
The core of the simulation was set out in confidential individual instructions of ap-
proximately one to two pages in length. They provided very brief positions and fall-
back positions on each of the issues under discussion, but no rationales or strategies; 
these were to be developed by each participant. It was noted to the participants that, 
in some cases, the instructions might seem contradictory – something that also hap-
pens in real life, and which is interesting to watch! Instructions were provided in a 
simplified form rather than by way of official delegation instructions. In some cases, 
instructions stipulated that a position could not be abandoned for a fall-back position 
without consultation with a designated senior official in the state’s capital. Parties 
were referred to the MEA	Negotiators’	Handbook for further guidance in dealing with 
procedural and strategic issues.
3 Informal documents and background information provided
3.1 Brief overview of ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC
The following additional information was provided to simulation participants.
3.1.1 Two-track negotiations 
Negotiations to enhance long-term international climate change cooperation are 
currently taking place under the UNFCCC. The deadline for completing these ne-
gotiations is the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 16) and sixth Conference 
of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 6). 
This brief overview, written by Kati Kulovesi, describes the negotiating process and 
the key issues thus far. It also outlines some of the main procedural issues during the 
last days of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. 
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The international climate change negotiations are taking place on two legally and 
procedurally distinct ‘tracks’.10 The so-called Protocol track was launched by the first 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP 1) in 2005 on the basis of Article 3(9) of the Kyoto Protocol and it focuses 
on Annex I Parties’ commitments beyond the first Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period in 2008–2012. The main issue under this negotiating track concerns Annex 
I Parties’ emission reductions in the post-2012 period. The work is carried out by the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). The AWG-KP’s work programme also covers so-called 
‘other issues’, which relate to the means available for Annex I Parties to reach their 
emission reduction commitments; and include issues such as market-based flexibil-
ity mechanisms and land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
While the mandate of the AWG-KP is limited to Annex I Parties’ further commit-
ments under the Kyoto Protocol, a broader negotiating track under the Convention 
was launched by COP 13 in 2007. The key instrument in this regard is the Bali Ac-
tion Plan (Decision 1/CP.13), which identifies the key elements or ‘building blocks’ 
for enhancing the Convention’s implementation – namely mitigation, adaptation, 
finance as well as technology and capacity-building. The Bali Action Plan also calls 
for agreement on ‘a shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a global 
long-term goal for emission reductions’. COP 13 established a new subsidiary body, 
the Ad	Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC 
(AWG-LCA) to undertake the work needed to reach agreement on the issues identi-
fied in the Bali Action Plan. Parties also agreed on the Bali Roadmap, setting out a 
two-year negotiating process with the objective of concluding work under both ne-
gotiating tracks at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 
2009. 
In order to reach agreement by the deadline, a number of UNFCCC negotiating 
sessions took place in 2008 and 2009 with the two AWGs always convening in par-
allel. Issues relevant to the UNFCCC negotiations were also taken up in a number 
of other international fora: the Group of Eight (G-8);11 the Group of Twenty (G-
20);12 the Greenland Dialogue13 convened by the Danish COP Presidency; and the 
10 For a comprehensive overview of the UNFCCC negotiating process and key substantive issues, see Kati 
Kulovesi and Maria Gutierrez, ‘Climate Change Negotiations Update: Process and Prospects for Copen-
hagen Agreed Outcome in December 2009’, 18 Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Envi-
ronmental	Law (2009) 229–243. 
11 G-8 is a forum that was originally created in the 1970s for the governments of six major economies: 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Later on, also Canada and 
Russia have joined the group. The European Union is currently also represented within the Group.
12 The G-20 is a group of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, established in 1999 in the wake 
of the Asian financial crisis. Its main focus is on issues related to economic stability. Its members are: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom and the US. 
13 The Greenland Dialogue initially convened in Ilulissat, Greenland in 2005. It subsequently served as an 
informal forum for ministers to discuss climate change issues outside the UNFCCC negotiation process 
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Major Economies’ Forum on Energy and Climate14 launched by US President 
Obama. On 22 September 2009, approximately 100 of the world’s leaders attended 
the UN Secretary-General’s Summit on Climate Change in New York in an attempt 
to strengthen political will to reach agreement in Copenhagen. Regardless of these 
efforts, expectations for Copenhagen were consistently lowered throughout 2009 and 
many critical issues remained outstanding when Parties convened in Copenhagen, 
Denmark from 7 to 18 December 2009.
3.1.2 The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen15
Some of the main issues characterizing the Copenhagen Conference included un-
precedented public interest and political pressure. More nearly 120 heads of State 
and government attended the joint High-level segment of the COP and CMP at the 
end of the Conference. The Conference was also subject to unprecedented media 
attention and in total nearly 40  000 people applied for accreditation, far exceeding 
the capacity of the conference venue in the Bella Centre. Access to the venue was 
further restricted during the High-level segment. This gave rise to numerous com-
plaints concerning transparency from organizations that normally participate in the 
UNFCCC negotiations as observers. 
Also in terms of the negotiations, the Copenhagen Conference was characterized by 
complex discussions on procedure and transparency. With many outstanding issues 
remaining, both AWGs continued their work in Copenhagen. Their deadline for 
reporting their respective outcomes to the COP and CMP was 16 December 2009, 
in other words, the second Wednesday of the Conference. As had been commonly 
expected, neither AWG was able to reach agreement on the key outstanding issues 
by the deadline. The AWG-KP finished its work without a result late on Tuesday 
evening, while the AWG-LCA continued its closing plenary throughout the night 
until early Wednesday morning. 
On Wednesday morning, 16 December 2009, the CMP convened to hear the AWG-
KP’s report. After the report, the Danish COP Presidency briefly notified the CMP 
of its intention to table a text (commonly referred to as the ‘Danish text’) and then 
proceeded to open the joint High-level segment of the COP and CMP. However, 
many Parties raised points of order to interrupt the opening of the High-level seg-
in the lead-up to the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009. Convened by Denmark, 
the Greenland Dialogue tended to include ministers and heads of delegation from around 29 countries.
14 The Major Economies’ Forum on Energy and Climate was launched by President Barack Obama in 2009 
and it has met ten times by April 2011. The Forum is intended to facilitate a candid dialogue among 
major developed and developing economies. The 17 major economies participating Forum are: Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United Nations has also 
regularly participated in the forum. A number of other countries have attended some of the sessions.
15 This overview is adapted and elaborated from ‘Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference’, 
12 (459) The	Earth	Negotiations	Bulletin; ‘Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Talks’, 12 (460) The	
Earth	Negotiations	Bulletin; and ‘Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Talks’, 12 (472) The	Earth	Ne-
gotiations	Bulletin. The reports are available through <http://www.iisd.ca>.
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ment, questioning the Danish proposal and raising concerns over transparency of the 
process. Some also stressed that text negotiated by the Parties, rather than a text ta-
bled by the COP Presidency, should form the basis of further work. All-day informal 
consultations ensued on how to move forward. The COP plenary convened late on 
Wednesday evening to hear, briefly, the AWG-LCA’s report. Parties were then in-
formed that consultations by the COP Presidency on how to proceed were still 
continuing.
At around noon on Thursday, 17 December 2009, the COP plenary resumed. COP 
President Lars Løcke Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark, reported on his in-
formal consultations and explained that further work would be based on negotiating 
texts forwarded to the COP by the AWG-LCA. Parties agreed to establish a contact 
group with a mandate to complete work on unresolved issues ‘within a short dead-
line’. They further agreed that open-ended drafting groups facilitated by people 
whom the Parties ‘know and trust’ would also be established. Immediately after-
wards, the CMP plenary convened and a similar agreement was reached; in other 
words, that a contact group, assisted by drafting groups, would be established to 
conclude work based on the text presented by the AWG-KP. 
The two contact groups thus began working on Thursday afternoon, with each divid-
ing into smaller drafting groups. Late in the evening, both contact groups held 
‘stocktaking’ meetings. After progress reports were presented from the drafting 
groups, Parties exchanged views on how to proceed. In the CMP contact group, the 
European Union proposed to proceed by establishing a ‘Friends of the Chair’ group. 
The proposal was supported by the key negotiating groups, including the Group of 
77 and China (G-77/China),16 the African Group17 and the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS).18 The G-77/China highlighted the importance of the smaller group 
reporting back to the contact group with a view to reaching a party-driven consensus. 
The contact group meeting was then closed and the COP President’s Special Repre-
sentative Connie Hedegaard proceeded to consult Parties informally on how to 
proceed with the establishment of the ‘Friends of the Chair’ group. 
In the COP contact group, a proposal was also made to proceed by establishing a 
‘Friends of the Chair’ group. This proposal was supported by several developed and 
16 In the UNFCCC negotiations, developing countries generally work through the Group of 77 and China 
to establish common negotiating positions. The G-77/China was founded in 1964 in the context of the 
UN Conference on Trade and Development and now functions throughout the UN system. It has over 
130 members.
17 The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is a coalition of some 43 low-lying and small island countries, 
most of which are members of the G-77, that are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise. They usually 
take a common position in the UNFCCC negotiations.
18 Based on the tradition of the United Nations, UNFCCC Parties are organized into five regional groups, 
mainly for the purposes of electing the Bureau, namely: African States, Asian States, Eastern European 
States, Latin American and the Caribbean States, and the Western European and Other States. Of these, 
the African Group often has a common position in the UNFCCC negotiations. Its members are also 
members of the G-77.
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developing countries. Some developing countries, however, raised concerns over the 
transparency of the proposed smaller group and suggested continuing work in the 
drafting groups. In an attempt to reach a compromise, suggestions were then made 
for the ‘Friends of the Chair’ and drafting groups to meet in parallel and to forward 
only certain key issues to the political level. In the end, Parties decided that most of 
the drafting groups should continue working while a ‘Friends of the Chair’ group 
also meets to discuss some of the key political issues. Some developing countries still 
expressed concerns over the procedure; and the G-77/China stressed that negotiating 
groups would have to be allowed to select their representatives. 
While these discussions took place, the world’s leaders had already begun to arrive 
in Copenhagen to attend a dinner hosted by the Queen of Denmark on Thursday 
evening 17 December 2009. At the conference centre, rumours began circulating 
that some of the leaders planned to meet after the dinner and take their own initiative 
to push the stalling negotiations forward. Ultimately, the end of the Copenhagen 
Conference came to be characterized by parallel negotiations at the expert and po-
litical levels. Late on Friday evening 18 December 2009, US President Obama held 
a quick press conference before his departure back to the US, announcing that agree-
ment had been reached on the Copenhagen Accord. 
The COP plenary convened a couple of hours after Obama’s announcement. COP 
President Lars Locke Rasmussen explained that ‘many hours of intense negotiation’ 
had ‘paid off’ and that he had held consultations with leaders and ‘mobilized support 
for an Accord which has been developed in a representative group of leaders from 
regional groups all around the world’. He said that the document ‘can be a significant 
impulse to our process’ and asked regional groups to consult on whether they want-
ed to join consensus to take the document forward as a COP decision and report 
back to him before the plenary reconvened. He then suspended the COP plenary 
and proceeded to open the CMP plenary, presenting the same document and then 
suspending the CMP meeting. The suspension of the plenary was, however, strong-
ly opposed by representatives of a number of developing countries banging their flags 
and raising points of order. Intense discussions followed, many of them focusing on 
the transparency of the negotiating process. Some of the key interventions, based on 
a transcript of the COP plenary from the UNFCCC webcast, are included in the 
background materials for the simulation exercise.
During the COP and CMP plenary discussions, it transpired that the Copenhagen 
Accord had been negotiated by delegates from Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, 
Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Grenada, India, Lesotho, the Mal-
dives, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Sweden (which held the EU’s rotating Presidency during the COP), Spain 
(the incoming EU Presidency), the United Kingdom and the United States of Amer-
ica. The meeting was chaired by COP President Rasmussen and UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon was also present. Most Parties were willing to support the 
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adoption of the Copenhagen Accord; despite what many recognized as flaws in its 
negotiating process and weaknesses in terms of substance. However, a small number 
of developing countries continued to oppose the Accord. Ultimately, no consensus 
was reached to adopt the Copenhagen Accord as a COP decision. After intense in-
formal consultations in the sidelines of the plenary hall, Parties agreed to ‘take note’ 
of it. The COP and CMP also agreed to extend the mandates of the AWG-LCA and 
AWG-KP until COP 16 and CMP 6 in Cancún at the end of 2010. 
3.1.3 UNFCCC Negotiations after Copenhagen 
Negotiations under the UNFCCC resumed in Bonn, Germany in April 2010 with 
a three-day meeting focusing on procedural issues. Many Parties expressed concern 
over the negotiating process in Copenhagen and stressed the need to have a transpar-
ent and party-driven process at COP 16 and CMP 6 in Cancún. Under the AWG-
LCA, discussions also took place on the role of the Copenhagen Accord and the 
textual basis for the AWG-LCA’s further work. Some countries stressed that political 
guidance from world leaders, as outlined in the Copenhagen Accord, should be re-
flected in further negotiations; while others opposed this on the grounds that the 
Accord had not been adopted by the COP and that its negotiating process had not 
been legitimate. The compromise was to mandate the new AWG-LCA Chair Mar-
garet Mukahanana-Sangarwe (Zimbabwe) to prepare text, under her own responsi-
bility, for the next session – drawing both on the AWG-LCA’s report to COP 15 and 
on work undertaken by the COP on the basis of that report. The Chair noted that 
these conclusions should be read with the understanding that such work refers to all 
work undertaken by the COP, including its decisions. 
During the AWG-LCA’s next session in June 2010, Parties exchanged views on the 
Chair’s draft negotiating text. Based on these discussions, at the end of the June 
meeting, the Chair released a preliminary version of her new draft negotiating text. 
Parties’ reactions to the preliminary version were critical, and many called for sub-
stantial changes. The second official version of the Chair’s negotiating text was then 
released as the	second	iteration	of	the	text	to	facilitate	negotiations	reflecting	the	Chair’s	
sense	of	how	the	text	could	be	advanced	to	further	facilitate	negotiations	among	Parties	
based	 on	 the	 work	 undertaken	 by	 the	 AWG-LCA	 at	 its	 tenth	 session (FCCC/
AWGLCA/2010/8) and will be used to facilitate the simulation exercise.
Negotiations under both AWGs are scheduled to continue in August and October 
2010, before the UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún from 29 November to 
11 December 2010. 
3.2 Additional informal material
Simulation exercise participants were also provided with a brief general overview of 
issues related to rules of procedure under MEAs as well as a transcript of key inter-
ventions during the COP 15 closing plenary in Copenhagen on 19 December 2009.
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4 Official documents
The following additional information was provided to simulation participants.
4.1 Draft negotiating text on a shared vision for long-term cooperative 
action 
This draft negotiating text provided to the simulation exercise participants was based 
on Preamble and Section A of the	second	iteration	of	the	text	to	facilitate	negotiations, 
reflecting AWG-LCA Chair Mukahanana-Sangarwe’s sense of how the text could be 
advanced to further facilitate negotiations among Parties based on the work under-
taken by the AWG-LCA at its tenth session (FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/8). 
Chapter I
The Conference of the Parties,
Pursuant	to the Bali Action Plan (decision 1/CP.13) which recognizes the need for 
long-term cooperative action to enable the full, effective and sustained implementa-
tion of the Convention now, up to and beyond 2012,
Guided	by the ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in its Article 2, 
Recalling the principles, provisions and commitments set forth in the Convention, 
in particular the provisions of Articles 3 and 4,
Reaffirming the political commitment and renewing the global partnership to combat 
climate change and to address existing deficiencies in the implementation of the 
Convention,
Acknowledging the important and ongoing role of the Kyoto Protocol in contributing 
to the ultimate objective of the Convention,
Deeply	concerned	about the findings of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change that the climate system is warming as a 
consequence of human activity,
Recognizing that the adverse effects of climate change are already evident and wide-
spread, particularly in vulnerable regions of the world, and that a delay in prompt 
and sufficient global emission reductions will lead to significant additional cost for 
both mitigation and adaptation, constrain opportunities to achieve lower stabiliza-
tion levels and increase the risk of large-scale, abrupt and irreversible impacts and 
breaches of critical climate thresholds,
Noting the important role of food production systems in mitigation and adaptation 
efforts,
Resolving to safeguard the survival of all nations and peoples threatened by the adverse 
effects of climate change,
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Noting resolution 63/278 of the United Nations General Assembly on ‘Interna-
tional Mother Earth Day’, which acknowledges that the Earth and its ecosystems are 
our home and that in order to achieve a just balance among the economic, social, 
and environmental needs of present and future generations, it is necessary to promote 
harmony with nature and the Earth,
Emphasizing the need for deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions and early and 
urgent undertakings to accelerate and enhance the implementation of the Conven-
tion by all Parties, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,
Acknowledging that the largest share of historical global emissions of greenhouse 
gases has originated in developed countries and that, owing to this historical respon-
sibility, developed country Parties must take the lead in combating climate change 
and the adverse effects thereof [by adopting ambitious, [quantified, legally-binding 
and economy-wide domestic] emission reduction commitments or actions, and by 
providing adequate financial, technological and capacity-building support to devel-
oping country Parties],
Recognizing that developing country Parties are already contributing and will con-
tinue to contribute to a global mitigation effort in accordance with the provisions of 
the Convention and could enhance their mitigation actions depending on the provi-
sion of means of implementation by developed country Parties,
Reaffirming that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the 
first and overriding priorities of developing country Parties, and also that the share 
of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social 
and development needs,
Also	reaffirming that policies and measures to respond to climate change are to be 
implemented in such a way as to minimize adverse effects on other Parties, espe-
cially developing country Parties,
Recalling the special national circumstances of Parties undergoing the process of 
transition to a market economy, as stated in Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Conven-
tion and relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties, and of Parties whose 
special circumstances are recognized by decisions of the Conference of the Parties, 
such as decision 26/CP.7,
Realizing that addressing climate change requires a paradigm shift towards building 
a low-emission society that offers substantial opportunities and ensures continued 
high growth and sustainable development, based on innovative technologies and 
more sustainable production and consumption and lifestyles, while ensuring a just 
transition of the workforce that creates decent work and quality jobs,
Recognizing the need to engage a broad range of stakeholders at global, regional, 
national and local levels, be they governmental, including subnational and local 
government, private business or civil society, including the youth and persons with 
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disability, and that gender equality and the effective participation of women and 
indigenous peoples are important for effective action on all aspects of climate change,
Noting resolution 10/4 of the United Nations Human Rights Council on ‘Human 
rights and climate change’, which recognizes that the adverse effects of climate change 
have a range of direct and indirect implications for the effective enjoyment of human 
rights and that the effects of climate change will be felt most acutely by those seg-
ments of the population that are already vulnerable owing to geography, gender, age, 
indigenous or minority status and disability,
Having	considered the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Coopera-
tive Action under the Convention pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Bali Action Plan,
A. A shared vision for long-term cooperative action
Note	from	the	Chair:	The	choice	of	auxiliary	verbs	such	as	“shall”	and	“should”	in	this	
document	will	need	to	be	made	once	the	form	and	legal	nature	of	the	outcome	to	be	pre-
sented	to	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	at	its	sixteenth	session	has	been	determined.
Agrees	that
1. Parties share a vision for long-term cooperative action that is to guide and 
enhance the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention 
in order to achieve its ultimate objective as set out in its Article 2; this vision 
addresses mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and 
transfer, and capacity-building in a balanced, integrated and comprehensive 
manner, giving equal weight to action on adaptation and mitigation.
2. Deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as doc-
umented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, with a view to reducing global emissions so as to main-
tain the increase in global temperature below [1][1.5][2] degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels, and that Parties should take action to meet this 
objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity[, taking into ac-
count historical responsibilities and equitable access to global atmospheric 
space].
3. Parties should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2020 at the latest, and the peaking of national emissions as soon 
as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking of national emissions 
will be longer in developing country Parties, and bearing in mind that social 
and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and over-
riding priorities of developing country Parties and that a low-emission de-
velopment strategy is indispensable to sustainable development.
4. Parties should collectively reduce global emissions by [50][85][95] per cent 
from 1990 levels by 2050 and should ensure that global emissions continue 
to decline thereafter. Developed country Parties as a group should reduce 
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their greenhouse gas emissions by [[75-85][at least 80-95][more than 95] per 
cent from 1990 levels by 2050] [more than 100 per cent from 1990 levels 
by 2040].
Note	from	the	Chair	on	paragraphs	5–11:	In	response	to	the	call	from	Parties	to	reflect	
all	building	blocks	of	the	Bali	Action	Plan	in	the	part	on	a	shared	vision	for	long-term	
cooperative	action,	the	Chair	has	included	paragraphs	5–11	below	as	an	initial	attempt	
to	express	a	shared	vision	for	the	different	elements.
5. Adaptation is a challenge faced by all Parties and that enhanced action and 
international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to enable and 
support the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulner-
ability and building resilience in developing countries, taking into account 
the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particu-
larly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially the least 
developed countries and small island developing States, and further taking 
into account the needs of countries in Africa affected by drought, desertifica-
tion and floods.
6. Enhanced action on adaptation should be undertaken in accordance with 
the Convention, follow a country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and 
fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, 
communities and ecosystems, and be based on and guided by the best avail-
able science, and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, with a view to inte-
grating adaptation into relevant social, economic and environmental policies 
and actions, where appropriate.
7. Addressing the impact of the implementation of response measures is a chal-
lenge faced by all Parties, in particular developing country Parties, and that 
enhanced action and international cooperation on response measures is ur-
gently required to enhance knowledge and understanding of the matter and 
to reduce vulnerability and build resilience in affected countries.
8. The full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention requires 
long- term national and international cooperative efforts to accelerate re-
search and development, demonstration, deployment, diffusion and transfer 
of environmentally sound technologies and know-how, in particular to de-
veloping country Parties.
9. In order to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention, all Parties 
should cooperate, consistent with international obligations, through effective 
mechanisms, enhanced means, appropriate enabling environments and the 
removal of obstacles, and ensure the provision of technological support to 
developing country Parties to enable action on mitigation and adaptation.
10. In order to achieve the full, effective and sustained implementation of the 
Convention [and in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and trans-
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parency on implementation], developed countries shall provide new, addi-
tional, adequate, predictable and sustained financial resources. [Developed 
countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars]
[Developed countries shall make assessed contributions of 1.5 per cent of the 
GDP of those countries] a year by 2020 to support enhanced action on 
mitigation and adaptation, technology development and transfer, and capac-
ity-building in developing countries.
11. Capacity-building is cross-cutting in nature and essential to enable develop-
ing country Parties to participate fully in, and to implement effectively their 
commitments under, the Convention.
Note	from	the	Chair:	The	section	on	a	shared	vision	for	long-term	cooperative	action	of	
the	report	of	the	AWG-LCA	presented	to	the	COP	at	its	fifteenth	session	contained	a	place	
holder	for	a	‘provision	on	trade	measures	(reference	to	Article	3,	paragraph	5,	of	the	Con-
vention)’	 to	be	elaborated.	Paragraph	12	below	provides	 text	 to	 this	end,	drawn	from	
Article	3,	paragraph	5,	of	the	Convention.	Specific	text	on	this	subject	matter	can	also	be	
found	in	chapter	VII	(economic	and	social	consequences	of	response	measures)	and	chap-
ter	IX	(cooperative	sectoral	approaches	and	sector-specific	actions	in	agriculture)	of	this	
document.19
12. The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open interna-
tional economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and 
development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus 
enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures 
taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.
Sections	B	to	G	of	Chapter	I	(Shared	Vision)	in	the	AWG-LCA’s	Chair’s	draft	negotiating	
text	are	provided	in	section	IV	of	these	materials.	
4.2 UNFCCC Draft Rules of Procedure
Participants were also provided with a copy of the UNFCCC draft rules of procedure 
(FCCC/CP/1996/2, 22 May 1996) with the following explanatory note: 20
Under the UNFCCC, Article 7.2, in tandem with Article 7.3, mandated COP 1 to 
agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure for itself and for any sub-
sidiary bodies. The rules of procedure to be adopted were drafted in the run-up to 
COP 1. They broadly mirrored the rules used in the UN General Assembly and in 
other MEAs. The draft rules of procedure could not be adopted at COP 1 due to 
19 Not included in the materials of this negotiation simulation exercise.
20 Introductory remarks by Kati Kulovesi, also using Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The	Interna-
tional	Climate	Change	Regime.	A	Guide	to	Rules,	Institutions	and	Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 432–434.
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disagreement relating to the decision-making procedures set out in draft Rule 42, 
including the specified voting majorities required for adoption of particular deci-
sions. 
In the absence of consensus, the draft Rules of Procedure have been “applied” rather 
than “adopted” at all subsequent COP sessions, with the exception of the disputed 
draft Rule 42. Successive COP Presidents have conducted informal consultations to 
try to break the deadlock, but to no avail. Great importance was attached to resolv-
ing this issue during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, given that, in the absence of 
any agreed majority voting rule for the adoption of protocols, the Protocol would 
have to be adopted by consensus. Since the successful adoption of the Kyoto Proto-
col by consensus, however, interest in securing formal adoption of the rules has di-
minished and consultations of COP Presidents on this issue in recent years have been 
largely perfunctory or have not taken place at all. The same draft Rules of Procedure 
have been applied under the CMP. This is due to Article 13.5 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
according to which the CMP shall apply the Rules of Procedure of the Convention 
mutatis	mutandis, unless otherwise decided by the CMP.
At COP 15 in Copenhagen, one Party opposed the proposal in the opening plenary 
to continue to apply the draft rules of procedure, stressing the need to adopt them 
to enable majority decisions. However, no progress was made concerning the Rules 
of Procedure in Copenhagen. After a small number of countries prevented the adop-
tion of the Copenhagen Accord by consensus, some commentators have identified 
the need to reform the working methods and move away from the consensus require-
ment. Any such reform would, however, need to be adopted by consensus. 
5  Evaluation
5.1 Unfolding of the exercise 
Thirty-two course participants engaged in the negotiation simulation exercise. Of 
those participants, one played the role of COP President, one played the role of 
Friends of the Chair Co-Facilitator, four played the role of Contact Group Co-Chairs 
and three played the role of the UNFCCC Secretariat (one in each break out group). 
The remaining players represented UNFCCC Parties.The general scenario note and 
confidential individual instructions were distributed to participants during the first 
week of the course. As far as possible the individual roles were distributed so that 
participants from UNFCCC Annex I countries played the role of a non-Annex I 
country, and vice versa. Participants were asked to review the documents, to keep 
their individual instructions confidential and to liaise with like-minded countries to 
coordinate positions and interventions. While the course organizers had pre-selected 
a participant to play the role of COP President, participants were asked to coordinate 
among themselves to select the Contact Group Co-Chairs.
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The negotiation simulation began on Monday 23 August at 09h00, with one of the 
simulation coordinators playing the role of the AWG-LCA Chair, delivering the re-
port of that group to the UNFCCC COP-16 plenary. The pre-selected COP Presi-
dent then took over proceedings according to a general scenario, speaking notes and 
suggested timeframe for the negotiations. These documents were only provided as 
guidance, however, and it is important to note that the COP President and other 
participants were fully in charge of the conduct of negotiations. The simulation co-
ordinators played an observer role, never intervened in plenary, and intervened only 
occasionally in the Contact Groups. Some additional instructions and guidance were 
given to players informally outside of the main negotiation settings. This guidance 
also was very limited, however, and participants had great autonomy in playing out 
their roles.
Spontaneous coordination by participants prior to the negotiation simulation led to 
quick opening statements on behalf of the regional groups. Nomination and election 
of the Contact Group Co-Chairs also proceeded quickly. Having fast-tracked these 
issues in the beginning of the first session, reality quickly set in when the group be-
came bogged down in discussions on logistical issues (room allocation, time manage-
ment, etc.). As is often the case in real negotiations these procedural discussions ul-
timately took as much of the first session as the substantive discussions.
The bulk of the negotiation simulation exercise took place in the three separate 
groups, viz. a Friends of the Chair Group and two Contact Groups on Text for a 
shared vision for long-term cooperative action and legal form of the outcome, re-
spectively. These formal negotiation sessions were supplemented by informal consul-
tations during the lunch and coffee breaks, as well as by an impromptu regional 
coordination meeting in the evening of Monday 23August, which was initiated by 
the participants themselves.
On the morning of the second and final day of negotiations some participants were 
given additional instructions from ‘their capitals’, to move the simulation forward. 
Despite these new instructions, participants took several more hours to come to an 
agreement in the three groups. Participants then re-convened for a closing plenary 
in the late afternoon of Tuesday 24 August, which proceeded very smoothly. This was 
made possible again through additional instructions from ‘capitals’. Often actual 
negotiations in closing plenaries can be extremely protracted, with crunch issues only 
being agreed on in the small hours of the morning, if at all. 
5.2  Feedback session
A feedback session on the negotiation simulation exercise was conducted two days 
after the simulation itself. In previous courses this feedback session had been held 
directly after the course. Due to the intense nature of the two-day negotiation simu-
lation the simulation coordinators and participants agreed that this session could be 
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held a couple of days later. Despite this time lag the discussions in the feedback ses-
sion were very active, with members from each Contact Group providing views and 
comments. 
Key issues raised during the feedback session included:
• a perceived need for a negotiation primer;
• a perceived need for a primer on regional coordination; and
• a perceived need for additional background on substantive / technical issues.
Many participants felt that a ‘negotiation primer’ would have been useful before the 
simulation exercise. While some participants had previous experience in multilateral 
negotiations, others were new to the process and would have appreciated an intro-
ductory session or sessions on general negotiating skills, making interventions in 
plenary / contact group, drafting decision texts, and so forth.
Some participants felt that the conduct of regional negotiation blocs was not en-
tirely clear to all participants. The exercise was originally designed to include an ele-
ment of coordination among like-minded countries with similar positions. This 
evolved during the course of negotiations as participants spontaneously organized 
themselves into regional groupings, and negotiated as and on behalf of the European 
Union and the G-77/China. This created something of an additional challenge – and 
also some confusion when one participant playing an EU country had instructions 
which did not match those of other EU states. This issue was eventually resolved by 
providing additional instructions from ‘capital’ to that participant. Nevertheless, it 
is important to stress that the individual instructions did not reflect the actual posi-
tions or views of any specific country. In subsequent exercises, hypothetical country 
names could be considered alongside the hypothetical country positions. In addition, 
participants felt that they would benefit from a session outlining the role, coordina-
tion and conduct in negotiations of specific regional blocs. This is something which 
could be included in the negotiation primer session in future courses.
Some participants also felt that they did not have the required substantive or techni-
cal background to engage properly in the negotiation simulation. They would have 
benefited from a more in-depth brief on the issues under negotiation. This was espe-
cially the case in Group C, which focused on the legal form of the AWG-LCA’s 
outcome. The distinction between the two separate processes under the LCA and KP 
tracks caused some confusion, as did the distinction between adopting a non-binding 
COP/MOP decision, and a legally-binding Protocol as an Annex to a COP/MOP 
decision. Some participants enjoyed this challenge, however, which also helped to 
illustrate the complex technical and procedural issues faced by negotiators of multi-
lateral environmental agreements.
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5.3 Overall assessment 
In previous years, a specific questionnaire on the negotiation simulation exercise had 
been circulated. Due to difficulties with receiving answers to this separate question-
naire the course organizers felt that feedback should be given as part of the overall 
course feedback, which included a segment on the active participation sessions. On 
the basis of this feedback participants viewed the exercise as very relevant (4.7 on a 
scale of 1 to 5) and considered the quality of the exercise to be good (4.4 on a scale 
of 1 to 5).

